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WAR AND POLICY

MR. SPENSER WILKINSON'S WORKS

The Nation's Awakening

Lessons of the War

The Brain of an Army

The Volunteers and the National Defence

The Command of the Sea and the Brain of the Navy

Imperial Defence

By SIR CHARLES DILKE and SPENSER WILKINSON

WAR AND POLICY

ESSAYS

BY SPENSER WILKINSON

The specialty of rule hath been neglected.
Troilus and Cressida, I, iii.



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TO MY WIFE

Preface

WHEN I was a boy my father, partly by precept but much more by example, taught me three lessons: to tell the truth, not to be afraid of saying what I thought, and to live for the public good. The public good in those days was in charge of the Liberal party, and the ideal public man whom I was brought up to revere was John Bright. In 1874 I happened to read an Austrian statistical pamphlet comparing the strength of the various European armies. It seemed to me remarkable that the British army should be only about a tenth of the size of the army kept by a Continental State of the same population. This was a fact of which it seemed desirable to get to know the explanation. But statistics, though they suggest questions, seldom give the answers. They require to be interpreted. An army is an instrument for war, and it was therefore necessary for my purpose to find out the meaning and nature of war. The investigation cost me many years of labour. It took me away from politics to camps, ranges, and manœuvre grounds, from the study of parliamentary debates and public

speeches to that of tactics, strategy, and military history. But after many years and a long circuit it brought me back, with a new point of view, to British public affairs, for it seemed that war is a form of political action, the only means by which a nation can assert against challenge its conception of right. British public life and English literature, under the influence of that Liberalism of which Bright was the great exponent, were pervaded by a false and distorted view of war, and regarded the exertion of force in support of right, not as something that might be necessary and for which the nation ought to be prepared, but as something altogether wrong. The current theories of public affairs were of no use to me. I had to begin again at the beginning and to build up for myself a view of national existence and national policy. Six years ago I sketched my conclusions as well as I could in a volume entitled *The Great Alternative: a Plea for a National Policy,* and a year or two later attempted a simpler if more systematic exposition in a second volume entitled *The Nation's Awakening: Essays Towards a British Policy.*

The essays here collected represent a portion of ten years' work in the search for, and the application of, principles which might serve as guides in the conduct of British national and Imperial affairs. If war is a fact of human life which cannot be neglected, no theory of the State or of British affairs which does not take account of it can safely be trusted. I believe that the first and last object in any policy

must be the right, that a State which knowingly departs from justice is preparing its own downfall, and that injustice due to ignorance is hardly less dangerous. But the right can too often be maintained only by force, and the great test of character for nations as for men arises when they are confronted by the dilemma which requires them either to risk their existence in a conflict for the support of what they believe to be right, or to commit moral suicide by acquiescence in what they know to be wrong. A true view of international relations must set out from the natural history of war. A systematic treatise on this subject will hardly be produced except by a student enjoying the ample opportunities of concentration afforded by unlimited leisure. The first of the following essays, however, may perhaps contribute something that may be useful to such a student. It was written in 1894 and is now published for the first time. The subsequent historical papers are attempts to get at the permanent lessons of the events or careers of which they treat. I have added under the title "The Art of War" a group of essays of which the purpose is to call attention to those modern methods of study which it is to be feared have never found a home in the British army. If these first two sections should convey an idea of the way in which war should be regarded they will have fulfilled their purpose. The rest of the volume is the application of the view of war thus obtained to some of the affairs of the British nation. In the third section are collected materials for a

judgment on questions which those who have, since 1895, had charge of the nation's affairs ought to have answered, though I cannot convince myself that our official politicians have properly faced them. The fourth section is a part of the effort to persuade the people of this country to set their defences in order. In the last section, which treats of the South African War—unsystematically, as in this matter the time for history has not yet come—are brought out the consequences of that neglect to think about war during peace which is, in my judgment, the cardinal sin of the British statesmen of our time.

The various essays were written each for a specific occasion—the review of a book, or the discussion of some question of the moment. If any reader should find that, taken together, they make a whole, he might, perhaps, be willing to see in that unity some confirmation of the truth of the hypothesis which they are so many attempts to illustrate.

I am indebted for kind permission to reprint essays, which first appeared under their auspices, to the Editors of the *United Service Magazine,* the *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution,* the *Contemporary Review,* the *Nineteenth Century,* the *Spectator,* the *New Review,* the *National Review,* the *Cornhill Magazine,* the *Anglo-Saxon Review,* and the *Morning Post.* To some of these gentlemen my debt is far greater; from Mr. Hutton, while he was still among us conducting the *Spectator,* I received invalu-

able encouragement, and from Mr. L. J. Maxse a number of hardly less valuable suggestions.

The essays have all been revised, but no attempt has been made to bring them up to date; on the contrary, they are meant to be read with the dates at which they were written.

I have changed the titles of Papers XX. and XXIII., and, in the essay on the "Defence of London," have seen reason to attribute to Sir John Ardagh work which, when the paper first appeared, I supposed to be Sir Edward Hamley's. In the revision I have had the benefit of the critical judgment of Sir Charles Dilke, with whom to have discussed questions of war and policy during ten eventful years has been a liberal education.

For the Index I have to thank the goodwill of my friend and colleague on the Morning *Post,* Mr. J. Cassels.

Sept. 10*th,* 1900.

CONTENTS

PAGE.

PREFACE vii

I.—MILITARY HISTORY.

CHAPTER.

I. THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 3

II. GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS 59

III. VALMY 71

IV. SCHARNHORST 86

V. THE ARCHDUKE CHARLES 100

VI. A FORGOTTEN WAR 106

VII. THE ARCHDUKE ALBRECHT 112

VIII. THE DEFENCE OF PLEVNA 119

IX. NELSON 126

II.—THE ART OF WAR.

X. MILITARY LITERATURE 141

XI. EVOLUTION NOT REVOLUTION IN MODERN WARFARE 156

XII. MOLTKE'S TACTICAL PROBLEMS 170

XIII. THE CHARACTER OF MODERN WAR . . . 176

CONTENTS

III.—PROBLEMS OF POLICY.

CHAPTER.		PAGE.
XIV.	The Khyber Pass	185
XV.	Chitral	200
XVI.	Russia's Strength	216
XVII.	Constantinople	228
XVIII.	Helpless Europe	241

IV.—NATIONAL DEFENCE.

XIX.	The Command of an Army: a Conversation	259
XX.	The Civilian Minister	274
XXI.	Trifling with National Defence	285
XXII.	The Defence of London	301
XXIII.	An Enquiry Concerning the Nation and the Navy	315
XXIV.	The Command of the Sea and British Policy	327

V.—THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR.

XXV.	Military Aspect of the Crisis	347
XXVI.	Moral Factors in the War	360
XXVII.	On the Art of Going to War	367
XXVIII.	War and Government	391
XXIX.	Surprise in War	404
XXX.	The American Civil War and the War in South Africa	419

SKETCH MAPS

		TO FACE PAGE
I. and II.	To illustrate the Campaign of Valmy . .	84
III.	To illustrate the Campaign in Denmark .	110
IV.	To illustrate the Campaign of 1866 in Italy	118
V.	To illustrate the Russo-Turkish War .	124
VI.	To illustrate the American Civil War .	420

I

Military History

The American Civil War

I

THE NATURAL HISTORY OF WAR

THE separation of military from political history corresponds to a convenient division of labour, for the accident of experience that qualifies the same writer to deal with both departments is not common. Yet this separation is attended with grave disadvantages. It divorces in thought things which in reality and by nature go together. War is political action. It arises from political conditions, it ends in political conditions. The course of the military action is to a great extent determined by the state of things in the political world at the time of its origin, and the political conditions in turn are modified by the military events. Even when armies and fleets are not employed, their existence and the possibility of their use constantly influence the action of governments. They are instruments of statecraft, and their use cannot be fully understood without an insight into the nature, not only of the instruments, but also of the power by which they are wielded, and of the purposes which they serve.

The military historian is apt to dwell upon technical matters; he seeks illustrations of the principles of strategy and of tactics; he traces the effect upon marches and battles

of improvements in the material conditions of life, and of the weapons perfected by the growth of the mechanical arts. The political writer, wishing to avoid the professional part of war, is usually content to take for granted the victories and defeats, to assume that war once present on the scene must be allowed to run its course, and that policy during that time is suspended. Neither of these views can give a true picture, for neither of them includes the whole subject, of which the essential part is to be found precisely in the region that lies between them, and that they both neglect. War is a relation between States, and to understand it properly we must start from the natural history of States.

The changes which have made the great wars of the nineteenth century so different from the wars of earlier times are the consequences of modifications in the nature of the belligerent powers, and it is from the transformations of the political world rather than from technical improvements, vast though these have been, that we must seek the explanation of the difference between the wars of Marlborough and Frederick and those of Napoleon and William I.

Our own age is sometimes described as that of democracy. The word is perhaps not happily chosen, for in more than one of the countries of Europe our time has been marked by a vigorous revival of the principles and the practice of monarchical government. Possibly the phrase representative government taken in its wider sense, may be more useful for our purpose; for the fundamental conception of the modern political world is that the State is a community, and that the government is charged with the interests of that community. The government represents and acts for the nation; it has no interests of its own apart from those of the nation. Even in the monarchical States the king or emperor of to-day conceives himself to be the representative of the national interests and the exponent of the national will; a difference of purpose between the government and

the nation appears to the contemporary mind, if not inconceivable, at any rate quite abnormal. The State, moreover, is no longer composed of a select few or of certain privileged classes; in theory, at least, it includes the whole population. In these two points is summed up the contrast between the State of to-day and the State of the earlier half of the last century. There is no longer a dynastic or family interest separable from that of the nation; and the nation is a community in which membership is shared by the whole population of the country. While the State has thus acquired a homogeneous character such as it never before possessed, the common interests are brought home to the consciousness of all by a thousand means before unknown: the press, the railway, and the telegraph make the relation between the government and those for whom it acts, as well as between the several portions of the country, incomparably closer and more immediate than at any previous period. Every note of the policy of a modern government causes the vibration of a multitude of chords, reacting upon its tone; and the constant interaction between government and that indefinable something which we call public opinion is to-day a condition of existence for every political community.

It follows that every government is, in the long run, in fact if not in mechanical arrangements, that which the democratic theory declares that it should be—representative. Governments do not undertake and carry out policies that awaken no response in the communities behind them. But where a government has happily divined the feelings and the desires of its supporting population, the action which it undertakes acquires an energy and a consistency not possible in the days when the State was no more than the instrument of a king's wishes. A community of thirty or forty millions of persons is not lightly nor easily set in motion; but when it moves it has the momentum of an avalanche.

Between States of this description wars are not extemporised. A government controlling the resources of a great nation, and impelled or restrained by the sentiments, passions, and ideas of such a vast community does not and cannot pursue in its relations with other governments of the same kind the trivial objects of personal or dynastic satisfaction. It necessarily looks to the national interests and aspirations, and pursues their realization with a persistence and an energy without parallel in the history of bygone centuries. Resistance to the policy of an eighteenth-century king might lead to the use of his small army of paid soldiers. Resistance to the policy of a great modern nation must sooner or later bring into action to overcome it the whole of the resources over which that nation has control.

A modern nation is too vast and too complex a mass to be easily stirred. But once roused to action it represents a terrific force, which nothing short of a similar mass moved by a like impulse can effectually resist. The workings of forces of this kind resemble those of the elemental powers of nature, the storm, the flood, and the earthquake. Thus it comes about that the great distinctive character of modern wars is a kind of inevitability which pervades them from beginning to end, and gives to their results something of the character which in superstitious ages was assigned to the decrees of fate.

During the pause that intervened between the earlier and the later wars of the French Revolution, one of the coolest and most competent observers, the Hanoverian Major Scharnhorst, endeavoured to trace the causes of the French successes. He found it to be that whereas the allies, never in entire accord as to their purpose, had each of them employed but a fraction of its army to oppose the designs of the revolutionary power, the French Government wielded the prodigious resources of a whole nation and was impelled by the strongest passions that ever stirred a population.

When this nation in arms found in Buonaparte a leader able to give intelligent and consistent direction to its action the forces available were strong enough to strike down with what seemed irresistible blows everything that the old States of the Continent could array in opposition. Napoleon's warfare in his earlier campaigns received the stamp of inexorable logic, not merely from his own energy and intelligence, but because of the violence and the simplicity of the passions of which he was the agent, and the superabundance of force which those passions placed at his disposal.

Writers on strategy are, rightly enough, apt to discuss the operations of war as matters of pure reason. But we should never forget that war is fighting, and that fighting without passion is outside the range of human experience.

A nation will not throw itself into a fight unless it is deeply moved; and it will not be aroused except by a cause profoundly affecting the sentiments or the interests of the mass of its people. The less the co-operation of the masses is expected, the more readily will the Government undertake a war; and for this reason our own country, where war has never made demands upon the whole population, except in the shape of an increase of taxation, is perhaps at the present day the one where war is most lightly thought of and its terrible earnestness least appreciated. Yet a conflict with any of the Powers that have organized their whole population for war could not be carried on by Great Britain without sacrifices both of person and of property from all classes of the community far greater and far more painful than it is possible for our every-day experience to enable us to realize.

The great characteristic of modern war is the inevitability that pervades it. War between modern States will be put off, postponed, and evaded as long as possible. It will break out only in consequence of a complete conviction upon one side or the other that an absolute conflict of pur-

poses has arisen, and that it can be resolved only by the appeal to arms. When this appeal is made, the action will follow the lines laid down by natural conditions. Great forces move like water down a hill; they find the shortest way; they strike where their blows will be most effective; and victory is to the strongest. Not that an army directs itself, nor that if the will and the force are there the question of management may be neglected. But given a national determination to fight and to win, the national energies will sooner or later find their way into the right channels.

The main purpose of the present inquiry is to illustrate from a concrete example the inevitability which has here been asserted to be the characteristic mark of modern international conflicts. The civil war in the United States of America was the greatest conflict of our times in regard to the number of the combatants, the area of the theatre of war, the questions of principle which it involved, and the completeness of the decision which they received. It rent asunder for a time the most peaceful community in the world, and brought into arms a nation to which the conception of the State as a military and militant community was peculiarly repugnant. Yet, in these circumstances, apparently so unfavourable to the development of a war, the dominant note of inherent necessity marks alike the causes, the origin, and the course of the whole conflict.

II

THE RISE OF THE UNITED STATES

The English colonies in North America first appeared as important actors on the world's stage upon the eve of the Seven Years' War. At that time there were thirteen colonies occupying the narrow strip of land between the

Atlantic and the Appalachian or Alleghany Mountains. Great Britain had no other possessions on the North American continent, except the vast but remote region of Hudson's Bay. The southern mainland, from its isthmus to what is now California, and to the eastern border of Texas, as well as the peninsula and the "backland" of Florida, belonged to Spain. France had a small colony at the mouth of the Mississippi, and a large and prosperous one along the St. Lawrence, stretching up to the great lakes. Her pioneers had tracked along the Ohio and the Mississippi, and she claimed the whole vast basin of these rivers as her sphere of influence. The English colonists, too, had their doctrine of "backland," and regarded the Ohio valley as their own legitimate heritage. The British Government upheld this view, and with its approval the colonists tried to expel the French from their new posts near the headwaters of the Ohio. Out of this conflict arose the Seven Years' War, memorable to Europe because it began with the great exchange of parts by which Austria left the English alliance for the French, and Prussia the French alliance for the English; memorable to America because this redistribution of partnership divided the energies of France, and thereby helped the English to victory at sea, with its corollaries of the conquest of Canada and the acquisition at the peace of all the French sphere of influence as far east as the Mississippi. During the war the colonists fought side by side with British troops, not without friction; they learned their own fighting powers; they discovered a general of their own, and had opportunities of observing the fallibility not uncommon among the British generals of that day.

Even at that time the relations between the colonies and England left something to be desired. In 1754, when the war, though not yet begun, was seen to be coming, the home Government had suggested that the colonies should form "a union and confederation with each other" for their

defence; but the scheme which in consequence Franklin propounded to a congress at Albany was rejected by the King's Ministers as too democratic, and by the colonists as leaving too much scope for the royal prerogative. Here was a seed of discord which struck root during the war, and grew up after its close. The British Government seems to have taken no reasonable means and no sufficient pains to understand the situation and temper of the colonists, and to have been unable until too late to appreciate the issue. Thus discontent became revolution, and the colonies having declared themselves independent, sought and obtained the alliance of France. Then was seen the result of England's desertion of Prussia in the Seven Years' War. She had to face France and Spain as well as her own colonies, and was without ally. The loss of the colonies was due, in a military sense, as need hardly be repeated after Captain Mahan's exposition, to the fact that England had not, when the war with France and Spain began, that command of the sea which consists in a naval force ready for action and decidedly superior to that of the enemy. A power that is forced by the relative strength of the fleets to fight on the defensive at sea can never count upon success in a land war carried on beyond the sea of which the possession is contested. But in a larger sense the loss of the colonies must be attributed to the want of continuity in England's European policy, which left her without allies when an ally would have been invaluable.

The war of independence gave the colonists a national consciousness. They already had all the elements of a nation. They were all substantially English, for even New York and New Jersey, originally settled by the Dutch, had been English colonies for a whole century before the Declaration of Independence. Their forms of government, in spite of great differences of detail, were all of much the same pattern. Each of them had its governor, wielding the

executive power; its select council; and its representative assembly or legislature. In each of them local administration was the affair of the parish, the township, or the county. They all had the English common law. The only change in these institutions that was required by the revolution was to replace the hereditary or appointed governor by an elected governor, or by an elected committee.

By their social, religious, and economical conditions the colonies were divided into two groups according as they were to the North or to the South of the boundary line between Pennsylvania and Maryland. In the Southern colonies the Anglican Church was established; in the Northern ones the spirit and traditions of Puritanism prevailed. The Southern States were almost exclusively given to agriculture, the Northern States devoted much energy to trade and shipping. In the South slaves were numerous; in the North they were few. This diversity of conditions, however, did not prevent the rise of a national feeling. The difficulty was to find the means of expressing this feeling in action, to create the institutions as well as the sentiments of a nation.

In 1775, when active resistance to England began, the conventions or irregular assemblies of the several States sent to Philadelphia delegates who formed a diplomatic body or Congress to discuss the common interests. This body very soon assumed the general direction of affairs. It adopted the Declaration of Independence (July 4th, 1776), and drew up Articles of Confederation which with much delay were ratified by all the States. It negotiated the peace with England, and it settled one very important branch of the national business. The separation from England left the colonies in possession of the country to the west of the Alleghanies as far as the Mississippi. Upon portions of this area several of the States had conflicting claims. The Congress of the Confederation was able to obtain the ces-

sion to itself of all the claims to territory between the Ohio and the Mississippi, "to be disposed of for the common benefit of the United States," and "to be settled and formed into distinct republican States, which shall become members of the Federal Union." The Congress determined that in these territories representative legislatures should be organized so soon as there should be population enough to sustain them, and adopted in 1787 an ordinance providing that in the area between the Ohio and the Mississippi slavery should not be admissible. This ordinance was almost the last act of the Confederation, of which, as soon as the peace with Great Britain was concluded, the unsatisfactory nature began to be manifest.

The Congress had never been much more than a body of diplomatists. It had no power to levy taxes, and depended for supplies upon the money voted to it by the several States. It had no authority to regulate trade, and therefore could not execute commercial treaties. It had no power to maintain an army, and no means whatever of enforcing its decisions either upon States or upon individuals. In short, it lacked the chief attribute of a government, the ability to assert its will. That a government was indispensable was evident, and eventually, in 1787, Congress resolved that a convention of delegates from all the States should be held for the purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation. The Convention met at Philadelphia, and sat from May to September, 1787. Its first resolution was, "That a national Government ought to be established consisting of a supreme legislature, executive, and judiciary," and it was soon afterwards resolved, "That no treaty or treaties among the whole or part of the States, as separate sovereignties, would be sufficient." This was pretty nearly all that commanded universal assent.

Upon almost every question of less generality there were strong differences of opinion. Some parties were for abol-

ishing the State governments and having a single central government; others regarded the States as all-important, and wished to restrict the powers of the Federal government to an indispensable minimum. The large States wished representation in the Federal legislature to be proportionate to population; the small ones wished the States to have equal representation. The agricultural States wished the Federal government to have powers over trade; the trading States dissented. The free States—at this time all those to the north of Maryland except New York and New Jersey, which abolished slavery a few years later—wished, in the distribution of taxation according to population, to have the slaves counted among the population; the slave States naturally objected. The New England States wished to give to the new government the power to legislate for the protection of shipping; the slave States were anxious that it should not be allowed to prohibit the slave trade. Upon each of these questions a compromise was reached. It was agreed that the Federal government should have powers thought to be ample, but that all powers not explicitly granted should be reserved to the States. The balance between large and small States was arranged by forming the legislature into a congress of two houses, in one of which, the Senate, all the States should be equally represented, while in the House of Representatives each State should have members in number proportionate to its population. For the purpose of apportioning both representatives and direct taxation, it was settled that slaves should be counted at three-fifths of their numbers. Congress was to have power to legislate for navigation, but was not to prohibit the slave trade until twenty years after the adoption of the Constitution. It was given the power to regulate trade with foreign nations and to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises.

These were the settlements on the principal points of con-

troversy. The general framework of the scheme was that to which the colonists had been accustomed. The colonial governor, clothed with the executive power, appears as the President, elected for four years, and invested with a suspensory veto on legislation and with the whole executive power, subject only as regards the making of treaties and the appointment of the higher public officers to the approval of the Senate. His oath of office bound him to maintain, protect, and defend the Constitution. Treason against the United States was to consist only in taking arms against them or in joining with and aiding their enemies.

III

THE CONTRASTS WITHIN THE UNION

The Constitution of the United States which came into force in 1789 was thus a compromise veiling without diminishing the antagonisms of interest and of opinion which it covered. The social and political contrasts grew in a confused medley for half a century. Then the dominant discord was suddenly revealed and lesser differences quickly grouped themselves around it, until at last the community was rent asunder in the violent explosion of the secession. In order to understand the depth of the schism and the force of the conflict which it involved, it is necessary to examine the nature and to trace the growth of the differences which at last proved irreconcilable by any milder method than civil war.

Almost from the first two opposite opinions were held as to the interpretation of the Constitution in regard to what was perhaps the cardinal point, the relation between the

several States and the central Government. Was "the United States" the name of a single nation formed of provinces having each its own local government but indissolubly joined in one whole, or was it a mere confederacy of independent States each of which could terminate the partnership at will? Both views could not be true, but each of them had its adherents. A political theory is very often little more than the dress in which specific purpose is presented to the popular ear. The political leader intent upon the defence of a particular interest seeks a theory which will serve as the major premiss from which to infer the conclusion to which he is committed. The doctrine is then but the cloak of the desires which for the time being it seems to cover. It was as a cloak for specific interests that the separatist interpretation of the Constitution was first propounded. The war, which began in 1812, between the United States and Great Britain, was ruinous to the shipping trade and detrimental to the commercial prosperity of the New England States. In the winter of 1814-15 a convention of delegates from these States met at Hartford to protest against the war. They declared that the Constitution had been violated by the executive, and that "States which have no common umpire must be their own judges and execute their own decisions." This was the full-blown theory of secession, that the several States were independent and could withdraw from the Union at their discretion. At the time the enunciation of this doctrine had no practical consequences, for the peace had in fact been signed in Europe before the convention passed its resolutions, and the grievance being thus removed the argument by which it was to be attacked lost its significance. But the dogma thus propounded was at a later time to become a dangerous weapon in other hands.

The first result of the revolution had been to widen the rift between the already divergent societies of North and

South. For while in Virginia and most of the Southern States the gentry had been the leaders in the national movement and thereby established their primacy in society, the Northern gentry with few exceptions had remained loyal to the British cause, and had, during the eight years' struggle, experienced the fate of the minority in a revolution—they had disappeared from the country. The broad difference between the commercial and democratic life of the North and the agricultural and aristocratic cast of Southern society was in this way rapidly and greatly increased. Economic conditions very soon came with irresistible force to enlarge the rift into a great gulf. The importation of slaves into the United States was prohibited in 1808, in accordance with the provision on that subject made in the Constitution. But the status of slavery was not touched. The slave in the Southern States had acquired a new value from the introduction of the cotton gin, invented some years before, and from the improvement of spinning and weaving machinery in England. During the early years of the nineteenth century a vast cotton agriculture grew up in the Southern States, where the climate was suitable and where the negro slaves furnished labour in what seemed the most convenient form. So great became the demand for slaves that, as import from abroad was no longer permitted, it became the practice to buy them in those States of the Union where cotton was not grown, but where slavery was legal. These became slave-breeding States, supplying labour to the cotton and tobacco growing districts further south. Steam navigation, while it facilitated the export of cotton, served also to quicken the passage of emigrants from Europe. The new settlers, being for the most part workmen, avoided the slave States, where labour was considered degrading, and spread themselves over the free States of the North and the vast open regions of the North-west.

Thus there developed within the Union two distinct

societies. In the South a small number of landlords possessed vast estates cultivated by slave labour, and were surrounded by a great clientèle of white dependants, without property, with all the pride of free men and all the vices of a pauper population prohibited by social conditions from productive work. In the North at the same time grew up a great industrial and agricultural community based upon personal liberty and equality, and recognising in all its institutions the dignity of labour.

The two systems in proportion as they grew side by side necessarily became more and more hostile. The appearance of common political institutions only concealed an incompatibility which could not but in the long run lead to inevitable conflict. For the representative institutions, which in theory were alike in both systems, lent themselves to quite distinct political growths. In order to appreciate the difference it is necessary to look at representative government from an American point of view. According to an American definition, a political party is an association of citizens holding like opinions, and aiming at the control of the will and force of the State in accordance with their opinions. Its fundamental mark, its main purpose, is to capture and hold for its members the executive and legislative organs of the State, and, this effected, the party will use the executive and legislative powers in the promotion of its own wishes.[1] This conception soon led the Americans to a complete organization of party, in which individual wishes were thoroughly disciplined in obedience to the appointed managers. The great contest was for the Presidency, the seat of the executive power. In preparation for this conflict each party by its delegates settled first of all its platform, that is, the definition of the object for the furtherance

[1] See the chapter on "Political Parties" in *Politics, an Introduction to the Study of Comparative Constitutional Law*, by W. W. Crane and Bernard Moses. New York: G. P. Putnam & Sons, 1884.

of which the executive power, if obtained, was to be employed, and then selected as the party candidate the person who by experimental votings was found to command the greatest favour or to excite the least opposition within the party. In support of this candidate at the ensuing official election, the votes of the entire party were then unhesitatingly given. It may be noted in passing, as indeed it has been often remarked, that this method, though the logical outcome of the system, leads to a result hardly contemplated by those European communities in which that system was first developed. It gives the executive power not to the strongest character and the wisest head, but to the candidate who concentrates upon himself the fewest antipathies. Thus it results in the reign of mediocrity instead of that rule by the strong will and the clear eye which to European thinkers, occupied with the welfare of the nation, has usually seemed a higher ideal.

For the purpose of the present inquiry, however, the important point is not the abstract results of the American method, but the difference between its application in the free and in the slave States. In the free communities the party organization was truly representative. It was a machine which turned out the average opinion of the population, the wishes in which the bulk of the voters of either party were agreed, and it brought into office an average man. But in the South there was no average, no middle class. The working population being slaves were outside the machine. The poor whites were in every way dependent on the slaveholders, and merely followed their lead. The political machine was worked by the slave-holding caste.

In the year 1860 there were altogether 346,000 slaveowners, and of these 69,000 had only one slave each. Thus, in the slave States, while the forms of democracy were preserved, political power and influence were concentrated in the hands of some 250,000 wealthy men, forming a compact

oligarchy. These men were accustomed by their relation with their slaves to despotic command, and by their relation with the poor whites to the exercise of an influence little short of command. They were bound together by a common interest, for their wealth, their power, and their social existence depended upon the ownership of their slaves. Their opinion was that of the South, for no divergent opinion was tolerated. As the nineteenth century advanced, and as the opinion that slavery was wrong began to find expression in the free States, the slave-holders became more keenly aware of the fact that their whole society rested upon slavery, and more and more intolerant of any discussion of its merits.

As the political and social contrasts deepened, the underlying difference of economic conditions became sharper. The slave States produced raw cotton, sugar, tobacco, and rice, articles for which the market was in the free States of the North or in Europe. They were without manufacturing industry, and even for their supply of corn and meat depended upon import either by river from the North-west, or by sea from the North and from Europe. The free States of the northern seaboard became, as the century went on, more and more devoted to manufacturing industry, while the new Western States which were growing up were agricultural and pastoral, the North-west being the granary and the South-west the cattle-breeding district of the Union.

The manifold conflicts of interest and sentiment which could not but arise in so great a diversity of conditions came by degrees to focus themselves around the central question of slavery. The wonder is not that slavery was the cause of a rupture of the Union, but that the breach between North and South was so long postponed. Had the original thirteen States been the whole territory of the Union, the conflict would probably have come before the nineteenth century was thirty years old. But the rupture was long

delayed, and all the issues dependent upon it were extended and intensified by the existence of a vast territory to the West, which was the common property of the Union. There seemed to be infinite room in that great West for differences which would be intolerable if confined within the narrow limits of the seaboard States; and during the early stages of its exploration and settlement the desire to act as a united nation in taking possession of it sufficed to produce compromises by which the inevitable conflict was postponed. When at length it became clear to all that the fate of the West turned upon the fate of slavery, the storm, thus swelled to gigantic proportions, could no longer be averted.

IV

THE GROWTH OF THE ANTAGONISM

The slave-holders had substantial reasons for wishing slavery to be legal in the territories. First of all, the nature of slave tillage required the acquisition from time to time of fresh land. Then the proximity of a slave-holding to a free area caused a perpetual sore; for the slave-holders could not but claim the right to recover slaves who had escaped into the free area, while the restoration of these fugitives to their masters seemed to tarnish the freedom of the community which allowed them to be sent back. Last, but not least, the political influence of the slave States in the Union depended by the Constitution partly upon the numbers of the slave population and partly upon the number of slave States. The ordinance of 1787 had decreed that the territory between the Mississippi and the Ohio should be

free. As this territory became settled and States were formed of it, the Southern leaders saw that unless new slave States were formed in the same proportion as new free States they would be outnumbered and outvoted both in the Senate and in the House of Representatives. The process of creating new States went on without difficulty in the area east of the Mississippi, a slave State in the South and a free State in the North being admitted alternately. But in 1803 the district west of the Mississippi had been bought from France under the title of Louisiana, and when in 1820 Missouri sought admission into the Union as a slave State, there was a hot debate as to whether slavery should or should not be permitted in new States formed out of the "Louisiana purchase." It was agreed that Missouri should be a slave State, but that in the rest of the "Louisiana purchase" north of the parallel forming the southern boundary of Missouri slavery should be for ever prohibited. This agreement was known as the Louisiana compromise. The Louisiana purchase was wider to the North than to the South; the area left open to slavery by the compromise was not great enough to admit of many new States—indeed, this area now forms the single State of Arkansas, while in the Northern part of the purchase six States have been created. The Southern leaders had therefore to look for fresh territory elsewhere. They were substantially in possession of the government from 1829 to 1860, and under their influence Texas was wrested from Mexico and introduced as a State into the Union, and subsequently a war was got up with Mexico, which ended in the annexation of the whole region between Louisiana and the Pacific coast. Almost immediately afterwards came the discovery of gold in California, followed by such a rush of population that California constituted itself into a free territory and sought admission to the Union as a free State. This took place in 1849. In 1850 Congress had to debate the question of California's admission to the

Union, and at the same time the question of the future condition as regards freedom or slavery of the territories acquired from Mexico outside the bounds of Texas. The Southern party was disposed to prevent the admission of California as a free State. Its leader, Calhoun, "declared that the maintenance of the Union depended upon the permanent preservation of a perfect equilibrium between the slave-holding and the free States; that equilibrium could be maintained only by the policy which would render possible the creation of as many new slave States as free States; concessions of territory had already been made by the South, in the establishment of the Missouri compromise line, which rendered it doubtful whether that equilibrium could be preserved; the equilibrium must be restored or the Union must go to pieces; and the action of Congress in regard to California would be decisive of the issue." In short, Calhoun's view was that if California should become a free State, the slave States should terminate their connection with the United States. He is said to have advised his party there and then to press this view to the utmost, that is, to vote against the admission of a free California, and if it were carried in spite of their votes, to induce their States to "secede."

Calhoun is the best exponent of Southern ideas. In 1832, when a protective Tariff Act disagreeable to South Carolina was about to come into force, he had set forth the doctrine of "nullification," that each State was for itself the judge of whether Congress had in any act exceeded its constitutional powers; that a State which held that these powers had been exceeded was entitled to declare the Act of Congress null and void within its own jurisdiction. Congress was merely the agent of the States, and any State could declare that its agent had exceeded the powers which it had delegated. At that time, though South Carolina passed an ordinance nullifying the Tariff Act, and though Congress passed an Act

authorizing the President to enforce the Act, the question was not settled, for the Tariff Act was repealed before its enforcement became necessary. Calhoun at that time elaborated a theory of "secession," taking hold of the precedent given by the Hartford Convention of 1814-15. The Union was a mere voluntary partnership of sovereign States terminable at will. A State could at any time in its own discretion withdraw from the Union or "secede," and the United States had no moral or legal right to use force to compel a State to remain in its relation of union with the rest.

In 1850 the threat of secession had a great effect. No considerable political party at that time dreamed of the abolition of slavery in the slave States. But Northern men thought that slavery was an exceptional condition, and that it ought not to be forced upon the new territories. The discussion ended in what was termed a compromise. California was admitted as a free State; but the rest of the territory obtained from Mexico was declared open to slavery, and a stringent Fugitive Slave Act was passed, by which the whole federal administration was put in motion as the instrument of the slave-owner to recover his slave escaped into a free State. This law made the affidavit of any white man to the effect that a person of negro blood was his property sufficient evidence to entitle him to the arrest of the person and to bar a writ of *habeas corpus*. The operation of this law acted as a powerful stimulus to the abolition movement, which until 1850 was hardly a political force. In 1852 appeared the story of *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, perhaps the most effective novel with a purpose that was ever written.

The compromise of 1850 was such a victory for the slave-owners that they determined to push their conquest further. In 1854 a Democratic Congress passed the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, by which the region embraced in the Louisiana purchase lying North of the line drawn in 1820, and in that

year declared for ever free, was divided into the territories of Kansas and Nebraska, the prohibition of slavery in this region was abolished, and the Fugitive Slave law extended to it. The theory of this bill was that the settlers in making their Constitution should decide for themselves for or against slavery. But the true meaning was seen when Southern slave-holders and their adherents poured into Kansas. Thereupon Northern anti-slavery settlers were also hurried in, and there was a great struggle in Kansas itself. Each party made a Constitution for the new State, and each party applied to Congress for the admission of the State into the Union upon the basis of its own Constitution. The divisions in Congress were by this time so bitter that neither side could carry its views; Kansas remained a Territory and did not become a State.

At the Presidential election of 1856 the Democratic platform was built upon the so-called compromise of 1850 and upon the Kansas-Nebraska Act, of which the meaning was now declared to be "not to legislate slavery into any Territory or State, nor to exclude it therefrom, but to leave the people thereof perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the Constitution of the United States." The anti-Democratic party, which at this time took the name of Republican, declared that neither Congress nor a territorial legislature nor any individual or association of individuals had any authority "to give legal existence to slavery in any Territory while the present Constitution shall be maintained." In the election the Democratic candidate, Buchanan, was victorious, having of electoral votes 174 against 114 for the Republican, Fremont, and of the primary votes 1.8 millions against 1.3 millions for Fremont. The significance of the election is that it proved the existence of a large and vigorous minority united in opposition to the extension of slavery in the Territories.

In 1857 the question of slavery received a new importance from a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States. Dred Scott, a negro of pure blood, born a slave, had been in 1834 the property of an army surgeon, who took him in that year into the free State of Illinois, and thence in 1836 into the part of the Territory in which by the Missouri compromise of 1820 slavery was unlawful. In this Territory Scott was married to a negress, who had also been taken into the Territory by her owner. They were afterwards taken by their owners into the slave State of Missouri. Scott claimed his own liberty on the ground that his residence in a free State through the act of his master had destroyed his master's rights over him; and the liberty of himself and his wife on the ground that their residence with their masters' consent in a free Territory had the same effect. The case came before the Supreme Court as an appeal, the facts being admitted. The court decided against Scott's claim, two of the nine judges dissenting. The court held that Scott was not a person, but only property, and that every citizen was entitled to take his property wherever he pleased within the Territories of the United States.[1] This decision went beyond all that the South had ever claimed. It made slavery the normal condition of the Territories, to be altered only by the formation of a particular area of the Territory into a free State. It further took away the ground from under the Democratic platform, which, by asserting that the territorial legislatures could settle for themselves the question of slavery, had appealed to Northern Demo-

[1] It is impossible to read the judgment delivered in the name of the court without feeling that it is a travesty of law and common sense. If free States were to exist at all, evidently a slave-holder who voluntarily took his slave into one of them thereby emancipated him; and the emancipated slave could no more than any other free person become a slave merely by passing into the territory of a slave State. But the majority of the judges belonged to the pro-slavery party. They went out of their way to declare the Missouri Compromise Act unconstitutional.

crats with what may be described as a theory of Home Rule for the Territories, or, as they expressed it, a theory of "popular sovereignty." In 1858, during a contest for the election of a senator for Illinois, the Republican Lincoln pressed home against his opponent Douglas the inconsistency between the Democratic platform and the Dred Scott decision. In Lincoln's mind the contest between North and South was shaping itself. "A house divided against itself," he said, "cannot stand. I believe this Government cannot endure half slave and half free. I do not expect the house to fall, but I expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing or the other."

In 1859 the tension of feeling on the slavery question was further increased by John Brown's famous raid. Brown was a fanatical anti-slavery man who had fought in the Kansas civil war. In October, 1859, with twenty followers, he seized the United States arsenal at Harper's Ferry and proceeded to set at liberty a number of slaves. He was soon surrounded by a Government force, captured, and in due course tried and executed for treason. In the South he was thought to be a type of the Northern abolitionists—there were not many abolitionists, and none prominent in politics, but the Southern leaders represented all the Republicans as aiming at the destruction of slavery—while the extreme anti-slavery men looked upon him as a martyr.

The question whether slavery should be further extended, or should be restricted to the area of the existing slave States, had thus gradually become the one burning question of American politics, in which all others were concentrated and swallowed up. The crisis was reached in the Presidential election of 1860. The Southern leaders, encouraged by the success which had hitherto attended their bold policy, determined to insist on the enforcement of the whole doctrine of the Dred Scott decision. The result was a split in the Democratic convention. The majority of the Demo-

cratic party, that is, the Northern Democrats with the more temperate Southerners, adhered to the theory of 1856 that the legislature of any Territory should decide whether slavery should or should not be permitted within its area. This was evidently the largest measure of toleration for slavery that could possibly be admitted by men brought up in the free States. The Southern leaders, however, withdrew from the convention, met in a separate assembly, and set up as their platform that Congress had no power to prohibit slavery or the import of slaves into any Territory. This was to declare slavery to be the fundamental law of the United States, from which only the existing free States were to be exempt, a doctrine which no party in the free States would admit. The Republican platform asserted the right and duty of Congress to restrict slavery to the States and Territories where it already existed, and denied the theory that a State was entitled to "secede" from the Union. The candidates were—for the Northern or moderate Democrats, Douglas; for the Southern Democrats, or extreme slavery party, Breckenridge; and for the Republicans, Abraham Lincoln.

The elections of November, 1860, gave Lincoln 180 electoral votes against 103 for the other candidates together, and Lincoln was duly elected President. But at the polls Douglas and Breckenridge together had been supported by over two million voters, while Lincoln had had rather less than two million. The Democratic party was still in the majority. But the Southern leaders had preferred to divide this majority by setting up their extreme and, as they well knew, impossible platform, and had thereby secured the election of Lincoln.

V

THE RUPTURE

So soon as the result of the Presidential election was known, the legislature of South Carolina called a State Convention, which on the 20th December, 1860, passed an ordinance repealing the ratification given by the State in May, 1788, to the Constitution of the United States, together with all acts by which amendments to the Constitution had been ratified, and pronounced the dissolution of the Union subsisting between South Carolina and other States under the name of the United States of America. At the same time the Convention made arrangements for the defence of the State. During the next six weeks similar "ordinances of secession" were adopted in Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, and Texas. On the 4th of February, 1861, delegates from the conventions of all these States assembled at Montgomery, Alabama, on the 8th adopted a provisional Constitution for the "Confederate States of America," and on the 9th elected Jefferson Davis provisional President. On the 18th of February Davis entered upon his executive functions. He was a planter who had been educated at the United States Military Academy at West Point, and had as a young man served with some distinction in the army. He had then entered political life, and had been Minister of War under President Pierce. Having the greatest confidence in his own military ability, he was ambitious to be the director of the Southern armies in the war which he and his friends half expected, and for which they were preparing. The militias of the Southern States had for some time been exercised; they were now called out, organized, and

officered, and began without delay to seize upon all the United States forts and arsenals within their several States, a proceeding in which they were in most cases assisted by the conduct of the United States officers in charge, who, being as a rule Southern men, held that the ordinances of secession of their States absolved them from allegiance and from the duty of defending the property of the United States entrusted to them. The commandants at Charleston and at Pensacola remained at their duty, and the local troops found themselves unable without force to seize either Fort Pickens at Pensacola, or the United States forts at Charleston, South Carolina.

The new government of South Carolina sent commissioners to Washington to treat for the acquisition by that State of the United States' forts at Charleston. These were the undoubted property of the United States, and if South Carolina had been entitled to secede from the Union, it would have been a fit subject for negotiation to determine upon what terms this property should be transferred to the seceding State. The commissioners brought, not offers of negotiation, but an ultimatum. Any act of the United States to reinforce the garrison or to alter its military position was to be answered by force. While the commissioners were at Washington, the United States commandant at Charleston withdrew his troops from the forts surrounding the harbour to Fort Sumter, situated on an island in the harbour, which he thought he could better defend than the whole series of works. The troops of South Carolina thereupon seized the rest of the forts, and proceeded to erect new works for the attack of Fort Sumter. In January they fired upon the United States steamer *Star of the West,* bearing provisions for the garrison of Fort Sumter.

These transactions and this first appeal to force revealed the true nature of the situation. There were many in the North who, though they held that no State or States had a

right to secede, were yet quite ready to consider the expediency of agreeing to secession. But few Northern men were willing to yield to threats or to force upon a matter of principle. The first shot fired at Charleston made clear the purpose of the South to claim as an independent community the political supremacy which had been lost at the polls. It was followed by active military preparations throughout the seceding States, which thus had a start of nearly two months in the work of organization and drill, for it was certain that Buchanan, the Democratic President, would do nothing, and Lincoln, the new Republican President, did not come into office until March. Early in March, President Davis, with the authority of the Congress of the Confederacy, called out 100,000 troops. On the 12th and 13th of April Fort Sumter was bombarded, and its effective defence being impracticable, capitulated on the 14th. This attack upon the United States aroused and united the North. On the 15th of April President Lincoln issued a proclamation calling out the militias of the several States, thus expressing the determination of the North to accept the appeal to force upon the question of union or separation. The call met with an enthusiastic response from the Northern States. The border States, Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas, replied by secession.

On the 21st of July was fought the battle of Bull's Run, in which the Northern troops behaved so well as to leave the enemy powerless to pursue them, when, after the battle was decided, their retreat became—what the retreat of raw, undisciplined troops usually becomes—a flight. Then, and not till then, the Government and the people of the North awoke to the reality of the situation.

VI

THE CONDITIONS OF THE CONFLICT

Perhaps the most remarkable phenomenon exhibited by the history of the war is the entire inability of the political leaders of the North, during the whole period between the secession of South Carolina and the battle of Bull's Run—from December 20th, 1860, to July 21st, 1861—to see the situation as it was. It seems incredible that any observer could fail to be certain, after the secession of South Carolina, that the slave States intended to secede, and to resist by force any effort to maintain the Union, and that such an effort would involve a war on a scale of almost unprecedented magnitude. It seems hardly less remarkable that the Southern leaders should have imagined either that the Northern States would allow the Union to be dissolved without a blow, or that if the issue came to a trial of strength, the Confederacy, with but half the population and half the wealth of the North, and without a navy, would be able to assert its independence. A thoughtful historian of the war has expressed the opinion that only one explanation of this want of foresight is possible. "There were no real statesmen in America. Those who passed under that name were but cultivated and intelligent demagogues, who reflected vividly the opinions of the masses and acted on the spur of the moment."[1]

Opinions may differ as to the definition of statesmanship, but it is evident that neither Lincoln nor any of his ministers

[1] Sander's *Geschichte des Bürgerkrieges,* etc., 2te Auflage von F. Mangold. I. 296.

had been accustomed before the month of March, 1861, to any political occupation other than ascertaining and reproducing such an average of the opinions of their party as would secure them support at the polls without the sacrifice of their own convictions. In any other sense the business of government was new to Lincoln, and it is his great merit that having a strong will and a clear head, he was able in the course of two or three years of trial and labour to acquire the qualification of which when he first took office he was devoid.

Davis, on the other hand, had had a large experience of affairs; but he was an extreme and rancorous partisan, possessed with an almost rabid personal ambition. His judgment was completely unbalanced by the great explosion of hatred in the South which he had done so much to prepare, and which, when the train was once fired, carried away a whole population. With all his education and ability, he was from the beginning a political desperado. He and his friends, finding the day of their political supremacy at an end, deliberately let loose upon their country the horrors of civil war, mainly because it afforded them the opportunity to exercise in the South that absolute power which within the Union had for ever passed out of their grasp. Lincoln, when he took up the reins of government, was a mere party politician, owing his election chiefly to his lack of distinction. But he was a man, and did his duty. When hardly five years later he fell by the hand of an assassin, he was as truly as any statesman known to history the father of his country. Without deserting his party, he had been true to the nation and to himself.

It is generally held that a united and determined nation, fighting for its liberty, and holding a territory suited by its extent and by natural obstacles for stubborn defence, is practically invincible. The white population of the Southern confederacy was both determined and united. The territory

which it defended was as large as three or four of the great States of Europe, and was covered with the obstacles afforded by extensive forests and great rivers. Yet in the course of three and a half years, counting from the beginning of 1862, when the war began in earnest, the resistance of the Confederacy was crushed, its cause lost, and every interest and principle that had been invoked in its behalf abandoned for ever. The causes of this tremendous defeat deserve to be very closely scrutinised.

The Confederates were fighting, not for liberty, but for mastery. Their leaders, however blind in some respects, clearly saw that slavery could not divide North America with free institutions. They attacked the United States in the hope of overthrowing the Union, and of creating on a basis of slavery a new nation which should absorb the whole field of the United States. By the close of 1861 the North had realized that this was the nature of the conflict, which was therefore fought out with the utmost energy and persistence upon each side.

The North had a population of about twenty millions; the South a total population of ten millions, of whom about seven millions were whites. But the South was by its social system almost a ready-made army. The slaves, though not available as soldiers, were a working population whom the war did not in the first instance disturb. The poor whites, accustomed to hardships, to arms, and to violence, were troops already half disciplined to obey their accustomed leaders, the planters. Hundreds of the best and most experienced officers of the United States army were Southern men, and most of these when their States seceded resigned their commissions and entered the Confederate service. The whole military machine, thus easily put together, was in the hands of an almost absolute President, experienced as a military organizer; and months were available during which the North could, and did, make no preparations whatever.

In the North there was no class so accustomed to arms as the average Southerners; no upper caste bred up to command, and no lower caste accustomed to obey. The arsenals were depleted; the small army disorganized; the best officers gone over to the enemy. The new government was in the hands of new men, and the President had not the most elementary ideas on the subject of military discipline, organization, and strategy.

VII

THE BLOCKADE

One weapon, however, the North possessed which the South had not—a navy. Not a ship nor a man went over to the Confederates, though a good many officers passed from one service to the other. The decisive factor in the war, the explanation of the collapse of the South, was the possession of a navy by the North and the lack of a navy on the part of the Confederacy. Six days after the fall of Fort Sumter the President proclaimed a blockade of the ports and coasts of the Confederate States, and this blockade was by degrees made a reality, and maintained with ever-increasing stringency until the end.

The blockade was in itself a deadly blow to the South. The Confederacy had two frontiers: a land one, which, roughly speaking, was at all points in contact with that of the United States, and was therefore closed for import and export by the mere fact of war; and a seaboard, by which alone, when the land frontier was blocked, communication with the outside world was practicable. The blockade closed this sea frontier, and transformed what had been a

highway of unlimited capacity, leading from every part of the Confederate coast to every other coast in the world, into an impenetrable barrier. The closure was not instantaneous. There were at first many leaks, which were stopped up gradually one by one, so that before the war ended the Confederacy was for all the purposes of import and export hermetically sealed. The leaks, indeed, were never very great, and did not materially affect the issue. Blockade runners made for a time great profits, but the high prices which their cargoes fetched were the best proof of the scarcity of the goods they delivered. Where a great stream was needed, a few slender rills were all that could trickle in.

The effect of the blockade was first of all to put an end to export and import. Neither cotton nor other produce could be sold, for it could not be delivered to the foreign markets. Provisions and manufactured goods could no longer be bought, for in the absence of exports there were no funds wherewith to pay for them, and if bought they could not be delivered. Thus the Confederacy was affected in three ways. It was impoverished at the very time when money was needed as the sinews of war. Its military resources were crippled by the impossibility of obtaining from abroad arms, clothing, and machinery. In the second place, mechanical skill and machine-making industries were almost unknown in the South. The railways, therefore, could not be supplied with new rolling stock, while that in hand at the outbreak of the war was used up. Shipbuilding, unknown at the South before the war, could not be established, and steamers could neither be built nor provided with engines. The blockade made it impossible to create the navy, in the absence of which it could neither be prevented nor broken. Lastly, the closing of the sea threw the South upon its own resources for food, and as cotton and tobacco had no longer any value when the markets were inaccessible, it became necessary to abandon their culture and to substi-

tute that of corn and other food stuffs. Georgia, which in 1860 was a cotton State, had become in 1864 the granary of the Confederacy.

But the consequences of the possession of a navy on one side and its absence on the other were by no means exhausted by the effects of the blockade. The command of the sea in the hands of the Northern fleets was a potent factor in the military operations.

VIII

THE THEATRE OF OPERATIONS

In 1861 the authority of the United States was fully recognised only north of a line following the Potomac from Chesapeake Bay to the southern border of Pennsylvania, thence westward to the Ohio, down the Ohio to the Mississippi, and up the Mississippi to the northern boundary of the State of Missouri. West of the Mississippi, Kansas was loyal, Missouri divided in its allegiance, while all the region south of Kansas and Missouri was on the side of the Confederacy. The population of Virginia, west of the Alleghanies, was Northern in feeling, and in July, 1861, this district was secured to the Union by the brief campaign in which General McClellan made his reputation. The necessary purpose of the North was to restore the authority of the United States throughout the whole of the vast area in which it was rejected; that of the South to resist this effort. Thus, though politically the South were the aggressors, in the military operations the North was bound to attack, and the theatre of war was almost entirely confined to the region south of the border line just described.

From the Potomac to the Mexican border is about 1,500 miles, about as far as from Brest to Odessa, and from the junction of the Ohio and the Mississippi about 600 miles, about as far as from Hamburg to Venice, so that the area to be conquered was as large as France, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Italy, Holland and Belgium, and Denmark. But while the population of this European area is about 180 millions, that of the Confederate States hardly exceeded ten millions, and was nowhere collected into a compact mass. There were few towns and no villages, but merely the isolated homesteads of the planters and their dependants. There were no roads in the European sense, but merely tracks and corduroy roads. Large areas were covered with primitive forest, jungle, or swamp, and the only good communications were the numerous rivers and the single-track railways.

In a country which did not fully supply its small population with meat and corn, it was impossible for an army to find sustenance, and the armies of both sides had to rely for their food upon the transport of supplies by river or by rail from depots established in the friendly territory behind them. In these conditions the movements of the armies were absolutely tied to the immediate neighbourhood of navigable rivers and railways. An examination of the river and railway maps furnishes the key to the military operations of the war.

The Alleghany Mountains, running in several parallel ranges from north-east to south-west, extend from Pennsylvania to the northern end of the State of Alabama. The streams which water the fertile valleys between these ranges emerge from them to run down either to the coast of the Atlantic and of the Gulf, or to the Ohio. Between the Alleghanies and the sea these rivers are all athwart the course of any advance parallel with the coast; they were therefore obstacles to an attack by either side. The Mississippi was a

great highway passing from north to south through the centre of the Confederacy, and connected by the Ohio with the Cumberland and the Tennessee, which, if followed up stream, led right through the State of Tennessee. The Mississippi, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee were thus the natural routes of invasion into the middle States of the South.

The Confederate States depended for communication with one another mainly upon the railways. Between the sea and the Alleghanies there were two lines, of which the first ran from Richmond by Wildon, Wilmington, Charleston, and Savannah, and thence by Macon, Montgomery, and Jackson, to Vicksburg on the Mississippi. The second line ran from Richmond by Raleigh, Columbia, and Augusta, to Atlanta, and joined the first at Montgomery. A third line traversed the Alleghanies, starting from Richmond and passing through Lynchburg, Knoxville, and Chattanooga to Decatur on the Tennessee, and Memphis on the Mississippi.

These great East and West lines were connected by the North and South lines from Columbia and Paducah near Cairo, and from Louisville and Memphis to New Orleans and Mobile. A second North and South line ran from Chattanooga to Atlanta, two junctions at which met all the great railway arteries of the Confederacy.

IX

SKETCH OF THE MILITARY EVENTS

The Confederate Congress in May, 1861, established itself at Richmond in Virginia, scarcely a hundred miles from Washington; and as the possession by each side of its own capital was the symbol of the successful maintenance

of its government, Richmond and Washington became the two most important points both for attack and for defence. Here, therefore, the principal forces were concentrated, and here for four years the Federal army of the Potomac was engaged in a never-ceasing struggle with the Confederate army of Northern Virginia. The history of this conflict, and of the campaigns subsidiary to it in the Shenandoah Valley, form the best-known portion of the war, and there is no need here to do more than collect the great salient points of a story which has been admirably told by a dozen competent writers.

After the defeat of Bull's Run, when it became evident that the war would have to be waged in earnest, General McClellan was appointed to command the Federal forces assembled near Washington. McClellan spent nine months organizing his troops. He was an officer of great intelligence, knowledge, and energy; he had the assistance of many professional officers, and disposed at first with little restraint of almost unlimited resources. Yet the force with which he took the field in the spring of 1862, and which was then and afterwards known as the army of the Potomac, at that time lacked the most essential quality of an army—the soldierly spirit. Enthusiasm, devotion, bravery, and obedience were not wanting. But the great organism had not yet received that breath of life which gives to the military community an almost indestructible vitality, but which no army possesses until it has been in the presence of the destroying angel.

McClellan was a good strategist. He saw that the possession of the sea gave him a great advantage, and, instead of attempting to force the enemy back by a direct advance from Washington towards Richmond, he transported the bulk of his force by sea to the peninsula between the York and the James rivers. But his army was cumbrous, and its movements at this time necessarily slow. The confidence of the

Government in the commander was undermined partly by intrigue working upon Lincoln's suspicions of a general belonging to the opposite party, and partly by McClellan's perhaps too great readiness to leave Washington without apparent secure defence. Accordingly the relation between Lincoln and McClellan became strained at the critical period of the campaign, and the general's resolution was weakened when it should have been strengthened. Thus it became possible for the Confederate generals to take the initiative, and to attack McClellan each time that his circumstances placed him in a delicate situation. They can hardly be said to have won a victory over him; but his relations with his Government compelled him to be cautious when the situation needed boldness, and to avoid risks when the only way to success lay in risking everything. After three months his army was resting on the James River, where it was easily and securely kept supplied by the fleet, and where its communications could not be touched by the enemy. But at this stage the confidence of the Federal Government in its commander, and in his view of the operations, collapsed. McClellan was recalled and the command given to Pope, who brought the army back to Acquia Creek on the south bank of the Potomac. The inestimable advantages of unassailable communications, and of a position which, though not five-and-twenty miles from Richmond, was for practical purposes equivalent to a base of operations, were thrown away. After this withdrawal in July, 1862, the United States required two years' experience of war in which to find a commander who united with the strategical judgment of McClellan the power to retain the confidence of the administration. In June, 1864, Grant, with the army of the Potomac, was once more on the ground from which McClellan had been recalled, and was preparing to pass his army to the south bank of the James, in order to interpose between the army of Northern Virginia and the resources

of the Southern seaboard States. During this long interval these two armies had neutralised each other, while the decisive blows had been delivered elsewhere.

The importance of the Mississippi, the great artery of the West, was understood by both sides. The Confederates fortified themselves at Belmont and Island No. 10 on the Mississippi below Cairo, at Fort Henry on the Tennessee, and at Fort Donelson on the Cumberland, while their right flank in Kentucky was covered by a force at Bowling Green. Grant, in command of the forces collecting at Cairo, was supported by Foote, the commander of a flotilla, while his colleague Buell was forming another army in Kentucky. In November, 1861, Grant dislodged the Confederates from Belmont. In the spring of 1862, while Foote with his gunboats sailed up the Tennessee to Fort Henry, Grant's army landed below the fort in order to invest it on the land side. The Confederates abandoned the work before Grant's force was up, and made good their retreat to Fort Donelson. Grant followed them, and Foote took his flotilla up the Cumberland to bombard the fort, which surrendered on the 14th of February with its garrison of 14,000 men. The Confederates, finding their line broken in the centre, now abandoned Nashville, whither Buell followed them, while Foote forced their next position on the Mississippi at Island No. 10. Grant then advanced up the Tennessee and landed at Shiloh or Pittsburg Landing to await the arrival of Buell from Nashville. At Shiloh on the 6th of April Grant was attacked by the Confederates under Albert Sidney Johnston, but held his ground until the arrival of Buell's force during the night turned the scale in his favour. The combined armies followed the retreating enemy to Corinth, which was entered on the 30th of May. About the same time Foote had driven the Confederates from Fort Pillow on the Mississippi above Memphis, and on the 6th of June he defeated and destroyed their flotilla near Memphis. The Mississippi

was now in the hands of the Federals from Cairo to Vicksburg, where the Confederates had erected a strong fortress commanding the river, and the Federals had laid hold on the railway from Memphis to Chattanooga, the first great East and West line of communication through the Confederate area.

On the 24th of April, Admiral Farragut, with a portion of the Gulf squadron, had forced the entrance of the Mississippi by passing Forts Jackson and Philip, which protected the lowest point of the undivided stream, and had then steamed up to New Orleans, which, being unfortified, had to surrender to him, and was occupied by Federal troops. The only point on the Mississippi which the Federals had still to conquer in order to possess the whole river was Vicksburg.

The summer of 1862 passed without another decisive blow in the West. There seems to have been a doubt at the Northern headquarters as to what the next move should be. There was no concentrated Confederate force offering an obvious objective; the importance of Vicksburg was not quite grasped; for it was a new fortress, and little was known of its strength. The Federal forces were dispersed along an extensive front from Memphis on the Mississippi to a point opposite Chattanooga on the Tennessee. The Confederate General Bragg collected the wings of an army at Knoxville and Chattanooga and invaded Kentucky, moving with little opposition as far North as Frankfort and Lexington. Buell collected an army at Nashville and followed Bragg, whom he met and defeated at Perryville (October, 1862). Bragg retired, but was not pursued, so that he soon afterwards established his army at Murfreesboro, on the Chattanooga-Nashville railway. The Federal Government at first thought that Vicksburg could be taken as Island No. 10, Fort Pillow, and New Orleans had been, by a flotilla. For this purpose Farragut was sent up the river

with his seagoing squadron. He found the works placed upon cliffs along the river, and therefore secure from damage by his guns, while the river in front of them made a bend which prolonged the space during which the ships were exposed. On the 28th of June he ran up stream past the batteries, a daring and dangerous feat, only to find that his ships could render no effective service on the upper part of the river, so that a few days later he steamed down again past the forts, the whole operation having served only to prove that seagoing ships of war are out of place in the shoals of a river far inland, and useless against batteries which their projectiles cannot reach with effect.

By this time Grant had fully grasped the situation. He saw that Vicksburg was the next objective. The difficulty was to reach a point from which it could be attacked. The town was two hundred miles away from Memphis or Corinth, Grant's bases for river or for land operations. There was no road, but the railways from Memphis and Corinth united at Grenada, and could be followed to Jackson, about forty miles east of Vicksburg. The course of the Mississippi might be followed, and to move an army by river was incomparably easier than to march. Grant's plan was to send Sherman from Memphis with gunboats and a strong force of infantry in transports to attack Vicksburg from the Mississippi, while he moved himself from Corinth down the railway upon Jackson, hoping thus to draw off the Confederates by threatening their communications. On November 24th Grant himself moved forward, having arranged for Sherman to start from Memphis about a month later. The difficulty of communication, the stupidity of subordinates, and the cutting of the telegraph by the Confederate cavalry prevented either general from hearing anything from the other until the campaign was over. Grant moved down the railway towards Grenada, drawing his supplies all the time from Columbus, Kentucky. But the Confederate, Forrest,

with a cavalry brigade, crossed the Tennesssee near Shiloh early in December, and destroyed the railways in Western Tennessee. A little later Van Dorn, with another cavalry brigade, surprised the depôt at Holly Springs, and Grant's communications being thus completely broken up, he was obliged to retreat. Meanwhile Sherman had moved down the river to near Vicksburg. The town stands on the edge of a long range of bluffs which run southward along the eastern bank of the Yazoo and abut on the Mississippi, which they then follow and overlook for many miles. To the west of these bluffs the whole country on either bank of the great river is low and swampy, intersected by rivers and creeks or bayous, overgrown with trees, and often inundated. Vicksburg itself was strongly fortified, and the works extended along the cliffs for some miles north and south of the town. Sherman landed near the mouth of the Yazoo and attacked the Confederate fortifications on the bluffs north of Vicksburg. The position was both unapproachable from the creeks and swamps intersecting the lowlands on which Sherman landed and impregnable from the nature of the position and the fortifications. Sherman had to give up a hopeless attempt.

But Grant had made up his mind to capture Vicksburg and for the first six months of 1863 pursued this one object with all the activity and obstinacy of genius. The Mississippi was, so to speak, his base of operations. It was necessary to get a footing somewhere on the bluffs above or below the town, but as the troops could not descend the river itself under the guns of Vicksburg, an attempt was made to cut a canal on the west bank, so as to transport them out of range of the bluffs. The canal scheme failing, the next plan was to cross from the Mississippi to the Upper Yazoo, and then descend that river till a suitable point on the bluffs was reached. This attempt also failed, as the Yazoo swamps proved impassable. At length a circuitous channel was

found on the western bank. The gunboats ran the gauntlet of the Vicksburg forts, and met the troops, who had passed through the swamps opposite the town, at a point called Hard Times, nearly thirty miles below Vicksburg. Here the river was crossed on April 30th, a landing being secured at Bruinsburg, on the east bank. Grant, after defeating on May 1st the Confederate forces collected to delay him at Port Gibson, marched on Jackson, where a fortnight later he defeated the Confederate commander, Johnston. He then turned towards Vicksburg, drove back the garrison which had come out to join hands with Johnston at Champion's Hill and Big Black Bridge (May 10th and 17th), and assaulted the city itself on May 19th. The assault was renewed three days later, but the works were too strong to be taken in this way, and Grant sat down before the place, warding off Johnston's feeble attempts at relief, until, on the 4th of July, 1863, Vicksburg surrendered.

The Mississippi was now throughout its whole length in the power of the Federals, and the Confederacy was thereby cut off from the western half of its territory, upon which it chiefly depended for the supply of cattle. At the same time there was an end of traffic with Mexico, which had at first been a safe though not very convenient avenue for neutral trade. The conquest of the Mississippi was the first great step towards the realization of the purpose of the North. It had been effected by the joint efforts of army and navy. Without the capture of New Orleans, due to the fleet, the reduction of Vicksburg would have been impracticable, for the Confederates would have held the Mississippi from Vicksburg to its mouth, and Grant's campaign, based on this portion of the river, could not have been undertaken.

The next route leading south through the Confederacy was the railway line from Nashville by Chattanooga to Atlanta. Here, at the close of 1862, Bragg was facing Buell's successor, Rosencrans. Rosencrans at the end of December

marched out of Nashville and attacked Bragg at Murfreesboro, defeating him in a three days' battle (December 30th, 1862, to January 3rd, 1863). During the summer of 1863 Rosencrans advanced up to the Tennessee, crossed that river, and moved against Bragg's communications with Atlanta. Bragg turned and inflicted on him the great defeat of Chickamauga (September 19th and 20th, 1863), from which the Federal army retreated to Chattanooga, only to find itself there shut in against the river by Bragg's victorious force.

The capture of Vicksburg had set free a considerable force for other operations, and Grant was sent with most of the troops available from this and other points in the West to relieve the army cooped up at Chattanooga. In November he attacked and defeated the Confederate investing force under Bragg.

Early in 1864, Grant was appointed Commander-in-Chief of all the Federal armies. He determined to concentrate the action at two focuses, of which one was represented by the army of the Potomac, with which he fixed his own headquarters; and the other by the force which he had left at Chattanooga, and of which the command was given to Sherman. These two armies, nearly five hundred miles apart, endeavouring each to drive back and defeat the Confederate force in front of it, could communicate with one another only by a very circuitous route passing through Ohio. The two Confederate armies could much more easily communicate, and Grant realized that there was some risk that the greater part of one of them might be withdrawn to reinforce the other. He believed the best way to prevent this was to give each of them enough or more than enough to do where it was.

Since July, 1862, the army of the Potomac had been unfortunate. Pope, Burnside, and Hooker had failed one after the other to make any serious impression upon Lee,

who had defeated them all. After Pope's collapse, Lee had invaded Maryland, to be checked at Antietam by McClellan (September 17th, 1862). After Hooker's dreadful disaster at Chancellorsville, Lee had marched through Maryland into Pennsylvania, followed by the army of the Potomac under Meade, against which he turned. But his assaults at Gettysburg (July, 1863) were beaten off, and in the beginning of 1864 the two armies faced each other on opposite sides of the Rapidan. On the north bank Grant had 120,000 men, while Lee on the south bank had hardly more than half that number. Grant's action in 1864 has been condemned by many critics as mere hard hitting; undoubtedly many men were killed in the fights in the Wilderness and at Spottsylvania, and Grant's attacks at Cold Harbour were repulsed with very heavy loss. But this policy, regarded from the point of view of the whole war, is perfectly intelligible. It was necessary to keep Lee's army fully employed, so that it could not be drawn upon for reinforcements by the other group of Confederate forces. For this purpose it was necessary to attack, and to attack hard and often, even though there was little prospect of victory there and then. During the campaign Grant moved by successive marches to his left, always keeping his face towards Richmond, until, instead of having his back to Washington, he had his back to the sea, which became his base of supplies. In June, 1864, after less than two months' fighting, his right flank rested on the James, and his men as they fronted towards Petersburg were looking in the direction of Washington.

This movement round Richmond was possible because the sea, controlled by the Northern fleets, was the best line of communications, and was unassailable by an enemy without a fleet. In June, 1864, Grant had reached the point aimed at by McClellan two years before. Here, entrenched on a front many miles long from the James River to beyond

Petersburg, he remained until the end of March, 1865. There was no object in further manœuvring, which would expose his own communications with the fleet on the James. He could not further prolong his lines to the left without unduly weakening them, and so long as his army held them it was impracticable for Lee to move away from Petersburg and Richmond without abandoning both places to the Federals. Thus from the time Grant took the command in chief, the object of absorbing Lee's energies was completely attained. Meanwhile the decisive blows were struck by Sherman. After the disaster of Chattanooga, Bragg was superseded by Joseph Johnston, a very able general. But the army he took over was in every respect inferior to that of his adversary (Sherman had 100,000 men; Johnston, at the end of May, 64,000), and the best he could do was to contest every step of the enemy's advance with as much obstinacy as was consistent with the necessity to avoid a crushing defeat.

Setting out from Chattanooga on the 5th of May, Sherman in two months pushed back Johnston to the Chattahoochee in front of Atlanta. The Confederate Government was disappointed with Johnston's cautious generalship—he had suffered no disaster, and kept his army in good condition and spirits—and on his retiring into Atlanta in the middle of July, replaced him by Hood, who was supposed to be bolder. Hood made several dashes against the positions in which Sherman was entrenched on the north of the town, but when, at the close of August, Sherman moved off with a part of his force and destroyed the railway to Macon, Hood's line of supply, Hood evacuated Atlanta and abandoned to Sherman the most important military centre of the southern part of the Confederacy. Hood now moved to the north-west, and tried to break up the railway to Chattanooga, which was Sherman's line of supply; but Sherman moved after him and drove him off, so that he retreated to

Decatur on the Tennessee. Sherman having now no enemy in front of him, sent back a part of his force under Thomas to Nashville, with orders to resist Hood in case he should march north from the Tennessee and himself set out with a picked force of 60,000 men to march across Georgia. The railway to Chattanooga was destroyed and Atlanta burned, and Sherman, leaving Atlanta on the 10th of November, appeared before Savannah on the 10th of December. On the 13th he took Fort McAlister, which commanded a navigable channel leading to the sea, and the same day communicated with the fleet.

Georgia, during the war, had been transformed into a corn-growing State, and was, in 1864, the granary of the Confederacy. Upon this fact Sherman had based his plan. He could rely upon finding everywhere in the State sufficient supplies for his army; and he took care that he left none behind him. He thoroughly destroyed the railways, so that whatever corn or other stores were still left in Georgia could not be transported to the Carolinas nor to Virginia. But the operation was practicable only because the Northern fleets had secure possession of the sea. No general will abandon his communications and his base and move off his army two hundred miles without being quite sure of securing a new base before he can be seriously interfered with. Sherman's new base was the Northern fleet, and as this could meet him wherever he might strike the coast, he was sure of reaching it even if he had been prevented from making the coast at Savannah. Meanwhile Hood had invaded Tennessee, only to receive from Thomas at Nashville (December 15th-16th, 1864) the most crushing defeat inflicted upon any army during the war.

Sherman's purpose in his march through Georgia had been partly to destroy the resources of that State which had hitherto been available for the supply of the Confederate armies, and partly to put his army in a position from which

it could repeat the same operation in South and North Carolina, and could move North to effect a junction with Grant. Once on the coast he had everywhere a secure base in the fleet. In January, 1865, he prepared his army for a fresh campaign, and on the 1st of February set out for the North. He moved first to Columbia, the capital of South Carolina, after a feint which, in conjunction with the movements of the fleet, caused the evacuation of Charleston; then he pushed on, destroying the railways as he went, to Goldsboro' in North Carolina, where he was joined by a fresh army corps that had been landed at New Bern. Near Goldsboro' he was opposed by Johnston with such forces as the Confederacy had been able to collect to resist him, but the action was not very serious, for Johnston dare not fight it out, lest he should be caught between Sherman's army and his force coming up from New Bern. On the 23rd of March Sherman reached Goldsboro', where his force, a few days later, reached a total of close upon 90,000 men. The railway to New Bern and Morehead City formed his line of supply, the fleet being again his indispensable base.

The Confederacy was now exhausted. Since the summer of 1864 the naval blockade had been extremely stringent. Mobile had been taken by Farragut (August 5th, 1864), and the only ports which blockade-runners could reach, and that not without the greatest risk, had been Savannah, Charleston, and Wilmington. Savannah Sherman had taken at Christmas; Charleston had been occupied as soon as the Confederates evacuated it; and Wilmington, of which the harbour was sealed by the capture of Fort Fisher in January, was itself taken by a naval and military expedition in February. No supplies whatever could any longer be obtained from abroad. Sherman's marches had swept clean of supplies a great belt up the centre of the seaboard States, and had so effectually destroyed the railways that even if there had been food to spare it could not have

been transported. During the winter it had been declared in the Congress at Richmond that there was not meat enough in the Confederacy for the armies in the field;[1] in Virginia there was neither bread nor meat enough for Lee's forces; the supplies depended upon the railway lines and the seaports which could be reached by blockade-runners, but Sherman's advance had closed both these avenues. A few weeks more, and his army would come up on Grant's left, so that Lee would be surrounded. The only hope remaining for the Confederates—not, indeed, of winning, for that had long been impossible, but of prolonging their resistance, was for Lee to move to the south-west, evading Grant, and, uniting with Johnston, either to attack Sherman or to move through the Alleghanies.

At the close of April, while Sherman was preparing for his next move forward from Goldsboro', Grant determined, while keeping an adequate garrison in his lines, to move part of his army westward on to the two lines of railway still open for Lee's use. At the same time Lee evacuated Richmond and Petersburg and marched westward. But Grant, prepared, was quickly on his track, and as Lee's army was worn out, half clad and half fed, it was overtaken in a few days. When Grant was approaching the remnant of Lee's army, he sent a note to Lee, which led to an interview, at which it was agreed that the officers and men of the Army of Northern Virginia should lay down their arms and go home to fight no more. This was on the 9th of April. Next day Sherman recommenced his advance, but four days later, near Raleigh, received from Johnston a note which led to the "surrender" of Johnston's force upon terms substantially the same as had been given to Lee.

The war was over: there was no Confederate army left, the administration of the Confederacy had disappeared, and its territories were in the occupation of the Federal forces.

[1] See Humphrey's *The Virginia Campaign of 1864-65*, p. 311.

There were no negotiations, and there was no treaty of peace. The Government of the United States resumed its authority.

X

RETROSPECT

At the end of the story it may be worth while to try and compress its essential points into a few brief sentences which may better enable us to grasp its tremendous meaning. During something like a century the growth of the United States was accompanied by the development in a portion of its area of the institution of slavery, which so modified the private, social, and political life of the region over which it was spread as to create within the nation a community whose aims, ideals, and interests were entirely incompatible with those of the majority of the population inhabiting the bulk of the national territory. In this way was produced an irreconcilable antagonism which only increased with every attempt to allay it. By the secession this peculiarly organised community attempted to separate itself from the rest of the nation in order to perpetuate the institution of slavery. The claim to a right to withdrawal was based upon a seeming ambiguity in the original constitution which enabled the seceders to pose as defenders of a sacred right, that of the independence of the several States. The majority of the nation was determined to preserve the national unity, an object which could be fulfilled only by force. It had become necessary to crush the Confederacy by arms. So great a task had, perhaps, never been undertaken before, for the Confederacy was qualified by the nature of

its population, by the extent and character of its territories, and by the determination which animated the leaders and followers alike to make a stubborn and prolonged resistance.

Suppose that a master mind like Napoleon's had been charged with the direction of the Federal operations, and had been able from the beginning fully to grasp the nature of all the advantages which the Confederate States possessed for defence. He would have seen that it would not be possible, as it had been in Europe at the beginning of the century, to break down the Confederacy by the crushing defeat of a single army, followed by the occupation of the capital, but that it would be necessary to defeat one army after another, and to exhaust the resources of the enemy by the occupation of the whole of his territory. Such a mind, devising a grand and comprehensive plan, might have seen that the first and most effective blow would be struck, if it were possible to close the sea to the shipping of the Confederacy, and thus to isolate the enemy's territory from the rest of the world; that, this accomplished, the next step would be, while holding the Confederate armies on the frontier between the Mississippi and the Atlantic, and keeping their forces there fully occupied, to take possession of the great highway of the Mississippi, and thus to cut off from the main body of the Confederacy all those territories which lay to the west of that river; that this accomplished, the third move would be to strike at the middle of the Confederacy by the avenue of the Cumberland and the Tennessee rivers, and then to pass an army from Chattanooga along the great central railway to Atlanta, from which radiate all the communications of the Southern States; and that then if an army were collected at Atlanta and pushed across the State of Georgia, the granary of the Confederacy, to the sea, it could sweep up through the seaboard States until it could take in the rear the last Confederate army, still held in the grip of the Federal forces, based upon Washington. Such a

plan would have been a work of genius, for it would have exactly met all the conditions which had to be considered. Whether this plan was ever devised by a single mind is, perhaps, doubtful, but it is the plan which was, in fact, carried out, and its statement sums up the military history of the war. In the American Civil War may be said to have been fulfilled the prophecy enunciated more than thirty years before by the Prussian general Clausewitz, that whenever a war should be the affair of a whole nation deeply stirred by the cause of quarrel, the operations would be sure to reveal a great and comprehensive plan.

Thus the purpose of the North to assert the national unity was effected. In the meantime slavery, the cause of the trouble, had disappeared. On the 22nd of September, 1862, President Lincoln issued a proclamation to the effect that on the first of January, 1863, he would declare free all slaves in any portion of the country which should then be in rebellion against the United States, and on the date named the emancipation proclamation was issued. This practically settled the question, and after the war was over an amendment to the Constitution formally put an end to slavery throughout the United States.

In an age which has been much occupied with discussion whether war is right or wrong, and when tender consciences in many countries are exercised by the spectacle of the sufferings caused by armed conflicts between nations, it has seemed to me that some service would be rendered by the attempt which has here been made to contribute to the natural history of war by the comprehensive examination of a single case regarded both from its political and its military aspect; for before we can form a judgment about war, it behoves us to know fully what it is, and to consider, not merely the pain which accompanies it, but the pains which it relieves. It is possible that our ordinary thoughts on the subject are apt to be confused by the employment of the

generic term war, which leads people to dwell on the killing and wounding that form the sensational features of every war. Our modern sentimentality, perhaps, makes too much of death and of wounds, yet it can hardly be a misfortune to be killed fighting for a good cause, and it may be doubted whether the pain suffered by the wounded soldiers of an army can compare in its sum total with the pain ungrudgingly endured in a single peaceful year by the women of the nation to which that army belongs. To reach a true view it would be better to dismiss the abstract term, to speak not of war but of wars, and to classify them according to their causes and their results. There have, perhaps, been wars which might have been avoided, springing from causes which might have found a peaceful remedy, fought with little vigour on either side, and productive of no valuable consequences. But of the wars of modern times the great majority may be classed with that which has been examined in this paper, inasmuch as they have been the outcome of antagonisms resulting from conditions of long growth, and incapable of reconciliation.[1] Of this class the American Civil War is, perhaps, the most perfect type, and it is, therefore, worth while fully to observe those of its features which illustrate the position of war in the moral order.

Slavery was a great wrong. It has been condemned by the common conscience of mankind. The accident of their history had associated Southern planters with this wrongful institution from which it was practically impossible for them to disconnect themselves. The people of the North were extremely reluctant to interfere with it, but it became, from its very nature, expansive and aggressive, and eventually drove its representatives into an attack upon the Union to which the people of the North were devoted. They

[1] Some of these cases have been discussed by the author elsewhere; see introduction to *Imperial Defence* by Sir Charles Dilke and the author, and the early chapters of the author's *Great Alternative.*

were assailed at the vital point of their national existence, and they took up arms in defence of what they believed to be the right. Fighting in defence of their own right, they asserted it, and with it the cause of right in the world. The world is well satisfied with the result. But the Northern armies were not composed of crusaders. They were not going out of their way to fight for an ideal disconnected with their own interests or their own lives. Their own country was assailed, and in defending it they were at the same time asserting a good cause. Is not this the natural form by which in this world right is vindicated? The theory that righteousness asserts itself stands in no relation to the facts of life. The realization of what is right in the region known to human observation is accomplished by the exertions of men attempting to carry out what they believe to be right, just as, at any rate in the English-speaking world, the fabric of civil law is built up by the actions brought by those who think it worth while to defend in the law courts those rights with which their own interests are bound up.

When a nation feels its vital interests wrongfully assailed by another nation, its only means of protecting those interests and of maintaining its belief in the right is to exert force in self-defence, and he would be a bold man who would maintain, upon a broad review of the wars of the last hundred years, that in the majority of cases success has not inclined to the side which has, on the whole, represented the better cause.

If this be the case, we must reject the conception of peace as the great object of political action. It rather behoves the free citizens of every State to be resolved that the policy pursued by their nation shall have justice for its aim and righteousness for its foundation, so that there may be no chance of their being called upon to draw the sword in behalf of wrong; no probability that their sons shall have to bleed in a quarrel of which their sons' sons shall be com-

pelled to say that, brave though their fathers were, they were brave in a lost cause.

The sentimental school, of which peace is the great aim, has attempted to foist upon the world the idea that war might be avoided by arrangements for international arbitration. This theorem is probably based on the analogy of the civil actions by which private quarrels are settled in the law courts, but the analogy is false. A safer analogy is to be found in the administration of criminal law, in which the State makes war upon offenders, and uses force to secure their punishment. As often as not the origin of a war is in some deep-rooted wrong which has to be set right, though sometimes the nature of this wrong is obscured, except to those most deeply concerned in it, by the nominal issues in which the quarrel is involved, and which too often, in the preliminary diplomatic discussions, take the place of the deeper issues. In such a case who is to be the judge, and how is the judgment to be enforced? At the time of the Civil War in America the majority of Englishmen undoubtedly believed that the question of slavery was not the question at issue, and that the people of the South were fighting for a right, to which the Constitution entitled them, to secede from the Union. This was, no doubt, a superficial view, but it was a view to which the language of the Northern statesmen necessarily lent colour, and which could have been avoided, and, in fact, was avoided only by the few who had an intimate knowledge of the history and conditions of the United States. Had the issue at that time been submitted to the arbitration of any tribunal which the world could have furnished, it is practically certain that the judgment would not have involved the abolition of slavery, and it may be doubted whether the right of the Southern States to secede would not have been confirmed. Nations are the best and only judges of their own affairs, and no nation worth the name will ever submit, in any matter in which it

believes that its vital interests are concerned, and that its cause is that of right, to any dictation from outside, even though it take the form of a judicial utterance. If the whole world were a single State, the ideas of the advocates of arbitration would be realized; but is it certain that in that event there would not from time to time be revolts against the authority of the State, based upon the purest ideals of conscience and duty, and probably as well justified as the most righteous revolts known to history?

The true respónsibility of a nation is not for the preservation of peace, but for abstention from wrong, and the penalty of wrongdoing, whether it takes the shape of peace preserved by cowardice or of a war in an unjust cause, is for nations, as for individuals, their own corruption and degradation.

Gustavus Adolphus

THE genius of great men lies not, as is too often imagined, in making something out of nothing, a kind of creation which is unknown to history, but in discerning a work to be done and in using the existing material for its performance. It is in the grasp of a situation, the construction of a purpose, and the utilisation of opportunities in its execution, that a statesman's greatness consists, and all the very great captains are statesmen. War is a means to an end, and nothing more; it is a phase of policy in action. The test of greatness in its management lies in the fitness of the operations for the attainment of the political end. War carried on for its own sake, or for the sake of winning battles, is a mere handicraft, the occupation of small minds. In noble war, the war of the great masters, the political purpose dominates everything. To understand Gustavus Adolphus we must grasp this purpose, ascertaining first how he interpreted the situation in which he found himself, so as to construe out of it his life's work, and then how he used his means and opportunities in the accomplishment of the task thus chosen.

On succeeding in 1611 to the throne of Sweden, Gustavus had by the fact of his kingship a threefold mission imposed upon him. His title to the crown had to be asserted against the King of Poland, who contested it; and it had to be justified in the hearts of his subjects by successful action for the maintenance of Swedish independence and of the Protestant religion.

The independence of Sweden was synonymous with the

command of the Baltic, to secure which Gustavus had to resist Denmark, Russia, and Poland. He took these quarrels one by one. Denmark, in possession of Norway and of both shores of the Sound, almost cut off Sweden from the North Sea, the principal communication between Sweden and the civilized world being by the waters of the Baltic. In two years Gustavus had won from Denmark a peace by which his hold upon Elfsborg, giving him access to the North Sea, was secured. In four years more he had compelled Russia to acquiesce in his possession of the eastern shores of the Baltic so far as they lay between Russia and that sea. Then came the Polish war, which continued with interruptions until September, 1629, ending with a truce by which Gustavus was left in possession of Memel, Pillau, Braunsberg, and Elbing, that is, in control of the coast.

In 1628 the attack of Wallenstein upon Stralsund revealed a new claimant for power on the Baltic. The Emperor had the Protestant States of Germany under his heel, and the Catholic design was with Spanish help to secure ascendancy on the northern inland sea. Gustavus saw that his work must all be undone unless this design were frustrated; that it was dangerous to wait until Sweden should be attacked, and that by taking the initiative he would compel the Protestants of Germany to be his helpers. Accordingly, making alliance with France, the other great enemy of the Emperor, he resolved to attack the Empire in Germany and to complete the defences of Sweden by the acquisition of the coasts of Pomerania and Mecklenburg. The time of his action was propitious, for Wallenstein had just been driven from command, and the Emperor by the edict of restitution had embittered the chief Protestant princes, though they still hesitated to take up arms against him. Gustavus landed on the island of Usedom, at the mouth of the Oder, in July, 1630. His force was small, but the Imperialist forces in the north-east of Germany were

also small, and were scattered over a wide area without unity of command. He never expected or intended the Swedish army alone to overthrow the Catholic Powers—the Emperor and the League—but he regarded it as the instrument by which he would unite the Protestant States and bind their several twigs into a strong rod with which to chastise their opponents.

Gustavus is often described as an inventor or originator in the matter of tactics and organisation. The truth is that he was merely, what every intelligent commander is, a thorough student of the military sciences of his time, applying to his own army with discernment, and with an authority which his teachers, not being kings, did not possess, the lessons he had learned. His masters were the military leaders belonging to the House of Orange, whose tactical judgment at the close of the sixteenth century had been stimulated by the study of Polybius. They had perceived the superiority of the legion, as a combination of separate mobile units each homogeneous in its armament but representing by their working together the co-operation of different arms, over the phalanx as a great immobile mass of heterogeneous elements. Accordingly they taught an order of battle in which the then traditional great squares of pikemen lined outside with musketmen were broken up into small oblongs, either of pikemen or of musketmen, disposed chequerwise for mutual support. They reduced the depth of these bodies so as to prevent the rear ranks being idle spectators of the defeat of the front ranks. They developed the use of firearms and advocated the preparation of an attack by the fire of artillery. These were the lessons which Gustavus Adolphus put into practice, improving his artillery and his musketry so as to develop a rapid fire. He is said to have taught his cavalry to rely upon pace and shock and the *arme blanche,* having learned in these matters from his Polish experience, but upon these points the evidence is imperfect.

He is known to have studied Machiavelli's great work on war, the profoundest treatise on strategy written between the fall of the Western Empire and the maturity of Frederick the Great, and there he would find ideas akin to his own upon the subject of a national army, of discipline, and of the use of force for the attainment of political ends. The Swedish discipline and the experience of many campaigns in Poland gave his troops the superiority upon every field, and the small formations on the Dutch or Protestant model invariably had the better of the large and ponderous squares and oblongs to which the Catholic armies still clung.

The King's strategy can best be judged by examining it in connection with three definitions representing as many aspects of this branch of military theory. One writer has said that strategy is the doctrine of communications. In the first half of the seventeenth century there were no metalled roads in Germany. Heavy goods were conveyed by water. The population lived in walled towns where all the produce of the surrounding districts was stored. Thus the movement of an army at a distance from rivers was much embarrassed, and as the haulage of supplies by land was impracticable except for short distances, it was necessary to have access to the towns for provisions. A country devoid of rivers and towns presented difficulties to the passage of an army resembling those offered in our own day by a desert. An unfordable river, moreover, was a very serious obstacle, bridges being few and their construction slow. These are the keys to one part of the strategy of Gustavus Adolphus. With his base on the shore of the Baltic which was a Swedish lake behind him, he landed on one of the islands at the mouth of the Oder, took the other island, and thus obtained control of the estuary; he then advanced up that river, making Stettin his principal depôt, occupying Cüstrin, and eventually taking Frankfurt, Landsberg (on the Wartha), and Crossen. The passages of the Oder being

thus in the hands of the King, the Imperialist forces on its right bank were isolated and the coast of Pomerania between Stettin and Danzig was reduced by the Swedes. At the same time Gustavus established a firm hold on Pomerania west of the Oder, besieging the coast towns which were occupied by Imperial troops and covering the sieges by a field army. His arrangements during the first months of 1631 illustrate his use of rivers. Stralsund and Wolgast were in his hands, and he was besieging Greifswald. For this purpose he held the continuous water line formed by the Peene, the Trebel, and the Recknitz, having garrisons in the towns at which these streams could be crossed: Anklam, Loitz, Demmin, Tribsees, and Dammgarten. He instructed Field Marshal Horn to keep in his own hands all the boats on these rivers in order to defend the streams and in order to carry reinforcements to any point where they might be required. At a later stage we find him protecting a more extended base by the similar water line of the Spree and the Havel, extending from Frankfurt on the Oder to his entrenched camp at Werben at the confluence of the Havel with the Elbe. When the alliance with Brandenburg and with Saxony and the defeat of Tilly at Breitenfeld had rendered practicable his advance into South Germany, his communications were formed by the occupation of a series of towns until he reached the Main; here he held the strong fortress of Würzburg, and from this point the Main formed his principal communication. He marched his troops along its banks, and transported his artillery and supplies in boats on the river. Thus from the point of view of communications the instruments of his strategy were rivers and fortified towns.

A favourite account of the essence of strategy is that it consists in dividing an army for the purposes of movement and supply and in uniting it for battle. In this matter Gustavus appears as a precursor of Napoleon. At first sight

the modern student is astonished at the dispersal of the Swedish forces; but a close examination shows that Gustavus has always arranged for a concentration in case of need, and his instructions to his scattered generals are full of provisions for the event of a concentration becoming requisite.

A third account of strategy regards it as the art of using battles so as to further the object of the war. Gustavus, though the very ideal of personal bravery, and though he had perfect confidence in the *morale* and in the tactical superiority of his troops, never fought a battle for nothing. In the whole war, from his landing in July, 1630, to his death in November, 1632, there were only four general engagements. At Breitenfeld Gustavus attacked Tilly against his own strategical judgment in order to secure the alliance of the Elector of Saxony, whose immediate anxiety to prevent his territories being ravaged induced him to urge an attack upon the Imperialists. When the King thought the time ripe for striking a blow against the enemy's army, he was deterred by no considerations of numbers or position. Thus, when his great base from the Baltic to the Rhine had been secured and the time had come for taking the offensive from this base against the Catholic Powers, he attacked the Bavarian army, although its position behind the Lech was, according to the then current opinion, almost impregnable. In the same way at Nuremberg, so soon as he had united with the army of Oxenstierna the force which till then he had preserved in his entrenched camp, he attacked Wallenstein, though the Imperialist general held a fortified position which, as the event proved, was too strong even for Swedish bravery and Swedish tactics. A few weeks later, when Wallenstein by his invasion of Saxony threatened at once the King's system of alliances, his communications with the Baltic, and the centre of his great base, or *sedes belli,* Gustavus unhesitatingly marched to the attack and delivered it

without the slightest delay. The strategy of Gustavus Adolphus was methodical, not in the perverse sense of an attempt to prove a theory by practice, but in the higher sense of the rational employment of the available means clearly understood in order to effect a purpose of which the grasp is never relaxed.

The career of Gustavus Adolphus in Germany has been the subject of controversies upon which some light may be shed by a consideration of the King's design in connection with the conditions in which it had to be executed. In the first place he has been held responsible for the fall of Magdeburg, in the sense that his action stimulated and encouraged the resistance offered by that town to the Emperor, and that he failed to bring relief in time. The alliance between Magdeburg and Sweden was concluded in August, 1630, when the enterprise of Gustavus was just beginning. The King's purpose was to unite the Protestant States for their defence, and he may well have expected the example set by Magdeburg of alliance with himself to have been more readily followed than it was. He sent Falkenberg, who proved himself in the highest degree brave, skilful, and determined, to assist in the defence of the town, and he conducted his own operations with unprecedented energy and persistency. He could not have fully foreseen the vacillation and timidity of the Elector of Brandenburg and of his Saxon colleague. To have marched to the relief of Magdeburg while the policy of Brandenburg was in doubt, would have been an act, not of generalship, but of Quixotic folly, and it is perhaps the best proof of the strength of the King's character that he did not attempt it, though he took decided measures for bringing Brandenburg on to his side.

The next disputed question is concerned with the course taken by Gustavus after the battle of Breitenfeld. He engaged the Elector of Saxony in the invasion of Silesia and

Bohemia, and himself marched through Thuringia to the Main and the Rhine. It has been thought that a more decisive operation would have been for Gustavus himself to march upon Vienna, leaving the Elector of Saxony to operate in the German States.

This course was not dictated by sound strategy. There was in Austria no military objective, for there was at this time no Imperial army to be attacked. Vienna had not the importance which it possessed a hundred and fifty years later. The Emperor would have left his capital, and if, as is probable, he refused to make peace, Gustavus would have found himself in the position of Napoleon at Moscow. Moreover, a march on Vienna from Leipzig was probably impracticable. Bohemia had been devastated, and neither the direction of the rivers nor the distribution of the towns facilitated such a march. But the decisive consideration is that the enterprise would have diverted the King of Sweden from his great design, which was in the first place to unite the Protestants of Germany. The Elector of Saxony was quite unequal to this task, and in case of any mishap to the Swedish arms might have turned against them and made terms with the Emperor against Gustavus. The course adopted increased the breach between the Saxon Elector and the Emperor, and enabled Gustavus to strengthen himself by uniting under his own lead the Protestants of South Germany. It enabled him to create a new and strong base between the Main and the Upper Danube, and prepared the way for the most effective attack upon the chief Catholic Powers, Bavaria and the Emperor, that by the line of the Danube. Oxenstierna was the advocate of the march on Vienna. Nothing more clearly proves the inferiority of his judgment to that of his master, which partly explains the collapse of the great scheme immediately upon the King's death.

The King has been blamed for marching on Munich and conquering Bavaria while the Elector was effecting his junction with Wallenstein, which Gustavus was thus too late to prevent. But at this time the King did not know the direction of the movements of his adversaries, and the most effective blow against the Bavarian Power consisted in the conquest of the Elector's territory; so soon as Gustavus was aware that the junction was to be attempted, he marched with extraordinary rapidity to prevent it. The moment he perceived himself to be too late he entrenched his army at Nuremberg, and awaited reinforcements; the moment they arrived he attacked the enemy. Though the attack failed, the repulse was not decisive, for the Swedish army was intact. Wallenstein was compelled to retire, and during the time when his direction was uncertain, the King moved into Swabia in order to restore his authority in the region which was to be his base in a future campaign down the Danube.

It has been suggested that the proper reply to Wallenstein's march upon Leipzig was for the King to march upon Vienna. But no general in his senses will commence an offensive against a distant point in the enemy's rear when that enemy is already at the centre of his own communications. The immediate base of Gustavus at this time was on the Main, but his great base was the whole of Germany between Ulm and Stettin, and its extremities were connected by his alliance with Saxony. Wallenstein's object was to break up this base by forcing the Elector of Saxony to desert his ally. Gustavus was therefore compelled to march directly to the attack of Wallenstein. Had he survived the battle of Lützen, which would in that case have been decisive, he would have been master of Germany, could have dictated terms to the Emperor, and would have had to resist the subsequent intrusion of Richelieu. His death left his work unfinished, the Protestants disunited, and Richelieu master of

the situation. At the peace of Westphalia, Sweden retained little more than that strip of Pomerania between the Recknitz and the lower Oder, which had been the King's original base.

In summing up the work of Gustavus Adolphus it seems possible to distinguish between two parts of his design; between that which represented the defence of Sweden, the national purpose, and that which represented the ideal of the King's personal ambition, the *corpus evangelicorum,* in which no doubt his own influence was to be paramount. That this latter ideal really possessed him is proved by his dying words when Wallenstein's cuirassiers finding him wounded asked his name. According to a tradition which seems to rest upon sufficient evidence, he replied: "I am the King of Sweden, who seal the religion and liberty of the German nation with my blood." It is probable, however, that this conception was not an essential part of the original plan, but that it grew up during the course of the struggle and was fostered alike by difficulties and by success. At any rate, Oxenstierna, after the King's death, said that his general intention had been to secure his empire of the Baltic, to break the power of his enemies, to free the oppressed territories, and then to pause or to go on according to circumstances; that he had never expected to go as far as he had done, and had all along taken advantage of opportunity and based his decisions from time to time on the situation which presented itself.

The design then of a permanent union of the German Protestant States under Swedish direction was gradually formed as a result of the difficult conditions with which the King had to deal. His first act on obtaining possession of Stettin was to compel the Duke of Mecklenburg to sign a treaty by which on the death of that potentate, who was childless, his duchy should be held by Sweden until the costs of the war, fixed at a very high sum, had been repaid. The

next heir on the death of the Duke was the Elector of Brandenburg, who naturally thought this treaty an aggression on his rights. The treaties which Gustavus made with most of the Protestant States stipulated that he should have the sole command of their armies. The Elector of Saxony, who thought himself the principal Protestant personage in Germany, took umbrage at the great position thus acquired by the Swedish King. None of the Protestant magnates could rise to the King's conception of a great Protestant cause, especially as it required sacrifices from them, and, as he had made himself its representative, gave additional power to him. Yet the Protestant population of Germany rightly recognised in him the leader of their cause. The lukewarmness of his allies compelled him in asserting the cause to assert himself also. His case is like that of Cromwell, whose ideal was so lofty that none but himself could realize it, and in whom, therefore, devotion to a great end of necessity took the form of the assumption of authority in his own hands. The second half of the King's design was forced upon him by that individual independence and consequent disunion of the Protestant Princes which had already all but ruined them and which after his death was destined to prevent their triumph. The enduring success of that portion of the King's purpose which represented the defence of Sweden, and the failure of that part of it which represented his ultimate personal ambition, suggest an interesting parallel to the results of Napoleon's work as summed up by the late Sir John Seeley, who held that Napoleon's work, in so far as it represented the national interests of France, was abiding, but that the project of an extended empire, which developed in his own ambition as the consequence of his success, produced only ephemeral results. In each case the sense of nationality and the love of independence in the States whose co-operation was required frustrated an ideal design represented by the ruler of a foreign State. In the case of Gus-

tavus Adolphus this ultimate failure was not prevented by the high morality and humanity of the ideal which he had conceived. The net result of his work was to establish for a full century the greatness of Sweden and to save from destruction, though not to bring about the preponderance of, the Protestant cause in Germany.

Goethe as a War Correspondent

ON the 20th of April, 1792, Louis XVI. paid a visit to the National Assembly. Dumouriez, at that time Minister of Foreign Affairs, standing beside the King, read a report on the political situation of France and the complaints of the nation against Austria. At the conclusion of the report the King, following the prescriptions of the Constitution of 1791, proposed that war should be declared against the King of Hungary and Bohemia. The same evening the proposal was adopted by an almost unanimous vote.

Six days later, the traveller and economist, Arthur Young, wrote a hasty postscript to his *Travels in France* which were then in the press and soon afterwards published. "The intelligence is arrived," he says, "of a declaration of war on the part of France against the House of Austria. The gentlemen in whose company I hear it all announce destruction to France; *they will be beat; they want discipline; they have no subordination;* and this idea I find general. So cautiously as I have avoided prophetic presumption through the preceding pages, I shall scarcely assume it so late in my labours; but this much I may venture, that the expectation of destruction to France has many difficulties to encounter. . . . Many depend on the deranged state of the French finances; that derangement flows absolutely from a vain attempt at preserving public credit; the National Assembly will see its futility, misery, ruin; the NATION must be preserved. What on comparison is *public credit?*

"The divisions, factions, and internal disturbances offer to others the hope of a civil war. It ought to be a vain hope. During peace such difficulties fill the papers, and are dwelt upon, till men are apt to think them terrible; in war they are *treason,* and the gallows sweep from the world and the columns of a gazette the actors and the recital.

"Oil and vinegar—fire and water—Prussians and Austrians, are united to carry war amongst twenty-six millions of men, arranged behind one hundred of the strongest fortresses in the world. If we are deceived, and Frenchmen are not fond of freedom, but will fight for despotism, something may be done; but if united but tolerably, the attack will be full of difficulties in a country where every man, woman, or child is an enemy that fights for freedom."

In spite of his disclaimer, Arthur Young, in these sentences, was a prophet, for he had fulfilled the one indispensable condition of true prophecy—he had been a diligent and disinterested observer, and was better able than most of his contemporaries to gauge the material and moral resources of France.

The bankruptcy which he foresaw took place before his sentences were printed. On April 27th 300 millions were voted, with the proviso that they were not to be used for the payment of debt, except in small amounts, and on May 15th it was resolved to suspend the payment of debts until further notice.

The belief that the Prussians and Austrians would find themselves opposed by a nation in arms was in part founded on the previous action of the National Assemblies. On July 28th, 1791, the *constituante* had decreed the levy of 100,000 volunteers, and of this number perhaps one-half served in the garrisons or with the armies during the campaign of 1792. These volunteers of 1791 well represented the patriotic movement of the early revolutionary period; the battalions elected their own officers, among whom many became fa-

mous in later years—Moreau, Jourdan, Davout, Victor, Suchet, Lannes, and Gouvion St. Cyr.

Further levies of volunteers were ordered, after the declaration of war, in May and in July, 1792; but few of these volunteers of 1792 reached the armies in time to take any part in the campaign of that year.

The regular army of France, the King's army, suffered no doubt from "divisions, factions and disturbances." Of 9,000 officers, no less than 6,000 had resigned—most of them leaving the country. But those that remained were steadfastly attached to the national cause, and the defection of so many occasioned the more speedy promotion of the remainder, and the advancement of a large number of experienced non-commissioned officers.

At the beginning of August, 1792, there were, besides the garrisons of the fortresses, most of them far from complete, three armies watching the northern and north-western frontiers. The region between Dunkirk and Basle was divided into three districts—the northern under Lafayette, from Dunkirk to Montmédy, with 43,000 men; the centre under Luckner, with 17,000 men, from Montmédy to the Vosges; and the Rhine, with 22,000 men, under Biron. These troops, amounting in all to 82,000, were concentrated at a few centres. Most of Lafayette's army was distributed in three camps on the Flemish border, while at Vaux, near Sedan, he had 19,000 men. Luckner's force had its headquarters at Metz. In every respect save one these armies were in a pitiable condition. They were ill equipped; their discipline had been ruined, first by the social war which the revolution had brought about between the classes to which officers and men respectively belonged; then by the ill-judged measures adopted by the Constituent Assembly; and, finally, by the resignation of the greater number of the officers. The skirmishes on the Flemish border in the spring had been a succession of disgraceful panics, and there was not a single

commander who believed that his troops would face the enemy. To compensate for all these defects, there was but one strong point. The troops, whether of the line or volunteers, were agitated by an intense patriotism, which was stimulated rather than depressed by their difficulties and early disasters.

The power of subtle moral forces is, however, not easily or commonly appreciated, and the common opinion was that of Arthur Young's friends that the French would be beat. It was, of course, the opinion of the Prussian and Austrian Courts, which, after having for many years belonged to two opposite and hostile political systems, now suddenly, they hardly knew how or why, found themselves allied against the French. The union, in fact, was far from thorough. The Emperor and the King were never for a moment agreed about the real aim of the war or the division of the spoils; and they were eyeing each other askance in regard to the future of their Polish neighbours.

The definitive treaty between the Emperor Leopold and the King Frederick William II. was signed the 7th of February, 1792. In the course of the same month the Duke of Brunswick, who was to command the combined army, had a series of consultations with the King of Prussia at Potsdam, and sketched out a plan of campaign which served as the basis of the subsequent operations. At this time it was understood that the Prussians would send 42,000 men and the Emperor 56,000 men from the Netherlands, besides a considerable force from the Upper Rhine. The Prussian army, 42,000 strong, as agreed upon, assembled at Coblentz by the 19th of July; on the 25th the Duke of Brunswick issued his celebrated manifesto, and on the 30th the march to the frontier began. It is easy for the historian, now that the story of the campaign is familiar, to find in the constitution of the headquarters and the composition of the Allied Army the moral and material causes which gave to events their

peculiar shape. There was in fact, though not in name, a divided command. Brunswick, naturally cautious and circumspect, was the more cautious because he had a reputation to maintain. Moreover, he detested the *émigrés,* and seems to have had little sympathy with the object of the war. Frederick William was sanguine, anxious to acquire the reputation to be obtained from a decided success, and eager to reach Paris and save the unfortunate King. The natural result of two such incompatible influences was fitful and irresolute action.

The Prussian infantry was still that of Frederick the Great, and the cavalry not unworthy of Seydlitz and Ziethen. The artillery, the engineers, and the military administration had all been neglected. There was no regular system of requisition, supply depended upon a huge and extravagant train, and the sanitary service was the worst possible. It is remarkable that though the army was provided with tents, the soldiers were entirely without overcoats.

The Austrian contingent was a very different thing when the war began from the splendid army shown on paper at the Potsdam conferences. From the Netherlands Clerfayt brought 15,000 men, while Hohenlohe, who was to come from the Rhine and take Landau, Sarrelouis, and Thionville, had only 14,000. There were 5,500 Hessians (excellent troops) and 4,500 *émigrés,* without proper arms or equipment, and with pride and prejudice instead of discipline. The total was 81,000 men—30,000 less than had been calculated upon.

It was a week's march from Coblentz to Trier; at Trier there was a week's halt, and another week passed before the army reached the French frontier at Redange, on August 19th. The same day Lafayette, commander of the French army of the North, left his camp at Sedan and the country which he could no longer serve. The invaders had before them an open door; an energetic advance must have brought

them to Paris long before they could be stopped, either by the 19,000 men at Sedan or by the 17,000 men at Metz. Next day the Prussians and Austrians invested Longwy; the second day it was bombarded for a few hours; capitulated on the third day, was evacuated by its garrison on the fourth, and the Prussian army then spent five days doing nothing at the camp of Praucourt, close to Longwy. Here the army was joined by "the greatest witness of the age,"[1] the poet Goethe. Twenty-nine years later Goethe compiled from his brief note-book, from his recollections and from the then published records, an account of the campaign which gives a peculiarly faithful and lifelike picture of the events. It should be read side by side with M. Chuquet's admirable volumes[2] dealing with the events of 1792.

The Duke of Weimar was fond of soldiering, and Goethe, as far back as 1780, had become his Minister of War. In 1792 the Duke, at the head of his cavalry regiment, joined the army of invasion, and was most anxious for Goethe's company. Goethe, principally occupied with his optical theories, and comfortably settled in a home of his own, disliked this new expedition. By way of compensation he made himself comfortable. He took with him his servant Paul Goetze, and a chaise which, though it seems to have been the Duke's, he generally describes as his own. Behind it was packed a trunk containing a good supply of clothes, books, maps, various scientific essays in manuscript, and all sorts of odds and ends.

The servant, the chaise, and the box, however, by no means exhausted the resources of civilisation, though for what follows it is not clear how far Goethe was indebted to the officers' mess, of which he was doubtless a member.

[1] Sorel. *L'Europe et la Révolution Française*, vol. iii., p. 101.

[2] *Les Guerres de la Révolution. La Première Invasion Prussienne. Valmy. La Retraite de Brunswick.* (Three vols.) Par Arthur Chuquet. Paris: Leopold Cerf.

There was a large sleeping carriage, of which he seems to have had the exclusive use. The officers' mess had a great cooking van or travelling kitchen drawn by six horses, and a most complete camp outfit: table, forms, chairs, boxes, packing-cases and a couple of tin stoves. In spite of these abundant supplies, Goethe is twice during the campaign found providing himself with extra wraps.

It was the afternoon of the 27th of August when Goethe reached the camp at Praucourt, which he describes as "pitched upon a plain." "Though it could be overlooked, it was by no means easy of access. A moist, upturned soil hindered the horses and the carriage; we were surprised to find neither guards nor sentries, nor any one else who might have asked for our passports, and from whom we might have obtained some information. We drove through a tented desert, for every one had crept under shelter to seek what protection he could from the horrible weather. With some difficulty we managed to inquire where we should find the Duke of Weimar's regiment; at last we reached the spot, saw faces that we knew, and were kindly received by comrades in distress." A better acquaintance with the camp of Praucourt did not improve Goethe's opinion of it. The plain on which it lay was at the foot of a hill, along the side of which ran an old ditch intended to protect the plain from the drainage of the slope. This ditch had served its purpose long enough to become a reservoir of all the disagreeables that can accumulate near a camp; its bank had then burst, and deluged the camp with its contents. Goethe was offered a tent, which he prudently declined, preferring to stick to his "schlafwagen," to and from which he was carried, it is to be presumed, by the faithful Paul.

On the 29th "we started from these half-petrified waves of earth and water, slowly and not without trouble; for how was it possible to keep tents and baggage, uniforms and the rest, even moderately clean, seeing that there was no dry

place where anything could be spread out to dry?" That evening the camp was pitched at Pillon. The next day's march brought the Army to Verdun, which was invested and mildly bombarded. The town and the citadel were commanded from the neighbouring heights, the works were decayed, and the garrison of volunteers had not the iron discipline which would have enabled the commandant to resist the appeals of the townspeople, terrified under the first effects of bombardment. Beaurepaire, the commandant, finding that a surrender was about to take place in spite of his own determination to prevent it, committed suicide, and Verdun capitulated on the 2nd of September.

While the Prussians, doing nothing in the camp of Praucourt, had been seasoning themselves for the dysentery, they had also been losing their chances of success. The French were still scattered, and at a distance. It was the 19th of August, the day of the invasion, when Dumouriez, then in the camp at Maulde, near Valenciennes, received his nomination as Commander-in-Chief of the army of the North, in place of Lafayette. Not till the 28th did he reach Sedan to take command of an army demoralised by the desertion of its general. Dumouriez' plan was, if possible, to barricade with his little army the passages through the Argonne. The forest of Argonne is a belt of low wooded hills stretching for a distance of forty miles along the eastern side of the river Aisne, which is parallel in this part of its course to the Meuse. The hills are only some 300 feet higher than the bed of the river, and the wood, which is composed of thickly-planted beeches, birches, and hazel trees, has, here and there, openings and clearings. This wooded region in its southern and broadest part measures seven or eight miles from east to west. The eastern edge is further protected through the greater part of its length by the stream of the Aire, which turns west and traverses the forest, to throw itself into the Aisne at Grandpré. The southern part of the forest is

divided into two parallel bands by the valley of the Biesme, which also turns west and runs into the Aisne. A hundred years ago there were hardly any practicable roads through this forest, which, therefore, presented a very serious obstacle to the armies of the eighteenth century, accustomed only to move in close order and in large bodies. If the Prussians were to advance from Verdun in the direction of Paris, their natural way would be by the straight road to Chalons, which enters the forest near Clermont, crosses the Biesme at the village of Les Islettes and the Aisne at Ste. Menehould, where it emerges from the forest. Failing this road, it was open to them to march round either end of the forest, or to attempt one of the less favourable or more circuitous routes which traverse it. These are: the path from Varennes to Lachalade, the road by the Aire at Grandpré, and the road from Buzancy through la Croix aux Bois. On the morning of the 1st of September, while the Prussians were bombarding Verdun, Dumouriez was still at Sedan. It is one of the chief faults committed by the Prussians that they did not on this day take possession of the defile of Les Islettes. Instead of doing so, they waited after the surrender of Verdun to spend a week encamped under its walls, and when at length they were ready to move on, they found not only Les Islettes but all the passes occupied by the French.

After these foolish delays, Clerfayt and his Austrians from Stenay were sent to attack the defile of Croix aux Bois. It was taken and retaken, and finally remained in the hands of the Austrians on the 14th. Meanwhile, the Prussian army had moved from Verdun to Landres, where it confronted Dumouriez' principal force, in position since September 3rd behind the Aire at Grandpré. Dumouriez, finding his position turned by the Austrians, retreated southward, skirting the western edge of the forest. The Prussians followed through the defile of Grandpré, and moved forward to reach the Verdun-Chalons road. Here again,

however, the Prussians were slow to seize their advantage. Dumouriez' retreat took place in the night of the 14th-15th, but the Prussians did not leave their camp at Landres until the 18th, when they marched to Vaux les Mouron. By these delays they gave Dumouriez ample time to choose his position on the open hills just west of Ste. Menehould, to restore the discipline of his troops, and to receive reinforcements. The army of Metz, now commanded by Kellermann, had set out on September 4th for Chalons, while the Prussians were still at Verdun, and marched by Ligny and Bar-le-Duc to Vitry. At Vitry, Kellermann received orders to join Dumouriez, and marched, after some hesitation, to Ste. Menehould, forming the junction with Dumouriez on the 19th of September. Kellermann commanded the left wing of the combined army, which now had its advanced guard in the neighbourhood of the village of Valmy.

The march of the Prussians on the afternoon of September 19th is described by Goethe with admirable art. The troops had already marched in the morning from Vaux les Mouron to Massiges, and were preparing to dine and to bivouac when the order came to pack the baggage and continue the march. Every one knew that such a move, with the baggage left behind, was the preliminary to a battle, and the hope of a decisive action consoled the officers for their lost dinner. At dark a halt was made at the village of Somme-Tourbe, where Goethe, like every one else, was obliged to try his hand at foraging. He was luckier than Bismarck and Sheridan at Gravelotte, or even than the Crown Prince of Prussia at Königgrätz, for he was able at once to lay hands on four bottles of wine. The march was resumed at daylight next morning. Goethe had exchanged his chaise for a charger when the baggage was packed, and now rode with the advance guard formed by the Weimar regiment. In drizzling rain and mist they rode from Somme-Tourbe right across the great Chalons highway, where they found

themselves under fire from a French battery stationed at the farm of La Lune. The cavalry was withdrawn, and artillery and infantry were brought up to drive the French battery from the farm. An hour or two later, when La Lune was in possession of the Prussians, Goethe rode up to it, and could see Kellermann's army drawn up on a line running nearly north and south from the Chalons high road to a point some two miles north of Valmy.

As the morning wore on the Prussian main army was brought up and formed in order of battle facing the French, while the attack was prepared by the fire of some half-dozen batteries. The French artillery replied from its position on the hill of Valmy and on Mont Yvron, further to the north. There was much riding to and fro of staff-officers, and at length the King of Prussia gave the order to advance. Immediately after, however, he was met by Brunswick, who had been observing the French the whole morning; a brief council of war was held in the saddle, and was ended by Brunswick saying, in a decided tone: "Hier schlagen wir nicht!" (We shall not fight here!) The troops were halted, and remained watching the cannonade until late in the afternoon. When night came on the Prussians bivouacked on the ground, and the French retired to a better position near Ste. Menehould. The French had lost during the day about 300 men; the Prussians only 184.

This was the famous cannonade of Valmy which has been described by Sir Edward Creasy as one of the decisive battles of the world.

Brunswick's timidity was fatal to the cause of the invaders. A bold attack would probably have dispersed the French army; "the attempt but not the deed" filled the French with courage, and demoralised the Prussians. Dumouriez was perfectly equal to the situation; he knew that the Prussians could find nothing more to eat in the country where they then were, on the west of the Argonne; that the

transport of their supplies through Verdun and Grandpré was extremely difficult and laborious; he knew also that the incessant rain—it had practically rained without stopping since the invasion began—had reduced them to a condition of extreme misery, and that disease and hunger would soon play havoc in their ranks. If the attack which they had postponed on the 20th could be delayed a few days longer it would become impossible. Large numbers of volunteers were collecting at Chalons, and another camp was forming at Auberive on the Suippe. Still the French troops were not to be trusted to attack the redoubtable Prussians. Dumouriez negotiated, and in this way kept the Prussians idle for ten days in their camp at La Lune. The plan succeeded perfectly; before the ten days were over the Prussians perceived that their case was hopeless. Not only was attack impossible, but escape could be looked for only if the French permitted it. The Prussians now reopened the negotiations to cover their retreat. Starting from La Lune on September 30th, they retired by the same route along which they had advanced. On the 2nd of October they repassed the Aisne at Vaux. The army passed Buzancy on the 4th, Dun on the 5th, and recrossed the Meuse at Vilosnes on the 7th, halting at the camp of Consenvoye. By this time Goethe was heartily sick of campaigning, so he got permission to leave the army, and drove off in the "schlafwagen" to Verdun, where he met again with his chaise, from which he had been separated for three or four days. As part of the negotiation by which the retreat was covered, Verdun was to be given back to the French; Goethe was therefore forbidden to prolong his stay, and made his way by Etain, Spincourt, and Longwy, to Arlon, seeing something on the road of the horrors of a disastrous retreat. From Arlon he travelled by Luxemburg to Trèves, and thence by boat to Coblentz. Still eager to get as far away from the army as possible, he sailed down the Rhine to Düsseldorf, and re-

covered from the fatigues of the expedition under the hospitable care of the Jacobis, at Pempelfort. It was the 13th of October when Goethe recrossed the frontier; the army passed it eight days later. In this way Goethe spared himself the extremes of misery. How terrible the retreat and the sufferings of the Prussians must have been is shown by two simple figures. On the 19th of August 42,000 Prussians entered France and only 20,000 returned home. Many years afterwards the Prussian General von Lossberg, who served both in 1792 and in 1812, wrote:—"I was a spectator of the retreat from Russia, but the Prussian soldiers (of 1792) offered perhaps a more pitiable spectacle than those of Napoleon."

It cannot be correct to describe the cannonade of Valmy as one of the decisive battles of the world. There was no battle, and the cannonade did no serious harm to either side. The campaign decided nothing. It led to no peace, and to no modification of the policy of any of the Powers. Yet even the campaigns of Napoleon are not more instructive. Napoleon showed what could be done by a clear-sighted and determined commander, supported by the resources of a nation devoted to a particular policy. The campaign of Valmy showed how a splendid army and a talented commander could come to ruin from sheer lack of political purpose.

By his march from Verdun to Grandpré and Somme-Tourbe, Brunswick had completely turned the French army. On the morning of the 20th September each of the armies was on the communications of its opponents. The French, if defeated, would have been dispersed into the Argonne, and Dumouriez could never have collected them for another action. The Prussians were disciplined troops, well organized and officered. A defeat would have had to be very severe to have made impossible the escape of a fraction of their army, such as actually recrossed the frontier a month

later. But the French army, with its undisciplined volunteers and its ill-officered line regiments, was not fit for a serious fight. For weeks it had been panic-stricken. It is impossible to believe that if the Prussians had delivered their attack they could have failed.

How, then, was it possible that the army, after being brought with infinite trouble to the position from which it could strike the decisive blow, should be halted merely to watch the opportunity pass away? The King had ordered the attack, and Brunswick countermanded it. This is only the superficial explanation. The question is, how came such shilly-shallying to be possible? The King and Brunswick no doubt disagreed. From the beginning the King wanted a rapid advance to Paris. Brunswick never wanted to march to Paris at all. His plan was to capture the fortresses on the Meuse, and then wait for a second campaign the next year, before proceeding further. How, then, did the King give the command to a general whose views were so opposed to his own? The only answer, but the certain answer, is, that he did not know his own mind; he had no clear, well-understood policy.

This is the secret of nearly all failures in war. "You ought never," says the father of military criticism, "to begin a war without knowing what you mean to get by it and in it." You must know your purpose, and choose your military objective accordingly. The King of Prussia really wanted some addition to his territory, as well as the distinction of a successful passage at arms. He most wanted a slice of Poland. He had tried hostility to Austria, and had kept an army in Silesia for some months. Then he allowed himself to be persuaded into a treaty with Austria, and went into the French war hoping partly that it would divert Austria from Poland, partly to annex territory for Prussia, and partly to conquer some territory that might be given to Austria as compensation for a Prussian annexation in Po-

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Buzancy
La Croix aux Bois
Vouziers
R. Aisne
Grandpré
Landres
R. Meuse
Dun
Vaux les Mourons
R. Aire
Varennes
Massiges
R. Tourbe
Lachalade
R. Bionne
R. Biesme
uippes
Les Islettes
Clermont
Mont Yvron
omme-Tourbe
Valmy
Ste. Menhould
La Lune
R. Aisne
R. Aire
Scale of Miles
0
5
10
15
20

Mézières
Sedan
R. Meuse
R. Chiers
Arlon
Luxemburg
Montmédy
Longwy
Redange
Praucourt
Longuion
Rethel
R. Aisne
Vouziers
Grandpré
Dun
Pillon
Spincourt
Consenvoye
Varennes
Etain
Auberive
Verdun
Suippes
Clermont
Valmy
Ste. Menehould
The Argonnes
R. Aisne
R. Aire
R. Meuse
Chalons-sur-Marne
R. Marne
Vitry
St. Dizier
Toul
Nancy
Metz
Thionville
R. Moselle
Trèv
Scale of Miles
0 5 10 20 30 40 50

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land. The consequence of this mixture of motives was half-hearted action. Only a fraction of the Prussian army was sent against France; the war was begun as though the French army did not count. There were constant delays, due to divided councils; and when at length the great decisive moment came, the army frittered away its last chance in a fruitless cannonade. No one can imagine that if the vital interests of Prussia had been at stake at Valmy there would have been any hesitation to attack. Once there, every one would have felt that now at last the nation's fate was to be decided; the attack would have been made, and would have succeeded. In short, the Prussian Government was not in earnest when it began the war. The disastrous retreat and the loss of 20,000 men might seem to have been retribution enough.

But half-disasters do not awaken nations, and Prussia continued in the same shifty, irresolute policy for fourteen years longer, until the tremendous defeat of Jena announced the conquest of the country by the French. The lesson of Jena, that a country cannot live merely on the reputation of its past achievements, has been taught by many historians. But it has been too much the fashion to think that Jena came like a thunderclap, without a note of warning. Yet Valmy ought to have opened the eyes of the Prussians. That it did not is a striking illustration of the extent to which a nation may become blind to the incompetence of its rulers, to the weakness of their policy, and to the dangers by which its future existence is threatened.

Scharnhorst[1]

IN the great drama of the revolutionary and Napoleonic age, no episode is more striking, none richer in lessons for our own time, than that of the downfall and the uplifting of Prussia. How was it possible that the Monarchy which had been left in 1786 one of the great powers of Europe, could in 1806 be utterly crushed in seven weeks? How was it possible again that after six years more, during which Prussia was stripped of half her territories, and half of the rest kept under the iron heel of the conqueror, she could suddenly reappear as a great Power and put into the field an army as large as that of her Russian allies, and far more efficient than the one she had lost?

The resurrection of Prussia was the work of a group of men, among whom the chief figures are Stein and Scharnhorst, and the life of Scharnhorst is, therefore, necessarily the history of the new creation of the Prussian army, as the life of Stein is the history of the new foundation of the Prussian State. But to understand how Prussia rose again, it is necessary to understand first how she fell. Sir John Seeley, in his *Life and Times of Stein,* has admirably told the whole story in outline, though if we may judge by the biographies of Seeley which appeared in the newspapers at the time of his lamented death, the British reading public has not yet discovered this the most valuable of all his works. Seeley, however, had only imperfect access to the

[1] *Scharnhorst.* Von Max Lehmann. Leipzig, 1886-87.

materials for the military history of Prussia, and his volumes may well be supplemented by the rich store of information contained in Lehmann's more recent volumes on Scharnhorst.

In the sketch of Scharnhorst written by his intimate friend Clausewitz and published in 1832 we are told that if it is always difficult precisely to estimate the activity of a statesman, the difficulty is increased in the case of a man who, like Scharnhorst in the midst of his exertions, kept himself as far as possible out of sight in the background. For this reason Clausewitz found it impracticable to trace by documentary evidence his friend's share in the great events of his time. The hard task which Clausewitz renounced has been performed by Max Lehmann, who has ransacked the literature of the period and the archives of the Prussian War Office to find all that bears upon Scharnhorst's career, and has told the story with a fulness and a sympathy that leave little to be desired, and with a force and freshness that make his book a credit to German literature.

Lehmann is a disciple of Treitschke's, that is to say, he writes history to glorify Prussia. The partiality of patriotism appears on every page. When a German does a kindly act it is because he is a "kind-hearted German," when a Frenchman or an Englishman does wrong it is because he is French or English; "German" being synonymous with "virtuous," and "foreigner" with "vicious." An Englishman may derive a salutary warning from this naïve distribution of adjectives, and Lehmann's bias goes little deeper. He is perfectly honest and accurate in his account of the facts.

The fall of Prussia was due, in the first instance, to the irresolution of her Government in the period between 1803 and 1806.

In the eighteenth century the King was the State, and

Frederic William I., who concealed under the garb of a sordid and repulsive personality the essence of a great statesman, learned early the lesson that the State, far more than the individual, must rely on self-help. His hard, unamiable economy endowed Prussia with a force stronger than was possessed by other States of greater area and population. Frederic II., like his father, identified himself with the State, and threw his life into this work which this conception implies. He, too, grasped the fundamental law of the political world, that a State must rely upon its own efforts. Accordingly he clearly thought out his mission—the assertion of Prussia; he closely studied the forces against which he had to contend, and, never losing his grip of his one object, could look back at his death upon a career devoted to a purpose, and therefore great. He left Prussia one of the great Powers of the world.

Frederic William II. retained from the tradition of his century the belief that he was the State, but being a prey to sensual enjoyments he had no guiding purpose and no single eye with which to see the world as it was. Accordingly, he is torn between conflicting aims, looking now to Poland and now to the Rhine; and follows the lead now of one, now of another, of the small men about him, whose claim to be heard was, at the worst, that they pandered to his weakness, and at the best that they had been clerks to Frederic the Great. The chief antagonist of the Prussian purpose (to be a great Power) was Austria, and the accession of Leopold gave Austria a statesman. A few months of negotiation enabled Leopold to divert Frederic William from the Prussian policy, and to turn his attention from Vienna to Paris. Not knowing what he wanted—for though he attacked the French he was longing for a province of Poland—Frederic William invaded France with less than a quarter of his army, in conjunction with less than a fifth of the Austrian army. The war went on after the

first disaster, but as Prussia and Austria were more hostile to one another than to France, and more afraid of each other than of the enemy, and as the French to resist the scraps of armies opposed to them called the nation to arms, the allies were treated to a succession of reverses. When the French had conquered the whole left bank of the Rhine, Frederic William discovered that he had really no particular quarrel with them, and by the treaty of Basle retired from the contest, and consoled himself for his failure with his new Polish province. He died in 1797, and was succeeded by Frederic William III., a virtuous and intelligent young man, so afraid of deciding wrong that he never in his life decided anything. To such a disposition "a policy of neutrality" commended itself, for it was a phrase that veiled the fact that he had no policy. With the humanity of an age in which personal comfort was the supreme object he shrank from war, but as the ruler of a great Power he expected to exercise some influence beyond his own borders. His weakness—not peculiar to himself or his time—was that he did not grasp the inconsistency between these two desires. The rights or the interests of a State if challenged must be sustained by force, and to renounce the use of force is to abandon every right and every interest that is challenged.

The concrete cases in which the choice was presented to Frederic William III. were not easy. The first was that of Hanover. By the treaty of Basle Prussia had undertaken to guarantee the neutrality of Hanover (although its king, George III., was still at war with France) and the cordon of troops which watched the line of demarcation between the neutral area and the theatre of war included Hanover in its protection. The cordon was withdrawn on the cessation of hostilities in 1800. But in 1803 the war between England and France began again. Prussia must either be content to see Hanover the theatre of war, in which case its conquest

by the French was probable, or must herself occupy the country at the risk of quarrel with one or both parties. Frederic William did not want the French to enter Hanover, as they would then be posted between his own dominions in Brandenburg and his territories on the Rhine. But while he hesitated the French acted. They marched an army into Hanover and occupied the country. He felt aggrieved, but he would not fight; and as this was well understood, the French drew the natural inference that Prussia did not count.

In 1805 came the coalition between England, Austria, and Russia. Frederic William would not join it, and determined to be neutral, mobilising part of his army to prevent a Russian violation of the neutrality of Silesia. But at the outset of the war Napoleon violated the neutrality of the Prussian territory of Anspach by marching an army corps through it. Thereupon the King mobilised his whole army and agreed to a treaty with Russia, binding himself to send an immediate ultimatum to Napoleon, and, failing a satisfactory answer, to join the coalition with 180,000 men. He sent Haugwitz to Napoleon, ostensibly with the ultimatum, but really, as Lehmann has discovered, with secret instructions on no account to bring about a breach. Napoleon delayed the negotiation until after the battle of Austerlitz, when Haugwitz signed the treaty of Schönbrunn, involving a Franco-Prussian alliance and the cession of Hanover by France to Prussia. This cession of course meant war between England and Prussia, and as Frederic William wanted no war he offered to ratify the treaty of Schönbrunn only on the understanding that he was not to annex Hanover, but merely to occupy it until the general peace, when perhaps he thought England would agree to its annexation. Before Napoleon had consented to this change the Prussian army was placed on a peace footing. Then Napoleon declared the treaty void, and substituted a new

one less advantageous to Prussia, but still involving the annexation of Hanover and war with England. This the King accepted. The King had thus played false with the coalition, had revealed to Napoleon his real hostility, and had then shrunk back at the critical moment. If he had deliberately set out, first to isolate himself, and then to provoke a French attack, he could not have succeeded more perfectly.

In the summer of 1806 the continued presence of the French army in Southern and Western Germany convinced him that he had made a mistake. The discovery that Napoleon had offered to restore Hanover to England made him afraid of being attacked by surprise, so he again mobilised his army, opened negotiations with the Tsar, who had not yet made peace with France, and sent an ultimatum to Napoleon. From the extreme of timidity he had passed to the extreme of rashness. If the King expected Russian help against the French attack it was in the highest degree imprudent to precipitate that attack by an ultimatum, and thus bring on the decisive struggle before the co-operation of Russia was assured, and before the Russian army could be brought up.

These preliminaries have been recapitulated in order to show how in the management of its policy, in the stages preliminary to the military measures proper, the King's government had laid the foundations of defeat. The military conduct of the war was such as might be expected to accompany this kind of policy. No one could reasonably doubt, after the campaigns of Austerlitz, that a war against Napoleon would be a life and death struggle. Yet the troops in the Eastern provinces, to the number of 33,000 men, were not included in the mobilisation. The essence of good management is unity of direction. The King appointed the Duke of Brunswick to be Commander-in-Chief of the army; then he appointed Prince Hohenlohe to com-

mand half of it, and finally took the field himself. Accordingly no order could be given without his consent; he would not consent unless convinced, and could never be convinced so long as any one raised objections. The result was that the army was commanded by an irregular committee, with an irresolute chairman, at which a dozen persons attended and gave their opinions, and in which Hohenlohe and his staff-officer conceived their mission to be to oppose whatever the Duke of Brunswick suggested. With such a council of war, instead of a Commander-in-Chief, no successful war was possible. Without a policy, without a rational organization of the command, with little more than half the actually available force in the field, the Prussians were in any case sure to be beaten by Napoleon. But the extent of the disaster was increased by other causes.

Not one of the generals in the army, except perhaps Blücher, seems to have understood war. They were perfect in the drill of fifty years before, but had no conception that a battle and a prearranged review are two different things. Outposts and reconnaissance duties were unknown to most of the officers. Skirmishing was despised. Accordingly at every turn the troops were at a disadvantage against the French. Yet how much could have been done with them by a general like Wellington, is clear from the excellent behaviour of the men in the battles of Jena and Auerstädt. There were good officers in the army. Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, York, Bülow, and others who became famous in the later wars were company or field officers. But none of these rising men were in authority. Promotion by seniority was the rule, and the generals were, almost without exception, old and incapable. The capitulations that followed within the weeks after the great defeat showed the military incompetence of the bulk of the superior officers, the brilliant exception of Blücher serving only to show more clearly what the others ought to have been.

One cause which increased the gravity of the disasters ought not to be forgotten. The idea that the defence of the country was everybody's duty did not exist. It was thought wrong for the officers in command to seize upon provisions or stores for the benefit of their men. In the retreat from Jena to Magdeburg, and from Magdeburg to Prenzlau, the troops suffered incredible privations. They passed starving through a country in which there was plenty to eat; they were not allowed to touch it, while their French pursuers had the full benefit of it. The nation might be destroyed, but private property must be respected.

When the peace came, Prussia had to be built up anew from the foundations. The great difficulty was the King, for he could no more make up his mind after than before. Ever since his accession the army had been his pet care. He had had a Royal Commission of field-marshals and generals sitting for years, but it had rejected all the pet ideas of the reformers. Now he appointed a new commission, of which the leading spirit was Scharnhorst.

When Hanover was declared neutral in 1796 it was covered by a combined cordon of Prussian and Hanoverian troops. The Prussians were under the Duke of Brunswick with his headquarters at Minden, then the residence of Stein. The Hanoverian corps was commanded by Count Walmoden, Stein's brother-in-law, whose headquarters were also at Minden. Both Stein and Brunswick made the acquaintance of Walmoden's chief staff-officer, the Hanoverian Major Scharnhorst, who had made a name by his splendid bravery in the recent campaigns, as well as by his remarkable contributions to military literature. To his cool, clear head and stout heart it was mainly due that the Duke of York had made good his retreat from Dunkirk in 1793, and he had proposed, planned, and in great part conducted the bold exploit by which the garrison of Menin had cut their way through the besieging army in 1794. He had

served in the cavalry, in the artillery, and on the staff, and had been a military instructor. The *Military Library* (1783-4) and the *New Military Journal* (from 1788 onwards) were standard periodicals for which he was responsible, and he was the author of a *Handbook for Officers of the Applied Military Sciences* and of a *Military Pocket Book for Field Use.* The Prussian headquarters, after making the acquaintance of Major Scharnhorst, and seeing how he fulfilled his duties, reported to Berlin that he was an eminently practical officer, and that it would be a real acquisition if he could be induced to enter the Prussian service. A few months later the offer was made to him of a majority in the Prussian artillery. This offer was declined. But in 1800, Scharnhorst, now Lieut.-Colonel, finding that not being a nobleman he had no future in the Hanoverian service, intimated that he was willing to accept a similar proposal. The young King Frederic William III., when Crown Prince, had made his acquaintance, and received a favourable impression, so that no difficulties were raised, and on May 1st, 1801, Lieut.-Colonel Scharnhorst was appointed to the 3rd Prussian Regiment of Artillery, and in the following year received his patent of nobility.

One of his first appointments was that of instructor in the professional school for officers at Berlin, which he very soon transformed into what would now be called a staff college. His lectures at this institution were the beginning of Prussian systematic instruction in staff duties, and in the theory of war. At the same time he founded the Berlin Military Society, an institution for the delivery of lectures. In 1804 Scharnhorst was transferred to the staff, becoming one of three quartermasters to whom the study of three theatres of operations probable for Prussia was assigned. In 1806 he was the Duke of Brunswick's chief staff-officer, and after that general's fall at Auerstädt, attached himself during the retreat to Blücher, who attributed to him what-

ever success attended his efforts to save his corps. In the subsequent campaign in Prussia, Scharnhorst greatly distinguished himself, especially by his management at Eylau of L'Estocq's corps, by which that battle was saved.

Scharnhorst's modesty and bravery had attracted the King, who promoted him in July, 1807, to Major-General, and placed him at the head of the new Royal Commission to reorganize the army. From that time onwards Scharnhorst's whole life was devoted to the one task of preparing Prussia to renew the struggle for her independence. In this effort he combined a Napoleonic activity with the patience of Job, and with a modesty all his own. Of the Royal Commission he was the moving spirit; but it was laborious and harassing work, for the King appointed to it as many reactionaries as reformers. By degrees, Scharnhorst persuaded him to modify its composition, so that the reformers became a majority, but he never could induce the King to adopt a single measure in its entirety, or to agree to more than a tithe of what the Commission proposed.

In June, 1808, Scharnhorst became Adjutant-General, with the duty of reporting all military matters to the King; in March, 1809, when the Ministry of War was reorganized, he became also chief of the general war department, or head of what would now be called the general staff; in 1810 he further undertook the direction of the military academy, or reformed and enlarged staff college; and he was also Inspector-General of the corps of engineers. Thus, between 1808 and 1810, almost the whole work of organizing and managing the army was concentrated into his hands, and there was no department which he touched without transforming. Clausewitz has given a brief survey of Scharnhorst's aims in the reorganization of the army. They were, he says:—

"1. A subdivision, armament, and equipment corresponding to the new conditions of war.

"2. To recruit the army from a better class and to raise its tone. Hence the abolition of the enlistment of foreigners, an approximation to universal service, abolition of corporal punishment, and the foundation of good institutions for military education.

"3. A careful selection of the officers placed in command of the larger units. Seniority, which before had had too extensive a sway in the Prussian army, and had given it its leaders, was restricted in its rights, and the principle set up that those should be preferred who had most recently served in war, or had in some way distinguished themselves in it. As a fact, most of the men who afterwards were the most distinguished leaders were first brought to the front under Scharnhorst's administration.

"4. New exercises suited to modern war."

These headings, though they classify what was done, give hardly an idea of its extent. Scharnhorst induced the King to subdivide the army into divisions of all arms, reduced to brigades when Napoleon, by the Convention of 1808, obliged Prussia not to increase her army beyond 42,000 men, and not to create new cadres. At a time when the gun-foundries at Berlin and Breslau had been destroyed by the French, Scharnhorst managed to produce guns, muskets, and powder for a much larger army than Prussia possessed, and to provide for the troops the overcoats they had lacked in 1806. His great leading idea was to interest the whole nation in the national defence, and to be able to call the whole population to arms when the time should come. The Commission over and over again proposed the formation of a great reserve, or landwehr, which was to be separate from the army, and to include, as far as possible, all the men capable of arms. But the King would have no such revolutionary scheme. The most that could be had from

the King was his consent to allow trained men to be sent on furlough and their places taken by recruits, and though only a small number of such furlough-men were permitted for each company it was by making the most of the device that Scharnhorst produced the trained reserves that swelled the ranks in 1813. The King would neither introduce universal service, nor any kind of militia or landwehr until the enemy was at hand, that is, until too late for such measures to yield a practical result.

One of Scharnhorst's strongest convictions was that good leaders must be selected, irrespective of seniority. He and his comrades on the Commission had before their eyes the example of Napoleon and his marshals, all of whom were promoted without regard to age or seniority, on account of their tried ability. Accordingly the Commission made drastic proposals which the King would not endorse. They were, however, able to abolish the exclusion from the commissioned ranks of all but nobles, and to introduce the system by which future officers were elected by the officers of the regiments. They probably hardly foresaw the effect of this election in perpetuating in fact, though not in theory, the exclusiveness of the system. In the department of tactics, the essential change effected was that manœuvres were substituted for prearranged reviews, and due weight given to the working of the three arms in common. Scharnhorst himself trained up the new generation of staff officers.

It was above all a change in the spirit of the army that Scharnhorst sought to bring about, and in this he succeeded. He was the founder of a school, and when he died he left a number of disciples who represented the ideals for which he had worked. The body of Prussian officers did not cease to be a caste, but it became to some extent a caste of which the principle was duty. One thing Scharnhorst could not do. It was impossible to induce the King to have a policy. He had been thoroughly overawed in 1806, and

nothing could bring him a second time to stand up against Napoleon. The whole Prussian patriotic party was for joining with Austria in 1809. Scharnhorst was ready, but the King dare not budge. In each succeeding year the patriots were eager to rise and fight. But the King only went deeper into dependence upon France. He had to dismiss Stein; to accept Scharnhorst's resignation—a mere form, for Scharnhorst without the official position continued to direct the work of the war office and kept his post at the staff and its college—and finally to enter the war against Russia on Napoleon's side.

In December, 1812, the Grand Army was no more, and Napoleon was on his way back to Paris. By the end of the month York had taken the Prussian contingent over to the Russian side. Prussia's opportunity had come at last. The army knew it, and the generals in command spontaneously made their arrangements to fight the French. The people knew it, and began their preparations. The statesmen knew it, and besought the King to act. But the King was still blind and deaf. He thought generals, statesmen, soldiers, and people revolutionaries; was indignant at their disregard of his heaven-sent authority, and sent to assure Napoleon of his fidelity. The question arose in many a Prussian heart whether a spiritless King was worth keeping. Alexander sent him an ultimatum. Then at last Frederic William yielded, sorely against his will, to the necessity of being on his country's side, and the treaty with Russia was signed. A month later Prussia had 150,000 men under arms, and was levying 120,000 more.

Scharnhorst now obtained the royal approval to the projects for landwehr and landsturm, and to the suspension of all exemptions from military service—but all three measures only for the duration of the war. Arms, men, leaders, and the right spirit were now all forthcoming. Scharnhorst's six years of perseverance and patience had borne fruit.

Only one man had learned nothing. The army had been raised, armed, organized, and trained under Scharnhorst's auspices; it remained to put him in command of it. Frederic William never seems to have thought of such a step for a moment; he accepted Scharnhorst's modest proposal that Blücher should command, and allowed the first soldier in his dominions to be merely Blücher's chief of the staff—a position in which he had little more influence on the course of the war than when he had been seven years before chief of the staff to the Duke of Brunswick.

In the first great battle Scharnhorst was wounded. Frederic William let him go off, with his wound, on a mission to Vienna. On the journey, which was arduous, and which caused his wound to become serious, he wrote to his daughter—"I want nothing from the whole world. What is valuable to me it will never give me. If I could command the whole (army), I would give a great deal for that. I consider myself, compared with them all, quite capable of it. If I cannot have that, all things are indifferent to me. In battle I can always find a place. For distinctions I care nothing; as I do not receive those I have deserved, any other is an insult, and I should despise myself if I thought otherwise. All my orders and my life I would give to have the command in chief for one day."

Frederic William's ingratitude had hit him very hard. His wound took a turn for the worse, and a few weeks after writing the words just quoted he died.

The Archduke Charles[1]

THE Archduke Charles is perhaps among great Generals the one whose career has been least understood. In 1796, at the age of twenty-five, in spite of the bungling and disobedience of incapable old subordinates, he defeats Jourdan and Moreau, and hustles them one after the other across the Rhine. But his success is swallowed up in the disasters brought on by the incompetence of the Generals opposed to Bonaparte in Italy, disasters which with the means at his disposal the Archduke is unable to remedy. In 1799 he again defeats Moreau, only to find himself paralysed by the hesitations of Austrian policy and the friction of a coalition. In 1805 he is relegated to the minor theatre of war in Italy, and forced by the collapse of Mack at Ulm to begin by a retreat, which, however, he prefaces by giving Masséna a handsome beating at Caldiero. In 1809 he is face to face with Napoleon at his best. Defeated at Eckmühl, he yet manages to appear in time on the Danube at Vienna and at Aspern defeats the till then invincible Emperor. Beaten a few weeks later on the same ground (Wagram), he withdraws his army in good order and with its spirit unbroken. But thereupon he resigns the command, and disappears from public life. So many brave efforts ending in failure, and so promising a career cut short by retirement at the age of

[1] *Ausgewählte Schriften weiland seiner Kaiserlichen Hoheit des Erzherzogs Carl von Oesterreich.* Herausgegeben im Auftrage seiner Söhne der Herren Erzherzöge Albrecht und Wilhelm. 6 vols. With a volume of maps. Wien and Leipzig: Wilhelm Braumüller, 1893-94.

thirty-eight, have repelled the crowd of hero-worshippers. Even so thoughtful a historian as the late Sir John Seeley attributes the breakdown of Austria in 1809 "to the mismanagement of the Austrian leaders, particularly of the Archduke Charles, who in this, the great opportunity of his life, completely disappointed expectation."

These words doubtless reflect the judgment of every reader of the history of the Napoleonic age who has not specially studied the Austrian policy and the Austrian army of that epoch. Yet it is fundamentally wrong, and does injustice to one of the finest characters of the time. From 1809 to his death in 1847, the Archduke Charles lived the life of a student. His subject was war, and he wrote much. His history of the campaign of 1796, which was published in 1813, with a preliminary essay on Strategy, was at once recognised as the military classic *par excellence*. The introduction gave a concise exposition of principles which have ever since been accepted as true, and the history became the model of military criticism. For the Archduke ruthlessly exposes his own mistakes, and traces his success and his failure, as well as those of his antagonists, to the application or to the neglect of the principles which he establishes. This work was followed in 1819 by a history of the campaign of 1799. Upon these volumes, which placed him in the very highest rank as a teacher of war, and upon his campaigns the Archduke's fame has hitherto rested. But some years ago his two sons, Albrecht and Wilhelm, set on foot the publication of his collected works, not indeed complete, but with only unimportant omissions, and since the appearance of the sixth and last volume those who care about it can now learn pretty nearly the whole truth.

The works now published either for the first time, or for the first time in a generally accessible form, fall into three classes. There are, first, histories written between 1830 and 1840, for the instruction of the Archduke's sons, of the

revolutionary wars from 1792 to 1797; together with a précis of the Peninsular War and of the wars of 1812 to 1815. Then there are essays on many questions of military organization, tactics, and strategy, most of which were contributed, during the author's later years, to an Austrian military magazine; and lastly, there are a number of memoirs, some private and some official, dealing with Austrian affairs and the Archduke's part in them, between 1800 and 1809.

The Archduke writes with Tacitean conciseness, and it is impossible in a short paper to give more than a hint of what is to be found in his six large volumes. It is easiest to begin at the end with the State papers. In January, 1801, the Archduke was placed at the head of the Austrian military administration. On April 4th he handed to the Emperor a memorandum on the principles to be observed in reorganizing the department, which is a masterpiece of administrative insight. The Archduke lays it down as the first duty of the military administration to settle the size and strength of the army required by the State, having regard to its resources and population, and to the military forces of its enemies. He then surveys the whole field of military administration with a thoroughness of grasp and a breadth of view that cannot be excelled. The Emperor Francis, his elder brother, approved of the ideas, and the Archduke set to work to carry them out. But he was opposed and obstructed at every turn by the whole of the military bureaucracy, by all the old incompetent generals, and by the multitude of aristocratic aspirants to place and power. The Archduke was bent upon the regeneration of Austria. In 1802 he sent to the Emperor a "Memoir upon the present condition of the Austrian Monarchy in comparison with that of France before the Revolution," a document which may well be compared with any of the papers in which a few years later, Stein, Hardenberg, and Scharnhorst advocated

reform in Prussia. The Archduke carefully followed foreign affairs. In 1804 he protested against the project of an alliance with Russia for a war against France. He showed that the Russian alliance could not help Austria, and that Austria could not in the space of a few months be prepared to confront the French Empire in arms with any prospect of success. The Emperor Francis listened to other advisers, and in 1805 decided upon the war, and upon the removal of the Archduke from his post. The command of the principal army was entrusted to Mack, and the Archduke sent to Italy with a force quite insufficient to produce any decisive result. In spite of the untiring exertions of the Archduke the campaign, which began with the capture of Mack's army, ended with the defeat of the Russian and Austrian forces at Austerlitz, and with the fulfilment of the prophecies made in the memorandum of 1804. After the peace the Archduke was again placed at the head of the army and again for several years laboured incessantly, in spite of renewed opposition and obstruction, at its reorganization.

In 1808 there was a new movement in favour of war with France. Again the Archduke protested; urged that the suggested alliances were illusory; begged for delay and for thorough preparation before the war was allowed to become inevitable. Again he was overruled. But this time he allowed himself to be persuaded to remain at his post and to take command of the army. It had been impossible in the few years of his administration to change the traditional spirit of generals and officers. When the war came the commander found himself paralysed by the helplessness as well as the disloyalty of his subordinates. His first move, on nearing the enemy, was to march to crush Davout at Ratisbon. His force moved in three parallel columns. Davout attacked the left column, and the commander of the next column watched its defeat from a hill a mile or two away,

without the idea occurring to him that his duty, the object of his existence, was to move his own column to its help. Thwarted at every turn by such incapacity as well as by ill-will, his army far outnumbered by the enemy, the Archduke was yet able to add to his fame by the victory of Aspern, and the splendid if unsuccessful resistance of Wagram. In the preface to a short account of the war of 1809, now apparently published for the first time, the story of that year is summed up in one brief but pregnant sentence:—"In the year 1809, the Austrian Government failed to understand the European situation, and its General overestimated the instruments at his disposal."

The Archduke's later military essays are amongst the most remarkable in military literature. They rank with the best of Scharnhorst's papers and with the best work of the modern German school. An essay on the General Staff reads like an account, written in advance, of the Prussian General Staff of our own time. An essay on the method of instruction in tactics anticipates the system of problems now everywhere in vogue.

The Archduke's histories and précis differ in quality, some of them being so condensed as to be hardly more than mere summaries of events. The brief survey of the Campaigns of 1796 and 1797 (not before published) is a masterpiece, and adds essentially to our insight into the subject. For example, the question has been debated by Clausewitz, Jomini, and their successors down to the author of the Belgian précis published in 1889, whether it would not have been better in 1797 for the Archduke to have resisted Napoleon's advance on Vienna by placing his army in the Tyrol rather than by interposing it between Napoleon and his objective. The Archduke settles the question. He says that he ought to have gone into Tyrol, and that he did not do so because he was still possessed by the erroneous ideas of war in which he had been brought up.

This account may suffice to show that the volumes now published are a storehouse of ripe military wisdom, an invaluable addition to the library of the officer who aims at the mastery of his profession. It may be fitly concluded with one of the Archduke's aphorisms, which, though it has long been published, is not as well known as it deserves:—

"In consequence of the excessive increase of armies, tactics have lost in value, and the strategical design of the operations (rather than the details of manœuvre) has become the decisive factor in the issue of a campaign. The strategical design, as a rule, depends upon the decisions of Cabinets, and upon the resources placed at the disposal of the commander. Therefore either the leading statesmen should have correct views of the science of war, or should make up for their ignorance by giving their entire confidence to the man to whom the supreme command of the army is entrusted. Otherwise the germ of defeat and of national ruin may be contained in the first preparations for a war."

A Forgotten War[1]

ON November 28th, 1862, General von Roon, Minister of War at Berlin, wrote a letter to the chief of the Staff pointing out that the disputes then pending with Denmark might lead to a war, and asking whether that eventuality had been considered in the chief's office. A few days later Moltke replied, "We have constantly kept in view the possibility of a military solution of the dispute with Denmark," and "respectfully" offered his suggestions. "So long," he wrote, "as our navy is unable to cover a landing upon Seeland, where we could dictate a peace in Copenhagen itself, there remains only the occupation of the Jutish Peninsula, which to be effective as a constraint upon Denmark must be of long duration, but which in that case may provoke the diplomatic intervention and even the actual interference of other Powers. The real military objective, so long as the seat of the Danish Government is inaccessible to us, is the Danish army. Merely to drive it back, however, will not lead to the end of the war. Not a first victory, but a victory made the most of by a pursuit which will destroy the enemy's forces before they have reached their safe points of embarkation, is the goal to be aimed at and the only one that is attainable." Thus a year before the war of 1864 began, Moltke had made up his mind about the nature of a conflict with Denmark. We now know how

[1] *Moltke's Kriegsgeschichtliche Arbeiten: Geschichte des Krieges gegen Dänemark*, 1848-49. Herausgegeben vom Grossen Generalstabe, Abtheilung für Kriegsgeschichte. Berlin: E. S. Mittler und Sohn. 1893.

he sought and obtained his grip of the subject. He had during the year 1862 been writing a history of the Danish campaigns of 1848-49. He continued to work at his manuscript at intervals during the next fifteen years, and the work was issued in 1893 as the first of a series of hitherto unpublished military histories from his pen. The professional exponents of military history in England seem to have thought the volume beneath their notice. Yet it is a better model of military history than the official accounts of more recent wars, because, while in telling the story of the campaigns in Germany and in France the Prussian Staff had necessarily to exercise considerable reserve, and to confine itself to explaining the action of its own side only, no such reserve and no such limitation was imposed upon Moltke in regard to the earlier war. He had at his disposal an account compiled by the Danish Staff, as well as the narrative of the Prussian Staff, and his work is therefore not merely materials for a future historian, but a history.

The war of 1848 is the prelude to the subsequent history of Germany. The conflicts of 1864 and 1866 can no more be understood without a knowledge of the earlier one than the Siege of Troy without the abduction of Helen. The Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein formed a constitutional Monarchy or Dukedom, and they were united with the absolute Monarchy of Denmark by a personal tie, such as joined the Hanoverian to the British Crown from 1714 to 1837. The King-Duke Frederick VII., who succeeded in January, 1848, had no children, and was likely to have none, and there was no one who after him could inherit both crowns. The Danes had long been occupied with the question how to avert the parting from Schleswig-Holstein, which, unless something were done, must happen at Frederick's death. Though Denmark was an absolute Monarchy, the strong party in the country was Radical, and the Radicals decided that there must be a Constitution for Denmark,

and that Schleswig, but not Holstein, which was a State of the German Confederation, must have the benefit of it—that is, must be annexed to Denmark. Within a month of Frederick's accession, the February revolution at Paris came like a thunderclap upon Continental Princes, and Frederick, being a person of no character, at once surrendered to his Radicals, made himself a Constitutional Monarch, and announced that the Constitution was for the "whole Monarchy"—in other words, that he would annex Schleswig. A deputation sent from Schleswig-Holstein to protest against this arbitrary, illegal, and unconstitutional proceeding was received with insult, and the Danish army and navy were placed upon a war footing. The Duchies thereupon set up a provisional Government, called out their own troops (about a quarter of the, till then, Danish army), and took possession of the fortress of Rendsburg.

The action of Denmark aroused a storm of indignation throughout Germany, and several German Monarchs, being in fear of revolution, determined to espouse the popular cause of Schleswig-Holstein. The Kings of Prussia and Hanover sent each a division of troops into Holstein, and several lesser potentates sent smaller contingents. The Diet of the German Confederation also, after a little delay, declared war against Denmark. While the German forces were assembling in Holstein the Danish army invaded Schleswig. The Schleswig-Holstein troops, six thousand four hundred strong, were spread out in a cordon of outposts in front of Flensburg, and none of the commanders had the strength of mind to order this weak force back to its German supports, nor the judgment to concentrate it before it was attacked. On the 9th of April the Danes, with eleven thousand men, attacked and dispersed it, following quietly to the town of Schleswig. The German troops were not yet ready, and negotiations between various Governments were required before the first move. At length, on

the 23d of April the Prussian division, twelve thousand strong, advanced from Rendsburg to attack the Danish army of about the same numbers at Schleswig. The orders issued in advance contemplated holding the Danes in front with half the force, while the other half moved against their right flank. But as soon as the advanced guard of his right column, destined for the front attack, came into contact with the enemy, Wrangel, the Prussian commander, assisted by nearly all his Generals, took charge of this little skirmish. There was therefore no one to manage the battle. The Prussian troops were well trained and disciplined, and the Danes not much better than volunteers. Accordingly, the Prussian companies fought their way forward into the town, and when darkness came on, the Danes, tired out and feeling beaten, withdrew. Next day the Danish army retreated in disorderly haste. Wrangel, when at night he suspected that his troops had won a battle, sent for the Hanoverian division, twenty miles away, to lead the pursuit. Accordingly, as was to be expected the Danish army escaped, and two days later was safe in the island of Alsen. Wrangel then realized that his victory was barren, and that he had lost his one chance of destroying the Danish army.

The Danes had a fleet and the Germans had none, so the Danes could move their troops by sea when and where they pleased. They placed a small force in Jutland as a bait, which Wrangel followed, but of course could not catch, for when pressed it disappeared to sea. Meanwhile the Danes in Alsen recrossed the strait and fell upon the detachment left to watch them. When Wrangel turned back to repair this little reverse, the Danes landed a fresh force in Jutland to follow him down the peninsula. In July, Wrangel reported home: "It will be impossible to force the Danes to fight and to compel them to accept a peace except with the help of an allied fleet." The Danish command of the sea stalemated the Germans on land, while the Danish fleet was

inflicting enormous damage to German trade by a blockade of the ports in the North Sea and the Baltic.

In short, the King of Prussia and his German allies had committed the elementary blunder of beginning a war without knowing how they proposed to finish it. If they had well understood that the only chance of success lay in destroying the Danish army, Wrangel's mistake of letting it escape would hardly have occurred. But the German allies had made an even greater and more fundamental error, a false step, not merely of stategy, but of policy. They had completely forgotten that there were other Powers which were on the Danish side. As soon as Wrangel appeared in Jutland, Sweden protested and prepared an expeditionary force, and the Czar Nicholas sent to the German Courts a note as strong as it could be short of an ultimatum, in which he plainly declared himself on the Danish side. By September the Germans agreed to an armistice in which the Danish claims were provisionally admitted. This secured the Danes for the winter, when they were afraid of an attack across the ice. In the spring of 1849, being sure of Russia, they terminated the armistice and renewed the war. A fresh Prussian General, Prittwitz, was entrusted with the task of chasing an army that invariably retreated, but fell upon any detachments he might unwarily expose. He ended his campaign by allowing twenty thousand Danes to attack and nearly destroy the little Schleswig-Holstein army left by itself in front of Fredericia. Then came a fresh armistice, in which, at Russia's bidding, Prussia left Schleswig and Holstein to their fate. At this point Moltke's history ends, though the war in Denmark went on. The Duchies, abandoned by their allies, raised an army of forty thousand men, and held out until January, 1851, when Prussia, now completely under the heel of Russia and Austria, was compelled to interfere on the side of Denmark, and

English Miles
0 10 20 30 40 50
SEA
Aalborg
Lundby
JUTLAND
Elsinore

Fredericia
DENMARK
NORTH SEA
SCHLESWIG
Alsen
Flensburg
Schleswig
Eckernförde
Kiel
Rendsburg
HOLSTEIN
BALTIC SEA
Walker & Cockerell sc

to join with Austria in an ultimatum requiring the disbandment of the Schleswig-Holstein army.

The war is full of interesting episodes. The achievements and the failures of the numerous volunteers in the Schleswig-Holstein service well illustrate the strength and the weakness of such troops. The capture of a Danish line-of-battle ship and a frigate by a handful of artillerymen at Eckernförde (April 5th, 1849) is one of the most remarkable events in naval warfare.

Moltke's history is described by the Prussian Staff in their preface as worthy of the name it bears. It certainly tells, with perfect lucidity, a story which in itself has hardly a parallel for elaborate intricacy. It is exhaustive yet concise. It abounds with brilliant though sober, tactical and strategical criticism. The author touches upon politics only when he is compelled; so many readers will be glad to supplement his story by a reference to Sybel's more recent work. No one can read the volume without learning that sound policy is the foundation of military success, and that the command of the sea, even in the hands of an insignificant military Power, may counterbalance a number of victories won upon land by a far stronger enemy. But the distinctive merit of the book, which entitles it to be called a masterpiece, lies in a command of the subject so perfect that the story of a dismal failure becomes in the author's hands a series of convincing lessons in war.

The Archduke Albrecht

IN May, 1866, while the bulk of the Austrian forces were being assembled in Bohemia for resistance to the Prussians, the Archduke Albrecht was entrusted with the defence of the Austrian Empire against the attacks of the new Kingdom of Italy. He had not an easy task. Victor Emanuel had a quarter of a million of men in the field, without having withdrawn necessary garrisons from any of his fortresses. The Archduke had a field army of ninety-five thousand men, of whom about seventy-five thousand were effectives, and this force could not be increased, for it was impracticable at the outset of a campaign against Italy to diminish the garrisons of the fortresses in Venetia. The frontier line across which attack was to be expected ran from the Lake of Garda for thirty miles due south, first along the Mincio to the upper lake at Mantua, and thence to the Po at Borgoforte. From Borgoforte it followed the Po to its mouth, about ninety miles. Behind the Mincio, which is an equable stream of no great volume and easily bridged, runs the swifter and more variable Adige, its course from Verona being to the south-east for some forty miles, when it turns due east and runs parallel to the Po, at about twelve miles distance from that river, to the sea. The Austrians held the fortresses of Peschiera and Mantua on the Mincio and of Verona and Legnago on the upper Adige. The Mincio, if passed by the Italians, must be crossed by them in the space between Peschiera and Mantua,

a space reduced by the necessity for avoiding the rayons of the fortresses to about fifteen miles. The belt formed by the parallel beds of the lower Po and the lower Adige is intersected by two smaller streams or navigable canals parallel with the large rivers; it has few roads, and is quite impracticable for an army at both its eastern and western ends by reason of the marshy nature of the ground. The only practicable space is in the central region extending for a few miles on either side of the high road from Ferrara to Padua, which itself passes through Rovigo, a small Austrian fortress garrisoned at this time by eighteen hundred men. An Italian attack must come either across the upper Mincio or across the Po and the Adige, near Ferrara. The Archduke promptly resolved that his best plan in either case would be to allow the Italian force to cross, and then strike a prompt blow against it with his whole army. If the enemy should advance from both directions at the same time, he would strike at one army and neglect the other, being sure that the delay which the enemy must suffer in bridging and passing the upper Adige, over which he himself had secured passages at Verona and Legnago, would insure him against the risk of being caught between the two armies.

The success of an attack by an inferior force depends to some extent upon its being unexpected. The first thing, therefore, was to prevent the Italians from learning his movements. The Archduke ordered the frontier to be hermetically sealed, an operation in which the Austrians were adepts, and which was carried out with complete success. He then, in the middle of June, collected his whole army behind (to the east of) that part of the Adige of which Legnago is the centre, had the line of the Mincio watched by a few squadrons and rifle companies, and that of the Po by small parties from the garrisons of Legnago and Rovigo. He learned that of the twenty divisions of the Italian army, twelve were in Lombardy under Victor Emanuel, and eight

in the neighbourhood of Bologna and Ferrara under Cialdini. A double attack was evidently intended. That of the King across the Mincio would be the principal one both in force and in importance; that of Cialdini must be considerably delayed by the difficulties of bridging four streams and of besieging or evading Rovigo. Accordingly, the Archduke resolved to move his army to Verona, ready to attack the King on his crossing the Mincio. On June 20th, the King of Italy declared war, and announced that he should commence hostilities on the 23rd. The Archduke allowed his army to rest in its central position until the 22nd. On that day he moved it to the neighbourhood of Verona. The country between the Mincio and the Adige is a flat plain, except in the corner near Peschiera. Here a belt of low broken hills, about seven miles wide, runs down from the north in continuation of those that flank the Lake of Garda, and overlooks the left bank of the Mincio for some six miles below its exit from the lake. The Archduke intended to place his army on these hills early on June 24th, and then immediately to move south to the attack of the Italian army as soon as it should have crossed the Mincio. But learning on the 23rd that the Italian army was then crossing the river, he sent on that evening on to the northern portion of the hill plateau his reserve division and his 5th Corps, holding his 7th and 9th Corps a mile or two west of Verona ready to follow at dawn. On the 23rd the Italian main army had passed the river with seven of its twelve divisions, leaving the remainder partly "to observe Mantua" and partly in readiness to follow later. But the movement was so arranged that the troops were spread out in the plain to the south of the hills, and only a small force was on the western edge of the plateau, quite close to the Mincio, a few miles below Peschiera.

By about eight o'clock on the morning of the 24th the whole Austrian army, concentrated on the plateau, was

moving south on a broad front. Its left flank was covered by a cavalry brigade in the plain. The Italian army was still spread over the plain, some three of its divisions threading their way into the hills, the King, General La Marmora, and all the general officers being in happy oblivion of the Austrian army, which they imagined to be many miles away beyond the Adige. Firing was heard in the hills. "The forts of Peschiera," said General La Marmora, little dreaming that seventy thousand Austrians were just beginning to sweep his isolated divisions from the plateau. A little later the Italian divisions of infantry, which were leisurely moving in front of Villafranca (in the plain opposite the south-east corner of the plateau), were suddenly fired upon by artillery in their front, and desperately charged by a few squadrons of Austrian cavalry. The cavalry suffered severely and the infantry were not materially damaged. But Generals, officers, and men were so startled and petrified by the sudden appearance of an enemy and by the boldness and vigour of his charge that all seem to have lost their heads. Twenty thousand men stood spellbound at Villafranca, doing nothing for the rest of the day. General La Marmora was convinced by this charge that the Austrian army was coming from the east across the plain to attack his right flank. Instead of sending to learn the meaning of the firing in the hills on his left flank, he galloped off the field to bring up the corps that was observing Mantua, only to find when he reached it what he ought to have known before he started—that it could not be marched to the battlefield in time. He was the King's Chief of the Staff; and when he had disappeared, there was no one to direct the battle, which was left, as battles too often are, to conduct itself. The Italian divisional Generals, as they one after another discovered that there was a serious battle going on upon the plateau, moved their forces up to the help of their comrades. But these spasmodic unconcerted reinforce-

ments were of no avail against the repeated assaults of the Austrian army, of which the Generals had received clear instructions and which was all day watched and carefully directed by the Archduke. Shortly before sunset, the Austrians stormed the last Italian position, the village of Custozza, on one of the southern spurs of the plateau. From here, in the roseate glow of a magnificent sunset, the Austrians looked down upon the wide plain between Villafranca and Valeggio and watched the spectacle of a hundred thousand men surging towards the river in the hurry and confusion of retreat. They were looking upon a beaten army.

There was no pursuit. All the Austrian troops had been engaged; all had been on the move since dawn; all were exhausted; and all lay that night where they were. The Italian army next day continued its retreat, and Cialdini was ordered by telegraph to abandon his enterprise on the lower Po, and hasten to the rescue of the King's force. On July 1st the Archduke crossed the Mincio, not for pursuit, but merely to be ready in a favourable position to meet a second advance of the Italians. On July 2nd the defeat of Königgrätz changed the whole situation. A few days later the Archduke was ordered to return to Vienna and to move all available troops from Italy for the defence of the capital.

The battle of Custozza, or the thirty-six hours' campaign that falls between dawn on the 23rd and sunset on the 24th of June, contains the whole career of the Archduke Albrecht as a commander in war. It has given him a high rank among the commanders of the nineteenth century. The Archduke's arrangements from the beginning are admitted to be models. Nothing could be better than the choice of the region for the first concentration; the measures for observing the rivers; the march to the right and the direction of the attack. The plan of the battle was judicious and its supervision, in circumstances that could not be foreseen, cool, wary, and determined. Willisen thought it a fault

that more emphasis was not given to the blow of the Austrian right wing. This, however, seems to have been due not to the Archduke's plan but to the bungling of subordinates. The action was no doubt too dispersed to produce the most decisive result—the material ruin of the enemy by the barring of his retreat. The explanation may perhaps be that the Archduke moved from his camps behind the Adige half a day too late. Had the whole army been on the hills near Peschiera on the evening of the 23rd the action would have been more compact. The Italians had given three days' notice of the opening of hostilities. The Archduke took this to mean that they would be free to enter Austrian territory at noon on the 23rd. The Italians understood themselves to be at liberty to cross the border at 6 a.m. on the 23rd. As his intention was to take them by surprise, the Archduke did not wish his army to be in position a moment too soon; and thus he may have been led to a slight delay which marred the decisiveness of his victory. That he did not pursue is probably to be attributed to his foresight of what would happen in Bohemia, rather than to lack of energy or boldness.

This brief review of what he did will show that the Archduke was a great commander. There is no need to compare or contrast him with others; he had but one opportunity, which he used splendidly. It is more interesting, and happily less speculative, to ask how he gained the powers which he displayed in this brief campaign. The answer is that he had been well trained—that is, he had taught himself war by hard study, and had had the advantage of the best teaching. His father, the Archduke Charles, was one of the greatest teachers of war; perhaps he had no superior except Napoleon. In the retirement of his later years the military education of his sons was his chief care. After the Archduke Charles died (1847), the Archduke Albrecht served in the Italian war of 1848-89 under Radetzky, and

distinguished himself in the defence of Verona as well as in the subsequent actions. He could not have had two better masters. Both the study of his father's campaigns and the experience of his own early service had made him familiar with the theatre in which in 1866 he was called upon to act.

The Archduke Albrecht gave to the world the lesson which he thought the most important that could be drawn from his experience. He published in 1869 a short paper on "Responsibility in War," which ought to be familiar to every politician. The gist of it is that failure in war brings with it immeasurable consequences to a nation, and that it can be avoided, if at all, only by full devotion to their duty of self-preparation on the part of all who may have to bear any responsibility in connection with it—officers, generals, commanders, and, above all, the statesmen whose duty it is to see that the national forces are duly prepared—that competent leaders have been found in plenty of time, and have been given authority to train their subordinates.

Lake of Garda
Scale of Miles
0
5
10
20
30
40
Verona
Peschiera
Padua
Custozza
Valeggio
Villafranca
R. Mincio
R. Adige
Legnago
Mantua
Borgoforte
R. Po
Rovigo
R. Po
Ferrara

The Defence of Plevna[1]

TO learn the lesson conveyed by the defence and the fall of Plevna we must find the true place of these events in the war of which they were a part. Before the month of April, 1877, when war was declared, the Russians had mobilised nine army corps, seven of which (200,000 men) were posted on the frontier between the Pruth and the mouth of the Danube. Russia had secured the neutrality of Austria and the alliance of Roumania, both indispensable. The Turkish forces were dispersed over a wide area. A considerable army was still operating against Montenegro; forty-four battalions of the army that had defeated the Serbs were still under Osman Pasha at and near Widdin, observing both the Serbs and the Roumanians. In the quadrilateral formed by the fortresses of Rustchuk, Silistria, Shumla, and the much-dilapidated Varna stood a hundred and twenty-four battalions, perhaps seventy thousand men. The existence of these fortresses and the presence of an army between them rendered improbable, because too dangerous, an attempt of the Russians to pass the Danube between Rustchuk and Silistria. An advance of the Russian main army through the Dobrudscha was out of the question, because in that district a large army can be supplied only from the sea, which the Turkish fleet commanded. The Russians, therefore, must advance into Roumania, and try to cross

[1] *The Defence of Plevna, 1877: written by one who took part in it.* By William V. Herbert. London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1895.

the Danube between Rustchuk and Widdin. Broadly speaking, the distribution of the available Turkish forces was good, though it does not appear to have originated in any specific design. The plan, suggested by Greene after the war, of a Turkish offensive defence by the seizure and fortification of Galatz, Braila, Reni, and Ismail, and a vigorous attack on the Russian army during its advance into Wallachia, was quite impracticable. Nor was it possible without an army at least twice as numerous and much more mobile than the Turks possessed to prevent the Russians from passing the Danube. The real question for the Turks was whether to deliver their great blow on the north or on the south side of the Balkans. The plan, much cherished in theories, of posting an army on the hither side of a mountain chain, with a view to a concentrated attack upon the first fraction of the enemy that emerges in isolation from one of the passes, depends for its chance of success upon a particular formation of the country. Where, as in Piedmont, the mountains rise steeply from the plain so that a series of passes open directly on to the main plain, an army in the plain can prevent the junction of the enemy's columns because that junction can take place only in the plain. But between the Balkans and the plain of the Maritza stand the Little Balkans, a lower parallel range, separated by a very narrow valley from the main range. This valley offered a gathering place for Russian columns moving through the passes, and would have been a trap to a Turkish force posted in it. The best plan open to the Turks was, therefore, collecting their army in the quadrilateral, where it could base itself either on Adrianople or on the sea, and having the advantage of the Rustchuk-Varna railway for supply, to make a vigorous attack upon the Russian army when it should be between the Danube and the Balkans.

That the Turks had this plan it would be hard to deny, but what they certainly had not was the determination and

the energy, or, in one word, the will to carry it out. The Russians moved one corps into the Dobrudscha, where it remained passive; with six corps they moved through Wallachia, and by July 2nd had made their bridge at Sistova, and begun to cross the river. Two corps under the Tsarovitch were to face eastwards as a defence against the main Turkish army; one was to face westwards; an advance guard under Gourko, with one corps in support, moved south towards the Balkans; and two corps, of which one did not pass the Danube until the close of July, were at first held in reserve. The Turkish army fell back before the Tsarovitch to the line of the Lom, while Gourko crossed the Balkans and reached Eshki-Zagra, on the edge of the plain of Adrianople. Here he met the Turkish army under Suleiman Pasha, which had been brought by sea from Montenegro to Dede-Agatch, and thence pushed forward by railway through Adrianople. Suleiman had ninety-five battalions, say sixty thousand men, and Gourko fell back to the Shipka Pass, where, however, he held his ground. Thus at the beginning of August the chief Turkish army, then under Mehemet Ali, had been passive, and Suleiman was about to waste his force by the impracticable frontal attack of a mountain position. The Russians had troubled themselves little about the Turkish armies, which should have been their first objective, and were dispersed over the wide semicircle from the Danube above Rustchuk, by Tirnova, Shipka, and Lovcha, to Nicopolis.

On July 13th, Osman Pasha, after a week's negotiation with the secret debating society at Constantinople, which, under the Sultan's guidance, appointed, removed, and embarrassed the Generals in the field, set out with twelve thousand men from Widdin and marched to Plevna, which he reached on the 19th. The nearest hostile force was the army-corps covering the Russian right flank, which had just taken Nicopolis and its Turkish garrison. Of this corps a detachment,

about seven hundred strong, attacked Osman at Plevna on July 20th, and was repulsed. The whole Russian corps, and a good part of one of the reserve corps—about twenty-eight thousand men, with one hundred and seventy guns—were then brought up to the attack, which was renewed on July 30th. Meantime Osman had intrenched his position and been reinforced, so that he had now thirty-three battalions, about twenty thousand men, and fifty-four guns. The attacking force was thoroughly beaten and lost heavily.

The effect of this defeat was to paralyse the Russian army, dispersed as it was over three extensive fronts, and facing at once east, south, and west. At the headquarters it was at once decided to send for one hundred and twenty thousand fresh troops from Russia, and for the Roumanian army thirty-seven thousand men, as well as to call up, to make good gaps and losses, some two hundred and twenty thousand further troops, to be sent gradually from Russia to the front. Osman's offensive had been confined to an advance to a position in which he must be attacked, and to an effective defence in that position. What must have been the result of any vigorous offensive now undertaken by the two other Turkish armies? The second battle of Plevna took place the day before the collison between Gourko and Suleiman at Eshki-Zagra, after which Gourko retired to Shipka, slowly followed by Suleiman. About the same time General Valentine Baker reached the headquarters of Mehemet Ali, and tried to induce that General and Suleiman to co-operate. Had Suleiman left a small force in front of Shipka, and sent thirty thousand men over the Balkans further east to co-operate with Mehemet Ali, the latter General would have had force enough to be sure of driving the Tsarovitch back across the Yantra, and in all probability across the Danube at Sistova. Such a blow would have ended the campaign with disaster to the Russian arms, and the opportunity for it had been created

by Osman's action. Suleiman, however, refused to move, and ruined his army by hopeless assaults on the Shipka position. Baker set going a partial attack on the right wing of the Tsarovitch, who was easily driven back from the Lom; but when it came to the final attack, for which a remarkably favorable opportunity was given by the Russians at Verboka, Mehemet Ali's will failed him, and he retreated with all his army. From that moment the fate of Turkey was sealed. Mehemet Ali was replaced by Suleiman, who made partial and therefore useless attacks on the Tsarovitch, while the Turkish Balkan army continued to throw away its strength at Shipka. Osman, who seems to have contemplated a move to a position that would have covered his retreat to the Balkans, was ordered from Constantinople to remain at Plevna. His force by September 6th had been increased to thirty thousand men and seventy-two guns. On that day the Russians began an attack which lasted a week and for which they disposed of ninety-five thousand men and four hundred and fifty guns. The attack was unsuccessful and the Russians, after a pause, during which Osman's force was increased by reinforcements to forty-eight thousand men and ninety-six guns, proceeded to a regular investment, in which they employed no less than one hundred and ten thousand men and five hundred guns. Osman held out until December 10th, when, after a brave attempt to fight his way out, he surrendered with his army.

With the fall of Plevna the whole Turkish defence collapsed. The Russians were able to reinforce their parties in the Balkans, so that Gourko, who, with a new advance guard, had already attacked near Etropol a Turkish force covering Sofia, was able to turn its position and compel its retreat to Philippopolis, while the Turkish Shipka army, turned in like manner, was captured. The main body of the Turkish Lom army had been moved to the neighbourhood

of Sofia. It retreated before Gourko to Philippopolis, and was there, along with the detachment from Etropol, attacked by Gourko and driven through the Rhodope Mountains, leaving nothing to oppose the Russian advance to Adrianople and the Sea of Marmora.

The service rendered by Osman Pasha consisted in finding occupation from July to December for the greater part of the Russian army. In proportion to the force he drew upon himself was the risk he incurred at first of defeat, and afterwards of capture. But that he was in the long run obliged to surrender was due to the fact that no use whatever was made by the other Turkish armies of the opportunity which his action created for them. The Turks had no other General. Suleiman spent his time in intrigues for the succession to Mehemet Ali, who was rendered helpless and hopeless by the knowledge of Suleiman's plot. The Sultan and his gang of Pashas at Constantinople seem to have been one and all incapable, as helpless to direct a war as to carry on a government in peace. The bravery and endurance of the Turkish soldiers were thus thrown away to no purpose.

Mr. Herbert's *Defence of Plevna* tells, we believe for the first time, the story of Osman Pasha's army from the inside. The author, then a mere boy, became a Turkish officer early in July, 1877. He was sent from Constantinople to Widdin in charge of a party of soldiers, and after being encamped for some two months at the latter place, marched to Plevna as a lieutenant in one of Osman's regiments. His account of these earlier experiences introduces us to the Turkish army. He then describes what he saw and felt during the battles and the long siege of Plevna. It is a truthful picture of war, reproducing to the life its grand and dreadful scenes, its normal misery, its horrors, and its agonies. The picture, drawn from a lieutenant's point of view, furnishes elements for a judgment of Osman Pasha, who himself hardly appears in it. We see on the eve of every fight each

Scale of Miles
0 10 50 100
R. Pruth
Reni
Ismail
Galatz
Braila
R O U M A N I A
Wallachia
Dobrudscha
SERVIA
R. Danube
Silistria
Widdin
Rustchuk
Nicopolis
Sistova
R. Lom
R. Rendina
B U L G A R I A
Plevna
Lovcha
Verboka
Tirnova
Shumla
Varna
Balkan Mountains
Etropol
Sofia
Shipka Pass
Eshki-Zagra
Philippopolis
Rhodope Mts.
R. Maritza
Adrianople
Little Balkan Mts.
Sea of Marmora
Dede Agatch

company receiving clear and explicit orders; we see the men well supplied with such provisions as exist, and always abundantly with ammunition. From these details we know that Osman's army was well commanded, and are therefore not surprised that it was confident of success, and fought well.

Few writers have better conveyed than Mr. Herbert the impression which battles make upon those who take part in them, not as generals or staff-officers, but with the rank and file of their regiments. The author's first battle, his experience of a charge and of a *mêlée,* and his recollections of the great struggle against Skobeleff's famous attack, are bits of fighting from the life. Amid these scenes of grim conflict and the greater terrors of the day after the battle, the human heart asserts itself irrepressibly; one lieutenant plays chess while waiting for the fight to begin, another falls in love while in the hospital; at the height of the siege the Roumanians in the Grivitza redoubt exhibit a marionette performance of shadows on a sheet to the enemy, the Turks, in the opposite redoubt. These are the touches that show why it is that a leader of men or a master in war must be an artist in human nature.

Nelson[1]

WHAT do we mean when we say of Nelson that he was a great man? This is the question which Captain Mahan has taken infinite pains to answer. That he has adopted the right method is beyond doubt; he illuminates the record of Nelson's work by the parallel record of Nelson's thoughts. Nor will any serious fault be found with his conclusion, which is to exhibit the great commander as a compound of determination with intellectual power. Thus he speaks of " that preparedness of mind, as well as of purpose, which at bottom was the greatest of Nelson's claims to credit." The two volumes are an enumeration of the seaman's actions accompanied by a classified catalogue of his ideas. The analysis seems to me accurate throughout. But when Captain Mahan begins a synthesis, when, having taken his hero to pieces, he puts him together again, I cannot feel quite satisfied. The question here is, How do judgment and determination come together in the same man? Captain Mahan finds the cement in the shape of " genius." This is to my mind a synonym for miracle and amounts to giving up the problem. We apply the word genius to those men who in any department reach the highest level of developed power. This perfection of faculty in exercise is the divinest phenomenon in life, seldom recognised by the

[1] *The Life of Nelson, the Embodiment of the Sea Power of Great Britain.* By Captain A. T. Mahan, D.C.L., LL.D. London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co. Price, 36*s.* net.

public in time to be made the most of for the public good, and, when perceived, regarded as inexplicable and superhuman. It has always seemed to me a bad definition to explain greatness by genius. The better way is perhaps to examine the growth of the man whose powers when mature appear so extraordinary. This method also is followed by Captain Mahan, but in his hands it leads to a result less clear than might be in regard to the genesis of Nelson's power, because the expressions of the later period are always kept before the reader during the consideration of the years of growth. Captain Mahan perpetually recurs to explanations that do not explain, at one time to "genius," at other times to "faith." Perhaps a simpler analysis may be worth attempting.

The Battle of the Nile revealed Nelson as the greatest leader in naval war. Until that time he was in no danger of being puffed up by public recognition, though afterwards his sense of his own greatness was naturally somewhat expanded. The first forty years of his life, therefore, the time of his development, are the period when his own idea of himself will be the clearest and most unaffected. The letters of this period are a true record, and they may be interpreted by the light of the autobiographical sketch which he wrote in 1799, when he evidently meant to tell his readers how, according to his own experience, a great man makes himself.

The essence of Nelson, the root and foundation of the whole man, is zeal. His autobiographical sketch is pervaded by this idea. At fourteen "my ambition was to be a seaman"; at fifteen "I begged I might be coxswain"; "I exerted myself to have the command of a cutter"; at nineteen his captain "felt as easy when I was upon deck as any officer in the ship." Even then "a frigate was not sufficiently active for my mind." In this review of his own life the whole impression is of an uninterrupted effort to be

the best man at his work, and in particular at command. It winds up with the moral: "Thus may be exemplified by my life, that perseverance in any profession will probably meet its reward . . . and I may say to the reader, 'Go thou and do likewise.'"

We must, however, not take Nelson's career on the mere faith of what he thought of it at forty-one. There is no need to do so, for we can find abundant corroboration in his previous correspondence, which is brimful of evidence of zeal, activity, and ambition. Here are a few typical passages:—

"December 13, 1786.—Our country has the first demand for our services, and private convenience, or happiness, must ever give way to public good."

"May 6, 1788.—I have invariably laid down, and followed close, a plan of what ought to be uppermost in the breast of an officer: that it is much better to serve an ungrateful country than to give up his own fame. Posterity will do him justice: a uniform conduct of honour and integrity seldom fails of bringing a man to the goal of fame at last."

"March 26, 1794.—I feel for the honour of my country, and had rather be beat than not make the attack. If we do not try we never can be successful. I own I have no fears for the final issue; it will be conquest, certain we will deserve it."

"April 1, 1795.—In short, I wish to be an admiral, and in the command of the English fleet; I should very soon either do much, or be ruined. My disposition cannot bear tame and slow measures. Sure I am, had I commanded our fleet on the 14th, that either the whole French fleet would have graced my triumph, or I should have been in a confounded scrape. I went on board Admiral Hotham as soon as our firing grew slack in the van, and the *Ca Ira* and *Censeur* had struck, to propose to him leaving our two crippled ships, the two prizes and four frigates, to themselves, and to pursue the enemy; but he, much cooler than myself, said, 'We must be contented; we have done very well.' Now, had we taken ten sail, and had allowed the

eleventh to escape, when it had been possible to have got at her, I could never have called it well done. Goodall backed me; I got him to write to the Admiral, but it would not do; we should have had such a day as, I believe, the annals of England never produced."

"April 28, 1796.—I have not a thought on any subject separated from the immediate object of my command, nor a wish to be employed on any other service."

"June 20, 1796.—Opportunities have been frequently offered me, and I have never lost one, of distinguishing myself, not only as a gallant man, but as having a head; for, of the numerous plans I have laid, not one has failed, nor of opinions given, has one been in the event wrong."

"August 2, 1796.—Had all my actions been gazetted, not one fortnight would have passed during the whole war without a letter from me: one day or other I will have a long gazette to myself; I feel that such an opportunity will be given me. I cannot, if I am in the field for glory, be kept out of sight."

These scraps from Nelson's letters reveal a man burning for distinction, and full enough of himself, though it must be remembered that they are, as a rule, confidential utterances to intimate friends, and by no means prove a lack of proper modesty. It is an honourable ambition. Never for a moment does Nelson seek distinction except by deserving it. He has the disposition to command, and, therefore, he spares no effort to qualify himself. He is determined never to lose an opportunity, and therefore he is always making plans, constantly thinking over what can be done and how to do it. His determination to act when opportunity offers is the purpose of his life, the moving spring of the whole man. Because he means to act he is perpetually planning, constantly discussing with himself and others the whole situation in which his work places him, and every possible operation which may be necessary. Thus in him judgment and determination are inseparable; they are two sides

of the same thing. If to Captain Mahan their union seems miraculous, the reason is that his career has been a different one. Nelson threw his whole force into thinking how to do what he had to do, what he was resolved to do, what it was his duty to do. His forethought was part and parcel of his action. Captain Mahan's duty in the central years of his life has been not so much to act, and, with a view to action, to prepare his mind, as to teach and to study in order to teach. Academical study rarely leads directly to action; it seeks principles and constructs a theory, but it is divorced from executive responsibility and authority. This kind of study tends to overload the intellect at the expense of the will, and leads to just that astonishment at the perfect equipoise between the two which marks Captain Mahan's general summaries of Nelson's greatness. The academical study of war, as Captain Mahan well points out, is a thing of modern growth. No one has more distinguished himself in this department than the author of *The Influence of Sea Power upon History,* and the remarks which I have ventured to make are not meant, and will not be taken by him, to convey any disparagement of his work. But most certainly the study of war can never produce its perfect fruit, the profound insight of a great leader, if it is carried on without the steadying ballast of responsibility. Jomini and Clausewitz will never teach us quite as much as Frederic, Napoleon, and Moltke. In maritime war it is from Nelson that the most can be learned, and if there is a doubt as to which of Nelson's ideas are the most important, it may to some extent be solved by comparing them with the leading ideas of the other great masters. To work out the comparison is, of course, a task beyond the limits of a short essay; but some hint may perhaps be given. Frederic the Great wrote more systematically about war than most other commanders, and never anything more valuable than the section headed " Du Militaire " in the *Testament Politique*

of 1768. The parallels between Frederic's ideas here expressed and similar ideas of Nelson's is worth suggesting. The first passage I shall quote[1] touches on the relation between the commander and his forces:—

"Tout ce que je viens de dire n'est pas suffisant encore pour former une bonne armée. Il faut qu'elle soit agile, adroite, mobile et capable d'exécuter les dispositions des généraux; ou bien l'habileté du général, inutile par l'ignorance des troupes, ne saurait déployer son art et ses resources" (p. 12).

Nelson is as clear as Frederic with regard to the necessity for intellectual power developed by exercise in the commander and to its helplessness unless the machine which he has to direct is supple to his hand. Thus (August 19, 1796) he expects St. Vincent to defeat a superior force "by the skill of our admiral and the activity and spirit of our officers and seamen." Nelson, indeed, is even more specific in respect of the qualities to which he attaches importance in his subordinates. "Their high state of discipline is well known to you, and with the judgment of the captains, together with their valour and that of the officers and men of every description, it was absolutely irresistible" (August 3, 1798). Frederic's view of the essence of tactics may be given under two heads, superiority of fire and concentration against a part of the enemy's position. "Les batailles se gagnent par la superiorité du feu" (p. 13). Nelson is all along certain not only that superiority of fire is essential, but that it must be sought at close and decisive ranges. Thus he writes:—

"February 23, 1794.—Our guns were so exceedingly well pointed that not one shot was fired in vain."

[1] From *Das Militärische Testament Friedrichs des Grossen.* Herausgegeben und Erläutert von A. V. Taysen, Major im Grossen Generalstab. Berlin, 1879.

"MARCH 13, 1795.—It was my intention to have touched his stern before a shot was fired. But seeing plainly, from the situation of the two fleets, the impossibility of being supported, and in case any accident happened to our masts, the certainty of being severely cut up, I resolved to fire so soon as I thought we had a certainty of hitting."

"MARCH 9, 1801.—I hope we shall be able, as usual, to get so close to our enemies that our shot cannot miss their object, and that we shall again give our enemies that hailstorm of bullets . . . which gives our dear country the dominion of the seas."

There is a piece of evidence which goes to show that the plan of taking the ship close up to the enemy before opening fire was a special part of Nelson's tactical theory, and recognised as his. Sir Edward Berry, in his hasty note to Nelson (March 30, 1800) informing him of the capture of the *Guillaume Tell,* writes at the foot of his postscript: "Within hail before I fired." He evidently knew that the master would be delighted with this feature of his action.

Frederic's view of the way to attack an enemy in position is:—

"Il ne faut attaquer qu'une section de ce poste, la droite ou la gauche ou le centre, selon qu'on y trouve plus de facilité" (p. 27).

Nelson writes:—

"AUGUST 19, 1796.—This country is the most favourable possible for skill with an inferior fleet; for the winds are so variable that some one time in twenty-four hours you must be able to attack a part of a large fleet, and the other will be becalmed or have a contrary wind."

"JANUARY 8, 1799.—By attacking the enemy's van and centre, the wind blowing directly along their line, I was enabled to throw what force I pleased on a few ships."

The development of this idea in the Memoranda of 1804 and of Oct. 9, 1805, is the famous "Nelson touch."

The wary Frederic lays down the principle: "Il ne faut jamais se battre quand l'ennemi le veut, mais seulement quand on le veut soi-même" (p. 33). Nelson is little given to the enunciation of general principles, being always occupied with the concrete case before him. Here are his ideas on this subject:—

"JULY 2, 1804.—My mind is fixed not to fight them, unless with a westerly wind outside the Hières, and with an easterly wind to the westward of Sicié.

"Do not imagine I am one of those hot-brained people who fight at an immense disadvantage without an adequate object. . . . We won't part without a battle. I think they will be glad to leave me alone if I will let them alone; which I will do either till we approach the shores of Europe, or they give me an advantage too tempting to be resisted."[1]

Frederic, like most great men, found it difficult to bring ordinary people to see the necessity for comprehensive designs:—

"Les projets de campagne vastes sont sans contredit les meilleurs, parce qu'en les mettant en exécution, ou ne tarde pas à s'apercevoir de ce qui serait impraticable d'effectuer, et qu'en se rabattant sur ce qui reste d'exécutable, on va plus loin qu'en ne formant qu'un petit projet, qui ne mène jamais à grande chose" (p. 25).

Nelson writes to the Queen of Naples (July 10, 1804):—

"I do not believe we had in the last war, and, according to all appearance, we shall not have in the present one either, plans of a sufficiently grand scale to force France to keep within her proper limits. Small measures produce only small results."

[1] Mahan, II. 305.

An officer whose heart is in his work and who has a sincere consideration and affection for his subordinates is sure to be beloved by them. Captain Mahan has admirably brought into prominence this side of Nelson's character. On some of the difficult questions of Nelson's life he is perhaps inclined rather to judge than to sympathize with his hero. The passionate attachment to Lady Hamilton is just what was to be expected from a man of Nelson's temperament. It matters little to us what Lady Hamilton's character seemed to be to others; to Nelson she supplied what his character absolutely required—a person from whom his devotion could meet with an expressive response. The case well exemplifies the truth of Goethe's saying: "Unreine Verhältnisse soll man niemand wünschen; sie sind aber für den, der zufällig hineingeräth, Prüfsteine des Characters und des Entschiedensten, was der Mensch vermag."

In the case of Nelson's disobedience to Lord Keith it seems to me that there is more to be said for Nelson than his biographer allows. It was no rash act of disobedience. "I am perfectly aware," wrote Nelson, "of the consequences of disobeying the orders of my commander-in-chief; but as I believe the safety of the kingdom of Naples depends at the present moment on my detaining the squadron, I have no scruple in deciding that it is better to save the kingdom of Naples and risk Minorca, than to risk the kingdom of Naples to save Minorca" (July 19, 1799). Politically and strategically I have little doubt that Nelson was right. Two months later (Sept. 20) he writes to the Admiralty: "I knew when I decided . . . that perhaps my life, certainly my commission, was at stake, but being firmly of opinion that the honour of my king and country was involved . . . I determined at all risks to support the honour of my gracious sovereign and country, and not to shelter myself under the letter of the law." This is an unassailable position. There can be no rule that an officer shall never

in any circumstances disobey an order; the only rule possible is that he disobeys at his peril, and with a rope round his neck. Nothing more convincingly proves the strength of Nelson's character than that he boldly put the rope round his neck when he was sure that the public service required it. The position of a perfect master of his profession under a commander at a distance, who is comparatively a second-rate man, is always difficult, and the true moral of this instance surely is that the Admiralty was not equal to its task of selecting the best commanders, irrespective of red tape. Wars are not won by regularity in great matters, but by "a happy irregularity," and one of the chief dangers of modern organization is, that the too systematic course of promotions and appointments may choke a whole service with second-rate men. The British navy is by no means free from this danger. A most distinguished and deservedly respected Admiral not long since attempted to justify the present cumbrous organization or disorganization of the Admiralty, giving in its favour two principal pleas, the first being that in five years at the Board he had not been able to master the interior working of the machine, and the second that in the last great naval war the British navy was in the end successful.[1] But the perusal of Nelson's correspondence must convince any unbiassed mind that success was obtained in spite of, and not in consequence of, the then organization of the Admiralty. It is said that if Nelson had survived Trafalgar he would have liked the office of Lord High Admiral, and to have had the entire management of the service.[2] The early death which prevented the fulfilment of that wish was an irreparable loss to the country.

[1] *Naval Administration*, by Admiral Sir R. Vesey Hamilton, G.C.B. pp. ix. 2.

[2] *Recollections of the Life of the Rev. A. J. Scott, D.D., Lord Nelson's Chaplain*, p. 199.

Captain Mahan repeatedly touches the subject of the effect of an inferior fleet as a hindrance to the inception and execution of the enemy's designs for the transport of troops by sea. A school of English writers some years ago maintained the opinion, of which I ventured to call in question the soundness, that a fleet weaker than the enemy's may be counted upon as an effectual bar to the execution of such designs. This weaker fleet was called the "fleet in being," but those who employed that phrase have, since their original doctrine was criticised, accepted the qualifications which I suggested, and appear now to use the term to cover a theory by no means identical with their earlier views. Sir George Clarke in *The Nineteenth Century*[1] covers this retreat by the sentence, "an effective fleet is a most powerful deterrent to naval operations, and especially to the over-sea transport of military forces," a rather elementary truism which no one ever disputed. My position from the beginning has been that there is no absolute bar to the transport of troops short of decisive naval victory, which is itself the proof that the winning force was superior, though of course not necessarily in numbers. It is interesting to note Nelson's ideas on this subject, which are as far opposed as possible from those of the popular English school of to-day. The following extracts tell their own tale:—

"October 26, 1794.—Before their army can risk being cut off, there must be a sea action to force us into port; when, if we are not completely victorious—I mean, able to remain at sea, whilst the enemy must retire into port—Italy is lost."

Again, in 1804 (June 8th) Nelson writes:—

"My first object must ever be to keep the French fleet in check, and if they put to sea, to have force enough with me to annihilate them. . . . That would keep the two Sicilies free from any attack from sea."

[1] June, 1897.

This is one aspect of the matter. The side that aims at preventing transport must gain the command of the sea. The other aspect is that of the side wishing to effect transport. According to Nelson (March 4th, 1796), "One week's very superior fleet will effect a landing: we may fight their fleet, but unless we can destroy them their transports will push on and effect a landing." And again, seven years afterwards (July 2nd, 1803): "As the army can only be moved by the protection of a superior fleet, that fleet they will try to have, and a month's start of us would do all the mischief." It is a pity that if the words "in being" were to be used in the discussion of strategy, they were borrowed from Torrington, and used ambiguously. The same words were used by Nelson without any ambiguity whatever. Writing to Lord Minto (August 29th, 1798), he laments that his wound had prevented his annihilating the French fleet at Aboukir, and says: "It is no small regret that *L'Orient* is not *in being* to grace our victory."

II
The Art of War

Military Literature[1]

THE debt which all English students of war owe to Colonel Maurice is so great that any one who tries to measure the value of his volume on "War" must shrink with the Eleatic of old from "laying hands on his father Parmenides." The new volume adds to the debt. A sounder and more lucid survey of recent changes in strategy and tactics, and of the present state of those branches of the practice of war, has probably not been written. The views which are expressed, in the chapter upon military literature, upon the necessity for and the methods of study, are those of the best masters, and the list of books will be invaluable to the many officers who have too long, in the British service, been left to find the path for themselves. An outsider may, perhaps, be permitted to say that Colonel Maurice's book reflects, probably more than he is aware, the present unorganized state of military study in England. It is not merely that he writes down to his public. The perpetual exhortation to read, the trouble taken to prove that no man can command troops without knowledge, seem to me labour thrown away. Those for whom they are meant will not read these passages, and for those who read they are need-

[1] *War.* Reproduced with amendments from the article in the last edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica.* To which is added an Essay on Military Literature and a List of Books with brief comments. By Colonel F. Maurice, R.A., Professor of Military Art and History in the Royal Staff College. London: Macmillan & Co. 1891.

less. The *Encyclopaedia* article, though its title is "War," is hardly more than an essay on strategy and tactics. This may have been a necessary limitation in a semi-popular book; though the *Encyclopaedia* in its scientific articles can hardly aim at the general public. A systematic essay might have set out with some account of war as a form of social relation or as a branch of political action. This would have prevented the paradox with which the book starts, that although recent changes have set out from weapons, their most remarkable effect is a moral one. Would it not be truer to say that the modifications of war in all ages are a result of social and spiritual growth, and are, therefore, always primarily "moral," and that in our own day the vast industrial development of society has given unusual importance to the influence of weapons upon tactics and of means of communication upon strategy? It seems to me that war is essentially a conflict between two wills, and that a distorted view must be the consequence of putting mere machinery—the weapons—in the forefront. For this reason discipline—the training of the will—is always, and will always be, the foundation-stone of an army. War is not a science. It may rather be compared to a business, for the successful management of which a number of sciences and a number of arts must be mastered. The ideal treatment of the subject would, I think, be found by setting out from a survey of the relation of these several branches to the practical end; reviewing the development of each branch as reflected in its literature, and then tracing through military history the development of the ἀρχιτεκτονικὴ τεχνή, the art of commanding-in-chief.

Something like this was possible, even in the space at Colonel Maurice's command. No doubt the reason why another plan was chosen was the non-existence of a reading professional public. But surely the way to create such a public is to give them the professional treatise. I believe

the right way to raise the standard of knowledge in the army is to write for earnest students and to let the general public alone. Colonel Maurice's sketch of strategy and tactics has too much the character of a general survey to be a text-book for the serious student. In the same way his account of military literature and his list of books, though they will be useful to the beginner, tell the real professional worker little that will be new to him. I think Colonel Maurice might have given more that would be useful to officers who aim high without being less helpful to the regimental officer. By far the best books on all tactical subjects are the German *Felddienstordnung* and the *Exercir-Reglements* for infantry, artillery, and cavalry. To the officer whose time is limited nothing better can be recommended; and rather than give him more text-book it would be better to put into his hand some set of practical exercises. For those who have time and interest to go deeper Colonel Maurice gives too little information. Take the subject of cavalry. The cavalry officer finds the names of seven books, of which one is "important but out of date," one contains "advanced views," and the others are "valuable." According to the method that commends itself to me this subject would have been historically treated. The first impressions of the French after 1870 were that their cavalry had utterly neglected the duties of screening their own troops and reconnoitring the enemy, and that the Germans had well performed their duties; that the German successful charges were due to better training and that the French cavalry had been thrown away in battle for want of leading. A system of reconnaissance and a harder training were demanded.[1] In Germany also the first task was the careful study of the late war, Major Kaehler publishing, in 1872,

[1] Bonie. *La Cavalerie Française*, 1878. The questions here put by Bonie were answered in his *Service d'Exploration et de Sûreté pour la Cavalerie.*

his account of Mars-la-Tour.[1] The Germans found themselves dissatisfied with their performance both in scouting and in charging, and the bases were sought for a more systematic training in reconnaissance and for a more effective command of large bodies in action. Experimental manœuvres were repeatedly held and the handling of cavalry was discussed by Kaehler,[2] by Schmidt in his instructions since collected, and by Verdy. All these writers agreed upon a system of divisions, each of three brigades of two regiments; an order of attack in three equal lines, with a view to manœuvres to gain the enemy's flank, and a system of reconnaissance in which the division was divided upon parallel roads in support of a widely extended line of scouting parties. Verdy's *Studies* took his favourite form of a series of imaginary operations, the scene of which is the country between Landau and the Forest of Hagenau. His *Cavalry Tour*[3] is laid in the district of East Prussia eastward of Elbing. The views of Schmidt, Verdy, and Kaehler found expression in the Drill-book of 1876, which marks the close of a period of development in Germany. About the same time the French introduced a new Drill-book,[4] and also after a preliminary study[5] an instruction on the science of reconnaissance.[6] To this epoch belongs the *Conduite d'un Escadron de Contact* of De Biensan, which, though published in 1881, is written in emulation of Verdy's *Studies,* and copies his system, which is very well illustrated by the

[1] Die Reiterei in der *Schlacht bei Vionville und Mars-la-tour am 16 August, 1870.*

[2] In the papers on Cavalry Tactics in *Von Löbell's Jahresberichte* for 1874, 1875, and 1876. These three papers are the best introduction I know of to the recent history of cavalry.

[3] *Beitrag zu den Kavallerie Uebungs Reisen.* 1886.

[4] *Decret du 17 Juillet, 1876, portant réglement sur les Exercises de la Cavalerie.*

[5] *Etude sur le Service de la Cavalerie Eclairant une Armée.* 1875.

[6] *Instruction sur le Service de la Cavalerie Eclairant une Armée.* 1876.

imaginary operations of a squadron in the country to the east of Châlons-sur-Marne. All these systems were minutely examined and their weakness crushingly exposed by General Lewal in his *Tactique des Renseignements,* published in 1881. Lewal attacked the three equal lines (I. 292) showing that they were a bad adaptation of infantry tactics (I. 298), and that the charging lines should be the principal force, the support and reserve the accessory. He also criticised the then current views on the employment of the cavalry division for reconnaissance. He showed that to place the division on two or three roads is to give it away. It can never be collected to strike a blow. A cavalry division is not, and cannot be, a mere net to catch sprats; it is a great cruiser, and should be used to strike and to destroy. It should, therefore, be always kept concentrated. Lewal's book seems to have been used by subsequent writers as a mine in which to dig—usually without acknowledgment. On the subject of cavalry combat he has anticipated in a few brief passages most of what Hoenig has to say in his lengthy essays. His criticisms have modified the whole theory of the cavalry division,[1] and the principle is now accepted that the duties of seeking the enemy and of covering one's own infantry columns are to be performed by distinct bodies.

In Germany there has been a return to the study of Frederick the Great's instructions to his cavalry commanders. The belief in the power of cavalry in battle has greatly revived; a change due partly to Hoenig, and perhaps more to the experience of frequent manœuvres with large bodies. The growth of opinion is seen in the difference between Hohenlohe's *Letters on Cavalry* (1884), which are still on the ground of *Drei Treffen Taktik,* and the *Talks about Cavalry* (1887), in which the views of a Saxon cavalry gen-

[1] The Germans, of course, never allude to Lewal. But the comparison between his discussion I. 263 ff. and § 71 of their *Felddienstordnung* is suggestive.

eral, as distinguished from those of Hohenlohe himself, find expression. Here there is unlimited confidence in the possibilities of cavalry, if trained according to a sufficiently high standard. The second epoch, that which began with Lewal's book, ends in Germany with the *Exercir Reglement* of 1886, which abandons the three equal lines and throws the great weight into the first charge. The most recent German discussion of the reconnoitring duties of cavalry is that of Verdy, in his *Studien über Felddienst* (1887), a commentary in the shape of imaginary operations in Silesia upon the *Felddienstordnung* of the same date. The French Drill-book of 1876 was revised in 1882, without material advance on the earlier German doctrine. Of the French *Instruction Pratique sur le Service des Armées en Campagne* (1884, revised up to 1889) I am unable to speak in detail. General Galliffet differs from General Lewal in believing (with the German Emperor) in the collection of very large masses of cavalry for a great cavalry battle at the outset of a war, and his views have been ably expressed in a recent *brochure* from the pen of a younger disciple.[1] An interesting set of cavalry exercises (on the frontier of Alsace-Lorraine) is contained in the anonymous *Cavalerie en Campagne; Etudes d'après la Carte* (1888), attributed to Major Cherfils. Here the distinction between a body of cavalry sent out by itself to seek and find the enemy (*selbständige Kavallerie* of the German *Felddienstordnung*) and a mere cavalry screen is very well illustrated. I know of no better way of gaining insight into the development of cavalry since 1875 than by reading Cherfils and Hohenlohe's *Talks,* after Verdy's *Kavallerie-Division.* The cavalry reader will perhaps accept my apology for this excursion into a region with which I am unfamiliar. My object

[1] *La Cavalerie dans la Guerre Moderne.* Par A. A. 1890. See also General Galliffet's own *Projet sur l'emploi de la Cavalerie en liaison avec les autres Armes.* 1880.

is merely to suggest a historical method of treating a branch of tactical literature, which Colonel Maurice can far better employ than I can and which, if he had systematically adopted it, would have given us a closer insight into the growth of tactics and a more exact guide in the choice of books.

In his account of the literature of infantry tactics I could have wished that Colonel Maurice had more clearly distinguished the various phases through which the subject has passed. Leaving on one side the contemporary discussions which are closely connected with, though not solely due to, quite recent modifications in firearms, I think three periods may be distinguished. First came the early discussions that followed the events of 1866 and 1870. It was a time when salvation was sought in forms, especially in great dispersion, both in breadth and depth. No account of this stage is so good as Colonel Maurice's own *Wellington Prize Essay,* and a reference to this would make the list of these early works unnecessary. But Kühne's *Wanderungen,* by far the best account of the tactics of 1866, ought to have been mentioned. No better work has ever been done. This period closes with the Austrian Drill-book of 1874 and the French one of 1875. Then came the attempt to deduce everything from trajectories and "cones of dispersion." A good sample of this phase is seen in Hessert's essays.[1] The French *Reglement sur l'Instruction du Tir* of 1882 shows the influence of this ballistic epoch. But by degrees the centre of gravity shifted to the question of the control and management of the dispersed troops. The later French and Austrian Drill-books show a marked reaction in this direction. This reaction in an extreme form is seen in the

[1] *Betrachtungen über die Leistungen der Französischen Gewehre* M|74 and M|66, *Erlautert an der Theilnahme des IX. Armee Corps an der Schlacht von Gravelotte.* Darmstadt, 1879. *Die Fehlschusswirkung und das Infanterie Feuer auf dem Schlachtfelde.* Darmstadt, 1881.

Sommernachtstraum. This was published early in 1888 in the hope of influencing the German Drill-book then in course of preparation. The Drill-book appeared later in the year and adopts principles diametrically opposed to those of the Dream. The German leaders had long held that everything depends, not upon formations but upon the power of each officer to dispose the body of troops entrusted to him in a manner suited to the object in view, to the enemy's conduct, and to the ground. This had been the text of Schlichting's lecture in 1879. In the German Infantry Drill-book of 1888 this doctrine is carried to the furthest point. Formations disappear and the officer's judgment is substituted for them; the book being mainly a collection of tactical principles. In the Field Artillery drill of 1889 the same plan has been followed. From this point of view the problem nowadays is not to find perfect forms—a few of the simplest will suffice—but to find officers who are tacticians.

A Continental officer, holding one of the very highest commands, said to me a year ago:—"I do not care so much about changes in drill. My trouble is to find capable generals and to train them to do their work." I have examined elsewhere the German system as applied to the higher training, and need not here return to the subject. Colonel Maurice comes near to it in his discussions of methods of study. It would have been useful, perhaps, to have given a fuller list of books containing practical exercises.[1]

In his discussion of strategy Colonel Maurice touches upon some of the harder questions of war. That "strategy

[1] The following might, for example, have been added: *Taktische Aufgaben gestellt im Landwehr-Stabs Offiziers-Curs 1879-80.* Von Johann Bock, K. K., Oberst-lieutenant. Wien, 1880. *Der Krieg im Frieden.* Von Taubert. Berlin, 1880. *Die 49 Infanterie Brigade in der Schlacht von Vionville—Mars-la-Tour.* Berlin, 1885. *Taktische und Strategisch-Taktische Aufgaben.* Von Souheur. Berlin, 1886. *Taktische Unterrichtsbriefe.* Von Griepenkerl. Berlin, 1890.

has undergone no change since the days of Napoleon" is an ambiguous statement which it is misleading to discuss; that the principles upon which the strategical direction of armies depend are permanent and unchanging can hardly be doubted; but that the application of the principles depends upon the state of civilization of the theatre of war is equally evident. It has been pointed out by high authority[1] that the change between the strategical character of the wars of Frederick and those of Napoleon was partly due to the construction of good roads throughout Western Europe during the intervening years. No less a change was to be expected from the railways and telegraphs that spread over Europe between 1815 and 1866.

That Napoleon would not have approved of the Prussian operations before Königgrätz I do not think proven. There is no question of interior lines. The Prussian decision to unite the two armies in Bohemia was not taken until it was known that the Austrian main army was not in Bohemia but in Moravia and could, therefore, not interpose itself. That portions of it could retard the march of the two armies was, of course, known. This is the point made in Moltke's paper in the *Militär-Wochenblatt*. As regards the plan of keeping the two armies separate and uniting them on the actual battlefield it is true that this seems to run counter to Napoleon's maxim: "Il est de principe que les réunions des divers corps d'armée ne doivent jamais se faire près de l'ennemi." But a general's practice is sometimes more important than his precepts. Napoleon himself at Bautzen preferred to bring Ney on to the battlefield from a distance, on to the flank of the Allies, rather than to unite Ney's corps with his own before the battle. And it is, surely, permissible to draw a lesson, as valuable as any of Napoleon's maxims, from the great battle in which he was himself finally over-

[1] *Die Kriege Friedrichs des Groszen, Herausgegeben vom Grossen Generalstabe.* Erster Theil, p. 174.

thrown. I can, therefore, see no departure from established principles in the Prussian operations of 1866. No general of the highest order, except Frederick,[1] has written systematically on war. The criticisms made by Napoleon, invaluable as they are, must always be taken with their context. Most of the current theory of Napoleonic strategy is derived from Jomini, who is, in particular, the literary exponent of the doctrines of interior lines, and of a single line of operations invoked by the critics of Moltke. But it is too often forgotten that Jomini himself lived to discuss the campaign of 1866, and that to his mind the chief cause of the Prussian success was "l'oubli des principes de stratégie d'un côté, et leur application de l'autre." Jomini, moreover, expresses the opinion that the introduction of railways will render more difficult the application by the defender of the principle of interior lines.

It is most assuredly true that strategy can be learned usefully only from the close study of a number of campaigns. To read books on strategy without studying campaigns would be like reading a treatise on astronomy without ever looking at the stars. But to attempt to study military history without reading strategy would be like trying to learn astronomy from star-gazing without taking advantage of the discoveries of Galileo, Kepler, and Newton. I cannot but think, therefore, that Colonel Maurice has hardly given his readers a sufficiently definite introduction to the great strategical writers. The application of strategical principles is as old as good generalship. Their logical analysis and expression is comparatively recent. The father of modern strategical doctrine is Jomini, who found the ground prepared for him by the definitions of a line of operations, due to Lloyd, and of a base, due to Bülow.

[1] It is probable that Frederick's efforts to produce a systematic treatise had a bad effect on his generalship. See on this point *Jähns, Geschichte der Kriegswissenschaften in Deutschland,* pp. 2017 ff.

Jomini approached the study of war in the spirit of the eighteenth century rationalism. He published, in 1804, his *Traité des grands Opérations Militaires,* which contains the gist of what he has to say. He analyses the campaigns of Frederick and of the earlier revolutionary wars by the aid of the two definitions he found existing, and showed the superiority of a single line over a double line of operations, and the advantages to be derived from the conformation of a base. The enthusiasm of a discoverer led him to lay great stress upon the geometrical element of strategy, though his works abound with evidence that he was well aware that success is by no means exclusively dependent on this factor. This exposition is obscured by the conventional character of his definitions which drives him into the use of a complicated technical terminology. For this reason neither his theoretical treatises nor his histories are suitable for elementary study. In 1813 the Archduke Charles wrote his *History of the Campaign of* 1796 in Germany, preceded by a treatise on Strategy, which, though original, bears a marked resemblance to Jomini's system. The Archduke attached great importance to the geographical knowledge of a theatre of war and prefaced his history by a minute account of Southern Germany. Two Prussian writers, whose experience was derived from the Napoleonic epoch, attempted theoretical surveys of war. Of these the best known is Clausewitz, who, like Jomini, prepared himself for writing a theory of war by a series of military histories, among the most valuable for strategical criticism that exist, though most of them were written from too scanty information to take high historical rank. If Jomini is the child of rationalism Clausewitz is the exponent of the reaction against it. He declines to see in generalship the mere application of geometrical analysis or of any logical system. To him the strong will, the courage to run risks, the chances that surround all human action, and the friction

that must accompany the co-operation of a mass of men are no less important considerations than the geometrical relations of lines of operation and bases. He differs from Jomini, not in disagreeing with his theorems, but by laying the chief stress on matters which in Jomini's works appear to be secondary, though, as I have said, Jomini does not ignore them. The two writers thus supplement one another. Clausewitz, though not an obscure writer, is yet a difficult author to read. He was under the influence of the Berlin fashion of his day for philosophy. A contemporary says of him "he was a pupil of Kiesewetter, who had administered to him a dilution, I might almost say a homœopathic dose, of Kant's philosophy." This tended, perhaps, rather to expand the bulk than to increase the value of his treatise on war. I hardly think it can be studied except in the original. A contrast to Clausewitz is his contemporary Willisen, who was for some years (between 1820 and 1830 —I cannot ascertain the precise date) professor of military history at the *Allgemeine Kriegsschule* (now the *Kriegsacademie*) at Berlin. He prefaced his historical lectures by a course of theory, which he published in 1840, along with an analysis of the Polish war of 1831.[1] Willisen, like Clausewitz, was anxious to be metaphysical, though I suspect Fichte rather than Kant to have been his model. He deduces everything with rigorous logic from the two characteristics of an army—that it can fight and that it wants feeding. But Willisen is a disciple of Jomini, and in his wonderfully lucid and convincing *Theorie* he expanded Jomini's system by a subtle analysis of the use of great rivers and of fortresses in defence. His history of the Polish campaign was written for a newspaper as a commentary on the war during its course, but was suppressed at the time after the first few articles, because the King of Prussia, who read and

[1] *Theorie des grossen Krieges angewendet auf den Russisch-Polnischen Feldzug von. 1831.*

admired the essays, did not wish to offend the Russians. Willisen afterwards wrote similar running commentaries, as the events happened, upon the campaigns of 1848, 1859, and 1866. The *Theorie* and the papers on the campaigns of 1831 and 1848 seem to me most valuable and I wish they were better known in England. His essay " Ueber Grosse Landesvertheidigung der Festungsbau und Heerbildung in Preussen (1860) " gives the Prussian view of the use of fortresses in national defence.

I know of no introduction to strategy at all comparable to Sir Edward Hamley's *Operations of War*. Yet, valuable as it is, it seems to me to suffer from a neglect of those factors of which Clausewitz makes so much and which are comprised under the vague general term " moral."

Sir Edward Hamley's strategy culminates in an analysis of the campaign of 1814, leading to the conclusion that the geometrical relations between the Marne, the Seine, and the Aube gave the defending army an advantage of five to four over the invaders. It may be doubted whether this does not divert the student's attention from a more important point. Napoleon's brilliant strategy in 1814 was aided much more by the mistakes of his adversaries than by the course of the rivers. He won the battles of Champaubert and Montmirail not because Blücher was south of the Marne, but because he was imperfectly covered by cavalry, because his army was unduly dispersed, because there was no single commander over York and Sacken, and because Blücher had no satisfactory arrangements for communication with his subordinates. A not less important factor in this campaign was the constant discord between Blücher and Gneisenau on the one side and Schwarzenberg and the great headquarters on the other side. It is hard to believe that the student will not be led astray by a discussion of the campaign in which these all-important factors are left in the background.

Berthaut's *Principes de Strategie* is a modernised reproduction of Jomini's system, written with a laudable absence of technical terms. Blume's *Studie,* on the same subject, is a concise but profound analysis, and well represents modern German views. Hohenlohe's *Strategical Letters* apply a sound method of strategical study to military history. His introductory letter is admirable and should be read by every soldier. The rest of the two volumes discusses the campaigns of 1806, 1859, and 1870. A comparison of Hohenlohe's account of the 1859 campaign with Moltke's brilliant history shows the difference between a masterpiece and good average work. For 1870 Hohenlohe suffers under the disadvantage of not having had access to the original papers in possession of the German general staff. His account of 1806 has been to some extent superseded by more recent publications: the posthumous historical sketch by Clausewitz; the history from the French Archives, by Foucart; and the latest history by Lettow-Vorbeck. The campaign has also been discussed in the *Essais de Critique Militaire* of a promising French writer, who conceals his identity under the initials G. G.

Colonel Maurice's space would in no case have allowed of anything like a full bibliography of war even of our own day. Those who want fuller information for reference would do well to buy the catalogue of one of the larger military libraries, such as those of the Prussian General Staff, or of the Royal United Service Institution.

Colonel Maurice, I think, gives too exclusive prominence to the German school. Yet France has produced in our own day at least two writers of great value who deserved more than a mere place in the list. Of these General Lewal occupies the first rank. He distinguishes between the conception of operations (strategy) and their execution (tactics), and his *Etudes de Guerre* discuss with rare penetration and in great minuteness the tactics of mobilisation,

combat, march, repose, reconnaissance, and supply. General Lewal is the great opponent of the principle of the new German Drill-books, that everything must be left to the officer's judgment. He calls his system *tactique positive,* and demands a complete set of normal or type dispositions. These he has elaborated with the aid of a large experience and of immense learning. I have met with no more instructive and suggestive treatment of the practice of war. Upon the studies of Lewal are largely based the *Marches et Combats* of the lamented General Berthaut, who, in these volumes, explains clearly and concisely the conduct in attack and defence of an infantry division. Useful work has been done also in Austria. Bilimek-Waissohn's essay on the Napoleonic general staff, his admirable account of the Servo-Bulgarian War of 1885, and his very judicious book on the war game, deserve to be known in England.

Colonel Maurice's *War* bears better than most English military works the test of close and constant reading. But it shows on every page the effects of the want of a reading professional public to address, and of an established and constantly developing body of doctrine upon which it could rest. Its author is like a chemical investigator who should try to explain to a public in which there were no chemists the recent changes in his science. He would be obliged to write an elementary text-book and an advanced theory, both at once. The background of doctrine will never be created and the professional audience will not come into being until the military education of the army becomes a portion of the duty of command, carried out under the guidance of a rationally organized general staff at headquarters. Probably no one more fully realizes this than Colonel Maurice himself.

Evolution not Revolution in Modern Warfare[1]

IN the August number of the *Contemporary Review* a professional soldier, holding a rank which implies mature convictions, propounded at some length a startling theorem. The effect of recent improvements in firearms and of other changes has been misapprehended by the military world. It will show itself on the first battlefields of the next war in such a shape as to produce "an absolute revolution in all our present systems of tactics and strategy," and there will be at least in tactics "an entirely new departure." This opinion was put forward with great modesty and in a popular style, free from technicalities. I do not doubt that many readers who have no special acquaintance with the business of warfare will have been impressed with Colonel Elsdale's paper. His view is likely to commend itself to peace-loving people, for if it were true it would certainly make for peace. Colonel Elsdale holds that the balance of advantage as between the attack and the defence used to incline on the whole to the side of the attack, but that it has now gone over decisively to the side of the defence. He calls this a revolution, not merely in tactics, but

[1] September, 1891.

also in strategy; that is, in plain English, it affects not merely every separate battle, but the whole course of a war. In future wars, then, the attacker, as such, will be heavily handicapped, and the defender will have long odds in his favour. If that is so, no one will attack if he can help it, unless he has some enormous special advantage to make up for the handicapping, and therefore wars will be scarce. Moreover, if the odds have hitherto been against a defender and have now swung over to his side, there can be no need for any very serious effort to arm on the part of any nation whose aim goes no farther than defence. It is evident, without more explanation, that the spread of an opinion like this must greatly affect the defensive measures adopted for a country like our own. If it is an erroneous opinion based upon a partial consideration of the subject its general acceptance would lead to grave and possibly disastrous consequences. I believe that it is erroneous and venture to give in detail the reasons which compel me to reject it.

To begin with there is something unreal about the abstract consideration of defence and attack as though they were distinct weapons, like the sword and the gun, between which you could pick and choose. In actual life this choice is not always to be had. A nation that has a quarrel forced upon it usually finds itself obliged, at least in the first instance, to adopt the defensive. Its choice is governed, not by a theory of the military superiority of defence, but by necessity. But in so far as there is an abstract doctrine it is not quite accurately represented by Colonel Elsdale. The best of all writers upon war—Clausewitz—considers that the defensive is the stronger form with a negative purpose, the offensive the weaker form with a positive purpose. According to him the advantage of the defensive is that time is on its side; every hour that the attacker lets slip, from ignorance, hesitation, or weakness, tells in favour of the defender. Moreover, "possession is nine points of the

law," and in war, as in law, it is easier to keep what you have than to take what you have not. Accordingly, no general attacks unless he believes himself in some way the stronger. He dares to attack because he thinks he is more skilful than his enemy, or that he has more men, or that his troops are better trained or better armed. No doubt victorious generals have as a rule, though by no means always, been the attackers. But this only proves that they had in fact the superiority in which they trusted. A victory is put down to the credit of the commander who won it, and mankind are probably not far wrong in supposing that the skill and character of the commander were more important than whether he happened to be the assailant or the assailed.

Every commander tries to get the initiative. He wants to have the first move. The reason is that the enemy must reply to your move, and in order to reply must first find out what your move was, what you have done. To find that out is the chief difficulty in war. Wellington once said that he had spent his time for years trying to get to know what was going on on the other side of a hill. Sherman described a general's chief anxiety as caused by "what he can't see the enemy doing." The commander who has the initiative throws this difficulty on to his opponent, and in general the initiative is with the attacker. I say in general, because the attacker may lose this advantage by a false move; probably if neither side made any mistake—which is out of the question—the attacker would always have the initiative. Troops, it is generally believed, prefer to attack. The men are said to dislike the suspense of waiting for the enemy.

I have described as accurately as I can in general terms the opinions commonly held as regards attack and defence, because, as it seems to me, Colonel Elsdale's statement, that "the balance of advantage has long oscillated between them, with a general preponderance to the side of the attack,"

is misleading in its vagueness. His opinion, that it "has now gone over decisively to the side of the defence," appears to me to be a mistaken generalisation from a strictly limited fact. It is true that within certain narrow limits, which can be precisely specified, the defender is strengthened by modern improvements in firearms. But it is not true that this results in a great or sudden change in the relations of attack and defence, either in regard to a battle as a whole, or in regard to the general course of a campaign. There has been no revolution in tactics or in strategy, but certain modifications long since realized have become more pronounced. The balance of advantage remains what it was.

A skilful defender may turn to his account in some parts of a battlefield certain peculiarities of modern firearms. The chief of these is the necessity of knowing the exact distance of the object aimed at. If the distance is wrongly estimated the projectiles will shoot over or fall short of the mark. Artillerymen find the distance by a number of trial shots, for the smoke of the bursting shell[1] enables them often to see whether it is before or behind the target. Some time is required for these experimental shots, and during this interval, which may be five or may be twenty minutes, the guns do little hurt, and the gunners are of course themselves exposed to the enemy's shot and shell. A defender makes the most of these conditions by completing his measurements and experiments before the attacker appears on the scene. It he has thus prepared to shell every spot in front of him that affords a suitable site for the attacker's guns the attacker's gunners will, for from five to twenty minutes, or even longer, be exposed to his shells without being able to give an effective reply. In that case they might never be able to reply at all.

The infantry has to estimate the range by the eye. This

[1] Smokeless powder is not used to explode the shells employed to ascertain the range, but only to propel them.

is a very difficult art, in which even great practice does not make perfect. If the defender has measured the distances to the various points in his front, and communicated the information to his troops, they will be very favourably handicapped. But this advantage tells only at the longer ranges. At a quarter of a mile it disappears, for with modern rifles the bullet during that distance never rises above a man's head, and, if properly aimed, will hit him somewhere if he is within 450 yards of the rifle.

Provided a man lies behind a bank of earth and shoots over it, his enemy can see only his head—a tiny target at the best, scarcely visible except at close range. So long as the defender does not move he can shelter himself in this way. The attacker, if he advances, must show himself. If he halts, he can get shelter only where he finds a bank ready for him, or makes one with his spade, and while making it he is exposed.

The defender therefore looks for a ground where he can secure all these advantages. It must be open, so that he can see any attacker for three-quarters of a mile in front, and must have no banks or ditches where the attacker can find shelter. Having found such a ground, the defender makes a bank or shelter for himself, and measures the distances to various points in front. If he can put behind his bank as many men as there is room for, about one for every yard, with a supply of fresh men hidden in a hollow close behind, he is in that part of his position impregnable against infantry. No riflemen are likely to do his men much harm with their bullets, and no troops can advance over the open ground without being shot down. The defenders might be shelled where they lie behind their bank, and then the attacking infantry could come up and drive them away. But before they can be shelled by the attacker's artillery, the defender's artillery will have to be silenced. Until then the attacking gunners will not dare to divert their shells from

the guns that are making havoc in the ranks of their own infantry.

These are the considerations that lead Colonel Elsdale to believe that attacks have no chance, and that the defence is supreme. But they make up only half the story. Open ground without banks or hollows is not common. It never stretches very far. Here and there, perhaps, a square mile of it may be found. But these open and level or gently sloping patches are interspersed with others containing woods, clusters of houses, banks, and hollows. A defending army must have a line at the very least five or six miles long for its front. There may in this space be two miles of open ground. The rest will be broken or covered. Here the advantages are gone. The attacker can approach unseen to within point-blank range, and when there can find shelter of all sorts. His chances here are less unequal, and in these less dangerous parts he will probably have the advantage of numbers, constantly pushing on fresh men. He will compensate for the disadvantage of his gunners by a great superiority in the number of guns. Where the ground is open he will keep his men back; they will creep up as near as they safely can, and, lying down with what shelter they can find, will shoot incessantly at the defender's banks, hoping to hit some one occasionally, and sure that the ground a little way behind the banks will be swept by their bullets. The defender is thus tied to his line. If he retires, the attackers will come on, and he is lost. If he advances to a counter-attack, he throws away his advantages. The attacker then, though he cannot drive the defender away, can hold him to his position. Meanwhile he has moved large bodies of troops round the ends or flanks of the defender's line, is attacking it at both ends, and trying with yet more troops to attack it from behind. By degrees he will have pushed all round the defender. His two moving wings will meet behind the position, and the defence

will be encircled. There is now no escape for the defence, except in an attack at some point of the circle. But the advantages which the defender enjoys so long as he keeps his position will then pass to the outside circle. The case of the defender outflanked is desperate. If he waits until he is surrounded, he must surrender. If he withdraws to avoid being surrounded, his retreat is likely to be disastrous.

Every improvement in firearms makes it more dangerous for troops to expose themselves as a target for shell or for bullets. No troops can expect to cross level open ground swept by the bullets of an enemy. For this reason an attack nowadays is not a charge, not a rush of men at other men. It is a long shooting contest between two sides, both stationary, while it lasts, at a considerable distance from each other. The charge takes place as the outward sign that the shooting match is over, and has been won. In the fire contest the defender's advantage is that he has good concealment and knows the ranges. The attacker will have more guns and rifles at work, and will be able to concentrate upon any part of the defender's position the shells, and perhaps the bullets, of a very long portion of his own line. In this way the attacker may overwhelm a given point of the defender's front, and there push his troops into the position; or he may gain the defender's flank. In either case, he can afterwards fire upon the defenders from two directions at once. These conditions are not destroyed by any improvement either in the range, accuracy or rapidity of fire of the rifle and the field-gun. The improvements, while no doubt they make the frontal defence stronger, also render the power of attack, by concentration of fire and by fire from two directions at once, more formidable than ever.

On the battlefield, then, there has been no revolution. There has been progress. Weapons produce their old effects at longer distances and more speedily. But the effects are not new in character. They have long been familiar,

and a knowledge of them is the basis of the tactics of the present day. The best representative of "our established systems of tactics and strategy" (which, according to Colonel Elsdale, will disappear in the first battle of the next war) is undoubtedly Moltke. So long ago as in 1865, Moltke published a paper of "Remarks upon the Influence of Improved Firearms upon Fighting," in which will be found all that is true of Colonel Elsdale's forecast, with much that Colonel Elsdale seems to ignore.

I quote from that paper the passages which trace the chief doctrines, omitting all the historical evidence which it contains, and all details:—

"Generally speaking, the consequence of the peculiarities of the improved firearms will be to strengthen the defence as against the attack. The defender can choose his position in such a way that the enemy must advance over an open plain. He will usually have time to measure accurately the distances of certain features of the ground, or of individual objects, in order to obtain the best effect from his fire.

"The attacker has, from the fact of attacking, certain evident advantages, which he will always retain. Acting upon his own resolve, he lays down for himself the law which his opponent, who waits to see what he will do, must needs accept. The attacker has a distinct object in view. He chooses for himself the way by which he will reach it; the defender has to guess his opponent's intention, and to consider the means of resisting. On the one side, the resolve already made and the confidence of action; on the other side, uncertainty and expectation. And in the end the defender, too, must, after all, take the offensive if he wants a decisive result. But there is another question: Ought we not first to seize and make the most of the evident material advantages of the stationary fire-fight before we begin our attack?

"To attack is not merely a matter of tactics. A skilful commander will very often be able to choose defensive positions of a strategical nature so offensive as to compel the opponent

to attack us in them. But even if we are absolutely obliged to advance to the attack of an enemy's position, we may combine with this proceeding the advantage of the stationary fire-fight, if we understand how to bring our battalions up to a suitable range.

"It may be foreseen that in future the defence must seek the open plain; the attack, broken ground. A gentle wave of ground, in front of which there is an open fire-field of from three to five thousand paces, and behind which the reserves can be posted under cover, offers the defender with our present firearms a strong position, against which, as has already been shown, a direct attack can have little prospect of success.

"The less the chance of success for a frontal attack, the more surely will the enemy turn against our flanks, and the more important it becomes to secure them. To support the flanks upon ground which is merely broken and difficult is a proceeding unsuitable to the changed conditions, for such ground is exactly what the attackers will seek, in order to escape from our superior fire.

"The smaller the force and the shorter its front, the easier it is to turn its defensive positions. . . . As the extent of the front increases, for example, in the case of an army corps operating alone, the difficulty of turning it becomes greater. . . . The position of an army cannot be turned tactically. Its front is four or five miles long, or even longer. The turning movement becomes a march, after the completion of which there is no time left to fight on the same day.

"There are, however, conditions where we may be absolutely compelled to attack the enemy in a position which he has himself chosen, which is therefore advantageous to him, and has perhaps been fortified. We know that this is a difficult task; from what has already been said about defence it follows that a direct advance against an open front with equal forces cannot succeed; that the attacker must direct himself, if possible, against the defender's flanks, must make for cover and broken ground, must make the most of his fire and advance by degrees."

Colonel Elsdale rightly urges that the improvements in

firearms tend to strengthen a defender in a well-chosen and prepared position against frontal attack. He sums up this part of his case by saying that in future an attack made by the advance of "troops in broad daylight, and in the open, upon an enemy of approximately equal strength occupying a defensive position," will be impossible. No tactician will deny this. But it is not new, for, as I have shown, it was asserted by Moltke twenty-seven years ago. It is a factor of only local application, and does not make in any way impossible the attack and defeat of the defending army as a whole, in spite of the strength of the favourable portions of its front.

Colonel Elsdale supposes an army corps with a clear field of fire in its front, with other army corps under the same command on its flanks, and he assumes three hostile army corps available for the special attack upon this one in the centre. He says: "No general in command of the three corps will dream of attacking the single corps in front of him by any such methods as have hitherto been practised—that is, by marching his men and guns in broad daylight against it." He thinks both sides will avoid a zone lying between them as broad as the range of effective rifle-fire. But if any corps in the front of a defensive position has a clear field of fire without cover in its front, the attacking general will not tell off three corps to attack there. He will devote one corps to that space (with perhaps at the most a second in reserve), and will order it, not to march its men and guns against the enemy, but to push its battalions up to effective range (*i.e.*, to the edge of Colonel Elsdale's "neutral zone"), there to attempt to shoot the enemy down. The defending corps will then be tied to its place. It cannot retire without giving its ground up to the attack. It cannot advance without exposing itself at a disadvantage to the assailant's fire. A forward movement of the defenders would give the attackers most of the benefits that Colonel

Elsdale claims for the defence. The third corps of the attacker will be available against the defender's flank—not the flank of the one corps, but the flank of the whole army.

An attacking general has usually been able to direct a superior force against any required point of the enemy's position, so that at that point the attack became too strong for the defence. Colonel Elsdale illustrates this by imagining Napoleon, stationed at a commanding spot from which he could see the whole battle, directing his troops in accordance with his personal observation of what was going on. Such direction, Colonel Elsdale thinks, has now become impossible, partly because of the enormous increase in the number of troops brought into the field, and the immense extent of ground they will cover; partly because smokeless powder does not reveal the number and disposition of the defending troops, compels the assailant to feel his way cautiously, and makes it very difficult for his artillery, which should by its fire prepare the attack, to find a target. Colonel Elsdale illustrates these difficulties by imagining Napoleon trying to direct the operations from a point where he cannot take in at a glance the field of battle, and he asks: "Is it not perfectly clear on the face of this situation that Napoleon has lost the conditions on which his great tactical successes formerly depended?"

There is no need to imagine this situation. It existed in every particular, except the smokeless powder, at the battle of Gravelotte. The difficulty which smokeless powder presents to a commander-in-chief consists, first, in the fact that the absence of smoke makes it very much harder for reconnoiterers searching for the enemy to find where he is; and secondly, that during the battle, the course of the fight can no longer be watched from a distance by following the backward and forward movements of the firing lines. But during the twenty-four hours which preceded the battle of Gravelotte, Moltke received no information regarding the

position and movements of the French army, except such as was obtained from officers who saw French troops in the distance. Their seeing would have been in no way modified by any change that can be imagined in the composition of the powder of the cartridges which those troops carried with them. During the battle Moltke not only had no general view of the proceedings; he did not know until midday the whereabouts of that part of the French force which, as the event proved, held and lost the key of the position. Nor did he know until many hours after the battle was over what had there taken place. It is clear, then, that the difficulties which Colonel Elsdale offers to his imaginary Napoleon presented themselves to Moltke in the preparation and conduct of the battle of Gravelotte. Moreover, the French position had precisely the advantages which Colonel Elsdale lays such stress on, and which Moltke, in his *Remarks* of 1865, had been the first to appreciate. Yet the defence was not successful. Colonel Elsdale suggests that, even with an enormous numerical superiority, a superiority of three to one, the case of the attack must be hopeless; but at Gravelotte there was no such immense disparity of numbers. According to the most accurate estimate,[1] there were present, within such a distance as to be available —on the French side, 112,800 men and 520 guns; on the German side, 187,600 men and 732 guns. Of these, there took part in the actual fight—on the French side, 84,050 men and 398 guns; on the German side, 109,200 men and 628 guns. Moreover, the French infantry was armed with a rifle so superior to that of the Germans as almost to compensate for the disparity of numbers. The German artillery no doubt was more numerous and better handled, but General Sheridan, who was present and examined the

[1] *Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften Herausgegeben vom Groszen Generalstabe,* which contains an exact account of the numbers engaged in all the battles of August, 1870.

French position next day, declared that he was surprised to find how little damage it had effected. Thus, in spite of all the difficulties foreseen by Colonel Elsdale, a victory was won by the attack without any unprecedented numerical superiority.

No doubt firearms of all sorts have greatly improved since 1870, and the difficulties of direction have increased with the growth of armies. But these changes, instead of reversing the relations between attack and defence, must have the effect of handicapping more heavily than before the side which is least prepared, whose soldiers and officers are less skilled in the use of the complicated weapons, and whose generals have been less successful in working out the hard problem of managing great numbers.

I am unable to understand Colonel Elsdale's analysis of the so-called "moral" factors. He illustrates the moral advantage of the attack by the case of an assailant armed with a gun against a defender with a sword. This would be usually considered a material advantage. The phrase "moral advantage" in relation to the attack is used sometimes to mean the initiative, and sometimes to describe the inspiriting effect which the act of attacking is said to produce upon the troops. It is also applied to the case where, for some cause, not of a material kind, men are led to neglect a palpable material advantage possessed by the enemy. When a handful of men attack a great number, or men with swords rush upon men with rifles, they are in possession of the "moral advantage." Colonel Elsdale refers to the Roman resistance to Hannibal, during the period which has always been connected with the name of Fabius, as an instance of "the great moral power of the *defensive*." But the Roman policy at this time can hardly be called defensive in the sense in which Colonel Elsdale claims the balance of advantage for that form of war. It was a policy of not fighting and of waiting to fight another day. There are sit-

uations in which such a course is the best generalship. But I cannot see that Hannibal's failure was due to the fact that he attacked, and that the Romans defended. Indeed, Hannibal's overthrow at Zama was consequent upon the Romans taking the offensive.

In war, as in chess, the best player generally wins. But while in chess the number of pieces and their powers are fixed and equal for both sides, in war their numbers and their powers depend upon the qualities, the resources, and the strength of purpose of the nations engaged. If one side opens the game with a set of twenty queens, an opponent having nothing but sixteen pawns will have a very poor chance.

My apology for having entered into this discussion is its political importance. A false view of the nature of defence must lead to the adoption of wrong measures of preparation. If Colonel Elsdale is right, Great Britain is rendered safe by the existence of 200,000 imperfectly trained and ill-officered Volunteers, of whom we constantly hear that they are not fit for the offensive, but quite good enough for the defence of positions. If my view is sound, this trust in the Volunteers is a national delusion, the forerunner of disaster. I believe that our national security must be won, not by defence upon land, but by attack on the sea, and that if the doctrine of the superiority in land warfare of the defensive should be generally accepted amongst us, its consequence must be the neglect of the Navy, England's peculiar weapon for protection. Such neglect, it seems to me, must lead straight and swift to ruin.

Moltke's Tactical Problems[1]

MOLTKE was not the cause, but the consequence, of the Prussian military system. He is not the founder of the school that he so brilliantly represents. The design of which our own day has seen the realization, is to be attributed in the main to Scharnhorst, to whom is due not only the conception of the armed nation, but the advice to search for leaders; not to distribute commands according to birth or survival, but to test and select. He founded an officers' school to teach generalship, or the art of command, and he tried his men by giving them test exercises. After the great war, the post of Chief of the Staff was given to Müffling, who, though hardly one of Scharnhorst's set, was a strategist of considerable power. Müffling used to pick the best pupils from the War School, and set them to work for a year or two under his own eye. At the end of the probation, he examined them by propounding a tactical problem for their solution. Moltke attended the school from 1823 to 1826, and in 1828 became one of Müffling's probationers. In his autobiography he has told us what a fever they were in when the date of their Tripos—the problems to be set by Müffling—drew near. In 1858 Moltke became Chief of the Staff, and from that time on he examined the post-graduate class every year, except in 1867,

[1] *Moltke's Tactical Problems, from 1858 to 1882.* Edited by the Prussian Grand General Staff. Authorised Translation by Karl von Donat. London: W. H. Allen & Co. 1894.

and in 1871, when there was no examination, because the war had interrupted the class. In 1882 Moltke handed over this work to Count Waldersee, his newly appointed assistant, though for that year he still set the problems and wrote out the solutions. The Prussian staff has collected these annual problems and Moltke's solutions, so far as they are preserved, and has added for each year, since 1872, a verbatim report of the short lecture in which he usually criticised the papers sent in, and explained his own solution.

A tactical problem is an exercise to be worked out on a map. You are told to suppose yourself in command of ten thousand men, with five hundred horse and four and twenty guns, on the march, say from Exeter to Bristol, where an army is assembling, of which your force is to form part. You have reached Taunton, and your troops are settled for the night, when you learn that a body of the enemy, fifteen thousand strong, is at Bridgwater. The ordnance map of the county is given you, and you are to write out the orders you would issue that evening for the operations of your force next day. The Prussian staff has given with the problems a set of all the maps to which they refer, and with its usual courtesy has also struck off sets of these maps to accompany the English translation.

What is the use of these exercises on the map? The Prussian school would answer that they offer the best means of learning how to command. You may read books full of theories or principles of war, and doubtless they will help you to understand the conditions of success. But the difficulties of practice are not met by principles, which tell you as a rule what not to do. You know all about "interior lines"; but there is the enemy between you and Bristol. You know all the requirements of a good defensive position; but every position you can find within reach of where you are has some distressing flaw. Yet with the enemy at

hand in superior force you must either withdraw or choose one of these faulty positions. "L'art de la guerre est tout d'exécution," says Napoleon, and, with reference to a number of tactical points, "la solution de toutes ces questions dépend des circonstances." Evidently the art of generalship consists in the appreciation of circumstances; everything depends upon the correct interpretation of a situation. That is the faculty which requires practice. The best practice would be war. The next best would be manœuvres; but they are very expensive and come only once a year. For everyday lessons manœuvres on a map are the best known makeshift. The Prussians have been for seventy years teaching their officers to read a situation and to make the best of it. Other armies have hardly yet begun. In England we do nowand then set a problem, but we do not believe in it. We cling to questions on the theory, which encourage the crammer. You can cram theory to any extent, but to deal with a situation judgment as well as knowledge is necessary, and judgment cannot be crammed. The problem is at once an educational instrument and a test; and it should be borne in mind that in Prussia the officer's advancement depends upon how he stands the tests, of which the most important is not the problem on paper, but the problems in the field to which it leads up.

The interest of the book before us lies, however, not in the illustration which it affords of Prussian methods. They have long been known, and there are a dozen sets of published problems by competent hands. The value of this collection is that it reveals Moltke. The man is more than the school, and in these exercises we see applied to comparatively small matters, within the range of every cultivated soldier, the workings of a spontaneous intelligence and the force of a self-dependent character.

We note first of all the ease with which Moltke creates a natural situation or scheme, and the terse simplicity with

which it is explained. One of the problems deals with peace manœuvres, another with the form of an order; every one of the remaining sixty-three seems like a fragment of real war. The mastery which this implies will best be appreciated by those who have themselves had to frame such schemes.

The solutions are unconventional. Moltke starts from a view of the situation as a whole, puts himself into the enemy's place and examines what the enemy's best move would be. Then he considers the purpose to be fulfilled by his own side. To achieve that purpose is always his dominant idea and in pursuit of it he is tied by no rules. "Our science gives us no fundamental rule to be always applied, no formula to help us over all difficulties. The essential thing in war is on every occasion to appreciate the situation rightly and to make the arrangements that are the best suited for that situation."

In the third problem a strong division is told off to cover the assembling of a large force at a given point. The enemy, in force superior to the division, is reported a long march distant. The problem is to select a position in which to resist the enemy's advance. A glance at the map shows two positions, one of which is almost ideally strong, while the other has the grave disadvantage of an extensive wood just in front of it. Nine men out of ten would choose the ideal position. Moltke rejects it as too strong. The enemy, he says, will not attack us in it, but march round it, and we shall thus be driven back, without fighting, too nearly on to the point we have to cover.

In the sixtieth problem, it is a question, among other things, of employing a division to cover the march of a convoy from Mühlhausen to Belfort against an enemy advancing from a known point beyond the Vosges. The average officer would march his division towards Belfort as an escort to the convoy moving on a parallel road.

Moltke studies the possible moves of the enemy, and finds that he cannot next day reach the convoy's road except by a particular pass over the Vosges. He marches off the division to cork up that pass.

Some of the problems turn not so much upon the question, "What is to be done," as upon the question, "How to do it." Here Moltke reveals infinite painstaking and an absolute command of details.

Napoleon said to Roederer:—"Si je parais toujours prêt à répondre à tout, à faire face à tout, c'est qu'avant de rien entreprendre j'ai longtemps médité, j'ai prévu ce qui pourrait arriver. Ce n'est pas un génie qui me révèle tout à coup, en secret, ce que j'ai à dire ou à faire dans une circonstance inattendue pour les autres; c'est la réflexion, c'est la méditation." Of Moltke one of his comrades, Verdy, has told us that—

"His keen intelligence never rested until he had thought out all the possibilities and consequences of a given situation, and was perfectly clear in his own mind. But this previous thinking out was so comprehensive and foreseeing that in war nothing took him by surprise. When information came that suddenly changed the situation, so that to others the turn of events was quite unexpected, he did not require a moment's reflection, his eyes seemed to expand, their wonderful expression seemed more inspired than usual, and immediately he explained in simple sentences in the most precise way what was now to be done."

The problems before us make this description intelligible. Moltke's own definition of generalship is practically that it is the art of solving problems:—

"A commander in the field," he says, "has during a campaign to make a succession of decisions based upon situations that cannot be foreseen. . . . If in war everything is uncertain, except whatever of will and energy the commander carries with

him, it is impossible that general principles, rules deduced from them and systems built up out of the rules, can have any practical value for strategy."

The conduct of war resembles the conduct of life. There are rules and principles which it is well to know; but for success more is needed than knowledge. The successful man sees the world as it is, grasps the situation before him, goes straight to the point, and keeps to it. We say of him, in one aspect, that he has character; in another, that he has common-sense, and common-sense at its best we call genius. The command of an army is a matter of character and common-sense. In Napoleon's words, " À la guerre les hommes ne sont rien, c'est un homme qui est tout." Of generals not mere ciphers there are three kinds. There is the commander who has the force of will, but whose intelligence is not cultivated. He makes a good subordinate—a Ney or a Benedek—but is prone to fail when left to himself. Then there is the intellectual man, apt to take in more learning than he can carry. He becomes a Brunswick, a Massenbach, a Colley. Sometimes, but not often, a powerful mind is coupled with a very strong backbone. Such a man, when he has a chance, does great things. Moltke's problems are not conclusive evidence as to character, but no one can study them without recognising the master quality of mind. Their author may have had infinite learning, but it has been digested out of sight. What is visible is the perfection of common-sense.

The Character of Modern War[1]

A FEW years ago two of the most distinguished officers of our day expounded almost simultaneously their views upon the general management of a modern war. The Prussian General and Turkish Field-Marshal, Baron von der Goltz, author of *The Armed Nation*—perhaps the most brilliant and fascinating account of the operations of war ever given to the general public—condensed his ideas upon the higher branches of strategy into a pocket volume of some two hundred pages, entitled *The Conduct of War: a Short Manual of its Most Important Principles and Forms.* At the same time the Austrian General (*Feldzeugmeister*), Baron von Waldstätten, the indefatigable teacher of the reformed Austro-Hungarian Army, published a pamphlet entitled *Strategical Principles in their Application to the Campaign of 1866 in Italy.* Both the volumes are addressed rather to the professional than to the general reader, and each of them deserves the close study of the public for which it is intended. Yet the professional teaching of each of these masters brings into relief matters that ought to be well known to the intelligent citizens of any country in which popular votes may influence the mode of prepara-

[1] *The Spectator,* January 28, 1896.[2]

[2](1) *Kriegführung, Kurze Lehre ihrer wichtigsten Grundsätze und Formen.* Von Colmar, Freiherr von der Goltz, Kgl. Preuss. General Lieutenant, z. d., etc. Berlin: Decker. 1895.——(2) *Strategische Grundsätze in ihrer Anwendung auf den Feldzug in Italien 1866.* Von Joh. Freiherr von Waldstätten, K.K. Feldzeugmeister. Wien: Seidel. 1895.

tion for war or the policy by which it is avoided or brought about.

Every one knows, of course, that, since the Peninsular campaigns and the Crimean War, there have been great changes, and a host of writers in the newspapers and reviews have held forth upon breechloaders, rifled guns, revised tactics, railways and telegraphs, and the rest of the new machinery of the military world. But there have been changes of far more importance than those that are due to the progress of mechanical invention, and of these fundamental changes the unprofessional public hears too little. War has become more serious and more business-like; or rather, it has followed the example of business, and undergone a complete metamorphosis. Just as the small firm, the stage-coach, and the pack-waggon have developed into the great limited company, using a network of railways and telegraphs, so war has transformed itself by enlarging the normal scale of its operations. The principles are the same, but the application is modified by the altered conditions. Baron Waldstätten gives a very striking illustration of this change of scale. An army in war exists in three stages of action—in the preliminary concentration when it is at a distance from the enemy, but ready to begin; on the move; and in battle, or ready for battle. Halted at a distance from the enemy an army must be spread over the country, in order to avoid the terrible inconveniences of food supply and the dangers of sanitary trouble that beset a large force huddled up into a small space. On the move the army is necessarily spread out along many miles of a belt of parallel roads. With a view to battle it must be closely concentrated—that is, packed into small space so as to be able to deliver a blow smartly with all its force. These three distinct conditions have always existed for all armies. But it is worth observing how they are affected by mere numerical increase. An

army of thirty thousand men, such as Bonaparte led into Italy a hundred years ago, can quarter itself comfortably in a rectangle of about eighteen miles by fifteen. So resting, it can all be assembled at any one point of the area within the twenty-four hours, and when closely concentrated will find plenty of room in a circle with a radius of a couple of miles. Such a force can move along a single road and progress twelve or fourteen miles in a day; its front for battle will be little more than two miles. Its commander can easily communicate with any of his troops, and in battle can obtain a general view of what is going on. Increase the force to one hundred thousand men and you will require an area measuring thirty miles each way for its quarters; will need three or four roads for its movement; it will occupy in battle a front of six or seven miles; and you cannot without difficulty assemble it from its quarters on to a battlefield within the twenty-four hours. An army of two hundred thousand men when at rest covers a space measuring forty-five miles along each side; advancing along three roads it would stretch along them thirty to forty miles. To assemble it from its quarters on to a single battlefield would be the work of three whole days. These figures, which are taken from Baron Waldstätten's pages, reveal better than any disquisition the increase in the difficulties of management that arise merely from the enormous numbers of modern armies. The art of spreading an army over the country for convenience of rest and of movement, yet of concentrating it in time for battle, becomes exceedingly delicate and difficult when three days are needed to collect the force which, if kept together, must almost inevitably be exposed both to starvation and to the ravages of the dangerous diseases that spring from overcrowding and defective sanitation. So hard is it to move very large masses of troops that an ill-disciplined or poorly organized army is in constant danger from its own

unwieldiness; its manipulation is impossible except its component parts—bodies of thirty or forty thousand men —are perfectly schooled in all that concerns their own internal mechanism. Armies much larger than two hundred thousand men are probably in any case unmanageable, and the great military States of the Continent, with combatants counting by the million, will in their future wars divide these masses into a number of separate armies working to a common end, but kept apart except for great but brief occasions.

The greatest change that has taken place in the character of war is rather spiritual than material. "War," says Baron von der Goltz, "appears in our day, as a rule, in its natural shape, as the bloody collision of nations, in which each of the parties to the fight aims at the entire overthrow, or, if possible, the destruction of its adversary." That is a sentence to be pondered by every Englishman. Perhaps it requires a little amplification, for it contains an allusion to a famous investigation too little known in this country. The profound thinker who, after the close of the Napoleonic wars, devoted the rest of his life to the analysis of their lessons, and left it as an invaluable legacy to his Prussian countrymen, declared just before his death that his life's work had taught him two elementary but profound truths. He proclaimed first that war is always in all circumstances nothing but a chapter of national policy; its ends are those of the statesman, the only difference between that chapter and the one that precedes it being that when the page of war begins the instrument used is force; when force has done its work, the thread, continued in the next chapter, is the same that ran through the blood-stained passages called war. His second discovery was that if war were logically conducted, each side would, from beginning to end, aim at the total destruction of the enemy's forces, by which is meant, not necessarily killing

all his men, but making an end of all his armies. The armies that surrendered at Sedan and Metz were in this sense destroyed, though only a percentage of the men were killed or hurt. The logical proceeding is to fight till the enemy is disarmed and prostrate, and then to dictate your terms, which in that case will be whatever you like—annexation, or anything short of it that you please. It is evident, however, that all wars have not been waged in this logical fashion nor carried to this extreme. Clausewitz classified wars according as they conformed to this absolute type or not. He saw in Napoleon's wars the marks of this rigid logic, and believed that their extreme violence was due to the fact that they were waged not by princes for dynastic ends, but by nations for self-preservation. He contrasted their fierce energy with the milder character and the half-measures of earlier eighteenth-century wars, and wondered whether in the future wars would always have the absolute character of those of his own time, or would revert to the tameness of an earlier period. The passage quoted from Baron von der Goltz refers to this discussion. It expresses the conviction, shared by all contemporary military thinkers, that the identification of Governments with nations has made permanent what Clausewitz called the absolute type of war. Baron von der Goltz holds then, that if two great Powers of our time have a difference, no matter how trifling or what the subject, which results in hostilities, the aim of each side will be to strike down the adversary, to utterly crush and disarm him, and then to dictate conditions as extreme as the forbearance of other great Powers will allow. This is the view held by all Continental military men and by all Continental Governments. It may be well to consider what it means if applied to the case of our own country. The view held by the military advisers of every Continental Government is that if their nation should ever be at war

with Great Britain its military aim will be to strike down and disarm this country, and then, but not till then, to exact such terms as can be had. A disarmed and helpless nation cannot argue about terms; the phrase "such terms as can be had" refers not to the British resistance, which would be *ex hypothesi* at an end, but to the possibility that to demand too much would arouse the jealousy of some other Power till then neutral. For example, in such an event as the thorough defeat of the British forces, it may well be believed that no Continental Power would acquiesce in the annexation of Great Britain by the victor. But it may equally well be doubted whether any Continental Power would risk its own existence in a war against the conquering State, merely to prevent Great Britain being shorn of her maritime forces, or of her Indian Empire. The conclusion to be drawn from these reflections is that war in our time is bound to be a struggle for national existence, in which everything is risked, and in preparation for which, therefore, no conceivable exertion must be spared.

It is worth observing that the absolute form of war is deduced, not from any of the changes in weapons or in the organization of armies, but from the entrance of nations into the arena which was before occupied by "sovereigns and statesmen." The dynastic form of war was a courtly duel, which went on until the first wound, whereupon honour was satisfied, reparation made, and the episode closed. The national form is a bitter quarrel, and a fight which ends only when one or the other combatant lies prostrate and helpless at the mercy of his foe, whose first anxiety will be to prevent the beaten enemy from ever recovering sufficient power to be able to renew the quarrel with hope of success.

This is no doubt an extreme view. Even in the bitterest international quarrel there are elements that tend to mod-

eration. But the extreme which has just been described is at present the one towards which the balance inclines, and it is worth setting forth, if only for one reason, that it has been fully considered by every statesman in Europe except those of our own country, none of whom have ever given signs of even a nodding acquaintance with it. This tendency of modern war to extremes is the fact that gives such immeasurable importance to the right kind of preparation, and makes it above all things necessary that a Cabinet of civilians should have as its thoroughly informed and trusted advisers the best naval and the best military strategist that the nation possesses. To have selected a Commander-in-Chief is a good thing; to bring him into the closest relation with the Prime Minister would be better; and the best thing that the Government could possibly do would be to find him a naval colleague, his equal in reputation, experience, and ability, and endued with an authority over the Navy co-ordinate with that which he ought to exercise over the army.

III
Problems of Policy

The Khyber Pass[1]

LATE in the evening on the 2d of December, 1892, I left Lahore by the mail to Peshawar, an eighteen hours' journey. When I awoke next morning near Rawal Pindi the train was winding slowly among low hills, which grew higher as the morning advanced. About noon it glided out of a cutting into Attock station, and we saw in front across its path a deep valley between sloping irregular rocks, which hemmed in on each side the grey swirling waters of a swift river. The train crossed the valley by a bridge high above the stream, giving us glimpses on either hand of the gorge of the Indus. The stream flows between grey rocks which rise on each side in broken stony slopes to the tops of the hills, a mile from the river and a thousand feet above it. The hills are unmitigated rock, bare and bleak. Here and there a sage-green bush dots the hillside, but it only emphasizes the general barrenness of the scene. Across the bridge the train turns to the right and goes up the valley for a mile or two, giving us glimpses of the river and of the great bridge. As we near the station at Khairabad we look across the river at the old Mogul fort of Attock, its high loopholed walls and battlements on a cliff a hundred feet above the water. Below, to the left of it, is a wide plain stretching as far as the eye can reach, like a vast swamp, with one or two silvery bands of water, the winter streams of the Indus approaching the gorge. Beyond Khairabad the railway

[1] *Nineteenth Century*, October, 1893.

leaves the Indus and follows the valley of its tributary the Kabul River. At four o'clock we pass the citadel of Peshawar, crowning a rock that juts up from the plain, and a few minutes later the train stops at Peshawar cantonment, the *Ultima Thule* of British India.

The cantonment, at an Indian town, means the place where the English live. The native town is usually enclosed by high walls and accessible only by a few gates; it is brimful of people, who crowd its bazaars or shop streets. Quite outside the town and a mile or two away is the cantonment, an unwalled district, where each house stands in its own enclosure or compound, and where the regiments, British or native, are quartered in "lines" or rows of huts. The cantonment usually has wide well-kept roads, with a grassy margin and avenues of fine trees, giving it the appearance of a great park. The English visitor, if he stays with friends, might be a week without seeing the native town at all, unless his curiosity prompted an excursion in search of it. There is always in the cantonment a club, with a ladies' wing (unless the ladies have a gymkhana or club of their own), and, besides the various parade grounds, a polo ground or a tennis court, so that a visitor bent only on amusement has plenty of resources.

The town gate of Peshawar is a mile from the cantonment, and the morning after my arrival I drove in with no companion but a native interpreter. Peshawar, with its mud and wood houses, its lattice windows, and its multitude of men, is infinitely picturesque. But the impression of the first visit upon an Englishman is not due to the quaint appearance of the houses nor to the Eastern dress of the inhabitants. There are about eighty thousand natives in the city. As soon as you are through the gate and inside the walls you are among them. Not another Englishman is to be seen, and possibly enough you are, at the moment, the only one in the town. Every one looks

at you. There is no staring and no rudeness, but you feel the eyes. The looks of the first half-dozen men you pass, as they sit in their shops or stand in the street, give you a new and strange sensation. You straighten yourself and hold your head up, with a resolve, of which you are hardly conscious till afterwards, that if a knife is plunged into your back you will not flinch. The eyes about you suggest that if there were no cantonment, no others to ask for an account of you, your throat would be cut and your corpse thrown away, and that the people in the street would look on without moving. You immediately feel that there is a responsibility in being an Englishman; you are a representative of your race and all that you do and say must be worthy of the position. The first duty is to not mind the eighty thousand people in Peshawar nor anything they may do. Those first five minutes in Peshawar bazaar reveal to you the secret of British power in the East. It is impossible without utter fearlessness.[1]

I had been advised to see the view from a watch tower in the fort. As I stepped on to the roof my first glance was along the railway line towards Attock and the valley of the Kabul River, by which I had come. This valley was the only opening in a circle of mountains surrounding the spacious plain. To the left the plain would have seemed endless but that beyond it were visible giant mountains one behind another, and above and beyond them all the cold pale snows of the Hindu Kush. Turning round, I found myself facing a semi-circle of black rugged hills

[1] The undoubted hostility of part, at least, of the population of Peshawar is, of course, not representative of any general feeling in India. But I have seen the same expression and had the same feelings resulting from it in Multan and Lucknow. Each of these cities was the scene and bears the marks of a bitter conflict: Multan of the murder of Agnew and Anderson and the subsequent siege, and Lucknow of the siege and relief of the residency. I was startled, however, to observe the same expression, unmistakable, on the faces of Bengalis at Calcutta.

about fifteen miles away, that seemed to rise straight up out of the plain and shut it in like a wall. No outlets were visible, but the directions of the passes that cross the hills were pointed out by a Sikh policeman; to the south the Kohat Pass, to the west the Bazaar Valley and the Khyber, to the right of which the Kabul River issues from the mountains. The flat ground at our feet is British territory; but the mountains all round are Afghan. Here in the plain the Queen's peace is kept; there in the mountains lived Pathan tribes who acknowledge neither Queen nor Ameer. We are at the edge of the Empire.

The Khyber Pass is generally thought of as the northernmost gate in a great mountain wall separating India from Afghanistan. In reality it is the small gate through an outer wall, leading into an enclosure, the plain of Jellallabad. Beyond this is the real wall with its great gates, the passes from Jellallabad to Kabul.

Put three basins in a row, and where two of them touch each other break down the edges a little. Call the middle basin that of Jellallabad, the left-hand one that of Kabul, and the right-hand one that of Peshawar. The broken-down rim between Peshawar and Jellallabad is the Khyber range, a block of hills twenty miles through from basin to basin and over 5,000 feet high. The broken-down double rim between Jellallabad and Kabul is a mass of mountains (the Karkacha and Kurd Kabul ranges) some 10,000 feet high and fifty miles through from basin to basin. Except at these two broken-down ends the rim of the Jellallabad basin is made up all round of much higher and practically impassable mountains. Accordingly all traffic between Peshawar and Kabul must go through the Jellallabad valley, getting in or coming out through the Khyber range. The range has only one road through it. There is a gorge through which the Kabul River forces its way, and there are paths, difficult, high and tortuous; but the only

road by which traffic is possible follows the Khyber Pass.

The Jellallabad basin belongs to the Ameer, and the Peshawar basin to Great Britain; but the Khyber block of mountains belongs to the tribes who inhabit it—independent Afghans, or, in border language, Pathans. These Khyber Pathans can raise but scant crops from their native rocks. They cannot "live on their holdings" and must needs have some other resource by which to eke out their sustenance. This additional source of revenue is the pass. From time immemorial they have taken toll from all who go through. Being poor, uncivilized, and accustomed to fight, their methods of levying what they conceive to be their due are rough and irregular. But from their point of view the dues are their traditional inalienable right. They are, however, very businesslike people. Their point is to receive the money. They are by no means disposed to insist on rough modes of collection. Accordingly they are open to contract for the tolls. During the first Afghan War they took a rent in lieu of pass dues from the British, and caused trouble only when they believed they were being defrauded. Since the last Afghan War the same arrangement has been renewed. Each tribe receives an annual payment from the British Government, in return for which the pass is free to all authorised travellers on certain days in the week. There is also a modern device by which the good relation between the British Government and the tribes is increased. A corps of troops called the Khyber Rifles is recruited from the tribesmen, and employed to guard the pass on the open days and to supply escorts to caravans and travellers. The pay of the men, of course, finds its way to their villages, and the whole population grows accustomed to a sort of respect for British authority. All these arrangements are in the hands of Colonel Warburton, whose official title is "Political

Officer, Khyber Pass." His position as paymaster to the tribes makes him a sort of half-recognised king. He frequently settles their disputes, and by the exercise of a delicate tact and of an unusual personal influence has for many years kept the whole Khyber district—a thousand square miles of hills—in comparative order. The cost of the whole business—the rent-charge in lieu of dues, the Khyber Rifles, and Colonel Warburton—does not exceed £10,000 a year.

It was my great good fortune when at Peshawar to be Colonel Warburton's guest, and he very kindly made arrangements to take me through the Khyber Pass himself. On Monday, the 5th of December, at eight in the morning, we left Peshawar in a *ghari,* a rough two-horse cab. The road leads across a flat plain, with few trees and not much grass or cultivation. As we emerged from the shady roads of the cantonment into the open, it was a glorious, clear, bright morning, and the air crisp and cool. In front and on either hand were the mountains, encircling the plain. On the left they were low and distant; then, crossing our front, higher and nearer; and again, to the right, lower because further away. In front was a peak, Tartara, which I took to be the height of Saddleback or of Cader Idris, but it is as high above where we were as Ben Nevis above Loch Linnhe. Gradually we saw behind the low range to the north, which might be twenty miles away, a few higher and more distant summits. Then above their rims was here and there a line of snowy peaks, far, far away. We stayed a few minutes at Hari Singh, where are Colonel Warburton's official residence, the headquarters of the Khyber Rifles, in a fort, and the frontier. About ten we reached Jamrood, where there is another fort or castle of light brown mud, a caravanserai or enclosed courtyard, and a parade ground. Here the Khyber Rifles, a fine body of men in khaki uniform with knickerbockers, were being

inspected by their commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Aslam Khan. Aslam Khan is an Afghan prince of the Saddozai family, *i.e.*, the royal family that reigned before the present Barakzai dynasty. He has passed most of his life in the British service and has for some time commanded these border levies. His fine soldier-like appearance and courteous bearing make him a favourite with the British of Peshawar, and it was a pleasure to learn that he would accompany us to Landi Kotal. At Jamrood we were joined by a third Englishman, Mr. Walton, and found waiting for us an escort—a native mounted officer and two or three troopers—horses for the colonels, and dogcarts (called *tum-tums*) for the English travellers and their native servants. The baggage had been sent forward on mules, and we started almost immediately. From Jamrood the road rises very gently for about three miles, over a belt of undulating ground at the foot of the hills. It leads into a deep bay in the mountains, at the end of which the ascent begins. In a few minutes we were winding our way through the most rough-and-tumble hills I had ever seen. The strata stood bolt upright, the hills being carved out of them. The road, which is well laid out, and has a regular ascent without extravagant windings, mounts steadily for three or four miles, when it emerges on to an irregular ridge, the margin of an airy upland plateau, wild and broken, shut in by black jagged hills beyond, but wide open to the sky. We looked down on a little valley at our feet, with a streamlet, a tiny patch of green, and a primitive mill. It is Lala China, the "red mill" where, in 1878, Cavagnari met Shere Ali's officer, and received the reply which was the immediate occasion of the Afghan War. We move on through the valley, and ascend for another mile or two to a second ridge, from which we see straight before us the fort of Ali Masjid. Imagine Helvellyn and Skiddaw, carded into the utmost possible ruggedness and

steepness, planted facing each other, with just a quarter of a mile between, and drop into the interval a hill like the great pyramid, but steeper and twice as high, with the battlements of a fort on its flattened top: that is the first view of Ali Masjid. We descend a few yards to a hut by the stream, and find ourselves the guests of Colonel Aslam Khan at a picnic lunch.

An hour later we are again on the road, which pierces the defile on the right of the fort. The road has been skilfully engineered, and is here cut into the mountain on the right. But in 1878 this road had not been made, and the troops had to march along the river-bed, which here for half a mile is a veritable gorge with sides of sheer rock, in some places only about twenty yards apart. Beyond Ali Masjid the road ascends so gently as to seem almost level. It winds in a great bend round the base of a hill which fits into a bay in the opposite hill, leaving just room for the road and the stream. This form of winding glen repeats itself several times, and then the hills stand farther apart, leaving between them a level plain about a mile across and three or four miles long. This wider vale is dotted with villages, or perhaps they should be called forts, of strange and striking build. Four mud walls, 15 feet high and 40 yards long, loopholed near the top, enclose a square space accessible only by a single door. At each of two opposite corners is a round tower about 25 feet high, also loopholed, and so built that it projects from the square. The houses, also of mud, are inside the square, which is the family fortress, the towers being placed so that men in one of them can fire along the outside of two sides of the main wall. We see in a general view about twenty of these strongholds. A rocky spur comes down from the right towards the centre of the plain, and its low extremity is crowned by a solid stone dome crumbling into ruins. Colonel Warburton tells us that it is a Bud-

dhist "tope" of unknown antiquity. At the end of the spur, just in front of the tope, was a post of the Khyber Rifles, who presented arms as we passed. Similar posts, of two, four, or more men, were perched up at nearly all the commanding points on each side of the road from end to end of the pass. They looked pretty in their bright khaki dress, and it was a quaint sight to see, as we did sometimes, two sentries on a pinnacle of rock 500 feet above us. I doubt whether such tiny posts have more than a ceremonial value, but their presence on such inaccessible points proves that they are thorough mountain troops, perfect in wind and limb.

We halt for a few minutes at one village—a cluster of forts by the road—while the head man salaams to the Political Officer and offers us tea and bread by the roadside.

At the next village the head man's sons come out and salaam, their father being away. Colonel Warburton explains that these two villages are at feud; a few weeks ago there was a "shooting" between them, in which eight men were killed. When there is a feud the women and children and cattle are shut up in the fort, and the men crown the battlements and try to pick off any of the other side who show themselves within range. But when Colonel Warburton is in the pass there is a truce. Both sides are agreed that a little fighting is good, but that regular pay is better, and by a judicious arrangement of times there is nothing to prevent them enjoying the benefits of one and the pleasure of the other.

At one village we saw a group of women drawing water from a stone cistern with good European pipes and taps. This is a much appreciated boon. The tribes well understand the benefits of English interference when it takes the shape of a good road where there was no road, or of bringing to their doors the water which before the women had to carry for miles on their heads.

About three o'clock we came to the end of the plain, which was formed by two spurs meeting. A short defile between them led to a second plain, lying across instead of along the road, and sloping up to the hills all round instead of being flat. In the middle of this hollow is the fort of Landi Kotal, an oblong rectangle 350 yards long by 250 wide, with high solid mud walls and round flanking towers at the corners. Up and down the plateau were villages such as we had seen already, their pale brown towers breaking the monotony of the treeless landscape.

The fort contains barracks for several companies, sheds and stabling, a covered reservoir of good water, and officers' quarters, in which our party was soon established. An hour later we strolled over to the serai, an enclosure a quarter of a mile away, smaller than the fort, with a similar mud wall. A caravan from Kabul had just come in, and the great square was crammed full with a noisy crowd of men, horses, camels, mules, and donkeys, infinitely dirty. There was a guard of Khyber Rifles at the gate, and the crowd inside, though noisy, was not disorderly. The officers of our party talked in Persian and Pushtu to some of the wayfarers, who came from various parts of Central Asia, from Samarkand, Tashkend, Balkh, and Kabul. Mr. Walton was anxious to buy the wooden bowl used to mix his rice by one of the Turkestan men, who had at first refused to sell it, then demanded many rupees, and when at last he had handed over his bowl and received one rupee, threw it into the air with a loud triumphant shout, "Allah Akbar!" We went back at sunset to our quarters in the fort.

Next morning we were up in good time, and set out to walk to the Afghan end of the pass. From the fort the plateau of Landi Kotal seems to be shut in all round by hills, but following the road for a mile or two we found it dropping behind a spur into a huge winding gully, a sort

of funnel or ravine down which in rainy times a torrent pours. The engineers have skilfully traced the road round the sides of this great drop so as to have a uniform and practicable gradient.

After walking down for a mile or two we came out on to a spur from which could be seen the end of the pass. The ravine was not wide enough even here to admit of a free view right and left, but the glance at Afghanistan through the V-shaped opening was a sight not to be forgotten. We sat on an irregular pinnacle of rock standing up from the ravine, which it half-filled up. On our left was the dreadful gorge of the torrent, and across it the rugged slopes of mountains that rose 5,000 feet above its bed. These hill slopes limited the view on one side; and similar slopes shut it in on the other. Deep down at our feet was Landi Khana, the foot of the pass; then, seen across a small patch of the plain, a stormy sea of mountains.

We walked back to the fort and spent the morning exploring the plateau. In the afternoon we ascended Mount Pisgah, one of the hills forming its western margin, and overlooking the vale or plain of Jellallabad. Here we saw beneath us the whole valley from Dakka, where the Kabul River enters the Khyber range, to the hill behind which lies hidden the town of Jellallabad, fifty miles away. The river could be watched for many a mile, its slender thread of water seeming insignificant in its broad stony bed. The plain stretched far into the distance, level like a calm sea, with rocks and hills jutting up through its surface. Beyond them were irregular ranges of hills, backed in turn by mountain ranges one behind another, and on the left, above the last dark mountains, the delicate pearly saw-teeth of a snowy range, faint and spectral in the dim distance. To the right, partly hidden by the rocks beside us, a giant roof of pure white snow stood up into

the sky. At its feet was a mountain range seen above nearer lines of hills, so that three great valleys lay between us and the peaks that bore that vast expanse of snow.

Late at night, when all my companions had gone to bed, I went out on to the parapet of the fort. In one of the towers stood, silent and motionless, the Pathan sentry. The moon had set, but in the starlight I could see the vale of Landi Kotal, with its lovely rim of mountains rising, jagged and broken, against the blue sky, and one great peak outside looking down at me over the rim. In the still sky the innumerable stars sparkled with unwonted brilliance, and as I looked up at Jupiter and Orion I thought that five or six hours later the turning earth would show these stars to eyes at home. How gladly would many an Englishman, exiled half across the globe, give his message to some star which might shine it down when passing England later in the night! The Englishman who stays at home too easily forgets that India is a great way off. Perhaps because it is so far away many have forgotten it altogether.

Next day we returned. Across the plain of Landi Kotal, along the plain of the Buddhist tope, and through the winding defiles I drove in the *tum-tum;* through the gorge of Ali Masjid I walked by the river-bed; and down the descent from Ali Masjid to Jamrood I rode with Colonel Warburton, following for part of the way a bridle path, which is shorter than the carriage road. At Jamrood we said good-bye to Aslam Khan, and drove into Peshawar.

The Khyber Pass is no longer a hindrance to movement. Thanks to the British engineers, whose road is excellent, having no grade steeper than 1 in 50, a lady's brougham can drive from Peshawar to Landi Khana. In a military sense the pass is difficult. The gorge at Ali Masjid and the defile beyond could be held for a long time by a small force against an army. Sir Sam Brown, in 1878, failed in

his front attack, and the turning movement which caused the Afghans to retire would not have succeeded against a vigilant defender. There is a track over the hills to the north, sometimes called the Tartara Pass, but it would not serve for a large force, and could easily be defended. To the south of the pass the parallel Bazaar valley offers an alternative route, but it is accessible from the Jellallabad basin only by crossing a high ridge, and ought not to be available against a wideawake opponent. A vigorous defence, with the tribes in its favour, would close the Khyber range against any advance in either direction.

From Peshawar to Jellallabad is eighty miles and from Jellallabad to Kabul another ninety miles. Every mile that the railway could be carried beyond Peshawar would bring India, in every sense, nearer to Kabul. The goods, which at present are carried 170 miles by camels and mules, would be indefinitely multiplied when drawn by the locomotive. The clans to whom the British are strangers would get to know them and become friendly. The Ameer and his people would have a better chance of understanding the Indian Government. These advantages are appreciated in India, and the Khyber country has been reconnoitred for a railway line. The pass is not a good route, as the descent to Landi Khana is too steep for any railway. But modern engineers would make a line along the gorge of the Kabul River, which pierces the range, and by following its course an excellent route can be obtained, free from floods, with no gradients above 1 in 200 and no extravagant tunnels. The rails once laid to Dakka could be carried on along the plain without difficulty to Jellallabad.

The peculiar situation of Jellallabad must be borne in mind. The stupendous hills which I saw from Mount Pisgah are the northern wall of the Jellallabad basin, an irregular wall formed by the ends of great ranges running

down from the north, but yet an effective barrier, which no army, Afghan or British, and hardly any traveller has yet crossed. The southern side of the basin is not visible from Pisgah; it is a straight wall of mountains (the Sufed-Koh) from 12,000 to 15,000 feet high, without a break. At its western end the valley is crossed by north and south ranges twice as high as the Khyber range, and the few passes through them are incomparably more formidable than the Khyber. It was in these terrible defiles that the British army retreating from Kabul was destroyed in 1842, a disaster that, strangely enough, is traditionally known as the "Khyber Pass massacre."

Some of my friends in India think that the best plan for the defence of the north-west frontier would be to hold a fortified position on these hills, connected by railway with Peshawar. Such a position would be the gate of Afghanistan. A British force there would be two or three marches from Kabul, the centre of Afghan life and trade, and the nucleus of all the communications in the country. Nothing could be better, provided the Afghans were agreeable. But they would hardly accept quietly such a state of things, though it might have been forced upon them after a crushing defeat. The Jellallabad valley is peopled by the most turbulent of the Pathan clans. The railway would be almost at their mercy. For this policy, therefore, the first requisite is to secure the allegiance of these clans. A man like Colonel Warburton might accomplish this, if he were given a free hand and supported.

It is hardly conceivable that the railway should not at some time be carried on to Kabul itself. This appears to be the consummation which the Indian Government should keep in view. A railway to Kabul will, sooner than any other agency, break down the isolation of the Afghans, and efface the memory of the unhappy conflicts which have estranged them from the British. It would also

enable the Indian Government to render them effectual help for the defence of their country, in case they should need and desire it. The dislike for the railway is at present cherished partly by the Ameer and still more by the Mullahs, who dread European influence as dangerous to their own ascendency. The common people are by no means absolutely biassed against the railway, or even against the British. If the line were carried to a point just outside the Ameer's territory at Dakka, and the Khyber tribes employed in its construction and working, and their subsistence provided for, the mere saving of time and trouble to the *Kafilas,* or caravans of traders, would advertise the advantages of the iron road to all the population of the Jellalabad and Kabul regions.

In these countries, too, it should not be forgotten, the railway of itself brings most of the benefits and avoids most of the evils of annexation. It Europeanises or Anglicises the country.[1]

[1] Since this paper was written the Tirah campaign has led to a modification in the political arrangements of this part of the frontier. Colonel Warburton has passed away, and Colonel Aslam Khan no longer commands the Khyber Rifles. But I have not altered the paper, which Colonel Warburton thought a true account, except by the omission of a passage advocating changes that have since been made.

Chitral

THE immediate practical question, whether there should be established in the Chitral Valley a British post connected by roads with Peshawar and Gilgit, has been settled. Unhappily, however, opposite opinions are held as to the wisdom of the decision, so that we are as far as ever from any such generally accepted view as might be the basis of a consistent and consecutive national policy in regard to the North-West frontier. The various decisions which a Government is called upon to take are not shut off from one another into watertight compartments; they are all intimately connected with one another, and in the relation between them is to be sought the continuity of design or unity of purpose, which are so many names for a policy. The problem of Chitral cannot be taken by itself; it is part of the larger question how to prevent any interruption of the task which Great Britain has undertaken of governing India. Such an interruption could be brought about by forces operating from outside, either by a successful blow directed against England's maritime power, or by the entrance of an invading army into India by land. A Russian attempt to invade India is a contingency of the future; all schools are agreed that such an attempt, based upon any territory that Russia now possesses, is impracticable. The purpose of any British Government must be, if possible, to prevent its ever becoming practicable. As to

[1] *National Review*, October, 1895.

the means by which this purpose is to be effected, three kinds of views are held: one school would influence Russia by action, or the threat of action, in Europe, or at a distance from India; a second school would rely upon an agreement with her; and a third school would trust to preparations made in India and on the frontier.

Effectively to occupy Russia elsewhere than on the Indian frontier is difficult, because the movement of her troops from Central Asia to other possible theatres of war must be so slow as to produce in the other regions to which they might be sent less effect than would be obtained from their action where they are. If it were possible to convince the Government of Russia that any action in Asia hostile to England would lead inevitably to inconvenience greater than any probable gain, no doubt the peace of Central Asia would be preserved; such a conviction would perhaps arise from a union between British policy and the policy of other European Powers, a union, however, which English opinion does not seem to favour. Theoretically, it seems sound to remember that the best way to keep a man from treading on your toes is to be ready to hit him in the face; but to do that you must be able to get at him, and, above all, you must not be afraid.

The proposal that Great Britain should come to an understanding with Russia is to me unintelligible. There are two things disagreeable to us that Russia may attempt: she may continue her advance towards India, or she may try and get hold of Constantinople. I understand those who suggest an agreement to propose that we are to consent to Russia's taking Constantinople in return for an undertaking on her part not to cross a given line in Asia. But she has already undertaken not to cross a given line in Asia, and I fail to see how she can add to the force of the assurances already given, or give these assurances any validity lasting beyond the minute when she is ready for

a quarrel. Our consent to her taking Constantinople would be gratuitous; if a Russian dominion over the Straits would harm us, we should be doing ourselves a needless injury by acquiescing in it; if it would not harm us, we ought, in any case, to abandon our opposition to it. A more general form is sometimes given to the proposed understanding. We are to cease opposition to Russian policy at all other points, provided she keeps still in Central Asia. In other words, we are to purchase peace in Central Asia by consenting to the Tsar's wishes, right or wrong, in other parts of the world. This view rests on the assumption that the Tsar will, and can, endanger India unless special means are taken to keep him in a good humour. For after you have agreed to his taking Constantinople, the geography of Asia will be much the same as it is, and the Tsar will be just as able to attack India as he is now. The moment you quarrel with him he will be at liberty to attack you, and your fears for the Indian frontier will be the fulcrum of a lever by which he will move your policy upon all questions, except that of India, in any direction he pleases. The proposed understanding would entirely fail to compass the object in view, which is to keep it out of Russia's power to disturb India.

It remains to consider the arrangements that can be made for this purpose on the frontier itself. In regard to these there are several theories. First of all comes the doctrine of masterly inactivity, of which the substance is that there are natural obstacles, and that Russia cannot cross them. This theory has broken down. The natural obstacles are deserts and mountains. The old school relied on the desert between the Caspian Sea and the hill country north of Herat. But Russia has annexed this desert and made a railway across it. Then there are the mountains. It would be difficult to find a more tremendous belt of mountainous country than that to the north of Peshawar.

Peshawar lies about 1,000 feet above the sea. Four hundred and fifty miles due north of Peshawar, and at about the same height, lies Margelan, not very long ago a Russian frontier post, a sort of diminutive Peshawar. Starting south from Margelan the ground rises rapidly; in less than fifty miles is reached the first great ridge of the Altai Mountains, 20,000 feet high; and then, after fifty miles of plateau, the second ridge, 25,000 feet high; then, for 200 miles is a plateau, of which the peaks are level with Mont Blanc, and the depressions level with the summits of the Pyrenees; on the south of this plateau run the Hindu Kush Mountains, rising to 25,000 feet, and from them in another 150 miles Peshawar is reached by crossing three or four lower ranges. How do the believers in natural obstacles account for the fact that in the last few years the authority of Russia has moved southwards from Margelan over the range of 20,000 feet and over the range of 25,000 feet, and along 200 miles of barren plateau, until now the Russian frontier rests at the northern base of the Hindu Kush, and is only 150 miles from Peshawar, and fifty from Chitral? It is evident that if we are to trust to deserts and mountains we need only to have patience and we shall soon find the Russian outposts within range of our own, wherever they may be.

This is precisely what is desired by the advocates of "the line of the Indus." This school appears to hold that we ought to have sat still on the Indus until Russia had absorbed Baluchistan, Afghanistan, Chitral, and the neighbouring hills and all the tribes of the Suleiman Mountains. When that stage had been reached, and Russia had perfected her communications to Jellallabad, Ghazni, and Quetta, perhaps even to Kuram, the Tochi, the Gumal, and Sibi, the British armies were to fight in the valley of the Indus the battles on which the fate of India would depend. No doubt, if it came to the worst,

and if Russian forces, with communications made behind them, should ever debouch from the Suleimans, the British Indian armies would make the best use possible of the advantages which a river like the Indus can afford to a defender. But what would be the state of India at such a crisis? Is not Anglo-Indian opinion unanimous to the effect that the army on the Indus would be paralysed by what would be happening in its rear? I do not believe that any Indian Government could be induced deliberately to stake the fate of India upon waiting quietly until the Russian bases were established at Kabul and Kandahar.

Another view, which, however, cannot be reconciled with that of the believers in the Indus, is that we should wait until the Russians are entangled in the mountains and then attack them. This is practically the view which has been held by every British Government for the last fifteen years. In 1880, an Ameer of Afghanistan was recognised, and the promise given him that if his territories were without good cause invaded by Russia, he should be helped in their defence. Since then his frontier on the Russian side has been delimited from end to end, a process which has no meaning except as a guarantee to him by England of help in case the delimited line be crossed by an invader. The adopted policy is therefore perfectly clear. The end in view is to prevent the Russian frontier from approaching nearer than it now is to India; the means to be employed, the movement of British forces, when called upon, to co-operate with those of the Ameer in ejecting a Russian invader from his territory. The contingency for which provision has to be made is not, in the first instance, a Russian invasion of India, but a Russian invasion of Afghanistan. To render possible British co-operation with the Afghans it was necessary to open the roads by which British forces can be collected on the border of Afghanistan, and for this purpose the area lying between

Afghanistan and the Indus has been gradually brought under British authority.

The kernel of the Afghan power consists in the tribes that inhabit the district of which Kabul is the centre. Afghan-Turkestan is not thoroughly Afghan either in population or in tradition; Herat is half Persian, and Kandahar, though truly Afghan, has from time to time been the seat of a rival, though hardly an equal, authority to that of the ruler of Kabul. In any contest for the possession of Afghanistan in which the assailant comes from the Oxus, while the defenders rely upon help coming from the Indus, the front of operations dividing the opposing forces must roughly coincide with one of the lines, Sukkur-Peshawar, Quetta-Peshawar, Kandahar-Kabul, Herat-Kabul, or Herat-Faizabad. The forces on either side may form one army or several armies; they may operate along one or another of the possible lines of advance; but in any case the front will be formed by the radius of a circle of which the centre will be near Peshawar, Jellallabad, or Kabul. The prolongation of this line lies in the region to the north of the Kabul River and in the space enclosed between that river, the Indus, and the Hindu Kush. A force placed inside that space will therefore be upon the flank of the defending armies. This unchangeable fact gives to the region described its principal strategical importance. But the district also lies on the flank of Kashmir (which covers the northern edge of the Punjab), and thus forms the corner between the western and northern faces of Northern India. Happily, the region is one through which the movement of an army is impracticable. Its area is equal to that of Switzerland, its mountains are cast in a larger, if not a grander, mould; their peaks are more inaccessible, their valleys more secluded, and their defiles more forbidding than those of the Alps. A country like this can never be the scene of the operations of large forces. The traveller

standing in the plain of Peshawar looks northwards upon an amphitheatre of mountains of which he is in the centre; the nearer ridges are rugged like the Scotch hills; in the middle distance are ranges of more than Alpine height, but bare, bleak, and dark; beyond them are seen here and there the snowy summits of the loftier ranges. The lower and the middle ranges are the homes of some of the hardiest of the Pathan clans; among the snow-clad heights beyond them live a milder race of other blood, the tribesmen of Gilgit, Yasin, and Chitral. From the Khyber hills, thirty miles to the west of Peshawar, another part of these mountains is seen; the ends of giant spurs that run down from the Hindu Kush on the west of Chitral; in winter these mighty buttresses carry, as a cap, a single mass of snow, the size of an English county. Behind this snow-crown lies Kafristan, till now the unknown land. The river of Chitral runs down skirting the walls of Kafristan to Jellallabad, and invites movement in that direction. Ninety miles and one great range separate Chitral from the Russian outposts on the Oxus. A hundred and forty miles and several ranges lie between Chitral and Peshawar. Five hundred Russians entering Chitral in summer could establish themselves there in spite of the Chitralis, and, as Dr. Robertson's resistance proves, might hold out there for months. Their presence would be the means of fomenting disturbance in the whole region; possibly of arousing against the Indian Government and the Ameer the tribes that live between the Kabul and the Indus. To eject such a troop of Russians, especially if they had won over support among the tribes, would be more difficult and costly than it was to relieve Dr. Robertson; and in case of war they would be able to raise a sore at a point of serious importance to India and Afghanistan, on the flank of the communications between them. This is, in moderate terms, the kind of danger to be prevented in Chitral. There is

really no way to prevent it except by forestalling the possible Russians and putting in the Chitral Valley a force able to block the road to any enemy. Five hundred British troops settled in Chitral with due preparations for defence may be able altogether to prevent a hostile enterprise which, if undertaken, might require for its defeat the services of twenty thousand. It seems, therefore, a wise economy of force to establish a small British garrison in the valley. But a garrison in an inaccessible post is in a dangerous situation; a small force sure of supplies, of relief, and, in case of need, of assistance, is effective, as without these conditions it can never be. For this reason the decision to establish a post at Chitral carries with it the resolve to open to that place a road, or roads, by which troops and convoys can move, and to take precautions against its being blocked by hostile natives. The post is settled in the valley, and the road from Peshawar has been made; but it is not so clear that adequate steps have been taken to make sure that at a critical moment the road will not be barred by a *sanga* and a tribe of Pathans.

It is a peculiar feature of the frontier problem that along the whole border from the Hindu Kush to the sea, the hardiest tribes, the best fighters, the most turbulent clans, are those nearest to the British border. The region which has just been described is no exception to this rule. The martial clans are those of Buner, Swat, and Bajaur, not those of Gilgit and Chitral. In my judgment only two kinds of relation are admissible between a civilized Government and wild tribes in its neighbourhood. Either the Government must let them entirely alone, or it must thoroughly subdue them. It is impossible to let the border tribes alone; the meddlings come from them. The only reasonable plan, therefore, is that of the Romans:

"Parcere subjectis et debellare superbos."

Little expeditions, sent to chastise a tribe for a series of maraudings, are a source of enormous expense, and their work is never done. They burn a few villages, destroy worthless crops, take hostages who know that they will never be hurt, and then march back again, leaving the tribe to return to its old courses. The right way is to announce to the tribes once for all the nature of British order, the necessity of the *Pax Britannica,* and after that to strike down any recalcitrant tribe. There is no other way by which the allegiance of the Pathan can be had; he respects, as all men do, an irresistible force, and once he perfectly understands that the Indian Government is such a force he will begin to appreciate the fact that its power is used for a high purpose and not wantonly. When that idea dawns upon him he will be loyal. The Indian Government for a whole generation has been afraid of touching the clans that live north of the Kabul River, afraid, not of the clans, but of the outcry that would have been raised by a party at home if the clans had been tackled as they ought to have been. In this way the clans have come to think themselves more important than they are, and there is danger in that frame of mind. I should be sorry to be misunderstood as advocating a hard and fast rule, a cast-iron policy, with the Pathan tribes. Nowhere is there so much room for tact, and those who want illustrations of it should read the now forgotten volumes in which Edwardes recorded the work of *A Year on the Punjab Frontier.* But tact cannot be exercised by a Government in Downing Street, nor by a Government in Calcutta, with regard to frontier tribes. It must be the quality of the officers in direct relation with the chiefs; and these officers can display it only if they are sure of being supported from headquarters, not merely when they advise conciliation, but when they believe that vigorous action is required. A man like Sir William Lockhart, whom the

tribes fear and respect, is the man who can best win them without blows; but such a man is helpless so long as he fears that even when he thinks it necessary he will not be allowed to strike.

I have attempted to show the place of the recent decision with regard to Chitral in the general scheme of frontier policy which has long been adopted by British Governments. No other general scheme of policy is practicable at present. Yet it may be useful to bear in mind that the adoption of the present policy was due to weakness and circumstances, rather than to deliberate purpose and foresight. The second Afghan War was undertaken apparently with the object of securing the passes that lead into Afghanistan. The positions desired were easily gained, and if the phrase "scientific frontier" had any meaning at all, they were such as in the judgment of Lord Lytton would enable the Indian Government to view with comparative indifference whatever might at that time, and in the then situation of Russia, have taken place beyond our border. Unhappily, in the treaty of Gandamak, the stipulation was inserted that there should be a British resident at Kabul, and the result was to renew the war, and to compel us to conquer Afghanistan. After the surrender of Shere Ali's successor, the country was in a state of anarchy; there was no native chief with even the semblance of power. At this moment came a change of Government at home, and the new Ministry resolved to evacuate Afghanistan, including some of the districts annexed by the treaty of Gandamak. It seems to me that at that time there were two reasonable courses: either to march out of the country, and leave it alone, or to annex it and complete the conquest. The Government did neither. They invited a pretender to assume the crown and paid him blackmail. Their idea was that in return for the payments he would take the English side against Russia. If it was the Afghan

interest to take that side, the Ameer must have taken it without pay; if it was not, no pay could secure him in case of a crisis. But the Government further bound itself to help him against Russia, in case of an unprovoked attack. This was, and still is, a pledge binding us to fight Russia at Russia's time, and in a theatre of war—Afghan Turkestan—which, at any rate in 1880, was far distant from the most advanced points on which British operations could be based.

The promise of assistance to the Ameer given in 1880 seems to have been not so much an act of deliberate policy as a device for dispensing with any policy at all. The same Government which undertook to help the Ameer against an invasion of Afghan Turkestan or of the Pamir steppes declined to make the railway to Quetta, and did nothing to open the direct way towards the passes of the Hindu Kush that lead on to the Pamirs. A few years later, when the Russians drove in the Afghan outposts, the help given to the Ameer consisted in a delimitation by which his territory was diminished, and the Russians permitted to settle on the Afghan side of the Merv desert. During the last year or two the same process has been repeated on the Pamirs, where the Russians have been allowed to push the Afghans across the Oxus, until the Ameer retains jurisdiction only over the inaccessible and indefensible northern face of the Hindu Kush. These Russian advances, however, have stimulated the preparations of India. The railways to Quetta and the position there prepared have made that place a base from which effective operations can be carried on. At the same time, the Indian army has been rendered more efficient than it ever was, and a consistent policy in dealing with the tribes has been pursued for several years past. Yet the course of events since 1880 suggests the impression that successive Cabinets have accepted a purpose or end without much analysis of the

means necessary to its attainment. The end has all along been to prevent the further advance of Russia. The means employed have been promises and subsidies to the Ameer, along with the contingent threats to Russia implied in the promises. But the execution of these threats, if it were required, would be difficult, and could not be attempted without the concurrence of the Ameer, and the sympathy of his people.

Governments appear habitually to neglect that "looking before and after," which is supposed to be the mark of the statesman's genius. The omission is made by both parties alike. A typical instance is afforded by the expedition up the Nile. It was quite evident, at the time when the decision was made to undertake the relief of Khartoum, that the expedition might or might not reach the city before its fall. But the event proved that the course to be adopted in case the relieving force should not be in time had not been seriously considered by the Government of that day. It was the other party that made the treaty of Gandamak, by which a British Resident was forced upon the people of Kabul. Every one concerned was well aware that the position of the Resident would be dangerous; in other words, that there was a chance of his being assassinated. It would have been natural, before making the stipulation, to have considered what step would have to be taken in case that should happen. There could be little doubt that in that event Afghanistan must be invaded and its armed forces crushed.

Had the government considered this contingency, and was it prepared, after conquering the country, to annex it and undertake its administration? Hardly. The communications between our bases and the centres of the Afghan power were too difficult and precarious, and it was far from certain that opinion in England could be relied on to support annexation. If then it would be inconvenient

to conquer and annex Afghanistan, it was injudicious to insist on a measure (the appointment of a Resident) which, if it failed, would render incumbent on us the invasion and conquest of a country we were not prepared to annex. Had this been thought out at the time, either the stipulation for a resident would have been dropped, or would have been accompanied by adequate preparations for the second war which its miscarriage, seen to be possible, was sure to bring about. After the catastrophe at Kabul, and the consequent invasion, the new Cabinet shrank from the difficulties of annexation, and took refuge in the alliance with a new Ameer, although it involved in the future a series of difficulties of much more portentous character.

Suppose that at any time a Russian force should cross the delimited frontier and possess itself of Herat, Maimena, Mazar-i-Sharif, or Faizabad, or even of all these places, without advancing beyond them. The British Government would hardly receive authentic information of what was taking place before the Russians would have completed the execution of their designs. Enquiries made at St. Petersburg might elicit the reply that the occupation of these districts had been caused by local events, and was to be temporary; that there was no desire to disturb the good relations between the two Governments. What would be the position of the British Government? It would depend in the first place upon the conduct of the Ameer. If that prince called upon us to assist him in driving out the Russians we could hardly refuse to do so without being dishonoured. It would be necessary then to assemble seventy thousand troops of the Indian army, British and native, at Quetta or at Peshawar, and to carry on a campaign at a distance from either of these bases, relying upon the good faith of our Afghan allies to keep open such slender communications as are afforded by the route from Kandahar to Herat or the passes through the

wild mountains that rise behind Kabul and Ghazni. If, on the other hand, the Ameer declared that he did not propose to attack the Russians we could hardly do anything but acquiesce in the change. Yet our credit in Asia would have received a great blow. This is the dilemma in which Great Britain has been placed by the oscillations of the party pendulum. It is a delicate and embarrassing situation, from which there is no obvious escape; and I have tried to put its disagreeable features in a clear light, in order to suggest, not a heroic remedy, but an appeal to good sense. Is not the lesson to be learned, that in matters where the welfare of the nation and the empire are at stake we ought to have a higher point of view than that of either party? Of course, in a sense, the differences of opinion between the parties turn upon different views of the national welfare. But there is a distinction between the domestic questions which divide us and the antagonisms that are raised against Great Britain by other Powers. In home affairs we are Unionists or Liberals, but in relation to other nations we are all British. Not that we all take the same view of questions of foreign policy, but we all regard them, and wish to regard them, from a national rather than from a merely party point of view. In short, we can differ about domestic questions without necessarily differing about foreign and Imperial questions. If by any means we could separate the two sets of controversies so as to suspend our domestic disagreements while discussing matters of national and Imperial policy, we should probably come to see more clearly in both departments. If the political leaders of thought can come to see the North-West frontier problem, not as a question between two parties at home, but as a question between England and Russia; and if they will, while there is leisure, work out the questions involved in it, there is some chance that when the opportunity comes, as it may, for example, upon the

death of the Ameer, we may be able to bring about a closer accord between the obligations we have undertaken and the preparations made to fulfil them.

The difficulty of carrying out by action in and through Afghanistan the purpose of restraining a Russian advance brings us back to the idea of action elsewhere. Such action must needs take the form of a counter-stroke, which is indeed, an essential part of any resistance, whether in peace or war. To omit the counter-stroke or repartee is usually the mark of the losing side, for it is the sure indication of want of spirit. An opportunity for bringing pressure to bear upon Russia in Asia was perhaps afforded by recent events in the Far East. It was clear at the beginning of the war between China and Japan that victory must rest with that one of the two Powers which should win a decisive naval battle. Early in the war it was evident that Japan had gained the mastery at sea, and that her army was able to defeat any forces that the Chinese could muster on land. It was also evident from the beginning that the retention of Corea and of the adjacent southern coast of Manchuria would be disagreeable to Russia, and yet that Russia could not possibly prevent it by military operations on land. The British Government, as soon as these features of the situation were manifest, might have given the Japanese Government an assurance of support in case of the interference of any third Power in the quarrel between Japan and China. Such an assurance must have prevented the joint action of Russia, France, and Germany. Germany had little interest in the matter; France no such interest as would have induced her actively to oppose Great Britain. Russia, therefore, would have been left to her own resources, which in view of the event here contemplated were inconsiderable. She could not in any reasonable time march an army across Asia; nor could she contend with a British fleet in the Pacific based upon Japan

and reinforced by the Japanese fleet. Powerless to hurt Japan, she could have attacked England only through Afghanistan. But to have attacked Afghanistan just then would have been to drive the Ameer into the arms of the British Government, and to have precipitated a conflict for which at the time Afghanistan and India were better prepared than Russia. Even a success of the Russian arms in Afghan-Turkestan would not have affected the situation of Japan in Manchuria and Corea. The Russian Government must therefore have shrunk from war, and must have sought by negotiation to attain its purpose of diminishing the acquisitions of Japan. The British Government could then have insisted, as the preliminary to discussing the reduction of the Japanese claims, upon the abandonment by Russia of the Pamir territory lying south of the northern arm of the Oxus. To this policy two objections can be imagined. It may be thought that our relations with France would have been subjected to a further strain. But there are not a few observers who hold that only a decided course like that here suggested will improve our relations with France. The French, whatever their feelings, do not at present want war with England; and to give them the opportunity, while there is time, of ascertaining that such is their real frame of mind would be to render a service to both countries. More specious is the objection which urges that the alliance of China may be useful to us. But China has no power to attack any one. She could be useful to England only by defending her own territories, which she must do, if she can do it at all, for her own sake, and whether she has our alliance or not. The course indicated would, however, not have brought England into collision with China, while it would have secured for some time to come a great preponderance of British influence in Japan, in the Pacific, and in Asia.

Russia's Strength [1]

"IS there any ground for this unwholesome and abject terror that Russia appears to inspire in other Powers?" This question, put to me in these words by a friend who is deeply interested in matters of European policy, leads so directly to the root of the present situation that it may be worth while attempting an answer. It has for some time been the fashion when such questions are asked to seek the answer in military and naval statistics. Those who consult tables giving the grand total of persons upon whose military service in some capacity the Russian Government considers that in the last resort it can count, may feel awed by the four or six millions of armed men who will in this way be paraded before the imagination. But totals of this kind are of little practical value. The real military force of a nation is represented by the armies that it can put into the field for specific purposes of attack or defence. In recent years, since the death of Alexander II., Russia has considerably strengthened her military power by preparing it for definite campaigns. Before the accession of Alexander III., Russia's army was spread over the greater part of her European territory. There was, and still is, a large force in the provinces south of the Caucasus, and a smaller force dispersed over the vast Asiatic territories under Russian rule. Of late the garrisons in the

[1] *National Review*, October, 1896.

extreme East have been strengthened, but a quite recent estimate does not put the Russian force in Asia, apart from the army of the Caucasus, higher than 75,000 men. The great change has been in Europe.

From Odessa to St. Petersburg is about a thousand miles, and from Warsaw to Kazan about twelve hundred. So long as the permanent quarters of the troops were spread over a parallelogram of these dimensions, even though the western districts contained more than their share, the army was doomed to perpetual unreadiness. In a country with hardly any metalled roads and few railways the collection into one district of contingents so widely scattered was so slow a process as to be impracticable; wars were ended before all the forces that should have been employed had been brought on to the scene of action. In 1860, Moltke, discussing the chance of Russian intervention in a war in Germany, wrote: "Moscow, which we may regard as the centre of gravity of Russia, is as far from Berlin as Madrid or Naples. The Russian army is spread over an area of a million square miles. It needs a long time to assemble, and has to cover from the Volga to the Vistula, a distance of 1,400 miles without a railway. The Russian army can reach our frontier only after we have been victorious, or have already suffered defeat." During the reign of Alexander III., the Russian Government became aware that the old-fashioned distribution of its troops rendered it comparatively impotent either for attack or defence at any given point. The remedy was found by choosing the region where it would be useful to be strong, and by moving into that region so much of the army as would make possible its complete concentration there in case of need. The question which was the proper district for this purpose must evidently depend upon the object for which it was thought most likely the army would be employed, and when we know the answer given we shall hardly be wrong in making

inferences as to the policy of Russia. The army was moved to the western frontier.

To understand its present distribution it is necessary only to remember one or two leading features of its organization. Four battalions form a regiment, and four regiments an infantry division, to which is attached an artillery brigade of six batteries with forty-eight guns. A cavalry division is comprised of twenty-four squadrons. The field army is made up of infantry divisions and cavalry divisions, and will be augmented in case of war, not only by bringing the infantry divisions up to war strength, which is about double the peace effective, but also by expanding the rifle brigades and reserve brigades, which in peace are composed of the cadres of four rifle battalions or eight infantry battalions. The cavalry division numbers about 3,900 sabres; the infantry division on a war footing about 16,000 bayonets; the reserve brigade half, and the rifle brigade a quarter, of that strength. Beyond these components of the field army, there are of course fortress garrisons of various arms, and the troops of the several auxiliary services. These are for the most part quartered in the great fortresses of the western frontier. By the present distribution, the whole European army of Russia is contained in six districts, those of Wilna, Warsaw, Kief, and Odessa, which together form the western frontier belt, and those of St. Petersburg and Moscow, from which railways run to the frontier.

The principal military centre is Poland, the great tongue of land that protrudes towards Germany between Prussia and Austrian Silesia. Here there are no less than eleven infantry divisions, and eight and a half cavalry divisions, which on a war footing would make an army of 217,000 men. The infantry is arranged in a horseshoe line facing the German and Austrian borders.[1] Seven of the cavalry

[1] The headquarters of divisions are at Bielostok, Lomsha, Ostrolenka, Pultusk, Warsaw (2), Radom, Ljublin (2), Brest Litewsk, and Kobrin.

divisions are on the outside of the horseshoe, five on the north side facing Prussia, and two on the south towards Galicia.

In the district of Wilna there are eight infantry and two cavalry divisions, at war strength an army of 142,000 men. The corner points of the district are at Riga, Witebsk, Bobruisk, and Grodno, so that its area is about 250 miles square; but the divisions are stationed at places in direct railway communication with Wilna and Kovno, the great frontier fortress on the Njemen.

On the south of the great marshlands that stretch eastwards from Brest Litewsk, a third army of 154,000 men, when completed to war strength (five cavalry and eight infantry divisions), is dotted by divisions along the railway from Charkow and Pultawa through Kief to Luzk, near the Galician border. A fourth army has its headquarters at Odessa, its four infantry divisions, except that at Sebastopol, being stationed near the Roumanian frontier, or the railways leading towards Bessarabia. Its war force would be about 70,000 men.

Behind these four armies are the great reserves at St. Petersburg and Moscow. At St. Petersburg, in direct railway communication with Wilna and Warsaw, are six infantry and two cavalry divisions, with a war strength of 111,000, and at Moscow, with a direct railway to Warsaw, and less direct railways to Kief and Odessa, are one cavalry and seven infantry divisions, making 121,000. These various bodies are the whole field army of Russia in Europe, 917,000 men. But, as has been noted, the outbreak of war will see them strengthened by rifle and reserve brigades, which might, after a time, add two or even three hundred thousand to the total force. In case the Government required to use all or any of these armies, it would be necessary first to call out the reserve men needed to fill up the cadres to the war complement, and to transport them from

their homes to the present quarters of their regiments. This process would hardly be accomplished in less than a month. It would be followed by the concentration in its district of the army to be employed, which in Poland might be effected in ten marches; in the district of Wilna, where the railways are convenient, in about the same time; but in the regions of Kief and Odessa would probably involve further delay. The Moscow and St. Petersburg contingents might by this time be approaching the frontier districts, and the expansion of the reserve cadres might be beginning.

The forces that would thus be put in motion are no doubt large. But it must be observed that the distribution here described admits of the full effort being made only in one eventuality, that of a war in which Russia is opposed at the same time by Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Roumania, or at least by Germany and Austria-Hungary. The armies of Kief and Odessa are too far away to be available within any reasonable time against Germany, and those of Wilna and St. Petersburg could not without very great difficulty and delay be moved to the Galician or Roumanian frontiers. The arrangement is evidently based upon the assumption of a common policy uniting Germany and Austria-Hungary. For the contingency of a war in which these two Powers were arrayed against Russia, the Russian force can hardly be thought extravagant, in view of Bismarck's famous declaration that Germany could place a million men on each of her frontiers, and have a third million in reserve, and of the probability that the greater part of the Austro-Hungarian army would be employed against the Russians. Further, it may reasonably be held that the disposition of four armies at points of assembly along a frontier eight hundred miles long (in a straight line from Odessa to Memel) is defensive rather than offensive. The essence of attack consists in concentrating the available force against a single enemy; a course which has been shown to be in this case

hardly practicable. No doubt the distribution of forces points to a preponderance in the quarter opposite the German frontier, which is watched by a very large body of cavalry, and upon which the armies of Wilna and Warsaw could be supported both by that of Moscow and that of St. Petersburg. This preponderance, however, is no more than a well-deserved compliment to the superiority of the German army in numbers, organization, and readiness, to that of the dual monarchy.

At the present moment, then, the military strength of Russia consists in her being ready for a war on her eastern frontier. In any other direction she is hardly prepared for a great effort, but in no other direction is she confronted by any military Power that could be dangerous to her. Her army of the Caucasus is no doubt equal to any emergencies likely to arise in that region, but is not in any reasonable time available elsewhere.

The Russian navy is hardly in itself strong enough to cause much apprehension to any of the great Powers. It may perhaps be described as generally about equal to that of Germany or of Italy, with the qualification that the special effort of the present time to increase the number of modern battle-ships tends to make it in that important element of force superior to either of them. But as it is usually divided between the Black Sea and the Baltic, and as all its possible enemies have their bases at points on the route joining those two seas, it must be regarded as subject to some embarrassment due to this strategical situation.

The very great influence exerted by Russia is due, not to her own forces, which are by no means disproportionate to the tasks of defence incumbent upon them, but to her alliance with France. The Russian and French armies together are more numerous and probably as efficient as the German and Austro-Hungarian armies combined. The addition of the Italian army gave a slight preponderance of force to the

Triple Alliance; but the exhaustion of Italy has rendered this advantage doubtful, while the combined navies of France and Russia are more than a match for the navies of the Central Powers. A war between the two groups would be an exhausting, ruinous effort to both sides; the balance of forces promises no decided success to either party, and therefore the great interest of most of them is to avoid it. The temper of the French is, however, still thought to be correctly described by the Bismarckian words, that if there were war between Germany and Russia "the chassepots would go off of themselves." In other words, French feeling places French policy at the disposal of Russia, although the Russian Government will hardly begin a war for any merely French object. This situation makes the Russian Emperor the arbiter of peace or war, and for this reason so much deference is paid to him.

The action of Russia in preparing her army for campaigns against possible European enemies seems to have been the outcome of a natural and reasonable policy. In general terms this policy may be described as the effort to bring the power or influence of Russia to bear upon the centre of gravity of the political world (or at least of the old world) which lies in Europe, rather than to disseminate that power by employing it in fragments at points far away from the centre of gravity. The effect has been to diminish Russia's military activity in Asia without diminishing her political influence there.

The movement of troops was carried out in the main in 1887. No thorough local preparations had been made, and large masses were quartered in districts where there were neither houses nor huts. Disease ravaged among the troops, and a long time passed before camps had been replaced by barracks or other permanent quarters. This carelessness of life and want of forethought is hardly a good omen for the future operations of these armies. The principal difficulty

attaching to the movements of very large forces consists in securing that all the men shall be properly fed and shall have such rest and shelter as may suffice for health. During the campaign in France these difficulties were overcome by the exertions of a splendidly prepared service directed by the perhaps unique talent of the late General von Stosch. Stosch was far from sanguine as to the possibility of properly supplying in the field the greatly increased numbers of more recent times. He once said that he neither knew how it could be done nor who could do it. In view of the inefficiency of Russian communications, the impossibility of a large army in the region eastward of the Oder, or, indeed, eastward of the Weser, living upon the country it passes through, and the traditional weakness in point of exactitude of the Russian administrative officials, the westward march from Warsaw and Wilna presents to the imagination dreadful possibilities of privation, disease, and starvation. But this by the way. The first effect of the changed distribution of the Russian army was to compel the German Government to a large increase of its available force, produced by extending the age of reserve liability so as to make liable in case of war several annual classes that had before been exempt. At the same time German policy was adapted to the situation. Bismarck's last great parliamentary speech, that of February, 1888, was the announcement that in order to avoid a war with Russia and France at once, from which Germany could have nothing to gain, and everything to lose, the German Government must make every sacrifice short of that of honour to propitiate Russia. Austria was to be defended if attacked, but not to be supported in her traditional Eastern policy, or at least not in any attempt either to extend her own influence or to stem the extension of Russian influence in the regions now or formerly under Turkish dominion. The normal and natural tendencies of Russian and of Austrian policy in regard to the Eastern Question

have never been better set forth than in Moltke's introduction to his history of the war of 1828-9. "The task which of necessity Austria will sooner or later have to perform" is "to prevent the downfall of the Ottoman Empire, or to regulate the course of that, perhaps, inevitable event." On the other hand, "Russia is absolutely driven by her geographical and commercial position to exercise at Constantinople a predominant influence, without which she can insure neither the internal prosperity of her southern provinces, the development of her maritime enterprise, nor the security of her southern border." The balance of force between the combination of which Austria is a member, and that of which Russia is the head, coupled with the dangers to all parties attending a conflict between the two sides, has necessitated a compromise in regard to Turkey, based upon the *status quo,* interpreted, so far as the minor States Bulgaria and Servia are concerned, in the sense favourable to Russia, expounded by Bismarck in the speech to which reference has been made, and so far as the Ottoman Empire is concerned, in the sense that its territorial integrity is to be maintained, but that Russia is to exert the influence which she desires. Thus the first result of the new Russian policy and of the new distribution of her army has been a great success in Europe. Austria and her allies are cowed by the prospect of a conflict which to avert they have given Russian influence full scope in Turkey and its former dependencies, the only reservation being apparently that Russia is not to conquer or annex territory. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire is to be postponed, and the delay is to be for the benefit of Russia. This being the attitude to which the German and Austrian Governments are constrained, the public discussion of the nature of the Turkish dominion, such as it has shown itself in Armenia, cannot but be distasteful to them, for it can only lead to the inference that they are actuated in their conduct by the dread of a conflict with

the Dual Alliance, an inference which they cannot wish their subjects to draw.

In Asia the new policy has had its effects. In Persia Russia's influence is already sufficiently strong, and in the direction of India no immediate action seems to be contemplated. An attack upon India, or even upon Afghanistan, will hardly be undertaken until the newly acquired districts of Central Asia have been fully Russified, and until it becomes practicable to assemble a considerable force beyond the Caspian. It would be folly to diminish the force in Europe, which, rationally disposed, produces such a great effect, for an enterprise of which in present conditions the execution is impracticable. An attack upon India ought to be preceded by a considerable weakening of the general position and status of the British Empire, and this must be effected by means of Russia's European policy.

In the Far East, however, a delicate situation was created by the Japanese conquest of Korea, and of the great naval bases on the Gulf of Pechili. If the Japanese were allowed to establish themselves here the path of Russian extension would be barred, and Japan in possession could, with naval help from England, prevent Russia from ever developing her naval ambition in the Northern Pacific. Prompt, direct, isolated action was not practicable. A Russian army could not be marched across Asia. The Japanese forces were too strong for the Russian forces on the spot, and naval help from European Russia could not be rendered if England should determine to help the Japanese. The danger was that England might see her advantage; might mediate between Japan and China, and guarantee to Japan against Russia the positions she had conquered. A fairly strong British Government would hardly have been deterred by joint declarations from Russia and France alone, for prompt action would have given England a great opportunity both in the Far Eastern and in European waters, and a

serious repulse to Russia in the Far East would have reacted on her position in other parts of Asia and in Europe. The accession of Germany to the combination was, therefore, a great service to Russia, and enabled her to recover, without a blow, an important position already lost, to inflict upon England a humiliation which in the Far East was palpable, and to reveal to Japan that English Governments are not to be trusted to assert the evident interests of their own nation.

That Russia aiming at predominance in Asia, and France seeking to make the Mediterranean a French lake, should see their rival in England, the possessor of India and the Administrator of Egypt, is quite natural. But the bitter hostility to England expressed in Germany for some time past, and now, as it seems, springing up in Austria also, cannot be accounted for by any natural or evident opposition between the policy of those countries and of Great Britain. The explanation seems to be that Germany and Austria have hoped that the stress under which they are placed would be relieved if England could be entangled in a conflict with either France or Russia, or both, and that this hope has been disappointed. The recent political changes have had for Englishmen one salutary consequence. They must have opened even blind eyes to the fact that between nation and nation there are no sentimental ties. We have no friends, and no nation loves us. We are esteemed in proportion as we are believed to be strong, and any interest taken in our welfare is measured either by the probability that we shall spend sovereigns or use ironclads for the benefit of the nation interested, or by the prospect which that nation sees of extorting from us some of our territory or some of our trade.

The immediate cause of the latest outbreak of Anglophobia is that the Continental Powers, having, with great control of their own rivalries, agreed to avert quarrels by

postponing the new-ordering of the Turkish Empire, perceive that it is in England's power to upset the whole fabric, and by so doing to shake down over their heads the truce which they have patched up. There is some danger, perhaps, when the Governments of the great Powers really believe our own Government to cherish an insidious design, either for the acquisition of a Turkish province or otherwise to their detriment, that they may concoct together a counter design against England. It is, therefore, a time to put ships in commission, to keep fleets concentrated, and to labour unostentatiously upon the defences of the Empire.

Constantinople[1]

WHEN Diocletian, at the end of the third century, found it necessary to concentrate his attention upon his eastern frontier, and upon the interior of Asia Minor, where the spread of Christianity was causing him deep anxiety, he established his residence at Nicomedia, the modern Ismid, at the extreme eastern end of the Sea of Marmora. Nicomedia was and is the starting point on the way into Asia Minor. The Roman road ran a few miles south to Nicæa, and then struck due east to Angora and Sebasteia (now Sivas), from which roads led eastward into Armenia, and south-eastward to the Euphrates at Samosata (Samsat). From Angora in ancient times, a road led straight to the great pass through the Taurus, known as the Gate of Cilicia, and thence to Tarsus and Adana and round the Gulf of Alexandretta to Antioch. In Turkey to-day there are no roads, but the chief caravan track still begins at Ismid and follows the direction of the old Roman road. There are two other routes leading from the Sea of Marmora to the Taurus. One of them goes from Ismid by Eskischehr to Iconium (Konia), and the other to the same place from Broussa by Kutaia and Afiun. From Ismid there is a direct inland route to Amasia and thence to Samsun on the coast, as well as a route which keeps near or follows the coast to Sinope and Trebizond. A line drawn from Broussa to Iconium, then to the pass through the Taurus,

[1] *National Review,* November, 1896.

and thence to Sivas and Amasia, encloses the great central district of Asia Minor, which, being walled in by rugged hills on the south, has its natural communications with the Sea of Marmora.

In the generation after Diocletian, Constantine the Great made his capital at Byzantium, about fifty miles farther west than Nicomedia and also on the Sea of Marmora. The new site had all the advantages of the old one, for the fifty miles of road connecting the two points (the only paved road in the present Turkish Empire) brought it near to the land routes to the east, while its sea communications gave it an importance without parallel. For a hundred miles the Sea of Marmora is separated from the Black Sea by a strip of hilly ground from twenty-five to thirty miles across. This land belt is pierced at its centre by the Channel of the Bosphorus, a zigzag loch or fiord, eighteen miles long from sea to sea, varying in width from half a mile to a mile. Immediately beyond the entrance from the Sea of Marmora, on the west or left-hand side of the strait, a small deep loch runs up into the land for about three miles, forming a safe and capacious harbour with an entrance some four hundred yards across. This is the Golden Horn, and Constantine built his city on the triangular spur between the harbour and the sea. North of the harbour lies the suburb of Galata, and on a hill above it the suburb of Pera, while on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus opposite the Golden Horn is the suburb of Scutari.

Constantinople in capable hands has unique advantages for its defence. So long as its owner has the superior fleet, the military attack, either from Europe or Asia, must proceed along a peninsula fifty miles long and only half as broad. The assailant, therefore, is tied to a narrow front of attack, with his flanks exposed to the operations of the defending fleet. On either peninsula are splendid defensive positions. On the European side, about fifteen miles from the Bosphorus, the width of the peninsula is reduced by the

Bay of Buyuk Chekmedje on the south, and the lake and marshes of Derkos on the north, to about fifteen miles. This position has in recent years been strongly fortified, and if properly armed and manned could hardly be taken by a frontal attack. It is computed, however, that the necessary garrison would be not less than 70,000 men. The banks of the northern half of the Bosphorus bristle with batteries, which are said to mount between four hundred and five hundred guns. On the south, the chief defence of the city is the Dardanelles, the passage which connects the Sea of Marmora with the Ægean. The Dardanelles are one hundred and twenty-five miles from Constantinople, forty-three miles long, and vary in width from thirteen hundred to four thousand yards. The strait is defended by works mounting something like six hundred and eighty guns. It will be evident that the defence of Constantinople involves the judicious co-operation of an army and a navy, and that its attack by an army alone must be always a difficult enterprise. The length and narrowness of the two straits is such that modern artillery properly employed would render the attempt even of ironclads to pass through them against the will of the defenders a most hazardous operation. An investment of the city would be practicable only in case the defender were without a navy, and the assailant had succeeded in passing some of his ships into the Sea of Marmora.

Constantine the Great, of course, intended his city to be the capital of the Empire, which implies that it could dispose for its defence of an army and a navy on a level with the standard of the times. So long as that condition is fulfilled, Constantinople is probably more favourably situated for defence than any other city in the world. But a great capital implies much more than good local conditions of defence. It should be placed at some meeting point of necessary communications, so that it will always be a focus of in-

tercourse. It is from this point of view that the importance of Constantinople is greatest. A magnificent safe harbour like the Golden Horn might well attract commerce even to some distance from its direct path, but Constantinople lies upon a route which must needs be followed by the whole trade of a vast region. The Black Sea has a coast-line of more than two thousand miles, to which the Sea of Azov adds six hundred more. To the Black Sea goes all the trade of the great navigable rivers, the Danube, the Dniester, the Dnieper, and the Don, with some portion of the trade of the Volga, transhipped to the Don. All this great trading area communicates by sea with the outside world only through the Bosphorus. Every increase in the prosperity of any district lying beside the Black Sea, or penetrated by one of its rivers, must bring with it a corresponding increase of the trade and shipping that passes and probably calls at the Golden Horn. If we take a larger view, and look at the natural directions of traffic between East and West, and between North and South, we find that Constantinople is the centre of a circle, of which radii run along the Euphrates and the Persian Gulf, along the Suez Canal and the Red Sea, and along the Nile. All these natural and necessary directions of trade, and if at the present day some of them are unused, it is only because the Ottoman Turks, wherever they have settled, have destroyed industry, ruined agriculture, and rendered communication so precarious as to drive away trade.

The land trade of Constantinople has always been directed on the Asiatic side along the two groups of routes described above, and leading either to Armenia or to the Gulf of Alexandretta and the Upper Euphrates. In Europe there is one great natural route which can never lose its importance. It follows the line Adrianople, Philippopolis, Sofia, Nisch, and the Valley of the Morava to the Danube, and into it branch the various roads crossing the Balkans,

from Northern Bulgaria. In ancient times there was a Roman road from Constantinople along the northern shore of the Ægean to Saloniki, and thence across the mountains to the Adriatic at Durazzo. This was a strategical road, and can hardly be said to have followed a natural line; it has long ago passed into disuse, and is not likely to be restored.

Trade between civilized countries is never entirely stopped by frontiers and duties, and the land and sea routes of which Constantinople is the centre have here been surveyed in order to show that with the restoration of civilization to the region in which at present the Sultan holds sway Constantinople must necessarily become one of the world's great centres for trade and shipping. A different question arises when we ask what is the district of which the natural and necessary capital lies by the Golden Horn. This region must hardly be sought in Europe beyond the immediate shores of the Dardanelles. At any rate, the basin of the Danube and the basin of the Vardar, with Saloniki, cannot be included in it, though a Power strong enough to hold Constantinople by its own resources would probably maintain itself at Adrianople, and might very well dominate the Valley of the Maritza, and possibly the eastern part of the Rhodope Mountains. But the history of its foundation suggests, and a study of the map confirms, the belief that Constantinople looks rather to the east than to the west. South of the Dardanelles the west coast of Asia Minor has its own ports, and the whole south coast will always carry on its trade rather by sea than over the rugged hills which separate it from the remote interior. But the inland region north of the Taurus, and between the Sea of Marmora and Amasia and Samsun, seems by nature to belong to Constantinople. From this region the land routes, as we have seen, all lead to Broussa, Ismid, and the Bosphorus, while from the north coast such traffic as there is would naturally go by sea to the same point. But the north coast of Asia

Minor is by no means favoured for navigation. Along its whole length the mountains fall almost straight into the sea, and it has not a single good harbour. In point of climate it is divided into an eastern and a western half, which meet at Sinope. Between Sinope and the Bosphorus the sea is usually cold and stormy, and there is no port in which ships can find shelter. Eastward of Sinope the ports are still only open roads, but the temperature is higher, the wind and the waves are less threatening, and there is more possibility of intercourse between sea and land. It is the forbidding aspect of the sea that gives so much importance to the inland communications in North-Western Asia Minor, which for this reason appears to be marked out by nature for the control of a ruler established on the Bosphorus. It is evident, however, that a State confined to this region alone could never be a first-rate Power, and that to give to the Ruler of Constantinople the control of resources sufficient to ensure his independence among the Powers it would be necessary to add to his dominions the west and south-west coast of Asia Minor. In that case his country would be as large as Spain, and better endowed than the Spanish Peninsula in respect of fertility and natural advantages.

The Gordian knot of the Eastern Question is the problem of the future ownership of Constantinople. The subject is beset with so many difficulties that no one who has thought seriously about it is tempted to offer a dogmatic solution. At any rate no harm can come of the attempt to explain the question by a brief review of some of the issues which are at stake. It is convenient to begin with the commercial interests, which fall under three heads according as they are Russian, Danubian, or British. Russia owns more than half of the coast of the Black Sea, and three of its principal rivers are hers. The whole of the maritime trade of her southern provinces, except in so far as it is a local Black Sea trade, must necessarily pass through the

Bosphorus. The maritime trade of the Danubian countries, of Roumania, Bulgaria, Serbia, and of Hungary and Austria, in so far as it does not find a more convenient route by the Adriatic, is also necessarily compelled to pass through the straits. The recent completion of the works by which the rapids at the Iron Gates have been rendered navigable must greatly increase the importance of the Danubian trade both to Austria-Hungary and to her neighbours lower down the stream. The British interest arises from the fact that the imports and exports to and from both Southern Russia and the Danubian countries are for the most part carried in British ships.[1] But whereas the Russian and Danubian interests are necessary and permanent, the British interest may fairly be described as accidental and temporary. The principal maritime and commercial Power will probably al-

[1] The following figures are taken from the Board of Trade Returns for 1895:

	Value of Total Imports and Exports to and from Great Britain.		Value of Exports of British Produce.	Shipping with Cargoes, or in Ballast.			
				Entered at British Ports from.		Cleared at British Ports to.	
	Imports from.	Exports to.		Number of Ships.	Tonnage	Number of Ships.	Tonnage
Russia, Southern Ports	11,525,791	1,315,714	1,026,416	884	1,187,177	164	250,694
Austria	1,221,783	2,149,552	1,715,605	—	—	—	—
Roumania	2,118,505	944,034	891,917	189	213,782	186	220,796
Bulgaria	21,283	182,209	159,126	5	5,839	1	1,244
" in 1894	126,102	—	—	—	—	—	—
Serbia	—	7,492	7,411	—	—	—	—
Turkey in Europe	1,601,684	2,636,390	2,483,369	69	61,167	246	314,023

The trade of Russia mostly passes through the Northern Ports, as may be seen from the following return for 1894, which does not distinguish between Northern and Southern Ports:

Total Tonnage entered for Russian Ports from all Countries, . { 625,142 in Russian ships. / 7,933,188 in Foreign "

Cleared from Russian Ports for all Countries, ... { 603,372 in Russian ships. / 7,913,888 in Foreign "

This gives a clue to the share of foreign (largely British) ships in Russia's trade.

ways be the principal customer in the trade both of Southern Russia and of the Danubian countries; so long therefore as England retains her maritime and commercial greatness she may be expected to retain her share in the Black Sea trade. That share depends, however, not upon England's geographical position, but upon what may in a large sense be called the accident of her maritime pre-eminence.

There would, perhaps, be some justification for putting these commercial interests into the foreground. Against that view may be cited the analogy of the Sound and the Baltic trade, which makes it probable that the course of trade would not be greatly affected by the fate of Constantinople, provided that the city passes into the hands of a civilized Government. A very strong Power might use its establishment on the straits for the purpose of acquiring a monopoly of the Black Sea navigation by means of preferential duties or one-sided regulations. In so far as this is probable it would be an argument against a Russian acquisition of Constantinople.

A weightier factor in the problem is revealed by a consideration of the effect which the fate of Constantinople must have upon the distribution and application of force between the Great Powers. Perhaps the clearest way of discussing this part of the subject is to examine in turn each of a series of hypotheses. Suppose then, in the first instance, that Constantinople and the Dardanelles passed into the possession of Russia. It would, of course, not be difficult for a civilized Power so to fortify the Dardanelles that their passage by a hostile fleet would be impracticable, and that the works covering them would form a first-class fortress, that is, a position not to be taken except after a protracted siege. In that case Russia would be able to exclude from the Black Sea all ships of war but her own; that sea would be for purposes of military transport a Russian lake. Her armies could be moved across it without any possibility

of hostile interference with them, and as there is no means of preventing from the land the landing of an army moving freely by sea (because an army carried in steamers moves many times faster than an army upon land) there would be no possibility of successful resistance to Russian attack by any country bordering on that sea. Roumania, Bulgaria, and Northern Asia Minor would at once become in fact, if not in theory, portions of the Russian Empire. The frontier which Russia would thus acquire would place the eastern half of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy at her mercy. This solution then is incompatible with the preservation of Austria-Hungary as a great Power, as a State strong enough to resist the dictation of any one of its neighbours. It may be assumed then that Austria-Hungary would prefer to this solution of the Eastern Question a war in which her independent existence would be staked. But Russia in possession of the Dardanelles would secure a further advantage. Within the Black Sea she could keep in training a navy as large as she pleased, absolutely safe from hostile attack, and yet always at liberty to take the offensive against other navies. The great addition to Russia's resources of every kind and to her forces for attack and defence which she would acquire upon this hypothesis, make it the general interest of the European community to resist the acquisition of the straits by Russia. The present European system is bound up with the co-existence of a number of great Powers, and implies that none of them shall be so much stronger than its neighbours as to overshadow and overawe them. In this European interest France is undoubtedly a partner, although her present policy appears calculated to promote her own specific and immediate interests at the expense of those remoter interests which she shares with the rest of the European nations.

The peculiar feature of the present situation is that it is doubtful whether any or all of the Powers are in fact able

to prevent Russia's seizing Constantinople and the Dardanelles by a *coup de main.* If she were to do so Germany and Austria would probably be compelled to invade Russia in order to force her to disgorge her prey. France would then certainly attack Germany, and the success of the Central Powers would depend upon the extent to which England was willing and able to help them. Lord Salisbury's declaration in 1886 that England would co-operate with Austria in resisting a Russian attempt upon the straits was not without effect. Its repetition in 1896, though it may perhaps be inappropriate at the Guildhall, would be no less effective.

A second hypothesis is that of the acquisition of Constantinople by Austria. This would involve no menace to the Western European Powers nor to Germany. Indeed, the extension of the Austrian Empire to the Taurus would probably lead to the absorption by Germany of the Western or German half of the present Austrian monarchy. The Black Sea would not become an Austrian lake, but there would sooner or later be a naval war between Austria and Russia for its command, in which, however, the cessation of her trade would paralyze the southern provinces of Russia, and an Austrian victory would be disastrous to the Northern Empire. For these reasons Russia is as strongly driven to resist an Austrian acquisition of Constantinople as Austria to oppose a Russian attempt upon that place.

Neither Russia nor Austria is likely at present to take a step calculated to involve her in a great war; it is much more probable that the two Governments have exchanged assurances to the effect that neither of them contemplates obtaining possession of the Bosphorus. No other great Power can dream of acquiring the city. The third hypothesis then is that of Constantinople as the seat of government of a Prince of European origin acting, either in his own name or under the nominal authority of the Sultan, as

Administrator-General of the district, already described, of which Constantinople is the natural capital, with or without the addition of Western and Southern Asia Minor. This form of settlement may possibly enough come under the consideration of the Powers as part of a scheme for the reconstitution of Turkey without territorial aggrandisement for any of their number. The difficulty lies in the regulation of the status of the straits. Two cases are worth examining. In the first place, the passage of war-ships through the Dardanelles or the Bosphorus might be absolutely prohibited. The prohibition would have to be enforced either by the joint action of the contracting Powers whenever the case arose, or by the action of the local Government, which would maintain an army and the fortifications of the straits. This plan has been tried. By the treaty of 1856 the Sultan was bound to exclude foreign ships of war from the straits, and limitations were imposed upon the fleets which either Russia or Turkey might maintain in the Black Sea. But Russia took advantage of the temporary impotence of France in 1870 to refuse any longer to be bound by these conditions, and the Sultan was in the subsequent negotiations (1871) given a discretionary power to permit ships of war to pass the straits. By the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi (1833), dictated by Russia, the Sultan was bound to close the Dardanelles at Russia's request, "that is to say, not to allow any foreign vessel of war to enter therein under any pretext whatsoever." A comparison of these two stipulations, both the outcome of Russian initiative, shows that the Russian policy is to have the straits open to Russian men-of-war but closed to those of all other Powers. This would give Russia a peculiar advantage. Her fleet would be available for attack against her enemies, yet she would be secure against the offensive operations of their fleets. This is an arrangement to which England ought never to consent, for it would enable Russia

to take part in an attack upon British sea-power without the possibility of a British counter-attack in the region where Russia is vulnerable. Either the straits should be closed to the passage of the ships of war of all the Powers, or open to them all. If they are closed there is no reason why Russia should maintain in the Black Sea a naval force greater than is needed for the local police of that sea. But Russia declines this solution. If they are declared open, Russia will always be tempted to seek sufficient influence over the local Government at Constantinople to bring about their closing to the ships of her enemies, or, if such influence cannot be obtained, to seize and close the straits by her own forces when the occasion arises.

The desire of Russia that no foreign fleet should be able to enter the Black Sea, and that she should thus be secure against attack in that quarter is natural, and, perhaps, even reasonable, but it is at least as natural and as reasonable that England and the other maritime Powers should object to a Russian fleet being permitted to issue from that sea. The closure of the straits to ships of war might be effected by separating the ownership of Constantinople from that of the Dardanelles. A principality of Constantinople with Northern and Central Asia Minor, is not more rational nor more natural than a principality of Western Asia Minor, with its capital at Smyrna, and its northern limits at the Mysian Olympus, the Sea of Marmora, and the lines of Bulair.

In case it were intended that the straits should be open to the ships of war of all the Powers the best territorial solution would probably consist in the separation of their European from their Asiatic shores. Ismid might then become once more what it was in the time of Diocletian, the seat of government for Northern Asia Minor.

The questions which have here been raised deserve more attention than they seem to have lately received in England,

for upon these matters the Powers must be agreed before they can hope to act harmoniously for the alleviation of the sufferings of the Armenians, and the hardly less unfortunate Osmanli inhabitants of Anatolia.

Helpless Europe[1]

"THE number of shells fired was about seventy, of which the British ships fired twenty-five. . . . Afterwards, as the Cretans were picking up their dead and wounded, the Turks at the nearest outpost returned a brisk fire, to which the Cretans, disheartened by the fire of the warships, did not reply. . . . I visited the insurgents' outpost at the Convent of the Prophet Elias, and ascertained that three men were killed, and twelve men and three women, one of whom was a nun, were wounded." In these sentences *The Times'* special correspondent described the affair of Sunday, February 21st, at Canea. The British nation, which pays for those twenty-five shells, has to examine its conscience with regard to them, and to ascertain whether Lord Salisbury, under whose instructions the admiral fired them, was carrying out its will. Unhappily the criticisms of the Opposition are carping and half-hearted, and betray a desire to put the Government in the wrong, while the Government has not as yet known its own mind, and cannot come before Parliament with a frank statement of its policy. No minister has been able to say plainly what the purpose of the Government's action is, and how the action will conduce to carrying out the purpose. Yet there need be little doubt about the British national purpose. It can be expressed in terms from which no reader will dissent. During the last ten years a new British navy has been

[1] *National Review,* April, 1897.

built, as the result of expressions of public feeling rather than of the initiative of Governments. Its creation was dictated by the wish to be ready to defend the United Kingdom and the Empire. Its employment in European disputes was not contemplated by most of those who urged its construction, though there was a hope that a strong England would be an influence in favour of peace. In the English mind, however, right comes before peace, and, undoubtedly, any one who should propose to kill human beings for the sake of peace, without the palpable object of preventing crime, would not be entitled to expect in England that universal support which indicates the national approval. To make war in order to prevent war is not good sense; and if it is necessary to choose between two wars, England should be guided in the choice by considerations of justice, and, so long as they are compatible with justice, of her own interests.

The Government case is that they are acting in accord with the other five Great Powers, and that the purpose is to avoid a great European war. These two propositions cannot both be true, for they are inconsistent with one another. A European war, it should be observed, does not mean a war in Europe, for so long as there is fighting in Crete there is war in Europe. A European war is the phrase used to denote an armed conflict between two or more of the Great Powers. But of such a conflict there can be no possible danger if the Great Powers are all agreed. As every Government that has spoken has declared that there is danger of a European war, the inference is that the Powers, though hopelessly divided as to what they want, are agreed in the desire to postpone their quarrel. There are two parties amongst the Great Powers. One side has some purpose in view to which the other side objects, and the difference is so fundamental that if the question is raised neither side will give way except to superior force. The side which has

the positive purpose would rather postpone action, and the side which resists that purpose would rather postpone resistance. The one side is Russia, and the positive purpose is to obtain possession of the Bosphorus. Here are *The Times'* correspondent's words, telegraphed on Saturday, February 20th, from St. Petersburg:

"When Russia, on the accession of the late Emperor in 1881, resolved to rebuild her Black Sea fleet, and re-establish her naval position in those waters she did so with a distinct and definite plan for the eventual occupation, either by force or, preferably, by agreement with the Sultan, of the Black Sea end of the Bosphorus. The city of Constantinople does not necessarily enter into the plan of occupation, and, indeed, for obvious reasons, would, if possible, be left out. The policy of which this plan forms a chief part has been steadily maintained ever since, and is as strenuously held as when it was first initiated. The Black Sea fleet has been built and is now ready for sea; nor can it be doubted, whatever the contradictions, that the complementary preparations on land have been likewise duly advanced. During the Armenian troubles and up to the present day Russia has kept steadily in view the necessity of being prepared for all eventualities, but more particularly to take advantage of the opportune moment to establish herself on the Bosphorus, and thereby make the Black Sea a Russian lake. It is no part of Russia's programme to provoke a state of affairs which must inevitably bring her into direct conflict with one or more of the Powers, or even into less desirable co-operation with them—a co-operation that would balk the aim and object of her policy—namely, the possession of a preponderating influence in Constantinople. Whatever may be finally done in the Turkish capital, Russia wishes, and is determined, to do it herself with as little interference as possible on the part of any other Power. Throughout the Armenian difficulty she posed practically as the friend of the Sultan, and the reason is obvious. From Turkish misrule she has nothing to fear, unless it leads to European interference."

This telegram gives in a nutshell an accurate view of Russian policy in regard to the Eastern Question, a policy opposed to the interests and the wishes of every one of the other five Great Powers.

No German desires to see Russia in possession of the Bosphorus. The whole German press was for years permeated by expressions of anxiety lest Russia should find the means of moving upon Constantinople, and it was to prevent this, and to free Germany from the fear of a French attack while she was helping Austria against Russia, that Germany persistently longed for the alliance of Great Britain.

To Austria the establishment of Russia on the Bosphorus would be a blow so deadly that so long as she has any chance of success she will fight to prevent it. Resistance to Russian aggression upon the straits has for many years been a cardinal point of Italian policy. The French remember the utterance of the Great Napoleon, who exclaimed when the question was raised whether Russia should obtain Constantinople, " Never."

These four Continental Powers, however, have been for many years past hopelessly divided in consequence of the dissatisfaction of the French with the Treaty of Frankfort, and England has during the same period kept herself outside of European policy, writing meddlesome notes in plenty, but shrinking from anything that could be denounced as a " serious step."

This being the European situation, what is the condition of Turkey? Chronic and hopeless anarchy, and universal disaffection perpetually breaking out into insurrection, suppressed by massacre. When last year the disturbance broke out in Crete, because 234,000 Christians object to be under the heel of 38,000 Mussulmans and of a Government that regards a Christian as no better than a sheep, the Powers, while allowing the Turks to pour 10,000 Turkish troops

into the island, dictated a series of paper reforms and urged the Cretans to accept them. So soon as the Cretans were quiet the Sultan set at nought the paper reforms. The Powers after nine months had proved unable to help the islanders, for, if they had been seriously agreed to do that, they would, on the first outbreak last year, have forbidden the landing of Turkish troops, and have sent to the island a European governor with a European gendarmerie, and full powers to govern according to his own common-sense. On the renewal of the disturbances the Greeks stepped in. Their right to interfere is that of nationality, upon which is based the existence of Germany and of Italy. It has well been said in France that, if Greece has no claim to act in Crete, the French case for action to recover Alsace-Lorraine falls to the ground. Public opinion in every country in Europe sympathises with the Cretans and Greeks against the Turks, except only that the blind believers in *la haute politique* think the action of Greece inconsiderate because it embarrasses the Powers.

Now, what has been the action upon which the Powers have agreed? They sent warships to Crete and advised the Sultan to leave the matter in their hands. They gave neither the Cretans nor the Greeks any hope of a solution favourable to Greek or Cretan wishes. They were not agreed whether or not to let the Greek troops land, and being thus paralysed could not prevent the landing. While the Powers were still discussing whether their object was to give Crete back to Turkey, to give it to Greece, or to keep it themselves and quarrel over it, they allowed their admirals, in co-operation with the Turks, to fire on the Cretans. The excuse made is that Turkey is in such a dreadful state that if the Greeks are allowed to have Crete there will be insurrections in other parts of Turkey; that the insurrections cannot be put down by the Turks, and will give Russia the opportunity to come to the Sultan's assist-

ance, and so to plant her feet on the banks of the Bosphorus. In short, the five Powers, being afraid of Russia, consent to do what none of the five nations represented really thinks right or fair in Crete.

Is it a misinterpretation of England's feeling to say that Lord Salisbury ought not to have co-operated in any way with the Powers until it was settled what was to be done with Crete, and that the settlement most acceptable to England would have been union with Greece? If the Powers had decided or were likely to decide against union with Greece, ought they not to have prevented the landing of Greek troops, a step which needed only an order to the admirals of the combined squadrons? The truth seems to be that the Cabinet as little knew what it wanted as the Concert of Europe, and that the awkward situation for which Greece is denounced is due solely to the want of accord between the Powers.

The fairest and best method of criticism, though perhaps not the easiest, consists in showing what ought to have been done. For this purpose it is necessary to go to the root of the matter and ask in the first instance whether a British Government has any duty or any right to meddle at all in the affairs of Continental Europe. This is a point of cardinal importance, for if England has no duties in regard to the Continent, as many people seem to think, the policy of the Government would stand condemned without further argument. But, if there is a duty, it perhaps carries with it the obligation for more energetic action than has been attempted. Moreover, if we can find out why it is our duty to interfere in European disputes, we may learn from the enquiry how that interference ought to be conducted.

The chief end of a Government in its relation with the outside world is the defence of the nation which it represents. National defence, indeed, implies something more than a resistance to territorial attack. A Government must

maintain the self-respect of its nation, and self-respect, with nations as with individuals, implies their playing their proper and legitimate part in the world. The nature of Great Britain's defence and the peculiar character of the part which she is called upon to play in history flow from the fact that Great Britain is an island, and from the close proximity of the island State to the European Continent occupied by the group of civilized nations that constitutes the great centre of the world's civilization and of the world's energy. An island State of limited size and population cannot in a period of developed navigation, if it is the near neighbour of other States of equal civilization and greater population, maintain its independence except by means of the command of the sea. But the command of the sea carries with it the command of all the coasts in the world and affords to the nation which holds it the opportunity for unlimited colonization and empire in regions of comparatively undeveloped civilization and energy. It is, therefore, the coveted prize of all highly civilized nations having a coast-line fit to be a basis for maritime enterprise. Its possession involves a kind of leadership—what the ancient Greeks called *ἡγεμονία*—in that part of the world remote from the European centre of gravity. This, then, is the part which England has to play, for she is so placed that she cannot maintain her independence on any other condition. We have here the first half of the truth about England's function in the world. But it is only half, for there is a second law, not dynamical but moral, equally true and still more fundamental. Human beings are not mere material bodies but spirits, and while in the material world the influence of force is paramount, in the spiritual world right is supreme. In human life these factors are intermixed, force being in the long run subordinate to right. The business of the British Government is therefore in the first place so to direct Great Britain's action that the greater part of

mankind may be satisfied with the way England plays her part, and in the second place to maintain a navy strong enough to defeat other navies. A merely dynamical view of the command of the sea is as false as it is wrong, and those who assert that the true policy of England is to create a great navy, in order to command the sea, while keeping clear of European quarrels, are talking nonsense strategically, historically, and morally. It is impossible for England to construct, man, and maintain a navy able to sweep from the sea all the other fleets in the world. Never in the past did England acquire or maintain her position in conflict against Europe. In every one of the great quarrels she was the champion of one part of Europe against the other part, and in every case her success has been due quite as much to the exertions of her allies as to her own efforts. Moreover, from the sixteenth century until to-day, she has never been a crusader. All her great wars have been fought in self-defence, and it is because in the past the good conscience of her people and the judgment of her statesmen have usually placed her on the right side that her self-defence has been at the same time the defence of others, and has given her the great place in the world which she occupied at the time of the Queen's accession. The England of our ancestors was not, as a rule, on the side which appeared at first sight to be the stronger. She had the boldness to resist what appeared to be the great Powers of the world in association with the weak and the almost helpless. Elizabeth, in conjunction with the hardly pressed Dutch and a France divided against itself, resisted the then colossal power of Spain. William III., when his own country was in desperate straits, accepted a doubtful throne, in order to be able to tie into a rod the slender reeds which separately must have been broken by the power of Louis XIV. Chatham associated England's cause with that of Prussia at a time when Prussia appeared to be on the verge

of destruction. In all those cases the greatness of the English leaders lies in their confidence in their cause, and in their indifference to the great forces ranged in the opposite camp.

This action of England, though primarily aiming at her own defence, has on one occasion or another saved the independence of almost every Continental nation. Thus, in the past, England by her maritime power has held the balance of Europe and checkmated every attempt to regulate the Continent according to the views, the ambition, or the system of any one Power or group of Powers. This is the service in virtue of which the European nations have acquiesced in England's maritime supremacy and in her possession of that Colonial Empire which is its consequence. Not, indeed, that her position has been at any time acceptable to all the Continental States; there have always been some who were anxious to contest it, but there have always been others to whom any transfer of the command of the sea would have been disastrous. The centre of gravity of human affairs is in Europe, and by England's action in Europe her position in the world at large will always be regulated. The rise of the United States no doubt modifies the situation, but since the region which includes the effective thought and energy of the world has been enlarged so as to include both Europe and the United States the position of Great Britain has been rendered not less but more important.

To-day, as in the past, England's possession of her Empire rests upon her conduct in Europe. At the present moment, for example, the burning Imperial question is that of South Africa. Those must be blind who do not see that as far as force is concerned the decision depends not upon anything that can happen in Africa, where there is no Power that can resist a serious blow struck by Great Britain, but upon the relations of Great Britain with the Euro-

pean Powers and chiefly with the German Empire. If the British Government intends to secure for men of their own race that share in the future of South Africa to which they aspire, it is necessary not merely to do right towards the Dutch inhabitants of the region between the Cape and the Zambesi, but to disarm the opposition of Germany. Would it not be better to effect this by friendly than by hostile action? If we are to induce Germany to acquiesce in our view of South African affairs we must do her some great service in Europe. There might be arguments against that course if in order to do Germany such a service England were required to go out of her way. There can be none if the greatest service that can be rendered to Germany consists in taking a course to which we are impelled by the consideration of our own interests and our own duty.

The first mark of a British policy then is that it consists in the use of British force on the side of right in Europe. We have therefore, in regard to the present European situation, to ask ourselves which are the two sides, what are the causes they represent, and to which side Great Britain is attracted by the necessities of her self-defence and by the nature of her *rôle* in the world. The Turkish Government is the enemy of the human race. Its nature has been repeatedly explained by observers and inquirers whose knowledge and honesty is above suspicion.[1] The Turkish rule is a rule of bestial force, of corruption, of lies, and of unrighteousness. The duty of Europe is to make an end of it, and to set up a civilized Government in its place. But Europe has never been able to do this because the Powers are divided.

As regards Turkey we have seen that Russia aims at the control of the Bosphorus and at replacing Turkish by Russian authority over as much as possible of the Turkish

[1] The most impartial accounts of Turkey are to be found in Moltke's *Letters from Turkey,* especially that dated Pera, April 7, 1836, and in the *Life of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

Empire, while none of the other nations wishes for this solution. The Russian administration, though free from the worst Turkish vices, is yet hardly on the European level. The acquisition of Constantinople by the Russians would make the Tsar proprietor of the Black Sea, and master of Roumania, Bulgaria, and Asia Minor. It would put him in a position to overawe the Austro-Hungarian Government. The effect would be to make Russian influence supreme over half of Europe. England would be compelled greatly to increase her fleet, and probably to create a second Gibraltar at Mitylene or Lemnos. The whole tradition of every one of the Powers is against acquiescence in the Russian design. Why then do they acquiesce? First of all the unfortunate dissensions between France and Germany, the legacy of centuries, render it difficult for those two Powers to act together. A more serious hindrance arises from the refusal of England, maintained under both parties for many years past, to act her proper part in the European community. During these recent years, when Lord Rosebery and Lord Salisbury and all their followers have been wringing their hands and bewailing their helplessness to coerce the Turk or to oppose Russia, there has been open to them a policy which would have led to a settlement of the Eastern Question, to the establishment of European peace on a secure basis, and to the removal of the dangers with which the British Empire is threatened. The states of Europe and of Turkey have been crying aloud for England to act, and proclaiming that her action would be supported by that of three at least of the Great Powers, and by the sympathy of the world, and would be opposed, if at all, only by Russia.

The Triple Alliance arose out of the necessity of Austria to protect herself against Russia's aggressive policy, and of Germany to confront the combined hostility of Russia and France. So long as the Triple Alliance lasted a manifest determination on the part of England to resist Russian ag-

gression, even in case Russia were assisted by France, would have given her the lead in a combination in which the central Powers would have been her allies. The best opportunity of such British action was afforded by the war in the Far East, which placed Russia at the mercy of an England ready to act. But the inaction of England and the exhaustion of Italy compelled Germany, threatened as she was by the Franco-Russian combination and estranged from England, to consider her own safety and to make terms with Russia. This change, however, did not alter the fundamental facts of the situation.

In regard to the fate of Turkey, the Power primarily interested is Austria. To Austria England should first address herself, declaring her unalterable determination to join in resisting the absorption of Turkey or the acquisition of Constantinople by Russia. The next Power concerned is Italy. Italy would require to be assured against attack from Germany or France, while joining with Austria and England against Russia. But in such a case neither France nor Germany would allow the other to attack Italy. Germany would never take up arms to assist the Russian design upon Turkey, and therefore, if not a co-operator with England, Austria, and Italy, would be neutral. France has no interest in helping Russia to Constantinople. The great popularity in France of the Russian alliance is due to the previous painful and prolonged isolation of the French Government. It ought not to be impossible to persuade the French nation that England, Austria, and Italy would be as useful to France as Russia.

The change in Germany's attitude, her recent determination to seek escape from a Franco-Russian attack by renewing her close relation with Russia, is the consequence of England's inaction. So long as Germany rested upon the Triple Alliance, England, after declaring her policy first to Austria and Italy, and then to Germany, could have counted

with certainty upon Germany preventing France from helping Russia. If, however, Germany now inclines towards Russia, a British statesman ought to be able to bring France to his side, at least to the extent of preventing Germany's interference in favour of Russia. The greatest interest of Germany at present is to be freed from the pressure upon her exerted by the joint policy of Russia and France. The decided action of England in the sense which I advocate would free Germany from this pressure, and, as it would also enable the Germans to realize their long-cherished idea of a colonization of Asia Minor, would be a service to Germany incomparably outweighing any cause of resentment which she maintains on account of disagreements about African colonies. Our Cabinet Ministers are too much absorbed in unimportant Parliamentary trifles to study the ideas of the Continental Powers, and have for a whole century been persistently ignorant of German ideas and German sentiment. There have been no better exponents of German national feeling than Bismarck and Moltke in the days when, being irresponsible, they could speak freely. In Bismarck's correspondence of the years 1851-1859 the dominant subject is the prevention of a Franco-Russian combination, or, if that is impracticable, the means of resistance to it. The best resistance, he thought, would be a combination of Austria, Prussia, and England; and the only reason why Bismarck rejected this solution was that he felt sure that English help was not to be had, because England had no statesman who understood Europe, or dared lead the nation for a great purpose. At the same period Moltke had no doubt that Russia was the great danger. In 1854 (January 25) he wrote to his brother Adolf—

"The German Powers are playing a sorry part. An increase of Russia's power is more dangerous to them than to any one else, yet they leave it to the Western Powers to pull the chestnuts out of the fire."

The policy here advocated would, of course, have a positive aim: to take the Turkish Empire under a European protectorate. This does not mean the exclusion of Russia from all influence on the settlement, but only that Russia would be assigned her legitimate place as one member of the European Commonwealth, rather than as an absolute dictator. Above all she would not be allowed to settle in her own interest the European question of the Straits. A satisfactory settlement of Turkey is, of course, not an easy matter. But some of its elements can be suggested. The first point is the extension of Bulgaria, Servia, and Greece, so as to include in each case those parts of European Turkey which by nationality clearly belong to them. The allied Powers would exert themselves to procure an agreement between these three nations regarding their future boundaries. Servia may fairly claim Old Servia; Greece the Islands of the Archipelago, Epirus, and much of Macedonia; Bulgaria the country between her southern border and the Ægean. Asia Minor is a country of great natural resources and would be a better field for German colonization than any part of Africa. The French have a traditional interest in Syria, and Russia, which has annexed one half of Armenia, is best situated for governing the other half, while Cyrenaica is perhaps more suited than Abyssinia as a field for Italian settlement. The creation of European protectorates in Asia Minor and Syria would be accompanied by the establishment of a principality of Constantinople under the guarantee of the Powers. Perhaps the best plan would be to treat the Sultan as the Khedive has been treated, and to provide him with European administrators for his reduced dominion of Constantinople and the immediately adjacent provinces. These administrators might with advantage be German, for Germany has for at least a century cultivated close relations with the Sultans, and provided them with military assistants. That Germany

would welcome a British initiative such as I propose will be evident to those who recall Moltke's[1] view, expressed in 1842—

"The Ottoman Empire will collapse as soon as the European Powers disagree as to its preservation or agree as to its end. The former case may happen suddenly and unexpectedly, and its results are beyond calculation. But the latter case depends on the free decision of the Cabinets, and its consequences can for the most part be estimated, considered, and regulated. In any case, the catastrophe is one that we can foresee must happen. The question is whether it is to be indefinitely postponed so that the Powers will be surprised by it when it comes, or whether the danger is to be looked in the face and the crisis brought on intentionally so that its effects may be regulated."

The course proposed by Moltke fifty years ago of bringing on the crisis could not during the last five and twenty years have been initiated by any Power except England because the other Powers were separated into two camps. The Armenian massacres were the sign that the end was inevitable. Both the English parties have been in office since the critical stage began, and both alike have miserably failed. It is time that the hollow pretence of a Party system was abandoned, and that some one should have the courage to speak clearly, not as a partisan, but as the nation's advocate.

Lord Salisbury's policy has, according to its official exponents, for one of its objects, to give Crete autonomy. Autonomy is the Greek for independence, the right and the power of a community to settle its own fate, to make its own laws, and to conduct its own administration. Autonomy coupled with suzerainty is exactly what is meant by the English phrase, Home Rule. But the Powers have no intention of allowing the Cretans to settle their own fate, to make their own laws, or to conduct their own administra-

[1] *Gesammelte Schriften*, II. 312.

tion. They are deliberating on the constitution to be given by themselves to Crete, and upon the choice of a ruler. It is said that Russia has proposed as governor a Montenegrin, which is almost a synonym for a Russian. Thus, when Lord Salisbury says autonomy he means a Russian protectorate. "The integrity of the Ottoman Empire" has now a similar meaning. In 1856 and in 1878 this phrase in the mouths of Western statesmen meant that Russia was to annex as little of Turkey as possible. To-day it is the motto of Russia, and means that Turkey is to be kept intact for Russia to inherit. Europe's true duty, in the execution of which England ought to take the lead, is to protect the subjects of the Sultan against their despot. Russia's purpose is to protect the despot against his subjects. When Russia supported the Sultan against English protests and threats, occasioned by the massacres in Armenia, the Sultan was convinced that Russia was his true friend and protector. Russia is now his protector against Greeks and Cretans. Lord Salisbury's policy of coercing Crete and Greece may lead to war between Greece and Turkey, which will be the signal for Russia to come to Turkey's help, and with the Sultan's consent to seize the Straits. England's opportunity will then be gone, for the Powers will not be induced to combine for resistance to a *fait accompli.* The European nations will then be certain of what they all now suspect, that British Governments have lost the insight, the courage, and the decision of former times, that England is no longer the great nation she was, and that the command of the sea might be in hands better qualified to use it for Europe's good.

IV

National Defence

The Command of an Army—A Conversation [1]

"YOU are quite right," I said, as Dorrington was putting away his brushes. "Antibes has it."

I took a last comparing look from the drawing to the view—the old castle, the bit of blue Mediterranean stretching away beyond Nice, the peaks of delicate snow clear cut against the exquisite blue and tinged in the evening light with a kindly blush.

"Well," said Dorrington, "I think that from this cape we see the best sight in the Riviera, and if Kirby takes the villa next year I hope to come again and catch the sunrise glow, but the flood of light baffles me after so many years of the gentle tones of Oxford."

Dorrington's room at Merton has one of the big windows looking out over Christ Church meadows, and I used in the old days to wonder that with the powers and the surroundings of an artist he could give himself to metaphysics.

"This Attic air," I said, "should be more stimulating for you than Bœotian damp."

"Oh," said Dorrington, "the change that delights me is in the men. In the long run the common room bores one. I like the practical sense of our parliamentary friends at which you are so fond of gibing. I enjoy the respectability of Kirby's Whiggery and the directness of Graham's Radi-

[1] *United Service Magazine*, May, 1890.

calism. After all, they are representative men, for Graham embodies the downright shrewdness of his Scotch constituents, and Kirby is just what the average Englishman likes —a safe man, a live guarantee against logic and experiments."

We walked back over the hill past the lighthouse. Half a dozen ironclads were manœuvring in the gulf to the west of the cape. As we stood watching them in silence Kirby came up walking briskly.

"I am going to the station to meet your old friend Bredow and his daughter, and Mrs. Markham."

"Who is Mrs. Markham?" I asked.

"The wife of an American friend of mine who married about three months ago. They have been together in Italy, and she is on her way to rejoin him at Paris. She is just staying here to-night so that I may make her acquaintance."

"*Voila l'ennemi,*" I said, pointing to the ironclads. "I hope when you go back you will try to awaken the Admiralty to the perseverance with which the French are making a navy to fight us."

"Nonsense!" said Kirby; "we shall never have any quarrel with the French. Why, we are their best customers. Still harping on defence, eh? Well, you will find Graham in the house reading the new Blue-Book[1] and your leading article attacking Churchill. See you again at dinner," and off he went.

When I went into the drawing-room before dinner I found Bredow and his daughter, who had blossomed into a beauty. They had just come from London, where I half suspect that Bredow had had a mission. I was watching Dorrington as he was introduced to Fräulein von Bredow, when Kirby said,—

"May I introduce you to Mrs. Markham?"

I turned round, and there stood Dolly Stevenson, looking

[1] The Report of Lord Hartington's Commission.

exactly as she did when I said good-bye to her last year at the Tragetto opposite Santa Maria della Salute.

"I might be a ghost, you look so scared," she said. "Mr. Kirby said he had told you I was coming."

"I did not know your husband's name."

"Well," she said, "you have won your pair of gloves, anyhow."

Kirby looked puzzled.

"I bet him a pair of gloves that he wouldn't write as good an account of Chioggia as Hare's. His account has followed me half round the world, and I only got it last month at Venice. My husband and I went to Chioggia again, and we both agreed that he has won the bet."

I took Mrs. Markham down to dinner.

"Got through the Report?" said Dorrington across the table to Graham as we sat down.

"Yes," said Graham, and plunged into talk with Mrs. Kirby.

I lapsed into a reverie. About half through dinner Dolly said to me quietly, "You might say something to me."

"I was just going to say something to you when the gondolier said, 'È troppo tardi, Signore.'"

"I knew what you were going to say, but I felt sure that if you caught your train we should neither of us lie awake at nights."

"Women see with their eyes and men with their imaginations."

"Perhaps," she said. "Now tell me about the fate of your friend, Mr. Dorrington."

"His fate," I said. "What do you mean?"

"Why," said she, "she's sitting next to him."

"Dorrington," I said, "is a confirmed bachelor."

"No more than you are," said she.

When I joined the party in the smoke-room Kirby was holding forth.

"An excellent commission, and, in my opinion, an admirable Report. The services and the merchant navy were well represented. Temple is an Indian administrator of great experience. Three ex-Ministers for War and Lord Randolph, 'the spirit that still denies.' What could you wish for more? I do not think there has been a better constituted commission in my time. The Report is a straightforward, business-like production, dealing with the subject on broad lines and not losing itself like so many of these military reports in unintelligible details. You have the existing system clearly and fairly represented, and the Commissioners tell you without any ambiguity what they want. They begin with the worst evil—the War Office and the Admiralty don't pull together. They will have nothing to do with wild schemes which would upset all our constitutional traditions. They propose to secure harmony by having a Chief of the Staff for each service and a naval and military council under the Prime Minister."

"You forget," said Graham, whose Radicalism inclines to the Jingo type, "that the admiral of the Commission objects to the position suggested for the naval Chief of the Staff, and that the general of the Commission thinks both proposals utterly inadequate for the purpose they are intended to serve."

"These are only objections of detail. You must look at the broad spirit of the thing. For the navy they propose merely to codify the system in actual working by a formal recognition of the responsibility of the First Lord and the strengthening of the First Naval Lord as special adviser, while they insist on a definite division of duties among the members of the Board and making each man responsible for his own work. The same principles are applied to the army. Definite and direct responsibility of the head of each department to the Secretary of State. A proper General Staff, which is what all the experts have been wanting for

years, and the abolition of the ruinous monopoly of initiative by the Commander-in-Chief. The Duke may have been all very well in his day, but his position has never been popular, whatever may be thought of it in the army; and the Commission shows great wisdom in getting rid of an old *régime* post like this which is quite incompatible with the democratic spirit, and was bound to be either a sinecure or a stronghold of obstruction."

"My dear Kirby," said Graham, "your loyalty to what are supposed to be the traditions of Liberalism is quite touching. What the country wants is a thorough change. The work of the services has been bungled from time immemorial. Both the offices ought to be turned topsy-turvy. The one thing needful is a clean sweep and a reconstruction on lines which can be reasonably guaranteed to work. It is true your Commission abolishes the Commander-in-Chief, but it straightway proceeds to recreate and multiply the same evil by making no less than three Commanders-in-Chief. First of all comes the Chief of the Staff, who is to organize everything, advise on everything, and correspond with everybody. He is to make a scheme for the defence of the Empire and revise the estimates to suit it. Then comes the Adjutant-General, in a new edition, revised and enlarged, swallowing by the way, as a small morsel, all the power and patronage of the military secretary. And last but not least, the general officer commanding the forces is to have the honours and dignities without the responsibilities of the old Commander-in-Chief. This is a palpable attempt to find for a new duke a modest equivalent for a place which public opinion will not allow to be renewed on the old scale. You may sneer at Randolph Churchill as you like, but there is more administrative good sense in his three pages than in all the rest of the Blue-Book."

"It is your turn now to forget," said Kirby, "for the Commission itself has completely replied to Randolph

Churchill. A minister over both services would be a new link in a chain already too long. What we want is not centralization, but decentralization. You remember how Sir James Stephen's Report showed that the Secretary for War is already overworked: and now you propose to give him the navy as well. No other Power does it, and all the naval men are dead against it. What do you think about it, Dorrington? I suppose you discuss these matters in the common room in the intervals of philosophy?"

"Philosophy just now is mostly intervals. What I miss in the Report is a concise definition of terms. I should like to know, for example, what is meant by responsibility?"

"Why," returned Kirby, "surely we all know what responsibility is. A minister is responsible to Parliament, and in the same way the Commission wants to make the subordinates responsible to the minister."

"I understand by responsibility," retorted Dorrington, "the certainty of being called to account. I take it the word exactly corresponds to the schoolboy phrase, 'You will have to answer for it.' It seems to me the Report would be improved if the word responsibility were taken out in every case where it occurs, and words were substituted specifying the exact nature of the liability intended."

"A Blue-Book, my dear Sir, is hardly the place for metaphysics——"

"Metaphysics," I interrupted, "sometimes crop up usefully where they might least be expected. Do you remember, Colonel von Bredow, our talk driving home from the manœuvres? You certainly left on my mind the impression that the success of the Prussian army owed a great deal to analytical philosophy."

"Philosophy or not," said Bredow, "there is no ambiguity in our army about responsibility. Every man knows exactly what work he has to do, and if he fails to do it to the satisfaction of his superiors he gets the sack. I myself have

just been retired because my failing health makes me unfit for a campaign."

"Or rather," I again interrupted, "because, although you were begged and prayed to stay for special scientific work, you cared too little for the philosophy of war without the practice to tie yourself any longer."

"Well, leave me out of the question," said Bredow. "How many officers have been retired, much to their surprise and disgust, within the last two years?"

"Yes," said Kirby, "your new Emperor reminds me of Lord Randolph Churchill. He has large schemes which sound admirable in a speech or read well in a memorandum intended for the constituencies; but between a bold idea and its practical realization there is a greater gulf than either of these young men imagine."

"There is more in the Emperor," returned Bredow, "than you seem to realize. You Englishmen, with your everlasting newspapers, bound by the conditions of their existence to be always cocksure, would do well sometimes to suspend your judgment."

"At any rate," broke in Graham, "you steady-going Liberals would certainly do well to suspend your judgment of Churchill. His memorandum is not so flighty as you suppose. Neither Lord Randolph nor any one else wants to upset the Constitution, or to limit or interfere with parliamentary control. What he feels is that no great and complicated business, of so special a character as either of the services, can possibly be properly managed by a man who knows absolutely nothing about it. This was the point emphatically brought out by Sir James Stephen's Commission, which Kirby quoted just now, but which makes against him. The great point of that Report was that although extensive military and technical knowledge is indispensable for the proper performance of his functions by the Secretary of State, that office is usually filled by a person

entirely destitute of both. Lord Randolph wants the best general at the head of the army and the best admiral at the head of the navy. Every one admits that this plan would be most likely to secure good work, and the only objection is on the point of parliamentary control. Lord Randolph meets this by a civilian minister responsible for the estimates. The replies of the Commissioners to Lord Randolph can hardly be conclusive, for every single one of their arguments applies with equal force against their own scheme. Lord Randolph certainly comes nearer than his colleagues to Mr. Dorrington's definition of responsibility."

"I think," said Dorrington, "that Churchill is on the right track as regards responsibility, but I would take a hint from what Colonel von Bredow tells us. I do say distinctly that in case of any failure in the sphere entrusted to him, every official should be liable to be dismissed or retired. I would even go further, and make the superior obliged to dismiss or retire him under penalty of suffering the same fate himself. The difficulty is to apply this system to the Cabinet Minister at the top."

"But," said Kirby, "you can't make one Cabinet Minister retire without upsetting the whole Government. The foundation-stone of Cabinet Government is collective responsibility; the Ministers stand or fall together. No one can be stronger on this point than Morley himself, the pet of the Radicals."

"Which I interpret to mean," replied Dorrington, "that no one at all, except the Cabinet as a whole, can be brought to book by the House of Commons for any act of administration whatever. As between any department and the House of Commons the Cabinet is rather a screen than anything else."

"From which I again infer," said Graham, "that your much-belauded Cabinet system is very far from being the perfect administrative machine which its Conservative-

Liberal admirers suppose. Lord Randolph's proposal, however, does something towards meeting the difficulty. He distinctly contemplates his Captain-General or Lord High Admiral resigning independently of the Cabinet. Moreover, a professional head, *ex hypothesi* the best man that can be found in the profession, can keep his subordinates up to the mark as no layman possibly can. A layman will never feel so sure of his ground as to call for the resignation of the head of a department. Only a professional man would be strong enough to do that."

"Dorrington's definitions," said I, "seem to be fruitful. Couldn't you oblige us with another?"

"It takes a bold man," replied Dorrington, "to define. All I did was to point out the want of it, which I think is equally clear in another part of the Report. The fixed idea of the Commission is to obtain some 'consultative' power; and for this purpose they create a General Staff which they describe as an 'organizing department.' Such a confusion of thought may be all very well for statesmen, but fancy a *Times* reviewer getting hold of it in his pet enemy's book."

At this point Dorrington went off to join the ladies, and I followed him to tell our hostess that I found it imperative for me to get back to town, and that I proposed to go by the morning train. When I went back to the smoking-room I found Bredow alone, and returned to the subject of the Commission's Report. I reproduce the substance of what he told me in the course of a long talk. It is needless to say that he expressed himself with a modesty and a reserve which can hardly be conveyed in a summary; and upon some points both pressure and contradiction were needed before I could get at his opinions.

"What strikes me most," he said, "both in the Report and in the discussion which has just ended, is that the one idea which seems to occur to no one is that of war. In the Report, for example, the only allusion to war is a statement

that the functions of the Commander-in-Chief, as at present constituted, appear to lapse with the commencement of war. To me as a soldier this remark would have seemed naturally to suggest the first step of reform—namely, the appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the officer who would most probably have the supreme command in case of war. That this should never have occurred to the members of the Commission seems to show that they were thinking all the time more of English public opinion than of any practical result. Indeed, for many years past we on the Continent have frequently been puzzled by the speeches and actions of English public men which we cannot explain by any reference to substantive policy, but only on the supposition that instead of looking at their own supposed functions, they are mainly occupied with watching their constituencies. I have read many a speech on foreign affairs for which no explanation could be found in the state of Europe, and of which I could never discover the bearings until I found that it was really a reply to newspaper criticisms, which also had no relation to the actual state of the Continent. I think there is nothing impossible in the successful administration of an army under a civilian Minister of War, provided his one idea is to be ready for war. In that case he will in the end find out the best advisers and give them his unqualified support. But if the minister has his eyes fixed, not on the wars for which it is his business to provide, but upon the vote of constituencies, necessarily unacquainted with the chessboard of international affairs, it matters little whether he be soldier or civilian, the services will not be efficient. Another point which causes me not merely surprise, but disappointment, is the misuse which is made of Continental, and especially of German, military institutions. I hardly like to say misrepresentation, because I suppose that would imply an intention; and I am, therefore, bound to assume that this peculiarity arises

from a want of any serious study of the arrangements thus wrongly held up as models. The principal case of this misunderstanding is in the reference to our German General Staff. The Commission is informed 'that in the Continental military systems there is a Department of the Chief of the Staff, freed from all executive functions, and charged with the responsible duty of preparing plans of military operations, collecting and co-ordinating information of all kinds, and generally tendering advice upon all matters of organization and the preparation of the army for war.' There is, perhaps, nothing incorrect in this description, but the general impression which it leaves is certainly false, as is proved by the practical inference drawn by the Commission, who would create a staff as an 'organizing department.'

"The *non sequitur* was pointed out by your Oxford friend. I am concerned to convince you that the premise is unsatisfactory. In our system the General Staff is the organ for a particular purpose of the general commanding. It is inconceivable without a general commanding, and without a complete administrative organization, entirely free from and independent of it. The Great General Staff is a reproduction on a larger scale of the General Staff of the Commanders of Army Corps. If you want in England to have anything analogous to our Great General Staff you would first have to permanently organize your army into corps, each of them inhabiting a definite district and under the command, in every respect, of a general with whom no one whatever, except the head of the army—that is in your present system the Commander-in-Chief—could interfere. To this general neither the War Office nor the Chief of the Staff could give any order.

"At present you cannot form such army corps except with your volunteers and militia, for your regular army is merely a reservoir to feed the garrison in India. The organization of army corps would become practicable only if,

as some of your writers have suggested, the Indian army were cut loose from the home service and authorised and compelled to provide for its own needs. This would enable you to have a really short service—two or three years, instead of seven—and a very large reserve, which would offer in itself an ample recruiting ground for the Indian administration. If, then, each corps were autonomous, providing, with few exceptions, its own *matériel,* and making its own estimates, the War Office would be relieved of much of its present work. It could then occupy itself with drawing up those general rules or codes of principle in the form of regulations without which no army can be worked, and which, in your present system, are hardly on a level with the similar regulations of Continental armies.

"In war no factor is so important as the choice of the supreme commander. And even the best commander is robbed of more than half his power unless he has that familiarity with and command over the fighting machine which can only be obtained by the long-continued exercise of his authority.

"Of how many a great general do we not read that before he could venture to take the field he had to spend weeks or months in breaking in, so to speak, the army given him, and forming it to his hand? The wars of our day give no time for preliminaries of this sort.

"A commander, of course, must always have about him a number of helpers upon whom he can rely. His hardest task is to pick out these men and teach them to work with him. This is what we really mean by a Staff. You had something like it in England after the Egyptian expeditions, when your service papers used to attack what they called 'Wolseley's ring.' A commander without his 'ring' is very nearly helpless, and it seems to me that the phrase which was intended to condemn was really the greatest possible compliment.

"The 'ring' in this wide sense includes, of course, the generals commanding corps, who must be picked men. No one can choose them so well as the man who will command them in the field, under whom they must learn to work.

"There is also an inner ring, consisting of the men on to whom the commander unloads the details of his own 'generalling.' You cannot move a hundred thousand men, still less half a million, without elaborate arrangements. No general could do all the working out himself. He gets it done for him in his own private office, which we Germans call his 'General Staff.' A commander takes untold pains to get this office into perfect working order according to his own methods. He wants it to go like a calculating machine, only the machine must be alive so as to bring intelligence to bear upon its workings.

"The commander and his private office belong together, like man and wife; and, like man and wife, it takes time for them to live smoothly together without friction. Your Commission seems to me to contemplate making the office without the commander. I should think this unnatural if the idea is not to appoint the commander until there is a diplomatic complication. It reminds me of Lincoln's maxim, 'Don't swop horses when you are crossing a stream.'

"I know your countrymen have a suspicion of any general in great authority. But it seems to me an unfortunate suspicion, reflecting little confidence either in your institutions or the patriotism of your soldiers. Indeed, I am not sure that this dread of giving a free hand to your best general will not prevent you from ever having your army in good order.

"Our French neighbours, though they, too, are prevented by their democratic feelings from appointing a Commander-in-Chief, have felt obliged to select the commanders of their various armies who at this moment have commis-

sions in their pockets, and are in official communication with the troops which will serve under their orders.

"In any case the Department of the Chief of the Staff proposed by your Commission lacks what we hold to be the one indispensable thing, the practical activity of its members, their constant intercourse with the troops, and their receiving the most thorough training for fighting in the field. Your Commission would merely make a military chancery, in which men learned desk work and where they would in time lose all touch of the realities of war.

"The General Staff, as we know it, implies, first a Commander-in-Chief, appointed with a view to war, though holding his office in peace; second, a Ministry of War, completely covering the administrative field; and, third, a permanent system of independent units or army corps. It is of the essence of our Staff that it does one thing, but the characteristic feature of your Commission's proposal is that the Staff is to do, not merely the one thing for which we have created it, but another thing which we hold to be incompatible with the proper performance of its one task.

"This is, of course, an individual opinion. Most of my comrades would not have allowed themselves to be drawn on, as you have drawn me, into definite statements, as to what another country may or may not do with advantage. And, perhaps, few of them would go so far as to admit that a civilian minister could in any case maintain an efficient army. But of this you may rest assured, that all the best and wisest men in Germany would be delighted to see a reform which would place the military position of Great Britain beyond a doubt."

Next morning at breakfast Kirby returned to the Commission. Dorrington was arranging to show Fraulein von Bredow his favourite view of the Alps, while Graham was trying to persuade me to take up in the newspaper for which I write his pet project of cheap telephones. Graham's tel-

ephones bore me, and I tried to listen to Kirby, who was evidently settling down to believe that the soundest thing in the Report was Campbell-Bannerman's protest against a Chief of the Staff. Of Graham's retort I remember only the phrase, "driving the Empire to the dogs by narrow-minded suspicion of anything like an honest army to defend it."

Soon afterwards I was in the train with Dolly, living over again the weeks at Venice without the disturbing cloud of imagination.

After we left Marseilles, Dolly fell asleep, and I sat awake with my eyes shut, half dreaming. Two French staff officers had got into the carriage at Marseilles, and I could not help hearing snatches of their conversation. The elder of them was a great admirer of the Germans, and talked of their Staff as an *institution vivifiante.* The younger man held that German originality is played out, and mercilessly attacked their new drill-books. He thought the Germans overloaded the "moral factor," and had undervalued the use of a precise formula. The elder then referred to the new German doctrines on cavalry, which his companion pooh-poohed, declaring that all this had been better done ten years earlier by a French general.

They afterwards talked over various projects for the improvement of the headquarters' management of the French army. Both of them thought that the French General Staff should be more of a school for generals and less of a mere bureau, but both were agreed that for France, at any rate, the first thing needed was to appoint in peace the Commander-in-Chief for war, and to give him, as far as possible, a free hand to train his generals.

The Civilian Minister[1]

THE debate which was the occasion, though it could hardly be called the cause, of the fall of the late Government illustrated a number of interesting features of the general administration of the army. The public was unexpectedly reminded of some elementary constitutional facts which are too often forgotten, and which have an important bearing upon those questions of military and of naval organization that are likely in the near future to make large claims upon our attention. It seems worth while, in view of coming discussions, to take note of the light shed upon administrative practice by the crisis.

The House of Commons, being dissatisfied with certain explanations on the subject of ammunition, resolved to reduce the salary of the Secretary of State for War: in other words, passed a vote of censure upon him. The consequence was that the Cabinet resigned. This is in accordance with the best constitutional practice, of which a corner-stone is the solidarity of the Cabinet. Translated into its practical consequences it means that the only way in which the House of Commons can call any one to account for any administrative act, is by turning out the Government. The Minister at the head of the department does not resign alone, but the Cabinet falls with him. In other words, there is no such thing as the individual personal responsibility of a Minister

[1] *National Review,* August, 1895.

to Parliament. The Minister is responsible to his colleagues; that is, they may compel him to resign if they disagree with him, but the House of Commons can bring its displeasure to bear upon a Minister only when it is prepared to eject the Government. Thus for the administration of the army the Cabinet, the whole Cabinet, and only the Cabinet, is responsible to Parliament. If a Secretary of State chooses to say he is himself responsible for a measure, as the late Mr. Stanhope was wont to say, and as Mr. Campbell-Bannerman said in reference to the selection for the Aldershot command, it is merely a figure of speech, meaning, perhaps, that he is its real author, but hardly that he can be made accountable for its consequences. But the Secretary of State, though practically irresponsible, wields in regard to the army, so long as he does not quarrel with his colleagues, the whole unlimited authority of the Cabinet. The Secretary of State, in short, from the Parliamentary point of view, is an autocrat over the army, his despotism being tempered only by the possibility of a party defeat. One is tempted to doubt the wisdom of the accepted doctrine that the army and the navy —for what has been said of the Secretary of State applies equally to the First Lord of the Admiralty—ought to be kept outside of party. It would seem rather that the only way of obtaining an administrative reform in either service through the agency of Parliament is by inducing the Opposition to take up the proposed change, with the express purpose of turning out the Government by an adverse vote.

The Secretary of State with a maximum of power and a minimum of accountability for its use is, if not the keystone, at least the figurehead of the whole military administration. None of the reformers has ever seriously proposed to tamper with him. No doubt it was suggested by Sir Charles Dilke and myself that he should be amalgamated with the First Lord, in order that there should be some Minister

compelled to think about the common function of both services, national defence; and the new Government has sought to reach the same end by bracketing the Secretary of State and the First Lord under the Lord President of the Council. But neither the proposal nor the measure adopted alters the conditions of authority and accountability. The civilian Cabinet Minister remains the central figure in the British administration of defence. The natural history of this official is therefore a profitable study. There can hardly be a better introduction to it than is afforded by an examination of the ways of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, who, before he brought down the Cabinet and became G.C.B., was a typical specimen of the *genus*.

Secretaries of State are all professional politicians. Their occupation through life is to make speeches in Parliament and on the platform, the condition of every speech being that it must defend the party. The result is considerable argumentative or rhetorical dexterity. But this lifelong devotion to political rhetoric is inconsistent with a mastery of any of the professions by which the work of Government is carried on. The politician rarely commands the field of foreign affairs; never that of war. Upon important occasions he requires, if in office, to be coached; if in opposition, to cram himself. The moment he leaves the familiar field of political controversy he is on delicate ground; and for that reason a lucid or masterly exposition of the administrative principles of any department except that of finance has rarely been heard in the House of Commons. Mr. Campbell-Bannerman while at the head of the War Office had twice to defend the Cabinet against challenge of important acts of his own department. On each occasion he damaged his case by ignorance of the subject. He seems to have been unable to realize that even his great experience of debate might be paralysed by want of knowledge, for it is absurd to suppose that if he had thought it necessary he could not

easily have obtained the information which would have prevented his errors.

In the autumn of 1893, the Duke of Connaught having been selected for the command at Aldershot, this appointment became the subject of a debate in the House of Commons. The attack upon the Government was feebly conducted, Mr. A. C. Morton making himself ridiculous, and discrediting in advance a case which after that Sir Charles Dilke, basing himself upon principles which I agree with him in holding to be sound, could hardly expect to save. It was certain that in case of a division the opponents of the appointment would be a mere rump. Mr. Campbell-Bannerman's task was therefore easy. For the division it mattered nothing what he said. For the credit of the Government and of the appointment it was desirable to be quiet, dignified, and authoritative. The Government, Mr. Campbell-Bannerman might have declared, had made the appointment in honour and conscience for the best interest of the public service. No more was needed, and no less was required. Instead of that the Secretary of State entered into an argument as to the qualifications of the officer selected. He began by asserting that officer's military capacity, quoting as the sole evidence an anonymous letter. Then he urged the officer's seniority, though the point raised by the critics was that this seniority had been reached by a rate of promotion quite unusual, except for princes. Lastly, he declared that no other officer was available because the others of the requisite rank were at the time employed. But the officer selected was at the time himself employed, holding a post in which he had nearly two years to run. Each of these arguments was peculiarly damaging to the case the Minister was defending, and none of them would have been used by a man who had thought seriously on the subject, or who had discussed it with a qualified professional adviser. Then Mr. Campbell-Bannerman indulged in a gratuitous attack

upon Lord Roberts (whose name had been mentioned with questionable taste by a Radical Member), and declared that to have appointed him would have been to appoint a full general to a lieutenant-general's command, and that to have raised the pay of the command to the general's scale would have involved an extra expenditure of £1,000 a year, a proceeding which was obviously out of the question. These utterances astounded the military world, for the officer selected was also at the time a full general, and the impossible operation of raising the pay of a command by the amount named in order to appoint a full general had been effected shortly before upon the occasion of an appointment to the command in Ireland. The formal error of quoting an anonymous letter, the insistence upon a seniority which is purely conventional, and the fiction that other officers were not available, are the blunders of a man unfamiliar with the army and not primed for the occasion. The irrelevant scolding administered to a general officer was the natural outcome of the politician's bad habit of abusing the other side; while the whole speech illustrates but too forcibly the almost reckless unscrupulousness to which some of our public men, of otherwise unimpeachable integrity, allow themselves to become inured in the course of parliamentary life.

The debate upon ammunition of the 21st of June, 1895, reveals in the Secretary of State a considerable laxity of thought in connection with that elementary principle of good administration which prescribes the true relations between a Minister and his professional subordinates. Mr. Brodrick raised the question whether there was a sufficient supply of small arm ammunition for the army, in particular of cordite ammunition for the magazine rifles. He referred to certain equipment regulations which lay down the standard for the total store of ammunition at 400 rounds per rifle. He asked whether the actual store was equal to this standard, and referred to the number of magazine rifles as

probably 500,000; implying, of course, that if they were to be all effective, there ought, according to the regulation, to be a supply of two hundred million rounds. Mr. Campbell-Bannerman had this time a delicate task. There was no certainty that a party division might not be taken, if the course of the debate offered a good excuse. His business was to make it impracticable for the Opposition to find the excuse for such a division; in other words, he had to convince the House that the supply of cartridges was satisfactory, and that the matter had been treated by the War Office authorities with all the attention it deserved. The difficulty lay in the fact that the supply by no means equalled the standard quoted by Mr. Brodrick from the equipment regulations. It was clearly a case in which some knowledge of the subject was indispensable; but Mr. Campbell-Bannerman had neglected to inform himself, and relied upon his parliamentary dexterity. Thus he did not know the strength of his case. Mr. Woodall, who was in the first instance put up to reply to Mr. Brodrick, stated that in estimating the quantity of small arm ammunition the War Office had been advised by the Director-General of Artillery and then by the Adjutant-General. Thus a deficiency below the regulation was tacitly admitted, and the responsibility shuffled off on to subordinates. Mr. Campbell-Bannerman then himself repeated the same statement, and, when pressed, enumerated certain troops for which he said there were 400 rounds per man, giving the impression that he was trying by a quibble to make out that there was the full regulation supply. The case was thus made to appear hopeless. The numbers given enabled Mr. Chamberlain to reckon that there was a stock of about 30 million cordite cartridges, and to contrast this figure with 700 million which he had heard that the Japanese army had in stock before going to war.

What ought Mr. Campbell-Bannerman to have done to

save the Government in this debate? Simply to have thought a little about cartridges. If he had considered the subject at all, he must have asked himself how many cartridges does an army use in war or in battle? He would then have learned at the Intelligence Division that the German Army in France in 1870-1, numbering more than a million men altogether, fired during the whole Franco-German War about thirty million rifle cartridges in all, and that the whole supply sent into France for the use of the army did not amount to 200 rounds per man. These figures would have gone far to allay any uneasiness, and the Secretary of State could then have proceeded to explain the contradiction between the official standard and his own contentment with a smaller figure. It was the standard of 400 that upset him. That standard represents in one sense the deliberate advice of the military officers as to the amount that the army ought to have, and it was a blunder to pit the Adjutant-General's opinion obtained for the occasion against the deliberate judgment of the Adjutant-General's office recorded in regulations. But the truth is that the British Army has formed of late years the bad habit of having two standards, one for theory and the other for practice. Thus there is on paper a standard army corps containing everything that an army corps imagined by the headquarter staff ought to possess. But no such British Army corps has ever existed in any place as a real entity, and it is doubtful whether its *disjecta membra* were ever all in actual existence at the same time. Similarly the 400 rounds per man seems to have been an imaginary ideal, pleasant to contemplate on paper, but not seriously meant. If Sir Redvers Buller really thought that the minimum stock of cartridges with which it is safe to go to war was 400 rounds per rifle, he would never have told Mr. Campbell-Bannerman that the increase of the vote for cartridges was not urgent. It may, perhaps, have a good influence upon the War Office habit of

making paper armies, that one of these dreamland regulations has upset a Cabinet.

The pith of Mr. Campbell-Bannerman's defence was that he "was advised by his responsible advisers." This phrase deserves a somewhat close examination. A person is properly said to be responsible when he is liable to answer for his acts. The full definition of a man's responsibility must explain what acts he has to account for, to whom he must render his account, and in what way he is liable to suffer for acts which are condemned by the authority which reviews his conduct. Our system of Government assumes that every act of the Executive is the act of the King, that the King cannot be called to account, and that he never acts except by the advice of the Cabinet. The House of Commons, therefore, in reviewing the acts of the Government, calls upon the Cabinet to answer for the advice which that body has given to the King. The Cabinet is a collective, indivisible body of "advisers" responsible as a body, though not individually, for the advice they have given. This is the origin of "responsible advisers." The words represent a fiction. Under the form of accounting for advice the Cabinet is held accountable for its policy, for acts which are really its own. By the fiction of responsibility for advice, political power and administrative authority have been transferred from the King to the Cabinet. The recognition of responsible advisers to the Cabinet—that is, of persons who advise the Cabinet and are accountable to the House of Commons—must therefore be looked upon with some suspicion, as the beginning of a process by which the authority of the Cabinet might pass into the hands of the permanent or professional heads of departments. You cannot separate power and responsibility. The man who decides is the man to be called to account. The moment he hides behind an adviser he shirks his responsibility and abandons his authority. The old and sound tradition made the professional

heads of departments the servants of the Cabinet, and imposed upon the Cabinet the duty of completely covering them with its own responsibility. They were accountable, not in any circumstances to the House of Commons, but only to the Cabinet. Mr. Campbell-Bannerman when he pleaded the advice of the Adjutant-General was departing from the tradition, and entering upon a new and devious path.

The Royal Commission over which the late Sir James Stephen presided set forth with great clearness the anomaly that, while for the efficient management of the army the highest professional qualifications are necessary, the Secretary of State, who exercises the supreme authority of the Cabinet over the military administration, is as a rule without any professional qualification whatever. It was felt to be desirable, while maintaining the authority of the Secretary of State, to give full scope for professional competence wherever it is required. The later Commission, known by the name of Lord Hartington, wished to give this element of special professional ability its due place in the work of designing and regulating the military organism. The Commission wished that the professional advice given to the Minister should be " tendered under conditions of the greatest responsibility possible," but it may be inferred from the context that they meant responsibility to the Minister, so that Mr. Campbell-Bannerman's defence is not justified by their report.

Lord Hartington's Commission did, however, propose a very sweeping change. They suggested the creation of a new department for the general management of the army, a department which was to be in no direct relation or contact with the army, and was to have no executive functions. The office of Commander-in-Chief was to be abolished and his duties to be distributed among a number of officers, all of whom were to be equals and all the direct subordinates of

the Secretary of State. These proposals have not, so far as I can discover, commended themselves to military men. It is admitted that the business of general direction and supervision has for many years been unsatisfactorily performed, and this is the premiss from which the report sets out. But it is hardly proved that the weakness of the system consists in there being a Commander-in-Chief. The present system gives very great power to the Commander-in-Chief, so that its good working depends largely on his professional attainments, energy, and character. The office has been held by the same person for many years, and it is quite conceivable that a change of person might be just as effective as a change of system. It is difficult to read the report without perceiving that the members of the Commission were exceedingly anxious to deal tenderly with certain susceptibilities. This is a motive which all right-minded men can appreciate and respect. But it was surely allowed to have too much weight. The proposals for change were put forward on the express understanding that they should not be carried out until there should be a vacancy in the office of Commander-in-Chief. That event is now at hand. Would it not be well before remodelling upon a new theory the whole plan of army management, to try the effect of a change of persons upon the present system, and to select as Commander-in-Chief a general whose professional capacity and judgment commands the confidence of the Cabinet? The Cabinet so long as their confidence was unshaken would be able to give him unqualified support in the exercise of his authority over the army. If that confidence failed, the relation ought to come to an end by the retirement of the Commander. Any officer chosen for the chief post in the army is sure to have behind him a distinguished career, and such a man ought to be treated with great consideration. His emoluments should be so regulated as to enable him upon a hint of want of confidence to retire from

his post without anxiety as to his means, and it should be his professional point of honour not to serve a day after the rejection of any suggestion which he considered essential. In this way the guarantee of accord between a Cabinet and its chief military assistant would consist in that officer holding his post. The Cabinet, instead of hiding behind him, would shelter and uphold him. The only occasion when the House of Commons might wish to review the relation betwen a Cabinet and its principal military assistant would be when the retirement of the latter gave reason to suppose that he had been overruled upon some fundamental matter. It is, however, hardly probable that a Cabinet would reject the suggestions of the general entrusted with the supervision of the military preparation for war, except upon grounds so convincing that there would be no reason to dread their scrutiny by Parliament.

Trifling with National Defence[1]

"What king, going to make war against another king, sitteth not down first, and consulteth whether he be able with ten thousand men to meet him that cometh against him with twenty thousand? Or else, while the other is yet a great way off, he sendeth an ambassage, and desireth conditions of peace."

THE year 1896 has been in a peculiar sense a period of test for the English system of representative government, and for those English politicians who occupy the three or four posts of the greatest moral responsibility. During the last twelve months the nation has had one single desire. All classes have been moved, with a unanimity for which in the record of the present generation there has been no parallel, by the wish that the defences of the country and of the Empire should be set in order. But what has been the result of this strong and widespread feeling? The navy estimates for the current year were increased so as to make liberal provision for that gradual strengthening of the maritime defences of the Empire upon which Governments have for several years been engaged, but no extraordinary effort was made, and the all-important, though difficult problem of securing an abundant supply of seamen was postponed, while the proposals made for the improvement of the army were put forward with little earnestness, and eventually withdrawn. Very different measures were called for both by the situation and by the temper of the people.

[1] *National Review*, January, 1897.

The situation was one altogether new to modern English experience. A series of diplomatic rebuffs had revealed to the public at large the fact, which had been before known only to the very small class who study foreign affairs, that each of the four greatest Powers in the world had adopted a policy running counter in some important matter to the necessary and accepted policy of any British Government. It had, of course, long been clear that French dissatisfaction with the British occupation of Egypt could not be removed by any course consistent with England's self-respect. The year 1895 had marked afresh the antagonism between Russian and British policy in regard to Turkey, which, though it has always existed, had for some years been fondly supposed to be a myth by those British politicians who confuse their theory of humanity with the facts of actual life. Events had also disclosed the Russian design of obtaining a foothold on the Pacific at the expense of China and Japan. It was plain that Great Britain could not expect to make good her position in Asia and Africa against a Franco-Russian combination unless she were prepared at any time to resist, if need be by force, the policy of the two allies. But the close of 1895 brought into the foreground other possibilities of grave conflict. Mr. Olney's despatch of July 20, 1895, informed the Government of the Queen, who is Queen in Canada and in British Guiana, that "the United States is practically sovereign on this continent," and asking the question, "Why?" gave the specific answer, "Because its unbounded resources, combined with its isolated position, render it master of the situation and practically invulnerable as against any or all other Powers." Upon the basis of this claim of suzerainty over the Queen in respect of her American dominions Mr. Cleveland proposed to dictate to the British Government the method of settling its dispute with Venezuela, and his action in this matter was enthusiastically supported by the people of the United States. This

American dictation, supported by the threat of war, was accompanied by German diplomatic interference in South Africa. On October 15 the German Government reminded the British Government that German policy in the Transvaal aimed at the preservation of the *status quo,* and that Germany would regard it as a serious injury to her interests if the Transvaal should be deprived of "the independence guaranteed to it in the treaty of 1884." This declaration of German policy was followed up by the Emperor's telegram to President Kruger of January 3, 1896, by which the British public first became aware of the bitter hostility cherished in Germany towards the British Empire. Since then further light has been thrown upon the policy of Germany by those who in that country are the best exponents of contemporary political thought, the officers of the naval and military staffs. These authors have explained to their countrymen that, although in the near future it may not be practicable for Germany single-handed to dispute with Great Britain the command of the sea, yet, if the German fleet could be made strong enough to deal with the British Channel fleet, Germany may hope, whenever England is at war with a Mediterranean Power (with France, or with France and Russia), to interfere with every prospect of success, for in that case a defeat of the Channel fleet would render practicable a German invasion of England.

The situation, of which these are the salient points, has arisen in consequence of the peculiar action for a number of years of the two groups of men from whom British Cabinets are chosen. The foreign Powers began very timidly to adopt the policy of opposition to England, and in nearly every case there was a point when a resolute British Government could have put a stop to it. In 1884 Mr. Gladstone's Cabinet ought to have replied by an ultimatum to the German annexation of Cameroons, undertaken because the German Government knew that England had decided to

annex the place. The reason that no ultimatum was sent seems to have been that the Cabinet of that day had not enough confidence in the readiness of the army and navy. In 1890 the French claims in regard to the Newfoundland shore should have been met by an order to the British admiral to uphold British rights. Neither in 1890 nor in 1884 would there have been war, but British rights would have been asserted. The attitude of both Front Benches was expressed by Lord Knutsford, when he said: "If the French insisted on their claims, the question could only be settled by war, and this country might be assured that war would not be sanctioned in such a question until after diplomacy had said its last word." Lord Knutsford and both Front Benches believed the English case in Newfoundland to be a good one, and the French claim to be wrongful. Why did they not assure both countries that the French claims if pressed could only be settled by war, *and that England was quite ready for it?* The reason must be that they did not believe England to be ready. This reason was well understood abroad, with the result that all the Powers have since Lord Knutsford's utterance been emboldened in their controversies with us. But while the foreign Powers have proceeded with ever-increasing disrespect towards England, our Governments have steadfastly walked in the fatal path of submission. In the Far East the unopposed action of Russia has well-nigh made an end of British influence; in the Armenian question England accepted a sharp rebuke from the same Power; the German declarations of policy in South Africa, which aroused the indignation of the whole English community, have never produced so much as a word of protest addressed by our Government to that of the Emperor; while, finally, the threat from the United States has succeeded beyond the expectations of its authors, for England has obeyed the orders of President Cleveland. Most surprising of all, these [illegible]

on the hypothesis that the Cabinets that made them believed the army and the navy unready to take up a quarrel, have been accompanied by a hesitation on the part of the same Cabinets to arm in earnest. There has been the strange spectacle of British Governments yielding with comparative ease to the pressure of foreign Powers, but yielding with great reluctance and inch by inch to the pressure of British public opinion calling for a strong navy and a ready army.

Suppose that in the formation of the present Cabinet one of those fortunate blunders had been committed by which a nation is sometimes saved in spite of itself, and that instead of all the places having been filled by political respectabilities, some one important post had been given to a man. The marks of a man are that he uses his own eyes for seeing, his own common-sense for judging, and that his actions spring from his own will. In public life the mark of a true man is that he cares more for his country than for himself. Assume that a man of this kind had been appointed to any one of the four posts in the Cabinet which carry with them authority in regard to defence: those of the Prime Minister, of the Chairman of the Cabinet Committee on Defence, of the Secretary of State of War, and of the First Lord of the Admiralty. So soon as he perceived that England was yielding to pressure from abroad he would have resolved to prevent the humiliation of his country. Only one argument could have been urged by his colleagues in deprecation of his resignation. They could not urge that their own policy was unjust; but only that the national forces were not in a condition to uphold it. His reply that every other object ought to be set aside until England was ready to fight in her just cause, and that the country must be told the truth, would have placed the Cabinet at his mercy. No Cabinet could afford to let one of its members resign ungagged on that issue. The next Cabinet question would have been: What estimates shall we propose? Upon this

he would have answered: Estimates that will make us ready for any conflict that can be reasonably expected while we insist on what we believe are England's rights. He would say: Let us record in a minute the matters at issue with other Powers; let us decide which causes England ought to expect us to make good; that list, in so far as it embraces causes in dispute, is a list of the Powers we may have to fight. Let us give it to our admiral and our general, and call for their reports upon these various possible wars. When these reports were presented he would discuss them with the admiral and the general until he understood the nature of the operations, from the success of which in each case of conflict a satisfactory peace might be expected; the forces required for the conduct of such operations with reasonable probability of success against the estimated forces of the enemy; and the distribution of our own forces proposed as preliminary to the first move. He would consent to no estimates unless they were based upon such an analysis, and unless he were satisfied that the navy and army for which provision was contemplated would be sufficient to meet any of the various contingencies of dispute set out in the Cabinet's minute. He would insist on the Cabinet's making a clean breast to their admiral and general as to the possibilities of dispute, upon the admiral and the general fully explaining to the Cabinet their views of the conduct of the war, in each separate hypothesis, and then upon the estimates providing without abatement for everything thought essential by the professional fighting men.

This is the common-sense or business method of preparing for defence. It is also the common-sense basis of policy. A Government which sets out upon a policy (as English Governments did in Siam, in Armenia, in Venezuela, and various other cases) without first reckoning out the means in the shape of ships and army corps at their disposal for carrying it out against the Powers concerned to oppose it, is

like a man that begins to build a house without knowing whether his funds will suffice to carry it above the first story. The common-sense plan of managing the national policy and the preparation of the army and navy estimates has not been adopted. But until all other methods are given up and this plan has been tried the British nation will remain in a fool's paradise, liable to panic, and, what is worse, to war at the wrong time and to defeat.

The question of the system according to which the Cabinet manages the army and navy estimates derives urgency at present from what took place at the Bristol meeting at which Lord Lansdowne and Sir Michael Hicks-Beach expressed opposite opinions on the needs of the army. No one who has read the speeches can doubt that Lord Lansdowne was putting before his hearers an outline of some of the measures that Lord Wolseley thinks necessary, and that if Sir Michael Hicks-Beach has his way those necessary measures will not be carried out. In regard to naval defence, recent discussion has turned upon the comparative strength of the British and other navies, a discussion that started from a recent Parliamentary Return. Much of this controversy is interesting, but its general effect is to divert the public mind from the one thing needed, which is that the Government should be compelled either to adopt the proposals of its naval adviser, the First Sea Lord, or to inform Parliament that these proposals have not been adopted. The First Sea Lord has in fact the power in his hands. He signs the navy estimates in his official capacity, which is that of the one adviser of the Government in regard to the employment of the fleet in war, to its mobilization and to plans of campaign. His signature is either a form by which the public is deceived, or it implies that the estimates cover preparations which in his judgment will enable the fleet to defeat the forces of any combination that he can foresee. But the Commander-in-Chief does not sign the army estimates.

The present Government was weak enough, when it selected Lord Wolseley as the general of its choice, to put him into the strait-waistcoat of a civilian war office and of a council of his own subordinates. Such conditions would paralyse a Napoleon, and if the country cares for its military defences, means will be found to untie Lord Wolseley's hands. The simplest would be to require his signature to the army estimates, prefixed by the statement that the estimates provide all that he thinks necessary for any war that he has reason to suppose may arise.

If the procedure above described be really that of common-sense why has it not been accepted? Because every politician before he has a chance of entering the Cabinet has been thoroughly cured of the habits that mark a man. He neither sees with his eyes nor judges with his common-sense, nor acts from his own will, and in very few instances does he care enough for England to sacrifice to her his own career. Lord Salisbury, the Duke of Devonshire, Lord Lansdowne, and Mr. Goschen, the four men now holding power to make or mar the defence and the policy of England, stand high above the average of their countrymen in intelligence, in culture, and in character; nothing could be farther from the purpose than any sort of attack upon them, the author of which would betray an ignobility of spirit in sharp contrast to the high-mindedness which happily prevails among English public men. But they have been kneaded in a mill that breaks the strength of all that pass through it. The nature of this weakening process can best be made clear to the reader by an experiment upon himself. The reader who has no pretensions to knowledge of war, whose mind is comparatively clear of the bias given by a limited amount of information, will have read with general assent the description given above of what has been called the common-sense plan of preparing for war and of managing defence and policy. Let the reader, then, who finds

himself in this frame of mind consider whether he is willing to act upon his feeling, and to go, for example, to his political club with a proposal that steps should be taken to make the adoption of this method of managing national defence the main plank of the platform of his party. He will hesitate. He will modestly distrust his judgment, and before committing himself will wish to hear the objections, and to have the views, of experts. In all probability the experts to whom he can most conveniently appeal will be naval or military officers of his acquaintance. Some of the military officers and most of the naval ones, especially the middle-aged men of either service, will denounce as heresy what is here called common-sense. The reader will then find his impulse to action paralysed by his inability to decide. Every Cabinet Minister connected with defence has found himself in this position, with the additional painful circumstance that in his situation inaction was as fateful as action. Every one of them has had to take refuge in compromise, to which his parliamentary training has accustomed him. In the House of Commons, where, as a rule, home affairs are uppermost, the great considerations are opinions and votes, and in these departments compromise is a road to success. No doubt this is a bad training-ground for dealing with war and foreign policy, where realities have to be confronted, but it is the training that Ministers have had. Then the Cabinet Minister has not only to decide in himself, but to carry his colleagues with him. The argument of the cohesion of the party is brought to bear upon him until he is ready to further compromise upon the half-measures which he had gathered courage to adopt. It is the necessity of making decisions of supreme importance with inadequate knowledge that saps the backbone of public men. They feel that, as amateurs, they cannot trust their own insight nor shape their own wills; they become the reluctant puppets of their own subordinates, and yet are ashamed of

the position. This was made perfectly clear by Mr. Balfour in August, 1895, when he was arguing in favour of that practical abolition of the Commander-in-Chief, which has been attempted with deplorable results. "If," said Mr. Balfour, "you put the Secretary of State for War in direct communication with the Commander-in-Chief alone, I do not see how the Secretary of State can be anything else than the administrative puppet of the great soldier who is at the head of the army." Mr. Balfour's parliamentary training makes his main interest in the management of national defence centre in the effort to make the Secretary of State feel easy. It never occurs to him to think of war, of what England's enemies can do, and of forming and preparing the army for war according to knowledge of war. The one idea is that the amateur Secretary of State is uncomfortable in the hands of a professional Commander-in-Chief. Mr. Balfour's remedy is to add to the amateur's authority and to reduce that of the professional soldier. It never occurs to him to add to the Secretary of State's knowledge, or, if that is impossible, to take from him those decisions which cannot rightly be made without knowledge.

Military histories almost always pass over in silence the transactions between the head of the State and his military advisers which as a rule precede the outbreak of war. The military historian takes the army as it was when war began, and shows how its commander used it, thereby illustrating the conditions of good generalship in the field. Yet the work done in the field is in reality altogether governed by previous work in the council chamber. The council-chamber work, as a rule, remains secret until long after the military history has been written, and naval and military historians have rarely the opportunity or the habit of documentary research necessary to trace it out. Accordingly the naval or military officer has seldom been able to pursue his professional studies up to the point where all the threads

meet—in the council chamber of Governments during the years preceding a war. It is, however, quite possible, without going through all the routine of a soldier's life and all the military sciences, to study these mainsprings of the military machine. By such study alone can that comprehensive and clear view be obtained which corresponds in the trained mind to the first glance at the whole subject taken by the outsider. But the highest professional men, those who have sat in the councils of Governments and have conducted wars with credit, as well as the few military historians who have gone deeply into the causes of failure and success, all speak the language above ascribed to commonsense.

A little concrete history is perhaps better than a good deal of abstract argument, and it may be worth while to note what were the fundamental causes of some of the great failures and successes in modern wars, taking either well-ascertained facts as the basis of our conclusions, or adopting the judgment of great men who were peculiarly qualified to know the facts.

Nothing more astonished contemporary Europe than the success of the French in the early revolutionary wars. In 1797, Scharnhorst, afterwards the regenerator of the Prussian army, wrote a paper in which the causes of the German defeats were traced. He found two sufficient explanations. The first was political. Neither Prussia nor Austria was in earnest; each Power was more anxious to gain an advantage over the other than to overcome the French. The second was the consequence of the first. In 1792 the allies employed less than a quarter of their standing armies against France, while France exerted herself to put a large force into the field, and in the following campaigns the forces directed by the allies against France were still mere fractions of their available armies. In 1805, Austria suffered the tremendous overthrow of Ulm and Austerlitz,

usually attributed to the genius of Napoleon. No one will wish to underestimate the personal force of Napoleon. But he had the advantage of an army which he had carefully formed and organized for a campaign upon a grand scale. What was the position of Austria? At the head of her army in 1804 was the Archduke Charles, at that time the best commander in Europe after Napoleon. That general's papers have lately been published, and show that in 1804 he implored the Emperor to avoid a rupture with Napoleon, for the reason that the Austrian army was in no condition for a war against France, and begged that if such a war were contemplated it should be postponed until after several years of hard work in preparation. He was overruled, and deprived of the command, and in 1805 came all the misfortunes he had foretold. After the catastrophe he was again placed at the head of the army, but without authority to enforce the arrangements he thought necessary. In 1808 he again protested against a new war with France, was again overruled, but this time persuaded to take the command. He fought in 1809 a good fight and was defeated. Many years afterwards, in a history of this war written for the instruction of his son (the victor of Custozza), he summed up his view in the words: "In the year 1809 the Austrian Government misunderstood the European situation, and the Austrian general overestimated the instruments with which he had to work." Had the advice of the Archduke Charles been followed Napoleon would have had a much harder task in his wars against Austria.

Two modern instances of failure from neglect of common-sense are worth noting. In 1859 Napoleon III. won the campaign of Magenta and Solferino. But whatever laurels he gained are due less to his military skill than to the fact that Austria brought little more than half of her army into the theatre of war. In 1885, King Milan of Serbia was surprised by the *coup d'état* at Philippopolis, and deter-

mined to prevent by force the union of the two Bulgarias. All the world expected the Bulgarians to be defeated, for statistics showed that the Serbian army was, numerically, far the stronger of the two. The Bulgarian success was not explicable at the time to observers in Western Europe, but when, a year or two later, the facts became known, they proved that King Milan, being short of money and of cartridges, had called out only half his army, and thus enabled the Bulgarians to outnumber him in the decisive battle. Prince Alexander had relied on common-sense, while King Milan had trusted, as the average Englishman of to-day trusts, "that we shall come through safely somehow."

In 1850 the Prussian Government found (as the British Government now finds) that its policy was opposed to that of some of its great neighbours. Convinced of the justice of its cause, the Prussian Government kept steadfastly on its way, until the Austrian army was on the move, and an ultimatum came from Russia. To fight was hopeless, and the Prussian Government submitted to the terms dictated by Austria and Russia. Among the many Prussians whose spirits revolted against this humiliation was the King's brother, who, a few years later, found himself Prince Regent. His first act when in authority was to make the army ready for war by doubling its size and numbers, and by choosing the best general he could find—Moltke—to advise him in the direction of campaigns. During the present year the Prussian staff has published a number of the memoirs in which Moltke studied the conditions of the various wars foreseen to be possible. As early as 1857 we find him working out, upon the basis of the then existing armies of France and Prussia, the best way in which Prussia could dispose of her forces at the beginning of a war. In 1860 there is a similar memoir on a war against Austria, and these two plans or projects were revised from year to year, or when some change in the political situation or in the armies ren-

dered revision desirable. In the preliminary studies for the Austrian war Moltke has to deal with the German allies of Austria; the total force of the enemies will be superior to that of Prussia, but he devises means by which Prussia may secure superior numbers in the decisive battle. The French war gave him no similar anxiety. Yet, strange to say, the French Government undertook to dictate to Prussia, although they were fully informed of the numerical and qualitative superiority of the Prussian army, and of the great probability that the South German forces would act, as they were bound by treaties to act, upon the Prussian side.

History, then, is on the side of common-sense, which tells us that if a fight is among the possibilities of the future we ought to prepare for it in good time. The popular idea divides the parts of the statesman and of the general, and supposes it natural that when the statesman has muddled his policy until it is an inextricable tangle he then calls upon some general to take the army as it happens to be, and to cut the Gordian-knot with the sword. This is the method of States that prepare for defeat. Great successes are found only where the statesman and the general are one and the same person, or, failing that, where the statesman and the military commander are during peace in constant intercourse with one another, so that policy and preparation for war go hand-in-hand. This harmony between the supreme Government and the military chief is illustrated on a small scale by some modern British expeditions. In the second Afghan War one of the brilliant exploits was the taking of the Peiwar Kotal. No doubt the success was due to the judicious dispositions of Sir Frederick Roberts, the general in command. But a not less important factor in it was the composition of the force employed, which was due to the opportunity which the Indian Government had had of consulting that officer before the campaign opened concerning

the formation of the Kuram force which he was to direct. In the same way the decisive victory at Tel-el-Kebir must be ascribed quite as much to the fact that Lord Wolseley's advice was taken before the campaign in regard to the strength and composition of his force as to the skill with which he employed it in the field.

The cardinal principle in the management of the external affairs of a nation is that policy should go hand-in-hand with readiness for a fight. Pretensions that cannot be made good against challenge should not be put forward. It is absurd for England to profess herself mistress of an Empire stretching round the globe, to claim commercial interests in every port, and an all-pervading influence making for the good of humanity, so long as she is not ready to resist with the strong hand encroachments upon her spheres of influence, her commercial interests, or her authority.

Readiness for a war must be based on forethought in regard to that war. It implies that a competent war-leader has considered the case, thought out his arrangements, and prepared his forces. This forethought in these three branches or degrees is the *raison d'être* of the Commander-in-Chief and of the First Sea Lord of the Admiralty. If, therefore, the army and the navy, when a war comes, are to be ready for it, the Government must beforehand have taken the advice of the Commander-in-Chief and his naval colleague. The estimates, which regulate the extent and kind of material preparation for war and the number of men trained, must be framed in accordance with the view of the General-in-Chief and the Admiral-in-Chief regarding the requirements of certain possible wars of which they have worked out the openings. This is the fundamental condition without which no guarantee against great disaster is obtainable. An absolute guarantee is never to be had. The general or the admiral, being but human, may make mistakes; but no army and no navy can be expected to be in the best condi-

tion for a fight if in their preparation considerations unconnected with fighting have been paramount.

The future of England, in so far as it depends on the military forces, lies in the hands of Lord Lansdowne. If he takes the bold course, he will find the country at his back, and he may safely insist, against the Chancellor of the Exchequer, upon the Government's asking in the estimates for all that Lord Wolseley thinks needful. If now, when the public mind is intent upon the subject, and anxious at any cost to have the military organization established on the basis of readiness for war, Lord Lansdowne flinches, the opportunity will be gone, perhaps for ever, and his responsibility will be immeasurable.

The Defence of London[1]

A THOROUGH discussion of the defence of London involves an answer to four successive questions:

1. Is Great Britain likely to be involved in a serious war?

2. In that case is the attempt at invasion probable, and is the landing of a foreign army in England practicable?

3. Suppose a landing to be practicable, is the preparation of a series of positions round London a prudent or necessary step?

4. If some form of fortification is desirable do the plans of the Government meet the requirements of the case?

It is evident that if a decided negative could be given to any of these questions, it would be superfluous to find answers to those that follow, but in fact very few of those who have thought about the subject are prepared with an unqualified "no" in any of the four cases. I shall attempt to answer them all, passing over as briefly as possible the first two, which I have examined in some detail elsewhere.

1. If British policy were conducted upon a consistent and avowed plan, there would be little danger of war. The British nation has no aggressive purpose, and a policy accepted by the nation could not aim at anything but the retention by England of the territories and rights which she has, and the maintenance of the principle of a European commonwealth which underlies what is called the Concert

[1] *National Review*, March, 1897.

of Europe. The danger of an attack upon England arises from the fears of the other Powers.

The raid upon the Transvaal was promptly disavowed and in no way countenanced by the British Government. The German Emperor's message, felt to be uncalled for and to imply a snub to this country, was therefore resented. No one in England for a moment dreamed of attacking Germany in consequence of that indiscretion. Our feelings were hurt and we showed it, that was all. But the German Government put such an interpretation upon the expressions of English feeling that it promptly set to work upon plans of campaign for a possible war. The French are afraid that England might join the Triple Alliance in an attack upon France, and, according to M. Clemenceau, this unfounded anxiety is the excuse for French naval preparations. The Russians are afraid that, as England keeps a strong fleet in the Levant, she has some design of her own upon Constantinople. Yet the only conceivable purpose of British action as regards Constantinople is to secure that the ultimate fate of that city shall be settled according to the will of the majority of the Powers rather than according to the will of Russia alone, and it matters less to England than to most of the Powers what the particular solution is to be.

The ambiguity of English policy arouses the apprehensions of all the Powers, and so long as it lasts there is some risk of a combination against this country. But if it were possible for a Government to lay down in clear, general terms the objects of British policy, and, still better, to obtain by a deliberate vote of both Houses of Parliament the national approval of the objects so defined, the confidence of the majority of the Powers would be secured, and peace, not only for England, but for the rest of the world, would be rendered less precarious than it is at present. A clear statement of the rights which it is intended to maintain, and to defend, if need be, by force, would not only form a sound

basis for the national policy and for the defence of the Empire, but its publication would diminish, if not remove, the mistrust of the other Powers in British policy. Such a declaration ought, it seems to me, to include the intention to act in concert with the majority of the Powers to resist by force the arbitrary initiative in international affairs of any single Power. This is what I mean by the principle of a European commonwealth.

I have said so much on what some will think a side issue, because it is the fashion to nickname alarmist any one who discusses the chances of war. Yet, far from being an alarmist, I regard England's position as unlikely to be in any way disturbed, from the moment when the nation's course shall come to be regarded as the nation's business, and to be treated as a matter involving the deliberate expression of the national will.

2. Assuming, however, that British policy continues to be a party matter, that no steps are taken to ascertain and formulate a consistent policy, or that before this has been done some accident inflames the fears and jealousies of other Powers so that England finds herself at war, under what conditions is invasion practicable?

I think it entirely depends on the relative fighting power of the British and the hostile fleets. If a British fleet at the outbreak of war is able to seek, find, attack, and defeat the enemy's fleet, there can be no invasion. If the British navy suffers a decisive defeat, invasion will certainly follow. No Continental Power at the present day will begin a war without the intention to strike down the adversary. A victory over the principal British fleet would therefore be pushed to its logical result, the assertion of the command of the sea against England, and after that there would be nothing to prevent the conveyance to England of a very large army.

The danger of a crushing defeat at sea ought to be remote. If the British Admiralty is now strategically efficient

such a disaster could hardly occur except in case of a combination of several maritime Powers against England. But the peace distribution of the British fleet, combined with the slowness of British mobilization, as shown by recent practice, might give a resolute and ready foreign Government the brief opportunity for a raid on a large scale. There are at present between thirty and forty British ships in the Levant, ten days from the Channel. The Channel Fleet is at Vigo on its way to Gibraltar, and might at any time be several days from the Straits of Dover. A foreign Government resolved to run risks might cover the transport and landing of a force, say in Essex, by sending to the entrance of the Channel a fleet which, though comparatively small, would yet be superior to any British force that could attack it for several days. It would be necessary in some way to prevent the exit of reserve ships from the Medway. The whole operation would, of course, be extremely hazardous, for the subsequent concentration of the British navy would cut off all retreat for the force landed in England. But if meanwhile that force had defeated the English field army and entered London the effect upon the course of events would be very great, and the prospect of such a success might induce a foreign Power to run the risks involved in the enterprise.

I hold absolutely with the naval school that the true defence of London and of England is a strong navy rightly used, and that the best preparation is to perfect the navy and its management. In case of the thorough defeat of the navy no military force that England now possesses would be equal in efficiency to the invading army, and no works would save London.

But the navy has not the numerical force required to command the sea at the outset of war against a combination of Powers. A mistake in the peace distribution of the squadrons and a delay in the mobilization of the ships in

reserve, both of which seem to me possible so long as the navy is controlled by a Cabinet in which strategy is unrepresented, would give foreign Powers the opportunity, upon which their soldiers undoubtedly build their hopes, of an invasion or great raid undertaken in the first days of a war unexpectedly declared.

3. What is the proper mode of resistance to a raid attempted by a group of army corps landed on the south or the east coast, and would the resistance be facilitated by special preparation for the defence of London?

Beyond doubt the force landed ought as soon as possible to be attacked and destroyed. The destruction of an army does not mean that all the persons composing it are killed; it means that its fighting power is broken, partly by a certain amount of killing and wounding, partly by its being thrown into confusion and losing heart, and partly by its being deprived of the means of supplying its wants. In ordinary land war an army is destroyed by a successful attack that drives it away from the roads or railways that constitute its channels of supply. An army is not like a tiger that can run all round its prey and attack from any direction. It is more like an imaginary monster composed of a snake combined with a tree, the tree containing the digestive organs, and the snake being nourished by the circulation passing through its tail from the tree. The snake's head may advance a long way from the tree, but a cut across its body at any point must be fatal. Suppose the snake's head is gliding through the grass towards an old gentleman lying asleep—its destined prey. The best way to kill the snake will be to rush at its tail with a knife. But this plan will not save the sleeper if the head has time to bite him before the knife is applied to the tail; once the knife is felt, the head will come back promptly enough.

This is the principle of some of the best plans of campaign for defence. One of the most brilliant was that

sketched by Moltke in 1860 for the defence of Prussia against Austria. It is worth while giving, as nearly as may be in his own words, a portion of this project, which offers a remarkable illustration of one aspect of the defence of London.

"We have to decide whether we choose the direct or an indirect defence of the capital. If we choose a position anywhere between Bohemia and Berlin, with our retreat to Berlin, we can on the defensive keep the enemy at a distance from the capital only by accepting a frontal battle at some natural or artificial line of defence. If in this battle we are defeated by the enemy's superior numbers, we shall lose not only the battle but Berlin as well, and run the risk, if vigorously pursued, of being driven back to Stettin. If Berlin were fortified in the style of a great entrenched camp it might well be assumed that the enemy's movement would there come to a standstill. But in that case we, too, should be tied to Berlin, and should have lost a considerable belt of territory.

"The conditions are quite changed if we arrange for a retreat not to Berlin but behind the Elbe.

"A flank position behind the Elbe will not hold the enemy spellbound or hinder him from advancing past it towards Berlin, but we expect this result from *an offensive based upon the Elbe.*

"It was shown that any attack from the west compels the enemy to front towards the west, to abandon the most direct road, and to look round for other communications towards his rear, because in this new situation ours all lead us on to his left flank.

"If the offensive stroke delivered from the Elbe succeeds it drives the enemy away from Bohemia, and back upon the, as yet, unconquered Silesia. If it fails we shall find behind the river a more complete and nearer protection than by retreating northwards, and the strong places secure to us the possibility of again advancing across the river after the shortest respite.

"This indirect defence will last the longer the higher up the

river it begins, for if we were compelled to withdraw to the left bank at Dresden or Riesa we should still be able to advance again on to the right bank at Torgau or Wittenberg. It will be the more effective the further down stream it is continued. For from Wittenberg, where our own retreat will be secured, we shall be operating directly upon the rear of the enemy who has advanced against Berlin.

"This, however, pre-supposes that Berlin itself can be protected for a few days, either by fortification or the occupation of a line of defence to the south of the city. If that were not the case, the indirect defence would end at Wittenberg; it would have then to pass into direct defence, that is, we should have to hurry to reach Berlin before the enemy.

"Here comes out clearly the importance of a protection for the capital by works of some kind, without its being decided whether this should be effected by the fortification of Berlin itself, or of some position further south.

"If the line of the Nuthe and the Notte can be so prepared that it can be held even for a short time by a comparatively weak corps, that course is strategically to be preferred even to the fortification proper of Berlin."

The Government scheme for the defence of London rests upon a plan closely resembling this project of Moltke's for the defence of Berlin. Its author is the present Director of Military Intelligence, Sir John Ardagh. No exact account of it has ever been published, though from explanations which have been given to Parliament, and from a statement made some years ago by General Sir Henry Brackenbury at the United Service Institution, and from a certain number of details which have in the course of execution necessarily been divulged, a fairly clear idea of the nature of the plan can be formed. The late Sir Edward Hamley, who was acquainted with the scheme, published in 1889 a volume entitled *National Defence,* in which his own views with regard to the defence of London were set forth. The plan which Sir Edward Hamley favoured was by no means

identical with that which has been adopted, but in regard to some portions of the subject it is probable that he fairly represented the general conception of which Sir John Ardagh is the author. Sir Edward Hamley considered that in the case of an enemy landed near Brighton and aiming at London there would be advantage in basing the British field army not upon London but upon some other point. Thus he wrote:

"Based upon Portsmouth, and posted across the Brighton Downs above the river Arun, it would oblige an invader landed near Brighton to wheel round to attack it, when, if the enemy were decisively defeated, he would not regain his landing place."

It will be seen that Hamley's army starting from the Arun to attack an enemy marching from Brighton on London is as nearly as may be, in precisely the same position as Moltke's army starting from the Elbe below Torgau to attack the Austrians marching on Berlin. Hamley's language seems to imply that he expected more than Moltke did from merely sitting still in a flank position, but this is doubtless due to the brevity of a popular exposition. In both cases the corollary is the same—the importance of some kind of protective works for the capital. Moltke preferred even to the fortification of Berlin the preparation of a line at some distance south of the city "so that it could be held for a short time even by a comparatively weak corps." That is (if I understand it rightly) precisely the idea underlying the Government scheme—which has been egregiously miscalled the fortification of London—only as London may be approached as well from the north-east as from the south there are to be two prepared lines instead of one. It seems to me that the idea is sound, and that some force capable of delaying the assailant ought to be interposed in front of

London, the more so because an invading force once landed will care little for its communications, but will attempt to carry with it its ammunition and a week's supplies, and trust, in case of success, to make a new base in London. Accordingly, an attack on its communications would not divert it from its purpose, and a successful defence requires its advance to be delayed until the field army strikes upon its flank and rear. The raiding force would be a flying column; it would resemble the tiger rather than the snake, unless the snake had emerged from a hole such as the Channel Tunnell, to which, in that case, his tail would be tied. The analogy between Moltke's scheme and that of the Government is, if this view be correct, not complete.[1] Moltke aimed at the Austrian communications. The War Office plan would aim at an attack on the flank or rear of the raiding force when it was confronted by his prepared positions and had a limited space, the county of Kent, into which to retreat if beaten.

4. It remains to enquire how far the scheme adopted by the Government corresponds with the idea which prompted Sir John Ardagh to make his plan. It struck me as very remarkable that in the debate on the Military Works Bill (February 18), five hours should have been occupied by speakers most of whom attacked the Government's proposals and yet none of whom appeared to have taken the trouble to acquaint themselves with their real nature. Sir John Ardagh thought that London required to be protected from assault, from the immediate inrush of a hostile force, and that the field army should be relieved from the necessity of always directly covering it. He proposed that, after the whole country between London and the coast had been

[1] The two schemes are absolutely independent of one another in origin, for Moltke's project, written in 1860, remained secret until many years after the adoption of the present scheme by the British Government.

carefully reconnoitred, the positions most favourable for this purpose should be determined, and that then the movements of all the troops destined to occupy them should be arranged, and the whole scheme of defence for each position thoroughly worked out. That done, he held that the volunteers told off for these positions should substitute for some of their ordinary drill a rehearsal on the ground of what they would actually do in time of war; that they should form camps near the places where they would be posted; should occupy in order of battle the line of the position; should see every outpost and every sentry posted, and should issue from the position in attack or in pursuit, until every company and every man thoroughly understood his own place and his own part in the work of defence. He proposed that these positions should be entrusted to volunteers, and that the volunteer artillery assigned to this duty should be provided with guns of position, for which purpose, twelve years ago, the old forty-pounders were fairly suited, and he contemplated the employment upon the protective lines of some 60,000 men of the volunteer force, half of whom would be furnished by the corps of London and its environs. The adoption of the scheme was announced in March, 1889, by Mr. Stanhope, after he had declared that there was absolute unanimity of opinion as to its principles among all the military advisers who had been consulted, in the following terms:

"In the remote contingency of invasion some part of the battle would have to be fought by troops insufficiently drilled, and from various causes inferior, not in courage or physical strength, but in knowledge and preparation, to the troops to which they would be opposed. It is, therefore, necessary to prepare and strengthen the position they would occupy, so as at once to protect the defenders and to make up for their necessary deficiencies. There are certain strategical positions round London commanding roads and railways which are

essential to its defence. These have been carefully examined by our most experienced officers, and places have been marked out, where, upon the occurrence of grave emergency, certain steps, arranged in every way beforehand, could at once be taken. Every preparation will be made for enabling the work to be executed without delay. And these are the positions on which, on London being threatened, the defenders of London would in a few days be concentrated and intrenched. . . . Almost all this work is to be left to be rapidly carried out when the emergency arises. There are, however, a few sites of specially urgent importance which we deem it essential to acquire at once. It is the intention to establish ordinary field works in the form of intrenched camps, which would form the backbone of the defensive line, and in which certain articles which would be required at the shortest notice could be stored, and where it will be possible hereafter to exercise some of the defenders in the actual place which they might have to defend. The cost of these precautions will be inconsiderable."

Thus, in 1889, the Government adopted Sir John Ardagh's scheme; they took the plan of distributing forty-pounders to the volunteer artillery; they declared that the volunteers should be exercised upon the selected sites. The Government lines run on the north-east from Tilbury by Warley to Epping, while on the south the known sites selected are at Guildford, Box Hill, Caterham, and Halstead, all on the range of the north Downs. To these positions volunteer artillery corps and volunteer brigades were told off, amounting in all to a force of 120,000 men and 233 guns.

It might seem, therefore, as though Mr. Stanhope had really made some provision for the protection of London against a raid. But the essential part of the scheme consisted in the opportunity which was to be given to the volunteers of making themselves familiar with their war duties and with the ground upon which they must be performed.

This, which is the gist of the whole arrangement, has been neglected. I do not know whether any volunteer battalion or artillery corps has ever seen the position which it has to defend, but it is certain that no such general or repeated rehearsal as was originally contemplated has taken place. Whatever then may be thought of the merits of the Government scheme for the protection of London it cannot at present be shielded from the reproach which affects most Government schemes for Imperial defence, that of non-execution.

Two further criticisms may be permitted. A careful perusal of Mr. Stanhope's speech suggests that he did not expect the volunteers to be in their positions in less than about nine days from the Government order to prepare. But in the case which I have contemplated of a suddenly executed raid, the invader would pass the north Downs, or the Warley-Epping line within a week of the time when the British Government became aware that hostilities were resolved upon. The contemplated delay in occupying the positions, which seems to me to be a fatal flaw, is due to a peculiar theory cherished at the War Office. The War Office assumes that there would be some kind of national or public inconvenience in mobilizing or calling out for actual military service the whole of the volunteer force, and that this inconvenience would be mitigated if for every two volunteers liable for military service only one was called out. What the inconvenience would be has never been explained, and I have never met a volunteer or a volunteer officer who understands it; but to avoid this imaginary difficulty the War Office proposes to call out half of the volunteers liable to be selected on some principle which has never yet been explained and the application of which will probably, when the time comes, throw the whole organization into confusion. Be this as it may, the War Office assumes that when a volunteer corps is required only one half of it can be

employed for any length of time. Upon this assumption is based the arrangement by which 120,000 men have been told off where only 60,000 are wanted. The assumption is absurd. The Government cannot employ any volunteer—cannot give him a categorical order—until the corps to which he belongs has been called out for actual military service. From that date every man in the corps will be in receipt of Government pay at army rates, and none of them will be at liberty to continue his share in "carrying on the daily business of the country." As a fact, moreover, the whole of the volunteers in Great Britain might be called out to-morrow without affecting in any appreciable degree the trade or industry either of the country or of any district. As a consequence of taking twice as many corps as are required for the purpose, the War Office has been obliged to count for the defence of London on volunteers from Lancashire, South Wales, and Scotland, as well as from London and the Midland counties, thereby considerably complicating the arrangements for the rapid concentration of the force and prolonging the time which must elapse before it could be ready in position. An efficient volunteer corps with proper organization ought to be ready to take the field at its headquarters on the third day, and there would be no difficulty in placing 60,000 men from London and the Midlands in their positions by the morning of the fourth day.

The one consideration which is always forgotten in parliamentary discussions of military defence is that of the requirements of war. Cabinet Ministers are always thinking of the effect of their proposals on the House of Commons, but the important matter for the nation is that the measures required to produce an effect upon an enemy should be carried out. Eight years have elapsed since, at the end of four years' argument, a plan was adopted which was to provide promptly for the protection of London in a given contingency. The total expenditure contemplated

was very small, not a quarter of the cost of an ironclad, but no practical progress has yet been made. Paper plans have been matured and money has been sunk in bricks and mortar. The training of the volunteers remains precisely what it was.

An Enquiry Concerning the Nation and the Navy[1]

WHAT is the proper standard of British naval preparation? The final answer to this question must come from the specialist, from our best admiral using the picked intelligence of the Navy to help him. Before he can set to work, however, some preliminary matters must be settled for him, presumably by the Cabinet, representing the common sense and the will of the nation. I propose to discuss some of these preliminaries, not, indeed, by way of saying anything new, but rather by way of reminding my readers of some commonplace truths, which appear to me to be very often forgotten when the Navy and the Navy Estimates are talked about.

None of us expects from the Navy anything more than defence. We wish to be protected. We want the United Kingdom to be preserved from invasion; our trade, if possible, to be uninterrupted, and our colonial possessions retained. What, then, is defence? It seems to me to be sometimes forgotten that defence consists in beating the enemy. You may resist an attack, and so long as your resistance continues you are engaged in defence; but you are not safe until your opponent is disarmed or bound over, under sufficient security, to keep the peace. You cannot, without

[1] *New Review*, March, 1895.

danger, relax your exertions before that end has been attained.

Let us examine more particularly the nature of a British defence, beginning with the obvious necessity of preventing an invasion of Great Britain. A coast line is particularly open to attack. A land frontier can be defended by an army collected at one point and ready to strike. But an army cannot defend a coast line against the descent of an army from the sea; it may attack the army when landed and may destroy it, but it cannot be counted upon to prevent the landing. For a fleet of transports can move faster at sea than an army by land; even the use of railways will not enable an army to move along a coast as fast as a fleet; wherever, therefore, there is a long stretch of coast with a number of possible landing-places, the force intending to land can anticipate the arrival of the force intending to oppose it. Moreover, the guns which ships carry are so much more powerful than any that can be quickly moved upon land that at a suitable point away from fortifications a fleet of warships can always cover a landing against resistance from the shore. The only way, therefore, by which an enemy can be prevented from landing upon a coast is by resistance at sea.

A fundamental factor in sea warfare is the nature of the battle-ship, which is a consequence of the law of displacement. Every ship when afloat weighs, with all that it carries, exactly the weight of the water which it displaces. Therefore, the builder of a ship of a given size has a given weight and no more to deal with. He may give, say, one quarter to hull, another quarter to engines, and half to cargo; or one-third to hull, one-third to engines, and one-third to cargo. A ship that has no cargo to carry can, therefore, have, say, one-half or one-third of its weight devoted to guns, ammunition, and the strengthening and protection of its hull, without being heavier or slower or less seaworthy

than a ship of the same size built for carrying cargo. Thus, in every age and in all conditions, whether of oars, sails, or steam, the ship built as an engine of war is always stronger than the merchant ship, which, as a general rule, cannot fight against it with any prospect of success. A fleet of war-ships, in short, can be faced by nothing but a fleet of war-ships; and if, in a given area of water, there is such a fleet, no other kind of ships can venture into that area except upon sufferance. The fleet of war-ships is said to "command" the area. The proper defence of a coast line against attack from the sea consists in having in the sea area from which the coast can be approached a fleet which commands that area. The would-be invader is then obliged, if he wishes to land an army on the coast, first of all to remove the defending fleet. For this purpose the most effective method is to attack it with another fleet also of war-ships, which will attempt to destroy it or drive it away, and so to obtain itself the "command" of the area in question.

In the long run one of the two fleets obtains the upper hand. For as war-ships take a long time to build, and as there are no efficient substitutes for them, a victory in which one sides destroys two or three of the enemy's ships and captures two or three more, upsets the balance. The beaten fleet must retire to a place of safety, usually to a fortified harbour, where it will be watched by the victor with a portion of his force while the remainder patrols the sea. The beaten side can send no merchant ships and no transports into the part of the sea thus in the enemy's power except at the risk of their destruction or capture. The winning side is at liberty to transport and land his army in safety, under cover of a portion of his fleet, and his merchant ships will run no risks except from stealthy attacks against which no fleet of battle-ships can give full protection, though, so long as the enemy's battle-ships are out of the question, the merchant ships can be protected partly by their own efforts and

partly by war-ships built for this special purpose rather than for battle.

The command of an area of sea thus involves the destruction or at least the *mise hors de combat* of the enemy's fighting fleet, and to attain this end is the first object of each side in any naval war. But the hostile fleet once driven from the sea, and precautions taken to prevent its reappearance, the victor has more than a local control of the sea. As against the beaten enemy the whole sea is his, to use as he pleases. The command of the sea, based upon the thorough defeat of the enemy, is as against that enemy not local but universal. It follows that an insular State requires for its efficient defence a fleet such as can in war obtain the command of the sea against its enemies, that is, can thoroughly defeat the hostile fleets, can drive them to seek shelter in their ports, and can then prevent their return to sea. If the insular navy can do this, not only is the island safe, but its trade can be protected, its colonial possessions are secure, and its armies can be landed upon any coast that belongs to the enemy in any part of the world. But if the insular navy is defeated, and defeat pushed to its natural consequence of exclusion from the sea, the island can be invaded, and its communications with the rest of the world cut off, while its transmarine possessions are all left to their own resources and exposed to the enemy's attacks.

In short, after thorough naval defeat an island must accept the terms of the victors, and become the political dependency of the State which has destroyed its fleet. This perhaps well-worn analysis is the justification of England's traditional naval policy, so well expressed in the eighteenth-century national song, which describes naval supremacy as the " charter of the land," and which admirably sums up the relation between a victorious navy and colonial ascendency. In short, England must maintain a fleet ever ready to de-

feat, and in the long run to destroy, the fleets of her adversaries.

Who, then, are the possible enemies that the British Navy may be called upon to face? The answer to this question must be sought in a review of the growth of England's maritime power. The eighteenth century nearly, but not quite, covers the period of its establishment. From 1688, when the Revolution brought England on to the side of Holland in the war against France, to the fall of the first French Empire, there was a series of wars in which France and England are always ranged on opposite sides. France at the beginning is aiming at supremacy in Europe, and is resisted by the Empire, Holland and England. The combination changes, but it always includes England on one side and France on the other; and by the end of the Seven Years' War England has established her maritime supremacy, and its concomitant of colonial ascendency. Then the combination is directed against her. In the American War she is opposed to France, Spain, and Holland, as well as to the American colonies, and her enemies have the assistance of the armed neutrality of the northern nations. After ten years of peace, the French revolutionary government revives the old design of ascendency in Europe, and renews the general war, in which England continuously takes part. First Holland and then Spain follow in the wake of France. But the French Navy, having lost its officers in the Revolution, is no match for the English, and even the genius and authority of Napoleon are unable to prevent the destruction of the allied fleets. The French, Dutch, Spanish, and Danish fleets are all annihilated, and England obtains the absolute command of the sea. Napoleon attempts to unite the whole of Europe in antagonism to the maritime domination of Great Britain; but the attempt fails, and the British naval supremacy is further strengthened by the destruction of

almost all the shipping trade of all the other countries—a destruction of which England, of course, reaps the benefit. The Revolution, in short, gave England the opportunity to raise up against that coalition of the Maritime Powers with which she was threatened a coalition of the non-maritime Powers. The result was the destruction of all navies, and of nearly all mercantile marines except her own: so that she possessed for the seventy years following the peace (1815-1885) an overwhelming supremacy at sea, both in peace and war, and was in actual occupation, though not in legal possession, of well-nigh every coast in the world not the territory of a great or civilized Power.

With what view do other nations regard this naval preponderance, so necessary to England, and therefore thought by Englishmen to be so natural? It may be worth while to go back a little, and see what was the Continental opinion on the subject at the time of the last great conflict. I begin with the period of the Revolutionary War, before the maritime war had assumed the course which afterwards made it the turning point of the whole struggle. Herder, in a volume of his *Letters for the Promotion of Humanity,* published in 1797, has a chapter headed "Mercantile Arrogance." "Trade," he says, "though due not to the noblest impulses, should unite, not separate, mankind. It should teach them, if not in the noblest form of gain, to know at least as children the community of their interests. For that purpose the ocean is there; for that purpose the winds blow and the rivers run. The moment one nation wishes, in her haughty greed, to close the sea to all the others, and to take the wind from them, that moment, if there is sufficient insight into the mutual relations of nations, the indignation of all the other nations must be aroused against the subjugator of the free element, the robber of the greatest spoils, the arrogant possessor of all the treasures and fruits of the earth."

After the true bearings of the naval contest on the Continental struggle had been revealed by the battles of the Nile and of Copenhagen, and after the British supremacy had been established in 1805, but before the defeat of Prussia in 1806, I find Bülow, the famous author of the *Spirit of Modern War,* writing a review of the campaign of Austerlitz, in which he denounces the mercantile and maritime supremacy of England, and declares that the welfare of Europe requires its abolition: "Bonaparte sooner or later must either cross the channel or fall." These words of Bülow's express Napoleon's own view. The late Professor Seeley has lucidly shown us how Napoleon, when he found himself the master of a France as great as either Richelieu or Louis XIV. had ever dreamed of, saw in England's maritime power the great obstacle to all his designs of supremacy in Europe, and how, foiled in his plans for the direct conquest of the island, he set about to conquer Europe, as a means of overcoming England. "England," said Napoleon, "ought to be a French island like Oléron or Corsica."[1] Mathieu Dumas, writing, during the Restoration, the history of the wars of the Revolution and the Empire, declares that "England, rising by degrees, has obtained such an ascendency over all the Governments of Europe, that it is no longer a preponderance that can be contested, but a veritable political domination." Jomini, the military exponent of the Napoleonic idea, and one of the clearest heads that has ever been occupied with the relations between war and policy, is never tired of repeating that "a maritime equilibrium is essential to the balance of power in Europe." A maritime equilibrium, it is needless to say, implies the end of Great Britain's naval supremacy, and therefore the reduction of England to the position which Napoleon had suggested.

To a Continental Power it is always disagreeable that her coast should be exposed to an English attack to which she

[1] *Nouvelle Revue,* Jan., 1894, p. 313.

cannot reply; and her dislike of this situation is not mitigated by the obvious consideration that naval supremacy is a vital necessity for England in a way in which it can never be vital to any Continental Power. Every Continental statesman, as soon as he looks seaward or begins to be interested in colonies, finds England in possession. Every Continental Power that has, in recent years, shown any expansive force, with the sole exception of Italy, has come into diplomatic conflict with England.

The danger to be anticipated is a coalition of Maritime Powers against Great Britain. No observer doubts that France might easily be induced to go to war with England if there were any prospect of success. That Russia would find, in the outbreak of an Anglo-French war, the best opportunity to establish her ascendency in Asia is believed by every diplomatist. But what seems to be ignored in all that is usually written or spoken on the subject is the obvious interest of Germany to associate herself in such a case with her two neighbours. Germany has no quarrel of her own with either Russia or France, and the ill-feeling cherished in both countries against Germany is purely sentimental. The French like to talk about Alsace and Lorraine, but there is to-day hardly a sane Frenchman who would propose to attack Germany for the re-conquest of the lost provinces. If France and Germany were allies for a short time Sédan would be forgotten. Germany and Russia have absolutely no solid cause of quarrel. The Russians dislike the Germans because Germans are to them the representatives of the hated Western World, or, as we should say, of the "foreigner." But so long as the German Government acquiesces in the Russification of the Germans in Russia this dislike need cause no political dispute. The late estrangement between the two Governments was due to the support given by Germany to Austria in regard to her Eastern policy; a moderate and qualified support no doubt, but exceedingly dis-

tasteful to the late Tsar. The present Tsar appears anxious to renew the traditional friendship that since 1812 has bound his family to that of the Hohenzollerns. Bismarck, from his entrance into political life, has constantly advocated for Prussia and for Germany an alliance with France and Russia. In May, 1857, he writes in an official report to his Government: "If there should be a breach between France and England a Franco-Russian alliance follows as a matter of course, and we shall have the choice between joining it on the best terms to be had, or of accepting an Austro-English counter-alliance." He then goes on to show how little help could be expected from Austria and England.

In a score of passages in his correspondence at that date he urged the same view, that the only wise course for Prussia was to be ready to enter into a Franco-Russian alliance. I shall confine myself to one further quotation. In a letter to Gerlach (11th May, 1857), Bismarck writes: "As far as foreigners are concerned I never in my life had much sympathy with any of them except the English; but they will not have our love, and if it were proved to me that it is in the interest of a healthy and well thought-out policy I would as soon see our troops firing on the English as on the French, the Russians, or the Austrians." Every one will remember to what lengths Bismarck went in 1885-7 to preserve the good relations between Germany and Russia. But most people have unfortunately forgotten that in 1884 he came to an understanding with M. Jules Ferry for a combined attack upon England in colonial matters, and how the two Powers acted in concert at the Congo Conference of 1884-5. Bismarck's action in regard to the Cameroons, Angra Pequeña, and New Guinea was so hostile and so deliberately provoking that, had it come from a small Power, such as Portugal, it would have been met by an ultimatum. Any one who will carefully read to-day Bismarck's speech of January 10, 1885, will be convinced that he then thought an

ultimatum not impossible, and was endeavouring to inflame the minds of his hearers so as to gain the necessary popularity for a war with England in case it should come. Hardly a greater service could be rendered to the British public, by way of showing what the policy of Germany was in 1884, and may be again to-morrow, than by the publication of a full translation of the remarkable trilogy of speeches which the Prince delivered that day. I was assured by several of the most experienced members of the Reichstag that in their recollection the feeling of the House that day was without parallel, except on the day of the announcement of the French declaration of war in 1870. In 1885, however, France was not ripe for co-operation with Germany. The Germans were still the enemy and the English had not yet been substituted for them. M. Ferry was expelled from office and his colonial policy execrated. To-day M. Ferry's policy in Tunis, Tonquin, Siam, and Madagascar, is that of France. Prince Bismarck no longer directs the policy of Germany, but the Emperor, who declared that, though there had been a change of pilots, the course was still the same, has been not less zealous, and has been more successful than Prince Bismarck in conciliating the goodwill both of Russia and of France.

I do not, however, assume that Germany would enter into active hostilities against England. She has no sufficient inducement. Great Britain, if at war with France and Russia, must yield compliance to any demands made by Germany, however exorbitant. Germany, therefore, might be content with a neutrality friendly to France and Russia: though the precedent of 1884-5 shows that, in order to be sure of engaging her neighbours against us, she might go to the verge of war. But mere neutrality must have far-reaching consequences. It at once renders Italy helpless as an ally for Great Britain. If Germany is prepared to look on indifferent France can compel Italy to remain neutral or even to

take part in the war on her side. For, if Germany will guarantee herself neutral, Italy is unable, with any chance of success, to resist an attack by the French army.

England for a dozen years past has pursued a policy at once of timidity and of isolation. Making friends with none of the Great Powers, she has estranged most of the small ones: Greece, for example, by the blockade of her coast and Portugal by the high-handed conduct of disputes concerning territory in South Africa. The action of France in regard to Siam, Madagascar, Newfoundland, and the Niger; of Germany in regard to most of her African acquisitions and to Samoa; and of Russia in the Pamirs, is hostile action. In every case it is *ôte-toi que je m'y mette*. The peace has in each case been preserved because British Governments have in each case yielded; but who can say, with regard to any one of these cases, that if the British Government had maintained what its members believed to be the just rights or claims, or the established interests of this country, there would not have been war? I believe, then, that the situation to-day resembles the situation of 1778, and that the danger is, not of an unexpected war with a single Power, but of the sudden appearance of a European coalition, embracing all, or all but one, of the great Maritime Powers, and aiming at the abolition of Great Britain's maritime credit. I say deliberately of her credit, because for many years past we have been living upon the tradition of the supremacy won by our grandfathers, and not upon the actual possession of the force with which supremacy might be made good.

I return now to my starting point, the standard of naval preparation. We must be able and ready to defeat and destroy the fleets of our enemies, or we shall become a dependency—it matters little whose. What, then, are the necessary preparations, supposing time is allowed us to prepare? First of all, surely, a Government of resolute men

capable of throwing off the worn-out trappings of party, and of leading a nation of men: for England at this moment is brimful of manliness eager to respond to a bold lead. Secondly, a reform at the Admiralty, by which power shall be given to those who best understand naval war, and who can exercise authority and answer for its right use. When these two essentials have been secured we may set to work to create the navy we need by putting a premium upon the most capable officers, by recruiting sailors, stokers, and gunners, and last, but not least, by building as many ships as our admirals want, as fast as money can build them. If we fail in any of these matters, or if we postpone them, many of us will live to see the passing of England.

The Command of the Sea and British Policy[1]

THE events which have happened since I accepted the invitation to address you, and announced the subject of which I proposed to treat, may, perhaps, suggest a very natural misinterpretation of the title I have chosen. It is not my object to touch directly upon any of the burning questions of the day, but rather to trace in broad outline the foundations of British power, and to show the close connection between those foundations and the majestic structure of Empire which has been built upon them.

By the phrase British policy I denote to-day, not the specific course adopted, or to be adopted, by a given Government at a particular juncture in international relations, but the historical calling of the British nation considered in connection with the means of fulfilling it. I believe that the purpose of a national existence cannot be arbitrary or accidental, but that it must flow from natural conditions, or, if you prefer the term, from natural laws. It will be my object to trace the natural conditions of the existence of the British nation, and to show how the policy of Great Britain, the purpose of British history and of British national life is the necessary and inevitable consequence of these conditions.

There is a preliminary enquiry with which we may fitly

[1] An Address delivered to the Navy League, December 19, 1895.

begin. What do we mean by a nation? We should probably define a nation as a State conscious of its unity, or as an independent community occupying a territory of its own; but however our definitions were framed, we should find the essence of it to be in the quality of independence, self-determination, or, to use the plain old English word, freedom. Independence, the quality in virtue of which a nation refuses to take orders from any source outside itself, is universally considered to be the specific attribute of national existence, the highest good, for the sake of which a nation will make every possible, every imaginable, sacrifice.

A nation, however, is not alone in the world. The very idea of one nation implies the existence of other nations, so that the political world offers the spectacle of a series of concurrent independencies. The question arises whether it is possible to mediate between two independent powers, between two free wills. We shall probably find ourselves obliged to answer that it is not possible. If that is the case the existence of nations implies the possibility of conflict; and experience shows that when the conflict turns upon vital matters, or matters considered vital by the parties concerned, the settlement can be effected only by force—each will attempts to overcome the other. The axiom, then, from which we set out, is that the existence of independent nations implies the perpetual possibility of conflict.

This truth has been so much obscured by doctrines which I believe to be shallow and half thought out, that I will digress for the moment in order the better to establish it. The assumption that war is an unnecessary evil has led to a variety of proposals aiming at its abolition. Let us consider for a moment two of the principal forms which have been given to such proposals.

The first is that recommended by the Peace Society, which suggests that arbitration would be a proper and

adequate substitute for war. Is not the mistake made of trying to apply to all cases alike a remedy suitable only for a particular class of cases? The idea of international arbitration is taken from the analogy of civil disputes between individuals, which are usually settled in this way, a lawsuit being an arbitration under the authority of the State. Arbitration has long been the usual mode of settling those international questions to which it is appropriate. But to extend it to all international quarrels, and to substitute it for war, is to falsify the analogy. Even between individuals the use of arbitration is strictly limited. In case of an attack upon person or property there is no question of arbitration. In a settled and civilized State the criminal law comes into operation, and the offender is seized and punished, the trial being simply an investigation to ascertain the facts. The State, in short, keeps an army of policemen, and employs them in perpetual warfare against criminals. Where there is no constituted authority able to protect person and property, men carry deadly weapons and defend themselves. This is exactly what nations do. Having no constituted authority over them they keep fleets and armies to defend their territories and to secure their independence, which, as the expression of their free will, corresponds pretty closely to the personal inviolability and freedom from constraint that Government secures to individuals. A subject who believes his person to be in danger from the intentions of another, can have the threatening assailant bound over to keep the peace. A nation that sees its independence threatened can do no more than arm itself and seek alliances.

The proposal to establish arbitration as the only remedy between nations resembles a proposal to abolish the criminal law and the police, and to render the robber and murderer amenable only to a civil action. The proposal for general disarmament may be compared to a suggestion

for taking away the weapons of the police. Experience shows that it is unwise to leave the policeman altogether unarmed, at any rate in a turbulent district.

The weakness of the arguments for disarmament and for universal arbitration have led to a suggestion for which, at first sight, there is more to be said, and which deserves careful examination. The well-known French publicist, M. de Molinari, has more than once advocated the formation of a league of neutral Powers under the auspices of Great Britain. Besides Great Britain it would include Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, and Denmark, and its function would be to prevent the outbreak of a war between any two European Powers, or combinations of Powers, by the declaration of an intention to attack whichever party should be the aggressor. In a letter to *The Times,* published in October, 1893, M. de Molinari suggested that the neutrals were "to declare to the Power that should take the initiative of breaking the peace their formal resolution to join their forces to those of the other side." M. de Molinari thinks that the five Powers which he enumerates would together have the force necessary to prevent a quarrel, say, between the Triple Alliance and the Dual Alliance, from engendering a war. Assuming this to be the case, we are confronted at the outset by a serious difficulty. The neutrals are to send to both sides, at the outbreak of the dispute, a hypothetical declaration of war. What is to be the condition of this ultimatum? The neutrals are to attack the aggressor. But what is the criterion by which the aggressor is to be distinguished, and who is to decide? There is hardly an unanimous opinion upon this question with regard to wars long past. Even in England there are two opinions in reference to the quarrel of 1870, and in regard to the wars of 1866, of 1859, of 1854 and, indeed, to nearly every international dispute, it is impossible to find such an accepted view of the origin

of the difference as places beyond controversy the answer to the question: Who began it?

The neutral Powers, in order to insure that they should not commit the crime of joining an aggressive combination against a purely defensive one, would be obliged to come to a conclusion about the rights and wrongs of the quarrel. How could they settle this point with sufficient certainty and rapidity to act upon it? Evidently the decision could never be made in advance, for it must depend upon the circumstances of the dispute. It would, therefore, be necessary upon the appearance of any disagreement between the Powers of Europe, for the five neutrals to come to an understanding. A conference might be held in London, under the presidency of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, at which Switzerland, Denmark, Belgium, and Holland would be represented. The labours of such a conference necessarily take time, during which the Powers in dispute would be exchanging angry notes, and, perhaps, mobilizing their armies. The neutrals would be obliged to mobilize at once in order to be able to act when the decision should have been reached. Either belligerent, if he doubted the justice of his own policy, or expected the neutrals to decide against him, would be tempted to forestall their decision, and to attack and crush whichever of the neutral States would probably be most dangerous to him.

A more speedy process is, perhaps, contemplated by M. de Molinari, when he describes the league as *sous la direction de l'Angleterre*. If the small neutral States empowered the British Government to decide their course for them and agreed to take immediate action under British guidance, the needful rapidity of operation might be secured. But the result of this plan, if it succeeded, would be to make England the formal arbiter of Europe—a situation to which it is scarcely likely that Europe would submit.

The small States themselves would never thus abandon their own initiative, and if they did, the great Powers would suspend their quarrels till they had made an end of this claim to dictate to them.

The difficulty of setting up the machinery by which the course of the neutrals is to be decided, seems to be insuperable. But let us assume that this difficulty has been overcome, and, further, that the neutral league has forces effective and adequate for its purpose. There would then be in Europe a power deciding questions of right and wrong between the European States, and enforcing its decisions. What would be the consequence, to Europe and to the world, of this state of things? The league of neutrals must evidently base its action upon the maintenance of the *status quo*. There can, therefore, be no change in Europe, for the league of neutrals will be bound to oppose the proposers of change. Every conceivable change is disagreeable to some Power, and the objecting Power will always allege rights which the change would infringe. When any proposal of change is made, the Power or Powers in favour of it will necessarily be warned by the league of neutrals to desist from their intention. Suppose the league of neutrals to have been joined by so many Powers as to be able to forbid war throughout the globe. Is it clear that the prohibition would be beneficial to mankind? No territorial change, no alteration of international law, no modification of existing treaty obligations will be possible without the consent of all parties, for the State which refuses to consent can always appeal to the irresistible force of the league of neutrals to prevent coercion. Peace will have been secured, no doubt, but at the cost of putting humanity into a strait waistcoat.

The net result in practice of M. de Molinari's scheme would probably be to lead England to throw her naval power, and, perhaps, a land force—which would, in con-

junction with those of Holland and Belgium and of Denmark, have appreciable weight—on to the side of one or other of the belligerent parties. It is always open to Great Britain, without any league of neutrals, to throw her weight into the scale, and so long as the British maritime power is believed to be overwhelming, the probability that Great Britain will take a side in a European conflict must operate as a strong deterrent against action upon the party which expects to find her in the opposite camp. The situation is distinct from that of an arbiter, which, as has been already urged, Europe will never tolerate. In so far as the British Navy is an irresistible force, the position of England, independent of local Continental disputes, and able, in all regions separated from Europe by the ocean, to assert her own policy, will always be disagreeable to some of the Continental States. What would be intolerable would be the attempt to use this position for the purpose of laying down the law to the European Powers. Its proper use is for the assertion of British rights, and for the protection of British activity so long as that activity does not disturb the legitimate activity of other nations. It is one thing for England to make the most of her advantages for the assertion of her own interests, or even to take a side in conjunction with other Powers on behalf of what her own people believe to be justice and right; it is quite another thing for her to presume to dictate the law to other nations. She ought not to expose herself to the retort: Who made thee a Prince and a Judge over us?

The truth seems to be that the cessation of war can reasonably be expected only from the amalgamation of all States into one great world-State, a process which may, perhaps, be some day accomplished, and which undoubtedly will not be effected except as the result of a series of wars, of which it is impossible to foresee the magnitude or the duration. We, however, are concerned only with a phase of

history marked by the independence of nations which we must therefore consider as perpetually engaged in the struggle for existence. The conflict between two nations implies an opposition of wills, and its issue must always be either the assertion of one will at the expense of the other, or a compromise, which is merely a postponement of the quarrel. The object of each side in every quarrel must therefore logically be to break down the will of the other side, which can be effected only by disarming it and so putting an end to its power of giving effect to its will;—either the armed forces of the one State must destroy the armed forces of the other, and then proceed to put physical constraint upon the Government of the beaten State, or the weaker State may be starved out by cutting off its communications with the rest of the world. The peculiar characteristic of an insular State is that neither method of constraint can be applied to it except by forces operating across the sea; it can be starved out by maritime blockade; it can be directly constrained by invasion carried out across the sea. Our task, then, is to apply the laws of international dynamics, or, if you prefer the phrase, the principles of strategy, to the case of Great Britain as an insular State, the near neighbour of a group of Continental States whose geographical situation compels them to be great military Powers.

The fundamental principle of navigation, and therefore the controlling elementary law of maritime strategy, is the physical law of displacement—that a floating vessel invariably weighs neither more nor less than the quantity of water which its immersed part displaces. It is a consequence of this law that the weight of a ship of given size is constant. Within certain limits, a builder may distribute the weight as he pleases. He may assign so much to hull, so much to engines of propulsion, and the remainder to cargo. For a given speed, the weight of engines for ships of the same

size will be much the same. The builder, therefore, must choose between assigning weight to hull, or giving it to cargo. A very strong hull means reduced carrying capacity, a great carrying capacity means a hull of the lightest possible construction. To these elementary conditions is due the difference between a ship of war and a merchant ship; the merchant ship must necessarily be constructed to carry the greatest weight of cargo possible, consistent with a hull strong enough for navigation, and with propulsion sufficient for the speed required in its business. The moment the hull is unnecessarily strengthened the ship will cease to be able to compete as a carrier with other ships of the same size and speed which, having lighter hulls, can carry more cargo. A ship built with a hull specially strengthened in order to withstand the various shocks of battle cannot in peaceful trade pay as a commercial enterprise; and the merchant ship, with its hull lightened down to the margin of safety, can never be exposed to the same rough treatment for which the man-of-war, with its specially strengthened framework, is prepared.

This difference between the man-of-war and the merchant ship has always existed and probably always will exist. Let us observe its consequences. The merchant ship, as a rule, must keep out of the way of the enemy's men-of-war, and fighting at sea must be carried on in the main by specially constructed ships. A very few men-of-war may make a great area of the sea unsafe for an enemy's trading vessels, and therefore a very few men-of-war patrolling an enemy's coast may, in the absence of friendly men-of-war, almost put an end to any trade by sea with that coast. The fact that the man-of-war is a special ship, and that the nature of its construction excludes it from profitable employment in trade, makes men-of-war comparatively few, so that, at any rate in modern times, no nation possesses men-of-war enough to serve as transports

for a large body of troops. An army to be carried across the sea must be conveyed in ships of the cargo type, not in ships of the fighting type, and a fleet of such vessels is comparatively helpless against the attacks of a squadron of men-of-war. An army caught at sea in undefended transports by an enemy's fighting fleet would be liable to total destruction—a calamity which can rarely befall an army on land. Thus the risks attendant on the attempt to invade a country from beyond the sea are very great, and the operation is safe only if the nation whose territory is to be invaded has no fighting fleets, or if its fighting fleets are so fully occupied by those of the invader as to make it impracticable for them to move to the attack of his transports. If the would-be invader proceeded logically he would, before embarking his army on transports, make an end, either by destruction or capture, or detention in some well-watched port, of the fighting fleets of the defender. The defender, on the other hand, would be perfectly secure against invasion if he could destroy, capture, or detain the fighting fleets of the invader, and still retain at his disposal a few men-of-war available to attack any fleet of transports. This situation, the situation of a Power which has dealt, either by destruction, capture, or detention in port, with the enemy's fighting fleets, and which still has men-of-war available, is described by the technical phrase, "The Command of the Sea." It is evident that in any war the Power which has acquired the command of the sea can freely transport its troops at pleasure, and is comparatively safe against any attempt at invasion. It will be further evident that where there is no command of the sea, because both Powers have fighting fleets as yet undefeated, the attempt at invasion undertaken by either side will be attended with very great risks, risks so great as to render the attempt exceedingly improbable; but it will also be manifest that such a condition of equilibrium in maritime

warfare must be, from its very nature, temporary and precarious. In warfare seriously carried on, where either side is at all in earnest, the attempt to upset the equilibrium by battle is sure to be repeated until the balance inclines one way or the other, and the balance once turned the advantage will be pressed to the utmost.

A serious naval battle rarely ends without the destruction of some ships and the capture of others. The total number of ships is never so large that one or two losses by capture, which count double in the balance, will not completely turn the scale for a subsequent engagement. Suppose that twenty ships are engaged on each side; if three on each side are sunk, the balance remains; but if in addition one side captures two of the enemy's men-of-war the numbers in a subsequent engagement would be nineteen to fifteen, a ratio very far from equality. It is of the utmost importance that we should impress upon our minds this temporary and precarious nature of any equilibrium in maritime war. The production of naval forces, that is, of skilled officers, trained men, ships, and guns is so slow a process, and their destruction so rapid, that between forces equal in every respect at the outbreak of war, a merely accidental advantage gained by one side or the other would be difficult for the other side to make good, and any decided advantage must rapidly lead to the discomfiture of the unfortunate party. For this reason a State to which either maritime blockade or an invasion by sea would be fatal can be secure only if it possesses in time of peace that considerable preponderance of naval force as against possible enemies which I would call the potential command of the sea; in case of actual conflict, a State so situated must either obtain the actual command of the sea, or be exposed to the danger of entire overthrow either by blockade or by invasion.

Here, then, is the first law of which we are in search, to

which I would give the name the *law of insularity*. An island State can, in the long run, preserve its independence only by means of the command of the sea. This law of insularity is the foundation of the whole national existence of Great Britain, the fundamental secret of her place in the world. There is, of course, no need to pause to remind you that this view of the importance of the command of the sea is by no means new. It was familiar to Drake, to Raleigh, and to Bacon, and received popular expression a century and a half ago in the refrain of the national song which describes the rule of the waves as the charter of the land. Those who, in our own day, have tried to urge this doctrine upon their countrymen—among whom, perhaps, the first place should be given to Sir John Colomb—are but attempting to revive a too long forgotten truth, a too long neglected national duty.

The law of insularity, however, presents only one side of naval predominance—what may be called the British side, or, if we are to borrow an illustration from recent events in the Far East, the Japanese side. It is well to consider the other aspect, and to look for a moment at the continental side, or, in the Eastern analogy, at the Chinese side. The insular State, having an adequate naval force, has its coasts and its sea-borne trade secure. The continental State, or group of States, has all its coast exposed to a landing from the island, and its sea-borne trade exists upon sufferance. No argument is needed to show that a continental State would never endure this condition of things, if there were any means of avoiding it. That China should allow Japan the power of landing armies on her coasts, or blockading her ports and stopping her trade, is conclusive evidence of the impotence and decay of the Chinese Government: but that, in the face of so many great military Powers Great Britain should for three centuries have preserved her independence, and should for two cen-

turies have enjoyed the almost uninterrupted command of the sea, is due to a different cause—to the divisions of Europe. The Continent being occupied, not by one nation, but by many, the principle of national independence has prevented their ever acting all together. In every epoch the Continental Powers have been ranged upon two sides, and, in the long run, Great Britain has always found herself helping and enjoying the help of one of the two parties among the European States. Now and then for a brief space she has resisted a combination of two or three Powers, but never has she had to face alone a determined effort made by a general combination. We are thus led to formulate a second principle or law, which may be called that of the *balance of power,* in virtue of which Great Britain has been enabled to maintain her maritime predominance. The balance of power has its material or dynamical aspect, and its moral aspect. From the dynamical point of view the possibility of the insular State taking, as she has so often done, a decisive part in the divisions of the Continent, arises from the twofold use that can be made of a decided superiority of naval force, which, as we have seen, renders possible either the blockade of an enemy's ports or the landing of an army at almost any point on his coast. These forms of constraint are familiar to us from the history of British warfare. But more important than the strategical or dynamical is the moral point of view, from which we perceive that Great Britain has had adherents or helpers on the Continent only by virtue of the cause she has espoused, and is by her situation compelled to espouse—the cause of national independence. Elizabeth, William III., and Pitt were fighting unwillingly, reluctantly, from sheer necessity, in order to maintain the national existence or independence. They found allies because the dangers which threatened them also threatened other nations who, equally reluctantly, were obliged to take

up arms in a cause identical with theirs. In each of the great epochs of modern European history Great Britain has been engaged in resistance to some ascendency, dangerous alike to her independence and to that of other States, which necessarily and for their own sakes have been her allies. The cause she has represented has been on the whole that of humanity, of progress, and of justice, and so long as that shall continue to be the case we may believe that she will never be utterly alone.

I need dwell no longer on the balance of power, because, since my own view on that subject was first published nearly two years ago, it has been confirmed by the remarkable volumes on the growth of British Policy which the late Sir John Seeley—whose memory will be more esteemed with every year that passes over his grave—has left as his legacy to his countrymen. I therefore pass on to another consequence of the command of the sea, that it brings all the coasts of the world peculiarly under the influence of the nation that possesses it. A maritime nation having almost a monopoly of power on the ocean, and devoted by the conditions of its existence to trade, is imperceptibly led to form settlements, and to found colonies upon uncivilized coasts, and to establish government in those coast regions where there is scope for trade, but where the government which alone could render trade secure does not exist. It is, I hope, unnecessary to elaborate this *law of Empire,* and I shall be content to remind you that in this case, too, the condition is not only material, but moral. The world does not tolerate long any great power or influence that is not exercised for the general good. The British Navy, so long as it is undefeated, places every coast even of the most distant continent at the mercy of the British Government. That is the dynamical foundation of the Empire, and if that tremendous power should be misused, and should become the instrument of great injustice or oppression, we

may be sure that the other nations would take means to restrain it, and that by some combination the British Navy would be destroyed, the British Empire sundered into fragments, and the power of the sea entrusted to other hands. I would formulate, then, as the last of the series, the *law of service,* asserting that the British Empire can subsist only so long as it is a useful agent for the general benefit of humanity. That hitherto this law has been obeyed we may fairly believe. Great Britain for nearly a century has had an almost undisputed monopoly of the ocean. She has used it to introduce law and civilization to every part of the globe which is accessible from the sea. She has destroyed piracy and the slave trade, and has opened to the untaxed commerce of all nations every port which is under her control.

In conclusion we may briefly recapitulate the laws which have been formulated. We have seen that by the insularity of her position Great Britain has been compelled, in defence of her independence, to acquire the command of the sea; that the condition of permanent success in this effort has been that she should assist the other nations in the preservation of their independence; so that the island State, in self-defence, has been obliged to preserve the balance of power in Europe, and thus the British Navy and the British Army have been employed to serve the general human cause of freedom. The position of isolation in Europe, of the absence of any permanent abiding connection with any special cause or party among the Continental Powers, the habit of breaking away from traditional connections so soon as the allies who have been helped are able to stand alone, of resisting the Powers with which she has been most closely associated, as soon as their power has become so great as to endanger the independence of others—these are the characteristic marks of British Policy. They indicate the attitude of a Power whose mission is to serve as a

make-weight between two nearly equal scales, and it is because the greatest service rendered by Great Britain to the world has been to maintain that balance between the European States which is equivalent to their independence as against one another, that she has earned the title which Continental critics are so fond of applying to her of *Perfide Albion*. The impartial outsider is apt to come in for a fair share of abuse from both the parties. This position of isolation, rendering possible the sustenance of the weaker side in any European struggle against an ascendency, this permanent readiness to choose her course so as to preserve the balance of power, is the condition upon which Great Britain has been able to assert and maintain the command of the sea, which carries with it as its necessary corollary the possession of a world-wide maritime Empire—an Empire which we are, perhaps, too prone to regard as the proud monument of the exertions of our ancestors and of our countrymen, but which, perhaps, ought to inspire us with the profoundest feelings of modesty and of responsibility; for the power in virtue of which it is maintained can be preserved only so long as it is justly and faithfully employed in the service of humanity. The position thus defined of security at home, of influence in Europe, and of power amounting to primacy upon the ocean and upon all sea-coast regions not in the possession of civilized States, is at all points the inevitable consequence of insular independence. We are thus led to the conclusion, from which there appears to be no escape, that the geographical position of Great Britain is such that she is compelled either to be the first of nations and to lead mankind, or to lose, not merely her Empire, but her very independence.

I have now completed the course which I laid out—with how much imperfection none can be so well aware as myself. Before we part, permit me to make one appeal. The career of Great Britain is not over. It is probable

enough that new trials are in store for her. The sphere of her action, and the conflict of forces in which her lot is cast, is in our day greater and grander than ever before. If, during the next century, this nation is to fulfil her high calling she will require in larger measure than in days gone by the devotion and duty of her sons and daughters. Let us then try to be worthy of that calling, and to live, as far as in us lies, not for our personal ends, not for pleasure, not for party, but for duty, and for the nation in which we live, and move, and have our being.

V

The South African War

Military Aspect of the Crisis[1]

NO Government that knows its business and does its duty goes into a war without first having obtained clear and convincing answers to the questions: What is the purpose of the war? How must the war be carried on in order to effect that purpose? and, Is everything ready for carrying on the war in the manner requisite to make it fulfil its purpose? As a competent Government does not draw back from a position once taken up, seeing that to draw back implies a violation of the rule "Look before you leap," the three preliminary questions have to be answered before the first step is taken in negotiations which, if their result is not favourable, may lead to war. A competent Government, therefore, always has the questions worked out and answered before it embarks on a policy. In the case of South Africa, the time for answering these questions was in the winter of 1898-99, when Sir Alfred Milner was in England for conference with Mr. Chamberlain, the latest reasonable date being that of the Uitlanders' Petition in March, 1899. The Government had then to decide whether it would or would not take up the case of the Uitlanders. To take up that case meant to make some sort of proposal to the Transvaal Government, and in case the proposal should be rejected to undertake further action. To espouse the Uitlanders' cause might possibly involve a war. The Government,

[1] *Morning Post,* October 10 and 11, 1899.

therefore, before deciding, must have fully considered the consequences of two courses—of neglecting the Uitlanders, and of helping them. At that time, then, the Cabinet would ask its military adviser to lay before it a memoir or memorandum setting forth, by way of answer to the fundamental questions, the general nature of a war, such as was then foreseen to be possible, with the South African Republic. Such memoranda or memoirs have always been prepared by first-rate commanders for their own use and that of their Government. Those written by Napoleon, which formed the basis of his famous invasion of Italy in 1796, bear dates in 1794 and 1795. The most interesting are those in which Moltke worked out his views of the campaigns in which he was so successful. His first campaign was that of 1864, against Denmark, of which the conditions are fully set forth in a letter to the Prussian Minister of War, written in December, 1862. The series of memoirs preparatory to the war with Austria (1866) begins in 1860, and the first of Moltke's memoirs on a war with France was written in 1857 and revised from time to time until the war actually broke out in 1870. Perhaps the best introduction to the present situation will be to note the principal points which any one accustomed to think out military problems would in December last have thought essential. This has been attempted in the following paragraphs, which must be read with the date March, 1899.

The object which the Government has in view in its South African policy is the permanent establishment from the Zambesi to the Cape of civil and political equality between the inhabitants of European blood irrespective of race and creed. The Boers of the Transvaal have not made use of the self-government granted them in 1881 to promote this end, but have created an exclusively Boer State. The unforeseen immigration of a population outnumbering the burghers, and largely of British nationality, has created a difficulty

not contemplated either in 1881 or 1884; the restlessness of these Uitlanders has aroused the animosity of the Boers, and the division into parties roughly corresponding to the two races has spread itself through the South African States and Colonies. The object of the Government is to end these divisions by the establishment in South Africa of a Commonwealth co-extensive with the country, and guaranteeing equal rights to both the white races. The Government has no desire to interfere with the Boer States, provided they will accept this ideal, as the Orange Free State has hitherto done. But the condition of its being realized is the acknowledged leadership of Great Britain, which has created in the British Colonies the equality desired. That leadership, as regards the Transvaal, is implied in the clause of the Convention of 1884, which gives Great Britain a veto on treaties negotiated by the South African Republic. The Government proposes to appeal to the Government of the South African Republic to make a voluntary offer of its burgher-ship on liberal and reasonable terms to those Uitlanders who are genuine settlers in the Transvaal. If that proposal proves unacceptable to the Republic the equality aimed at cannot be attained by friendly means. The South African Republic has put forward a claim to sovereignty which is inconsistent with the Convention of 1884, and, if successfully asserted, would frustrate the great aim of the policy of the British Government. It is, therefore, possible that the Government may at any time find itself compelled either to abandon its aim of establishing the equality of the two races, as well as the position of predominance acquired by Great Britain in South Africa, or to coerce the Government of the South African Republic by force of arms.

The first point to be noticed in connection with the use of force in furtherance of the policy of Her Majesty's Government is, that an appeal to arms cannot but modify the form of that policy, at least in outward appearance. A war

very commonly arises out of a territorial dispute; in that case the Power which is able to occupy the disputed area and to strike against the military forces of its antagonist blows so crushing as to leave no prospect of a change of fortune from a continuance of the struggle, may expect a peace in which its possession and title in the disputed area are recognised. But in the present case the issue is of a different kind. The Boers are convinced that their independence is inseparable from that monopoly of political rights in the Transvaal of which the British Government finds itself compelled to require the abolition. In other words the essence of the Boer State, in the view of its burghers, is precisely what the British Government wishes should be abolished. From this it must be inferred, first, that the Boer Government will exert itself to the utmost limit of its resources in what its burghers will regard as self-defence; and, secondly, that it cannot, so long as it exists, give guarantees for the acceptance of a system—that of equality between burghers and Uitlanders—which, in the eyes of the burghers, would be destructive of their State. The object which the British Government has in view can, therefore, in case of hostilities, be secured only by the overthrow and abolition of the South African Republic, and by the substitution for it of a Government based on the principle of equality between the races. The military objective of a campaign must, therefore, be the complete disarming of the burghers of the Transvaal and the effective occupation of the whole country. From the military point of view this must be taken as the purpose of the war.

It is always necessary to guard against the extension of a conflict by the intervention of States not originally parties to it. At present the relations between Great Britain and the other Great Powers appear to be satisfactory, but it would be in the highest degree imprudent to assume, after recent experience, that this condition will continue without

interruption during the course of a South African campaign. One security alone can be taken to guard against the possible change of attitude on the part of one or more of the other Powers. It consists in the mobilization of the entire navy. If the Government, on the day when hostilities in South Africa become inevitable, put all the ships of the navy in commission, and bring up the various squadrons in European waters to full strength and absolute readiness for action, the probability of foreign interference will be greatly lessened. On the assumption that this measure will be approved, the military problem already defined, the disarmament of the South African Republic, and the military occupation of the Transvaal, may be more closely examined.

The army of the South African Republic is identical with the burghers of the State. According to the *Staats Almanack* these number 29,447. Deductions must be made for sick and infirm, and for men employed in the necessary branches of the public service; and additions must be made for the Uitlanders of other than British nationality, some of whom will be ready to enlist on the Boer side, and to earn burghership by that means. The Transvaal has for some time been in close alliance with the Orange Free State, and there is every reason to believe that in any dispute with Great Britain the two States will stand or fall together. The alliance never had any possible meaning except against Great Britain. By the terms of the treaty, in case the dispute primarily affects the Transvaal, the whole forces of both States are to be under the Transvaal Commandant-General, who must consult with the Free State Commandant-General, and neither State may make peace without the other.

The Free State army, like that of the Transvaal, consists of the burghers, of whom in 1897 there were 20,000. Something like this number may be expected to be armed, though, as in the case of the Transvaal, there will be deductions to

be made. The existence of the Afrikander Bond and of strong Boer sympathies among the Dutch population of the Cape Colony, make it prudent to consider also the possibility of a rising among the Cape Dutch, with the object of joint action with the Boer States for the establishment of a South African Commonwealth independent of British authority.

The hypothesis which is taken as the basis of the following remarks is that the Transvaal and the Orange Free State will act together as allies, and that they will receive such assistance from the Cape Dutch as it may be in the power of the Cape Dutch to give them. If the Free State should remain neutral so much the better, but the best inducement that can be offered to the Orange Free State to remain neutral will be so to arrange that its adhesion to the cause of the Transvaal will not find the British Government unprepared. The best guarantee for the quietness of the Cape Dutch will be a strong garrison in the Cape Colony.

The Transvaal and the Orange Free State together form an egg-shaped area of about seven hundred and fifty miles long, from the Orange River on the south to the Limpopo on the north, and about three hundred and fifty miles across in the widest part, from Mafeking on the west to the border of Zululand near Vryheid on the east. On all sides, except from Zululand to the northern apex of the Transvaal, this territory is conterminous with the territory of the British colonies. The garrison of the British colonies consists of four battalions at the Cape and of three battalions, three field batteries, and two cavalry regiments in Natal; there are also volunteer forces numbering at the Cape about six thousand seven hundred, and in Natal about one thousand five hundred. A sudden outbreak of hostilities would leave open the initiative to the Boers, and the problem would in the first instance be to defend the British colonies. The distance of South Africa from the bases of British military power in Great Britain and India—it may be reckoned that

in the case of Great Britain at least a month, and in that of India at least three weeks, must elapse between the Government's order for troops to move and the arrival of the troops —gives an opportunity which a bold commander at Pretoria might turn to advantage. For the purpose of a sudden offensive, however, the Free State could scarcely be counted on, as its political attitude involves waiting until the actual outbreak of hostilities between the Transvaal and Great Britain. The Transvaal commander might, however, move forward towards Newcastle and Ladysmith, and so gain a strong advanced position, while at the same time destroying the lines of railway which would, if protected, form the most convenient routes for the communications of a British force taking the offensive. At the same time small Boer forces would probably attempt to destroy the railway from Kimberley towards Salisbury, which runs for hundreds of miles close to the Transvaal border. The protection of this railway is hardly practicable, and the defence by small forces of Newcastle and of the railway tunnel at Laing's Nek would require the construction of works, the mounting of guns, and the creation of depôts of provisions and ammunition.

When once the hope of a peaceful settlement has to be abandoned, the most effective defence of the British borders would consist in a prompt advance into the enemy's territories. When there is a British army marching on Pretoria the Boers will not waste much of their force on blows directed to doing material damage in regions where there are no British forces.

It must be borne in mind that throughout South Africa the black population far outnumbers the white, and that Great Britain, as the Power claiming to be responsible for the future of the country, cannot allow the blacks to take part in a conflict between the white races. The Basutos on the borders of the Orange Free State, and the Swazis in the

East of the Transvaal, might easily be induced to take the British side. But Great Britain cannot accept such help, and ought not to count on it. If, as is possible, the Free State is compelled by its apprehensions of attack from the Basutos to keep a portion of its forces on the Basuto border, the Free State force available against the British would, of course, be *pro tanto* diminished, but it can hardly be right to assume in the calculations a diminution from that cause.

The military tasks which will be imposed on the Government by the pursuit of its policy aiming at the establishment in South Africa of equal civil and political rights for men of both the white races can now be clearly defined. They are:

(1) To increase the garrison of the Cape Colony to such an extent as to secure in all eventualities the internal peace of that Colony.

(2) To secure by precautions taken in time both Natal and the Cape Colony against a Boer invasion.

(3) In case negotiations reveal a determination on the part of the South African Republic to thwart Her Majesty's Government in the pursuit of their great aim, to strike down the combined military forces of the two Boer States and to occupy both States until their political reorganization has been effected.

Such would be the general considerations laid before the Cabinet in March, 1899.

The remainder of the military adviser's memoir no private person can reproduce. The Government's military adviser has the assistance of a great organized Department, that of the Director of Military Intelligence, whose duty it is to procure, to sift, and concisely to record the most accurate information regarding the forces of States with which war is possible, and regarding all the conditions of warfare against those States. To such a store of information no private person has access. Moreover, an analysis of possible military operations is useful to friend and foe alike, so that

the sounder the judgment on which it rests the greater the harm to one's own country that may come of its publication. If, therefore, the attempt be made to complete the assumed memoir of March, 1899, it can be only on the understanding that large gaps are left in the strategical part, and that only strategical ideas which are elementary and obvious are set forth.

There are three military tasks to be considered:

1. The strengthening of the British force at the Cape to prevent an Afrikander rising.

2. Measures to secure Natal and Cape Colony against sudden attack from the Boer States.

3. Arrangements in case of need for disarming and occupying the Boer States.

It will be best to begin with 3, as the arrangements for 1 and 2 must work in with those for 3, and it is always wise in examining the conditions of a war to keep the end in view from the beginning.

The first point is the character and quality of the Boer levies, which are much the same in both States, so that those of the Transvaal may be taken as the type. The Transvaal burghers eighteen years ago had a large proportion of expert marksmen, trained by constant practice against running game. The game has disappeared since that time, but the tradition of fine shooting remains, and is encouraged by the Transvaal Government, which votes £3,000 a year for prizes at rifle meetings. The Boers may therefore be assumed to be still expert in the use of the rifle. The first condition of superiority in a war with them, is, therefore, good practice with the rifle, and the first measure which prudence recommends is at once to increase, with as little publicity as possible, the target and other rifle practices of the British infantry at all the home stations. As far as possible every man should have the opportunity of daily practice, and nothing should be left undone to establish the confidence of the in-

fantry soldier in the bullet as his most trustworthy weapon for attack and defence. For reasons to be discussed below, it is desirable that the men of the Army Reserve should have a share in this practice.

The Boers on taking the field are all mounted. Their recently organized artillery, which is a permanent paid force, of which the men serve three years so as to admit of passing many through the training, has siege, mountain, and horse batteries, but no field batteries. In other words, the gunners, like the infantry, are all mounted. The mobility of an army of mounted riflemen makes it difficult for an army of infantry to bring on a pitched battle. The most effective instrument with which to fight the Boers would be a force of men their equals or superiors in skill with the bullet, and, like them, mounted and accompanied by horse artillery. In order to give as much strength as possible to the force of mounted marksmen on the British side, of which the nucleus can be formed of the mounted infantry of the army and of the mounted volunteers kept up in various parts of the Empire, it is desirable to give a course of riding lessons to as large a number as possible of selected marksmen already trained.

The British infantry soldier of to-day is probably as expert with the rifle as the soldier of any other army; additional practice now given must have the effect of justifying and increasing the feeling of confidence with which our battalions may be expected to meet the Boers.

The maximum force of the Boer States, the levy *en masse*, may amount to 50,000 men. That number represents the minimum which should be supplied to the British commander entrusted with operations against them. There will, of course, be large deductions from the Boer total, as they must garrison Pretoria, Johannesburg, and Bloemfontein, must watch the large native population of both States, must be ready to repel a movement of the Basutos, and must

at least patrol the long border which separates their own from the British territory. But the British commander will have to guard as he advances a lengthening line of communications. Once he crosses the border he cannot rely on the use of a railway, and before he reaches the heart of the enemy's country his forces will be at least 400 miles distant from the nearest point of that ocean which for centuries has always been the base of British military operations. If it were possible for the Boers to collect 35,000 men for a battle near Pretoria it would be hardly possible for a British general who had started with 50,000 men from the sea to bring more than 35,000 men to oppose them at the end of his advance. But the object of the British Government is not a battle on equal terms; it is such a decisive victory as will destroy the Boer power and compel surrender. For that purpose not numerical equality, but very decided superiority on the battlefield is required. On the assumption that the Boer States can arm 50,000 men, the British commander should dispose of 70,000 or 75,000. [These numbers are not to be taken as exact. I believe the Boer levy *en masse* to be 50,000; but I have no means of estimating the deductions that may with certainty be made. If, as some think, the Boers can concentrate at one spot no more than 25,000, then the British force would be calculated to admit of reaching the battlefield with a fair margin of excess over that number.]

Working backwards, then, to the two other military tasks, the defence of Natal and the maintenance of British authority in the colonies, it is evident that the force required, before a British advance, to defend Natal may be incorporated with the British Army of operations, but that the force required to keep order in the Cape Colony cannot be withdrawn for the invasion of the Boer States. The Natal force may be regarded as the advance guard of the British active Army; the garrison of the Cape Colony forms no part

of it, but is an additional force. The first measure required is the increase of the garrisons of the Cape and Natal (for which purpose infantry battalions might suffice) from their present strength to one that will be adequate for the emergencies either of a rising or of a Boer attack. Six battalions more at the Cape and seventeen more in Natal would bring up the local forces to a strength which would leave no ground for uneasiness. These battalions should be sent one after another, with as little parade, publicity, or excitement as possible.

There were in the autumn of 1898 sixty-seven battalions in the United Kingdom, several infantry regiments having at that time both battalions abroad. The home battalions are normally composed for the most part of young soldiers in the early years of their training, very many of whom are not yet twenty years old, and are not fit for the fatigues of a campaign. The system is based on two assumptions: the first that when both battalions of a regiment are abroad the place of the home battalion will be filled up at home by the embodiment of a militia battalion; the second, that no home battalion is to take the field until the young soldiers in its ranks have been replaced by trained and seasoned men from the Reserve. A single battalion could, of course, be sent by the exchange of its young soldiers for older men drawn from several other battalions. But to fill up several battalions in this way would deplete a large number of others of their best men, and thus endanger the efficiency of the whole of the home forces. In March, therefore, the Cabinet had to face the difficulty that no large reinforcements could be sent from home to the Cape and Natal without first calling out the Reserve. The alternative was to draw on the British Army in India, a measure which ought never to be adopted without very grave and urgent reasons, for the British Army in India is by no means too strong in proportion to the large and now highly trained Native Army.

The memoir of March would, of course, contain detailed plans for the gradual reinforcement of the South African garrisons, and for the formation of a field force for the eventual advance against the Boer States, as well as an analysis of the probable plan of campaign. It would emphasize the great advantage to be obtained by calling out the Reserve at so early a period as to make it possible for the Reserve men to take their share in the extra musketry training and in the riding practice already discussed. The strategical part of the report would be occupied with bases and lines of operations, of which on British territory there are:

(1) The base at Durban, with the general line Durban-Ladysmith-Pretoria.

(2) Bases at East London, Bathurst, and Port Elizabeth, with line of operations following the railways towards Bloemfontein.

(3) Base at Capetown, with line of operations Capetown, De Aar, Mafeking. This line is, perhaps, most important as an auxiliary to (2), with which it is connected by the railway from De Aar to Middleburg and Colesberg.

A single line of operations is better than a double one unless there is such a numerical superiority as makes it practicable to move on each of two lines with a force certain to be by itself a match for any forces that the enemy can unite against it. Short of that any division of forces gives the enemy an opportunity, especially when his army has the great mobility of the Boer levies in their own country.

The memoir of March would discuss the problems of transport and supply, and would be supplemented by a sketch furnished by the Admiralty of the means of conveying the various detachments to the South African coast.

Moral Factors in the War[1]

"Achille était fils d'une déesse et d'un mortel: c'est l'image du génie de la guerre; la partie divine, c'est tout ce qui dérive des considérations morales du caractère, du talent, de l'intérêt de votre adversaire, de l'opinion, de l'esprit du soldat qui est fort et vainqueur, faible et battu selon qu'il croit l'être; la partie terrestre, c'est les armes, les retranchements, les positions, les ordres de bataille, tout ce qui tient à la combinaison des choses matérielles."—NAPOLEON.

IN the ordinary course of his work the military critic has first to ascertain and set forth what has happened, then to trace through the events the connection between cause and effect, and finally to form a judgment about the wisdom or unwisdom with which the persons directing the doings of each side—Governments, commanders, and generals—have used the means at their disposal for the attainment of their objects. This final process is in practice a sort of measurement of the acts of ministers and generals by a standard framed, with the help of theoretical treatises, upon the doings of the Fredericks, the Napoleons, and the Moltkes. It is impossible as yet to perform any of these processes for the war now going on. The reader will know more when these pages reach him about the events of the first week of the war than the wisest strategist in Europe can possibly know to-day—I am writing on the 26th of October. Yet in what is now known there is abundant material illustrating the true nature of war, and I may therefore try to throw some light upon what I believe to be the aspect of this and of every

[1] *National Review*, December, 1899.

war which is most important, both for the man in the street and for the woman waiting for him at home.

War is, from first to last, an affair of the soul; the predominant partner in the business is the mind or spirit. The full meaning of what is called the moral factor is often obscured because we are prone to take a narrow view of the mind or the spirit. Every one has his own individual body and is therefore apt to suppose that in the same way he has his own individual mind. But has he? All that you know of your mind is the thoughts that you think and the fact that you think them. Examine your thoughts, your whole stock of ideas, and see where they come from. You will find that, for the most part, you caught them, like so many colds, from the people about you. Thoughts are the common property of a number of people living together, the connecting link between the members of a community. A fully developed mind is found only among the members of a civilized State, who, in living together for generations, have gradually developed a whole series of ideas, which they could never have had in separation: ideas such as law, government, public affairs, and national defence. A child born into an English family learns as he grows the English words, in using which he begins to think the thoughts of his nation. As he grows up he imbibes the ideas of his class, of his trade or profession, of his political party, and of his church or sect. Tell me a man's birthplace, his family, his school, his occupation, sect and party, and I will tell you with pretty fair accuracy his stock of thoughts. What I cannot tell you is how he binds his thoughts into a sheaf; that is his individual function, himself in the sphere of mind. But not merely is his mind made up of contagious elements. His character, too, receives its ingredients from the social medium; he wills or acts according to the tone, form, or spirit of his community. As a schoolboy he acquires the trick of not sneaking; and all his life long he is catching habits of conduct or bits of will

from the people with whom he lives. Thus thoughts and wills, or mind and spirit, have in them a collective and an individual element, and the collective part is by far the larger. In national affairs the collective element alone is visible. Especially is this the case when there is a quarrel between two national States.

If we want to form a true estimate of an international conflict we must therefore find out the nature of the sets of ideas and of the wills that are in collision.

The Boer living on his farm has his spiritual backbone made up of the elementary ideas of a half-developed community—the congregation, the clan, and the country. But he has hardly a matured conception either of justice or of freedom, and his love of country is based upon a very short history. His patriotism is negative rather than positive; it is a bias against the foreigner rather than a conception of the State as something to live and die for. So little has the thought of the State or community penetrated the average Boer that he has never quite grasped the duty of paying the taxes. The idea of military duty has not grown beyond the first stage; it has produced a readiness to fight and to die, but no systematic view such as gives cohesion to an army. On October 21 Commandant Joubert telegraphed to Pretoria: "Commandant Lucas Meyer has had an engagement with the British at Dundee. Meyer made a plan of campaign by messenger with Commandant Erasmus, who, however, did not put in an appearance." Evidently the notion of cohesion, of subordination, of discipline, has not yet come to form an essential part of the Boer's moral skeleton. The tie which binds one Boer to another is comparatively weak.

The British are in a different condition. In their mental world the idea of Great Britain fills an immense place. Their lives are to a great extent made up of co-operation in all the various forms which I have enumerated as the sources of our stock of thoughts. The consciousness that one thought

is at this moment being thought in Great Britain, in Australia, Canada, and India lifts up every man who shares it; and this kind of consciousness has been developed from generation to generation, each successive period of war having strengthened it till it found its perfect expression in Nelson's signal at Trafalgar. This aspect of the national idea has its embodiment in the naval and military services. The British officer lives his professional life in the atmosphere of a "service" and in the idea of service. When war begins he is absorbed in service; it commands him, and he has caught from his military community the habit of taking death cheerfully when it comes in the course of the day's duty. This belonging to a world of developed ideas, to a civilized nation, is a power of itself, to which the membership of a half-organized community with no store of recorded deeds furnishes scarcely an adequate counterpart. The idea of the Boer State is no match for the idea of the British Empire. The discipline of a continuous national life, and of freedom in obedience to law, gives a force of character to every member of the community, and forms the basis of a military discipline which, working upon that basis, has made the British soldier in every age the best in the world. Read Jomini or Hamley as much as you please and you will find that the art of war consists in having two to one on the ground when it comes to the pinch. But the history of the British army is largely made up of having only one against two for the pinch, and then of ignoring the strategical failure, usually due to the carelessness of the Government, and winning the battle. This element that upsets the strategical calculus is what military writers call the moral factor, and it is the outcome of the general condition of the nation.

Consider the position of Sir Penn Symons on Friday morning, the 20th October. He had with him between four and five thousand men. The nearest British force was at

Ladysmith, separated from him by forty miles and by a Boer force at Elands-Laagte. Two Boer columns were approaching him, one of which was about equal in numbers to his own force, and the other twice as strong. As morning dawned one of these bodies of Boers was seen on heights from which his camp was commanded, and the shells began to fall. The other larger body was soon after reported to be only seven miles away and approaching the field. The British general has no hesitations. He attacks the body nearest to him with the bulk of his force, sending a small party to delay the approaching column, and the result is a victory, where, by the strategical conditions, it should have been annihilation. Commandant Erasmus did not put in an appearance. The difference between the Boer and the British way of doing things on that first Friday of the war augurs well for the weeks that remain before the Army Corps can arrive on the scene. Sir Penn Symons falls in the moment of victory. His practice of the idea that his nation has bred into him flashes that idea with new life and vigour into millions of hearts.

So much for the general morals of the war, the factors of character as affected by the degree of organization or embodied thought in the two conflicting States. But the matter does not end there. Napoleon's words which I have quoted at the head of this paper were dictated at St. Helena by a commander who had ended in failure, and whose cause was lost. He could not, without condemning the career for which he was apologizing, have lifted up his view of the moral element in war and have said:

"Thrice is he armed that hath his quarrel just."

But that this is the ultimate truth every man believes in his heart. If, then, we are to see the war as it really is we must get at its meaning and the purpose of both sides, looking, not only at the immediate occasion of the quarrel, but also

at the general cause of which each side is the champion. The Boers are fighting for their right to exclude British settlers from their body politic, and for their intention to break up the body politic which Great Britain, with infinite pains, has for a century been building up around them, a structure under the shelter of which their States have grown up. Great Britain is fighting to maintain that structure, and to assert the right of her people to a place in the Boer States corresponding to that given to the Boer or Dutch inhabitants of the British colonies. That the Boers were never in earnest with their negotiations about the franchise was clear before Mr. Chamberlain—and after him Sir Edward Grey —declared his belief on the subject. But the wrongness, the wickedness of the Boer policy is best seen in their attempts to raise the blacks against the British. The British authorities have exerted their utmost endeavours to keep the Basutos and other tribes from any sort of attack on the Boers. That a word from the British Resident would have let loose the Basutos on to the Free State every one knows. That word has not been and will not be spoken, though it would relieve Sir George White from his difficulties, and though the Boers have been saying and doing all they can to persuade the Basutos to massacre the British. The historian will ask not only what were the rights and wrongs of the moment, but what each of the two States stood for in the world. The answer will be that the Boers stood for ignorance, for prejudice, for race hatred, and for misgovernment, and that Great Britain stood for fair play, for freedom and for justice. These are the broad issues, and if, as I believe, they are here truly stated, our people may, in all sincerity, go to battle with the old cry: "God defend the right!"

There is, however, another element in the situation. Right in this world does not defend itself; it requires human champions, and if they blunder the cause of right suffers.

The Government, by its own admission, as well as by the patent evidence of facts, has blundered badly in not grasping sooner, what all who looked at South Africa instead of at that fictitious entity "public opinion" have known since the Bloemfontein Conference, that war was coming and that Natal and the colonies would need to be defended.

Yet the Government has with its eyes open left the colonies with a defence handicapped by a numerical inferiority so disproportionate that the Empire is condemned to weeks of anxiety and suspense, and the army to a needlessly heavy loss of lives. For this neglect the Empire might have to pay dear. Yet as the Government was undoubtedly drawn into its blunder by honest ignorance and by fond love of peace, its carelessness or blindness is no crime and need weaken no man's confidence in the justice of the cause. The issue will not be affected by it, and the heavy trial laid upon Sir George White's small force may perhaps serve to stimulate and nourish the sense of duty or of service which in a long period of peace has grown weak for lack of exercise. The British cause is not popular in the non-British world, and the Government can best repair its error by avoiding a repetition of the same mistake on a larger scale. The first hint of unfriendly purpose on the part of any Great Power ought to be the signal to such a call to arms as will make plain Great Britain's determination to carry her cause through in spite of all opposers.

On the Art of Going to War[1]

ALL our politicians of all parties are the product of their time and country; they all grew up in the period 1837 to 1887, the characteristic half-century of the Victorian age. It was a period of prodigious growth for this country; a period of peace, attributed in those days to the protection of the "silver streak"; of commercial and industrial activity and prosperity; of social transformation and of political reorganization.

During those fifty years the British public was for the most part wrapped up in itself. Political life was centred in the long and gradual revolution by which all classes were brought into contact with the business of making and unmaking Governments. Society was permeated with a zeal for improvement; the hunger and thirst after righteousness amounted almost to a famine. Humanity and philanthropy were the order of the day. This was the medium from which our present political leaders imbibed the thoughts of which their minds are composed, and to this atmosphere of good endeavour they owe their strength. From the same source, however, they derive an element of weakness, for an age that has morality on the brain is prone to look at the world through the turbid medium of conscience, which is a bad substitute for the eye; and a generation that is making money resents every circumstance that may interfere with that absorbing if sordid occupation. The ideal of the Vic-

[1] *Anglo-Saxon Review*, November, 1899.

torian age was peace. War was a horror to be avoided, and if possible not to be thought of. Even foreign affairs, the name in those days by a strange perversion given to the nation's business in the world at large, were anathema, for national as distinct from private business across the seas might lead to war, to the shedding of blood, and to what was more serious, the disturbance of trade. The accepted maxim of all parties was: "The greatest of British interests is peace."

When such was the dominant frame of mind it was hardly likely that any ambitious man, looking forward to a public career, should go out of his way to study the natural history of war, or to acquire an intimate knowledge of a process so much under the ban of popular disapproval as the conflict of nations. Indeed, the distaste for such subjects was so great that the English political literature of the period treats of government as a purely internal affair; it has much to say of the antithesis between the Government and the people, but is silent on the antithesis between the Government and other Governments. These gaps in the political thought of a generation are reproduced in the minds which best represent that generation, and thus it comes about that no British politician of what may be called front bench rank has any ordered stock of thoughts, such as in an age of science could fairly be called knowledge, either in regard to national policy or to war. Practical knowledge cannot be acquired in a hurry; it cannot be communicated by a process of cramming, for its valuable quality is the judgment in action which comes only from long exercise. This truth is recognised in regard to every subject commonly known to belong to the domain of a science or systematic study. When action in such a department is necessary the ordinary man always calls in a professional adviser. He knows that the matter is for the lawyer or the doctor and does not dream of trying his hand himself. But our politicians have paid so little at-

tention to the subject of war, and so little idea that its right conduct depends upon systematic knowledge, that during the last six months they have undertaken by themselves the most delicate, the most difficult, and the most important of all the operations of statesmanship without being in the least aware of the nature of the process. No member of the Government has betrayed a suspicion of the truth that the beginning of a war is as much a matter of right method as the middle or the end; and none of the Opposition critics, whose dream has been to have no war, seems to have been aware that for the avoidance of war, not less than for its management, a comprehension of its nature is indispensable.

The one great overruling condition of success in war is concentration of purpose: "Whatsoever thy hand taketh to do, do it with thy might." The nation that goes to war must be united. Every part of it must be permeated by the same view and the same will, and this view and this will must be centred in the supreme Government. From beginning to end of the activities of war a nation is merged in its Government: the Government alone has the initiative; upon it, and upon it alone, depend preparation, design, and execution. If the Government is lacking in forethought, in promptitude, in energy, or in tenacity of purpose, the national action will be paralysed. But if the Government is in earnest, and truly represents the community, it will find means to appropriate and to employ to the best advantage a large part of the enormous stock of wealth, energy, intelligence, and spirit which go to make up the national resources. This concentration is possible because war is a means to an end, and the first mark of the competence or efficiency of a Government in relation to an international conflict is the clearness with which it knows its own mind, the facility with which it distinguishes between aims which are vital to the national life, and must therefore be pursued without hesitation either in peace or war, and those which are subordinate

and accidental and are not worth great sacrifices and great risks. A Government that knows its purpose will be quick to detect the beginnings of a quarrel upon a vital issue; will divine opposition in the distance, and, long before there is any palpable sign of the coming struggle, will have analysed all its possibilities, have thought every difficulty, and made ready for every emergency. This is not mere rhetoric: it is a bald but true description of the action of Governments which have succeeded in war. Consider the case of Napoleon Bonaparte during the first years of the Empire, when he truly represented the French nation: the world was astonished by the rapidity with which, in 1805, he crushed the armies of Austria and broke up the coalition between Austria and Russia. But that which astonished the world was perfectly foreseen by those on both sides who understood the nature of policy and of war, and were acquainted with the condition of France and of Austria. In 1804 the Archduke Charles sent to his brother, the Emperor Francis, a protest against the project of an alliance with Russia for a war against France, explaining in detail how it would be impossible, in the course of a few months, to make adequate preparations to confront in arms the forces at the disposal of the French Emperor, and showing that it would be impossible for the Russian army to give effective assistance in time to save that of Austria from defeat. In January, 1805, Napoleon himself said to Miot de Melito that he had been two years preparing his army at great cost, that he had completed his military organization, and was then as ready as on previous occasions he had been at the opening of hostilities. The project of a landing in England had furnished him with a pretext for those preparations, and the result was that he had twenty days' start of any possible enemy, and could be in the field a month before any of them, and before Austria could have put its artillery on a war footing.

Napoleon may be thought a bad example, or a case of ex-

ceptional genius; we may turn to Prussia at a later date. The revolutionary year 1848, and the years which immediately followed, brought Prussia bitter disappointments and humiliation. Her educated classes shared the German aspiration for German unity, and thought that that unity should come from the initiative or leadership of Prussia; but Prussia's Government was undecided, her forces inadequate and unready. She was confronted by the veto of Austria and Russia, which had in readiness armies larger than her own. The lesson was taken to heart by the wiser men of that time, and when, in 1857, a new ruler who had profited by that experience found that authority had come to him, his first care was to increase his army and to surround himself by thoroughly competent men. These men knew perfectly that the German unity for which they looked must be gained by a life-and-death struggle with Austria, and must be defended against the utmost efforts of France. The first of them chosen by the King was Moltke, appointed to his post in 1857, in which year he wrote a memoir on a possible war with France, revised by him from time to time, until the year 1870 required the plans thus matured to be put into practice. As early as 1860 he worked out in a similar memoir an arrangement for the deployment of the Prussian army in case of a war against Austria, and this arrangement also was periodically revised in the succeeding years.

The cases in which victory can be traced to previous forethought might easily be multiplied, and might be compared with a longer list of those in which defeat was directly due to the absence of any serious previous study of the coming conflict. In 1859 Austria went to war with France and Sardinia without taking the trouble to put more than half her army in the field, her Government thus betraying its lack of the concentration of purpose which is the first condition of success. The war began with defeat which could not afterwards be remedied. The French Government, in 1870, for-

got to ascertain in time the strength of the German army, and by "going to war with a light heart" foredoomed its whole regular army to defeat and capture. The French example was emulated in 1885 by King Milan of Serbia, who, when he invaded Bulgaria, had not only failed to mobilize his whole army, but had so badly provided for it that after a few days' fighting the kingdom of Servia did not contain enough cartridges to enable another battle to be fought. The Greek Government in 1897 furnished a brilliant example of the haphazard method of going to war, of which the disastrous results are fresh in every one's recollection.

The popular belief regards war pre-eminently as the domain of luck and pluck. The strength and courage of the soldier and the genius of the general are thought to be the essential matters. There is an element of truth in this view; it is impossible to exaggerate the value of courage and endurance in the soldiers of the army, or to give too much weight to the influence of the personal magnetism exercised by a great leader of men; but in a higher view which embraces the whole subject, and is therefore more likely to approximate to the truth, courage and right leading are consequences rather than causes; they are the result of that sound management of a nation's affairs from which alone it is entitled to expect success in the conflict with another nation.

War is merely a means to an end; it is a piece of political action. No statesman in his senses would resort to violence and bloodshed if he saw a way to attain his object without them; still less would any prudent man wish his nation to make the sacrifices and to run the risks involved in the recourse to arms unless he were satisfied that this rough and arduous road would in fact lead to the proposed destination. The director of a nation's affairs, whether he is a despotic monarch or the chairman of a committee, must be supposed, before he begins to correspond upon a contentious subject

with the Government of another Power, to determine as well as he can whether the purpose which he proposes to himself is vital for the nation which he represents, so that it must be pursued at all costs, and also whether the opposite purpose of the other Government is regarded by that Government as indispensable. If both sides take the matter seriously a trial of strength is inevitable.

When the statesman has discovered, by the process just described, that the question he is about to raise may possibly lead to the use of force, he will, if he is prudent, avoid raising it until he has satisfied himself that for the war which he may have to conduct, he has secured, as far as human foresight can secure anything, the certainty of success. He may safely assume that the other side, fighting for an object of vital importance, will exert itself to the utmost of its resources. He will, therefore, take the full measure of those resources and compare it with the forces which he can himself bring to bear against them. If the comparison shows in his own hand such a preponderance as making due allowance for accidents and for miscalculations, gives a reasonable probability of success, he will raise his contentious question; but if the calculation shows the slightest doubt either as to the readiness or the superiority of his forces, he will use his utmost efforts to avoid a dispute until such time as his preparations are completed and the certainty of ultimate success has been practically assured.

An opposition of purposes between the British Government and the Government of the South African Republic was painfully brought home to the British public in the winter of 1895-6, and from that time onwards continued to occupy the attention of both Governments. Towards the close of the year 1898 the condition of the Uitlanders in the Transvaal again became prominent in public and private discussion in this country. At that time the High Commissioner, Sir Alfred Milner, was on a visit to England, and it

was generally believed that he came for the purpose of laying before the Cabinet his view of the situation in South Africa, and of obtaining instructions as to the policy which was to be pursued. As to the nature of the situation there has never been in this country any substantial difference of opinion. I find in a newspaper article, published in December, 1898, the question stated in the following terms:

"The Transvaal and the Orange Free State lying together, and both sharing political institutions of the Boer type, are surrounded by a great ring of colonies in which the political institutions are of the British type; but whereas in the British colonies and in the Orange Free State men of British and of Dutch descent live side by side on equal terms in spite of the fact that in one region the British and in the other the Dutch element has the numerical preponderance, in the Transvaal the Boers have political rights and the British have none. . . . It appears to us to be impossible that South Africa can permanently continue divided into two regions, in one of which equality and in the other privilege prevails. These districts will all either enforce equality or all accept privilege."

Coupled with this view was usually found the opinion that the cause of the Uitlanders was regarded by the British throughout South Africa as their own, and that the peculiar position of the British Government in relation to the South African communities laid upon it the duty of whatever action might be necessary to relieve the Uitlanders from the disabilities under which they suffered; it was thought that inaction on the part of Great Britain would estrange the British colonists, and would injure the relations between Great Britain and the British inhabitants of Australia and Canada, who are glad to regard the British Government as the champion of the British race all the world over. There was then the prospect of a contentious question between Great Britain and the Transvaal upon a matter of vital

importance to Great Britain, vital because British acquiescence in the conduct of the South African Republic, if voluntary, must prove Great Britain's indifference to the interests of her colonists; if compulsory, her impotence to assert them. Indifference or impotence would alike be fatal to that pretension of the British Government which under the name of Empire has in recent years taken so firm a hold upon the public imagination. This view of the case and of the national duty in regard to it was eventually adopted by the Government, and the formal decision to raise the question was conveyed in Mr. Chamberlain's despatch to Sir Alfred Milner of May 10, 1899, and in an alternative form in the instructions sent a day or two later, authorising the High Commissioner to meet President Kruger in conference in Bloemfontein.

If we are to credit the members of the Cabinet with the exercise of reasonable prudence in the conduct of the nation's affairs we must suppose that, before taking the decision conveyed in the despatch of May 10, they had thought out the course to be taken in case President Kruger should decline the advice offered him and reject the proposals made to him. It was evident from the beginning that if persuasion should fail the end set up could be obtained only by compulsion. The doctrine of reasonable care, therefore, implies that the Cabinet not later than the first week in May had fully considered in all its bearings the possibility of war with the Transvaal. What, then, was the probable nature of such a war, as with reasonable care it could at the beginning of May have been foreseen, or as in fact it was then foreseen by those who took the trouble to consider it?

The nature of the dispute made it very improbable that the Transvaal would agree to any proposals for a substantial enfranchisement of the Uitlanders. To the Boers the restriction of the franchise to themselves was the foundation of their independence, so that they could not but look upon

the proposals made by Great Britain as proposals for the destruction of the State. The exchange of views which had been going on for many months concerning the status of the Republic had disclosed to the Cabinet, though not to the world, that the South African Republic regarded itself as a sovereign State in no way amenable to British authority, and under no obligation to Great Britain, except that of submitting for approval treaties which it might negotiate with other Powers. If, therefore, the pending disputes should lead to war, the burghers of the Transvaal would be fighting for national independence. In such a cause it was safe to assume that the South African Republic would exert itself to the utmost of its capacity, that every available man would be placed in the field and that resistance would be carried to the last extreme. It has for fifty years been recognised as a fundamental law, a law of gravitation controlling the conflicts of States, that the strategical insight displayed by a Government in the conduct of a war will be proportionate to the intensity of purpose with which the nation led by that Government enters into the struggle. It was, therefore, reasonable to expect that the forces of the Transvaal would be handled with a high degree of strategical insight. The troops would consist of the burghers of the State, who were known to be expert with the rifle and to take the field on horseback; it was known also that the Transvaal was abundantly supplied with modern guns, with modern rifles, and with ammunition, and no soldier needs to be twice told that an army of mounted riflemen who have learnt to rely on the bullet, and have the assistance of anything like a powerful artillery, is one of the most formidable forces that can possibly be met. Long before May it was regarded as certain by all who had taken the trouble to inform themselves closely about the condition of South Africa that the Transvaal could count in case of war upon the assistance of the Orange Free State, with which it had concluded an offensive and

defensive alliance; and it was notorious that, in the event of war upon the issue then pending, the Boer States would receive a considerable number of recruits from among the Dutch farmers of the Cape Colony. The two States together were known to have on their burgher rolls about fifty thousand men, and that was the number of mounted riflemen which they might be expected to muster for war, though no doubt deductions would have to be made in estimating the number which could be collected upon a given battlefield.

For a serious war the British colonies were almost entirely unprepared. There were seven or eight thousand volunteers at the Cape and fifteen hundred in Natal. There were, in both colonies together, perhaps half-a-dozen British battalions, and no strong base except the naval base at Simonstown. The nature of the Boer forces permitted of their rapid mobilization, though the great extent of the two States would make it impossible for these forces to be concentrated upon any of the frontiers in less than three or four weeks. The distance from Great Britain places an interval of three weeks between the embarkation of a battalion at Southampton and its debarkation at Cape Town. If to this be added a week for mobilization, a month must be regarded as the minimum interval between an order given at the War Office for the movement of troops, and the arrival of those troops at the South African coast, itself distant from two to five hundred miles from the frontier of the Boer States.

If the Transvaal Government resolved to maintain its peculiar institutions, then the first plain indication that Great Britain was resolved that they should be altered would convince the Boer leaders that war was inevitable, and in that case sound strategy would counsel them to take advantage of the distance of Great Britain and of the defenceless condition of the colonies to cross the borders before British troops could prevent them, and in this way to bring over to their side as many as possible of their adherents among the

Dutch farmers of Natal and the Cape Colony. The question at issue had been quite as fully considered in the Transvaal as in Great Britain, and there was no reason to suppose that the Transvaal Government would not know its own mind. It was, therefore, of the utmost importance not to open the question until the arrangements for the conduct of the war had been fully matured. A very large force would be necessary; and if allowance be made of a week for mobilization, three weeks for the voyage, and a further three weeks for the interval between the despatch of the first and that of the last transport, the time to be reckoned between the Government's order for mobilization and the opening of the campaign by the British forces in a condition of concentration suitable for an advance must be set down at from seven weeks to two months. If the Boer States should begin their mobilization on the same day as the British Government, they would have something like a month's start in which the nearer portions of the British colonies would be exposed to their unresisted attack.

A serious attempt to grapple with the subject must at any time have led to the conclusion that, so soon as the two Governments should be really at cross purposes, the Boers would be compelled, by their interests or their view of their duty in the maintenance of their cause, to take the initiative, and that the British Government would then have to choose between two evils: either the Boer forces would overrun a large area of British territory in Natal and the Cape Colony, while the British forces were collecting at points near enough to the coast to be out of their reach, or the British forces sent up in small parties as they should arrive, to defend the borders, would be exposed to attack by very superior forces, and to the danger of being beaten in detail. No ingenuity could devise an escape from this dilemma, nor avert the probability that either the unopposed advance of the Boers, or the successes which they might gain over small

forces, would bring them the assistance of a proportion of the Dutch colonists, and, at the least, create dangerous excitement among the Kaffir tribes. There was no way out of the difficulty, but there was a simple way through it. The period of danger must be shortened by promptitude and energy; all the arrangements, so far as their elaboration on paper was concerned, might be fully worked out beforehand. The moment the first British overture should be rejected the mobilization and the movement of the troops should begin, as though war had been declared, and should be pushed on without interruption. The British colonies are British territory, and the despatch of an army to them does not constitute an act of hostility, though its purpose could not be mistaken. This course would have the additional advantage that it would prevent any possibility of the Transvaal Government being misled into the belief that Great Britain was not in deadly earnest. There was, in any case, the risk that the first overt act of preparation would set the Boers in motion, but this risk could by no possibility be got rid of, and might as well be incurred through a large measure as through a small one. Some advantage, too, might be taken of the seasons, it being well known that the movement of troops in the South African veldt is, to some extent, dependent upon the rains and the grass which they produce, and that the spring rains begin in October. Before that time the Boers would have a difficulty in moving large bodies of men, while the sea is equally open for the transport of a British army at all times of the year.

On the hypothesis of concentration of purpose and of reasonable care, the Government must, in the early part of the year, have made some such inquiry as has here been sketched, of which the results cannot have greatly differed from those here suggested. But what happened? In the first half of May the Government, as has been seen, decided to put its categorical question to the Government of the

Transvaal. This was done at Bloemfontein by Sir Alfred Milner, whose language expressed in the clearest and simplest way the true nature of the situation, and could leave no doubt in President Kruger's mind that the rejection of the moderate proposals made must ultimately lead to war. The President's reply was a categorical negative. That was the moment for active preparation, for the calling out of the reserves and for the despatch of troops. What was at that moment the Government's frame of mind? The failure of the Bloemfontein Conference was announced at a public meeting, on June 7, by Mr. Balfour, who expressed the opinion that the proposals which had been made by Sir Alfred Milner in behalf of the Government were for a mere necessary minimum of justice; but instead of declaring that the Government was determined to have that minimum, and that as President Kruger had flatly refused it the Government had decided to assert the cause of right, Mr. Balfour made the astounding declaration that, as he himself was satisfied with the justice of the Government's proposals, it was a psychological impossibility that President Kruger should not also be satisfied with them, and that there was therefore reason to expect a peaceful solution of the difficulties. This speech of Mr. Balfour's made it doubtful whether Sir Alfred Milner's view was that of the Government. Great Britain might, after all, agree to compromise. Accordingly, five days later a Franchise Bill purporting to make concessions to the Uitlanders was introduced into the Volksraad. Thereupon the British Government opened fresh negotiations, which again gave the impression that rather than employ force they were prepared to accept less than had been suggested at Bloemfontein. No military preparations took place, though the negotiations were accompanied by ministerial speeches implying that the Government intended to take up arms in case a satisfactory agreement was not reached. On July 28, the South African

policy of the Government was discussed in the House of Lords, and the Prime Minister, after describing the Conventions as "mortal," closed his speech with the words: "We have put our hands to the plough, and we do not intend to withdraw them from it."

The negotiations were continued after the rising of Parliament, and disclosed at every stage that kind of disagreement and of misunderstanding which mark a fundamental conflict of purposes. Meanwhile the Transvaal was arming. The hostility of the Orange Free State was becoming manifest, and a general exodus of British subjects from the Transvaal set in. The British in South Africa were anxiously waiting for a manifestation of British power, but only a few special-service officers and one or two odd battalions reached South Africa. At length, on September 8, when the Boer forces were collecting near the Natal border, the Cabinet decided to order the despatch of 10,000 men, to be drawn for the most part from India, to the colony of Natal, along the borders of which the Boer forces were beginning to appear. We now know that even at that time the Government still hoped that war would be averted, though, as their action showed, they had begun to fear that it might come. It is an open secret that the Government was restrained from immediately following up the 10,000 men with additional forces because they were afraid that any further move would precipitate the action of the Boers, and that they therefore waited for the arrival of Sir George White and the bulk of his force in Natal—that is, for a whole month—before ordering reinforcements. On October 7, orders were issued for the mobilization of a portion of the Reserve, and for the despatch of an Army Corps and other forces to South Africa. The Boers replied with an ultimatum, and began the war on October 11. In this way Sir George White's force, amounting in all to about 16,000 men, was exposed, without the possibility of reinforcement for a

period of six weeks, to the attack of the Boer army. The northern part of Cape Colony was laid open to invasion, while the tiny forces which had been extemporised at Kimberley were doomed to investment for at least six or seven weeks, and those at Mafeking to a siege of an indefinite duration. The two risks between which the choice has been discussed were thus combined. It was as though the intention had been to give the Boers the opportunity for gaining the Cape Dutch to their side, and for inflicting a series of reverses on the British arms at the outset of war.

The mischief did not end with these preliminary misfortunes. The exposure of a fraction of an army in isolation to the blows of a superior force invariably commits that army to movements, not in themselves desirable, for the purpose of extricating the detachments involved; it deprives the commander of his initiative, and compels him to abandon his plan and to suit his action to that of the enemy. Sir Redvers Buller's original design was to advance with his Army Corps from the Orange River towards the Vaal; but before his Army Corps had landed at the Cape he was obliged to divide it, and to incur all the risks which such a division involves, in order that half of it should attempt the relief of Sir George White, while the other half of it should attempt at the same time to relieve Kimberley, to resist the invasion of the Cape Colony, and to stem the rising tide of disaffection.

I am writing on November 25, at a critical moment in the progress of the war. When these pages are in the reader's hands the issue of the crisis will be known. Only those whose attention has been riveted for many anxious months to the nation's affairs in South Africa can hope as fervently as I do that courage and good leading will turn the balance in favour of the British arms. I make a very liberal allowance for the element of uncertainty which clings to any judgment based upon the limited information which reaches

us from the seat of war, but I cannot close my eyes to what is palpable and unmistakable—that the fate of the whole enterprise in its present form, and so far as the resources hitherto devoted to its prosecution are concerned, depends upon the success or the failure of the attempt of Sir Redvers Buller to join hands with Sir George White. To all appearances, Sir Redvers Buller has to face in difficult conditions a great numerical superiority. I have confidence in the discipline of the British army, the daring of its men and the coolness of its officers, and therefore I look for good news; but the strategical element of success, the possession of greater numbers at the decisive point in that part of the theatre of war in which at this moment the principal decision is impending, is not upon the British side. To secure for its own cause this particular element of success is the principal duty of a Government in relation to the conduct of a war. It appears to me that this duty has not been fulfilled, and the purpose of this inquiry is to ascertain the true cause of this failure, in order that, even if in the present case, as I devoutly hope, it should produce no serious consequences, the right precautions may be taken to prevent the recurrence of similar failures in future.

It may conduce to clearness to tell backwards the story that has already been sketched. Sir Redvers Buller, now on his way to Natal, is about to attempt with three brigades, which are at this moment separated from one another by forces of the enemy interposed between them, and which appear to be confronted with an enemy more numerous and more mobile than themselves, the relief of Sir George White, who has for six weeks contained, and been contained, by a portion of that more numerous hostile force. Yet the Government, early in October, ordered the despatch to South Africa of 50,000 men for Sir Redvers Buller's use, and of these by this time four-fifths have landed in South Africa. How comes it that the British commander, at the

crucial point and in the critical moment, can dispose of little more than a third of this force? I am not finding fault with Sir Redvers Buller's strategy, though possibly Napoleon in his place would have had five brigades instead of three. When he reached the Cape he was confronted by two dangers, each of them graver than has commonly been understood at home. At the Cape a general rising of the Dutch was imminent; in Natal a British army was invested by numbers so great that its eventual capture or destruction was not without the bounds of possibility. The decision to make the best effort to face both dangers at once does credit to the commander's courage, and the time has not yet come when his judgment can be subjected to approval or censure. But this much is certain, that only the long interval between the arrival of Sir George White's force and that of Sir Redvers Buller's exposed Sir George White to the possibility of being invested; and that the spectacle of a military deadlock in Natal, combined with an unresisted incursion from the Free State into the Cape Colony, subjected the loyalty of the Cape Dutch to a strain which it would, in all probability, have been spared if the first contact between the two armies had exhibited an unmistakable superiority on the British side. The division of Sir Redvers Buller's force is therefore directly due to the delay of the order for its despatch until a month after that for the despatch of Sir George White's. This delay was caused by the Government's fear of provoking an invasion of Natal while it was yet without defenders, and this fear, in its turn, was due to the Government's neglect to place its army in the field the moment that the preservation of peace became doubtful. That moment was the closing of the Bloemfontein Conference. At that critical instant the Government failed to grasp the full import of the situation.

It may be said as some excuse that the situation was intricate and perplexing. International situations are rarely

without these characteristics, which can be removed only by a great effort of will and of intelligence directed to discovering the main current of affairs and the channel in which it must needs flow. The function of a Government in the management of war is the subject of the wildest theories, and to these the Cabinet, as was to be expected, fell a prey. It is quite commonly supposed that the Government decides whether there is or is not to be a war, and, having resolved upon military action, selects its general and hands over to him the "military" conduct of the campaign. But, in fact, such a division is impossible. The plan of campaign is inseparable from the quarrel. When there is a struggle between two States, in which each hopes or intends to strike down the other and dictate terms to a disarmed and prostrate foe, the course of the war will be guided mainly by one consideration, how most effectively to employ the available force to crush the enemy. In such a case the whole resources of the nation will need to be freely used, and this cannot be effected unless the whole energies of the Government are devoted to the conflict. War carried on as a subordinate department of government is usually feebly conducted. The management of war reflects down to the smallest detail the spirit of the Government that wages it. This is no paradox, no mere accident, but lies deep in the essence of the matter. For the soldier's profession is above all others an affair of the spirit. His function is to die, or at least to offer himself to death, in obedience to an order. The common soldier, as he is called, exemplifies on every battlefield that principle of vicarious sacrifice which is regarded as the foundation and the glory of the Christian religion. To go out and be shot here and now because I am ordered—that is the soldier's duty. It is commended to him and accepted by him because he believes that his death will be for his country's good. The sacrifice is possible when it serves a purpose. When there is no purpose, when life is thrown away at random for noth-

ing, the moral nature of the transaction is gone. There is no sacrifice, but merely slaughter. The more manifestly his death is related to the national good the more ready is the soldier to face it. The less evident the connection the greater is the temptation to cling to life. Under a known great commander soldiers will do and dare everything, for they know that their lives will not be thrown away. But where the management breaks down, where there is an evident absence of a controlling mind, there is sure to be sooner or later a flagging of the energies and a slackening of devotion. In short, the bond of discipline is that the soldier in giving his life shall not have it thrown away. Give him a general who can command, and he will obey. Give him a headless general, and he will soon be heartless. But behind the general is the Government, and the best general will be embarrassed and perplexed whenever either in the preparation or during the course of a war his Government fails to know its own mind.

Fortunately, however, the common soldier is not directly affected by political errors, except when they evidently and palpably reduce the whole war to a blunder. He looks for officers equal to the situation immediately before him, which he too sees and understands. The officers and men of the British army may therefore be able to avert from the nation the consequences of the failure of the Government. Meantime the question for those left at home, and especially for those who are qualified by education and leisure to lead the nation, is how to prevent a recurrence of similar errors, not only in the more distant future, but during so much as remains of the present war. That will not be accomplished by overturning the Cabinet, for the neglect to master the elementary principles of the relation between war and policy, with which I think its members may fairly be charged, is to be ascribed in an even greater degree to the members of the Opposition who would in that event replace them. None

of our politicians appears to have troubled himself about the connection between right and force, the appreciation of which is the fundamental condition of success in the competition between nations. The leaders of the Opposition during the whole of the recent crisis have shirked their most manifest duty, for while they have protested against the use of force in a cause which they have admitted to be right, none of them has so much as suggested a course by which the objects at which they profess to aim could have been secured without fighting. Yet is it not now clear that the only chance, if there was a chance, of securing without fighting the objects upon which the British nation and indeed the British race has set its heart lay in absolute adherence to the minimum demanded at Bloemfontein, and in the support of that demand by immediate and thorough-going preparation for war, accompanied by the most peaceful, the most conciliatory, and the most considerate language consistent with decision and plainness?

The remedy, then, does not consist in exchanging one set of politicians imbued with the ideas of forty years ago, for another set more thoroughly steeped in the same ideas. The time for new men will be when the new men reveal themselves. For the moment a humbler specific may be worth considering. The strategical insight which the members of the Cabinet do not possess and cannot acquire, might be imported into their body by the simple process of finding a seat in the Cabinet for a strategist. The relation at present subsisting between the Cabinet and the Commander-in-Chief is calculated to ensure failure in war. "Mistakes made in the original assembling of armies," wrote Moltke in a famous passage, "can scarcely be made good during the subsequent course of the campaigns," and such mistakes are usually due to the incapacity of a Government to judge rightly the time when the assembling should begin. That time cannot rightly be perceived without the aid of strategical judgment.

But in this country, while the Cabinet is locked up in its room in Downing Street to make its decision, the Commander-in-Chief is sitting in his office in Pall Mall. It is as though the station-master at Rugby depended for his knowledge of the time on the schoolhouse clock, to be consulted by special messenger as occasion should require. Lord Lansdowne indeed affirmed at Sheffield on November 2, that the situation which existed during the first six weeks of the war was inevitable, that there had been no failure, and that it was impossible for any Government, in conducting a dispute with a distant State, to maintain the harmony between its negotiations and its naval and military preparations. An error that is unacknowledged and unrecognised is rarely amended, and the language used by Lord Lansdowne must compel many supporters of the Government to adopt the despairing tone of Lord Rosebery, who, believing that we have "muddled" into our present difficulties, has no hope of getting out of them except by a repetition of the process of muddling.

The most important function of the Secretary of State for War is to secure the connection between the national policy and the military means of giving effect to it. Lord Lansdowne, by declaring that this is impossible, may be taken to admit that he cannot do it. Yet nothing is simpler. No more is needed than that the Secretary of State should acquaint himself equally with the political aims of the Cabinet of which he is a member, and with the views of the Commander-in-Chief as to the military means to be adopted for the attainment of those aims. In case the Cabinet should hesitate to act in the manner, with the energy, or at the time proposed by the Commander-in-Chief, the Secretary of State must instantly become aware in his own person that the harmony between policy and strategy is endangered. His function would then be to call the attention of the Cabinet to this danger by declining to be associated with

their proposed decision in which strategy would be sacrificed. Thus either the balance would be restored, or the Secretary of State would be cleared of responsibility for its disturbance.

From the present situation it is plain that one of three things has happened. Either Lord Wolseley has given advice which was not inspired by sound strategical judgment —a most improbable supposition—or his advice was not asked for in time, or it has been overruled. On either of the two latter hypotheses a great injustice has been done him; for the present system gives him no opportunity of clearing his reputation by public protest against a course which he may have thought imprudent or dangerous. He shares neither the authority nor the responsibility of the Cabinet, which yet has the advantage of the credit inseparable from his name. If he were himself a member of the Cabinet he would be in a position to ensure by his own action that, in all matters relating to war and to its avoidance, those military considerations which ought surely in the domain of war to be paramount, should receive due weight at the proper time.

Changes in the mechanism of Government, however, are not likely in themselves to modify the spirit in which its work is carried on. Is there not perceptible in the men who have charge of the country's fate, able and high-minded as they are, is there not visible in them all a certain lack of simplicity and strength? Do they reveal that singleness of eye, that devotion to one purpose, that absorption in one object, which marks the great figures of history? To my view one idea seems to be absent from their minds,—the idea that to accomplish a great purpose you must run great risks, and that to lead a nation you must face at every moment of your career the chance of political annihilation. To disinterested eyes it was as clear as noonday that the Bloemfontein Conference was the British ultimatum, and that the Boer nega-

tive then uttered meant war. The Cabinet could not see this because its members were looking at something else. They were considering whether the country would support them if they then called out the Reserves and sent 70,000 men to the Cape. They were balancing between sound policy and safe politics, and trying thus to make the best of both worlds have incurred the danger of failure in both. The straightforward course pursued in time would have led to victory in South Africa, and to that success in the next election which vacillation has jeopardised. The statesman, like the soldier and every other true man, has to learn in his own person the tragic law of human existence—that the path to great achievements runs along the brink of the abyss.

War and Government[1]

THERE are two ways of regarding a nation. The legislator thinks of it as a collection of individuals, if and when his object is to give full scope to the action and development of each individual, so long as it does not hamper the action or the development of the others. But in the affairs of the world each nation is an individual, which must assert its claim to unhindered action and development. In the international area the nation in the exercise of its powers is a unit, and for this purpose its character is something distinct from that of the individuals who compose it. It can act only by its organs, just as the human being has legs to walk with, but requires, in order to set them in motion and control them, a brain to think, a will, and a nervous system to ensure the control of that will over every movement. The nation, as an active unit in a world of nations, has its Government as the organ of direction and control—of thinking and willing for the nation—and its various departments as the several limbs by which specific national functions are performed under that direction and control. The population of a country may, on the average, be healthy, wealthy and wise, and very possibly that is the condition of a great part of the population of Great Britain and Ireland; but the existence of these qualities is of little practical benefit to the nation as an active unit in the world, unless the organs by which the unit acts are themselves healthy.

The test of health in any organ is the effectiveness with

[1] *National Review*, February, 1900.

which it performs its specific functions. In this paper it is proposed to consider the function of government as the organ of direction, the mind and will of the nation, in connection with one of the most important branches of a nation's business—war.

When two Governments disagree with reference to a matter, about which each of them thinks it of vital importance that it should have its own way there is no known way of settling the dispute except by force. To such a case none of the other known methods of settlement is applicable. If each of the two Governments feels that the matter of dispute is not one of life and death, they will agree to an arbitration or to a compromise; if one of them only has this feeling that one will give way. But if neither can give way without ruining the nation which it leads there must be war between them.

During the second quarter of the nineteenth century the planters of the Southern States of the North American Union came to believe that their political power and their social system depended upon the institution of slavery. They found that slave tillage exhausted the soil, and required for its prosperity to be constantly acquiring new ground. They therefore made it their aim to introduce slavery into the new States which were growing up in the west. The free workmen of the Northern States found that their position was rendered difficult by the proximity of the slave States, and the Northern public came gradually to the resolve that there should be no more slave States. Thus two opposite views of the future of North America grew at the same time; one side looked to a future of universal freedom, the other to a future in which slavery should be everywhere legal. The Presidential election of 1860 proved that the slaveholders' ideal was losing ground. The slaveholders, in order to preserve it, determined to sever their connection with the free States, and basing their action upon

the theory that each State was independent and the Union a treaty revocable at will by any of the parties to it, gave notice that their States withdrew from the Union, and set up a new Confederacy among themselves. The Northern patriots held that the Union was indissoluble; they regarded the whole of the States as one nation, and the secession of the Southern States as illegal and treasonable. The Southern States when they seceded, armed and seized by force forts within their limits which undoubtedly belonged to the United States Government. Upon this the Northern States armed and the war began. There were two issues intertwined, that of the unity of the nation, and that of freedom or slavery, and to each side the assertion of its own view seemed vital. The war was fought out until the last Confederate army was destroyed. When that happened both questions were settled. There was no treaty of peace. The Confederacy had disappeared, and with it the theory of secession and the institution of slavery. We now know that what seemed to the Southerners a vital cause, that of the so-called independence of their States, and that of the institution in which their society seemed to be rooted, was a lost cause foredoomed to defeat. Perfect wisdom might have induced them to give way without fighting, but the ideas for which they fought were inseparable from the social framework of their lives, and the war was necessary to free them from those ideas. The Northern statesmen knew as little of war as our own politicians to-day, and fancied that sixty thousand men would in a few weeks suppress the Confederacy. They grew wiser by degrees. The task required four years of fighting and an army of a million men.

The American Civil War, of which the analogy to that which has since broken out in South Africa was observed as far back as December, 1898, was a case of inevitable conflict. The issues were vital, and their settlement meant the destruction of one of the parties.

The wars of 1866 and 1870 did not in the same way turn upon matters vital to both sides. In 1866 Austria was fighting for the primacy in Germany, which, as the event proved, was not a condition of her existence, though for Prussia there was no future unless she secured it. Austria, therefore, gave up the struggle after the first great defeat.

In 1870 France was fighting for prestige, Germany for her new-found unity under Prussia's lead. The French resistance was not comparable to that made by the Confederate States. France yielded before more than half of her territory had been touched by the war, and it is now pretty plain that the influence which the war was undertaken to maintain was not a condition without which the French nation and the French State could not survive.

A prudent statesman before letting himself be drawn into a quarrel with another State will take pains to reach a true estimate of the importance of the point in dispute, both to his own State and to the antagonist, for in proportion as a community finds its being and its wellbeing bound up with a particular purpose, the more intense and persistent will be its exertions for the assertion of that purpose. If, then, I commit my people to a war for something that turns out to be a mere whim, they will sooner or later grow tired of the struggle, and if the conditions on which I propose to insist involve the ruin of the State opposed to me, the people of that State will only grow more determined and more desperate as the struggle proceeds. This disparity of motive for exertion may go far to compensate for almost any degree of inequality between the real strength of the two opponents.

The beginning of war, then, is the purpose in view. From a purpose which is plain and simple you may get a well-conducted war; from a purpose about which you are not clear you never can. Unless you know what you want you cannot possibly tell whether war is the appropriate way

of getting it; therefore, in that case, the decision to go to war is foolish. Moreover, unless you know what you want you can hardly manage your war properly, that is, so as to get what you want. The starting-point of a good war is, therefore, a purpose necessary to your State and clearly understood by your statesmen.

Thus the foundation of success in war is sound policy, without which the greatest generals and the finest armies come to ruin. In 1792 the Powers of Europe took it into their heads to dictate to France how she should constitute her Government. Out of that a war arose, which ended in the French putting their whole energies at the disposal of a great general, who astonished the world by the tremendous defeats which he inflicted on the two Powers which had first meddled with the French. But the French general then set up in his turn to dictate to Europe how it should be governed, and, in spite of his genius and of his enormous armies, he ended as a broken man dictating at St. Helena memoirs intended to persuade the world that success in war has nothing to do with the rights or wrongs of the case.

A good cause, a purpose necessary to your nation, though it is the greater half of a sound policy, is only half. It must be supplemented by prudence or reasonable care in the choice of means for its assertion. A serious opposition of purposes between two States does not come suddenly like a bolt from the blue; the great disputes cast their shadows far in advance, and one of the statesman's functions is to recognise these shadows. When a quarrel is seen to be coming the statesman, after satisfying himself that his object is necessary and right, and that if the other side will not give way he must use force, sets to work to calculate and arrange. His one care is to keep the purpose in his mind, and to see that every part of his arrangements will contribute to its accomplishment. With this idea he sits down to prepare for the coming war. Ever in his mind he hears the old

words: "What king, going to war against another king, sitteth not down first and consulteth whether he be able with ten thousand to meet him that cometh against him with twenty thousand? Or else, while the other is yet a great way off, he sendeth an ambassage and desireth conditions of peace."

The process of war is always battle, the attempt of two forces to destroy or overpower one another. To the eye of the directing statesman, who in this function is the strategist, a war is a series of battles regarded as steps to the complete overpowering of the enemy, itself the preliminary to the carrying out of the purpose of his own State. When, therefore, the statesman, as strategist, considers an approaching war, he sorts it into a group of necessary battles. He wants no unnecessary battles, which would be waste of force, and would not contribute to the crushing of the enemy. He will try to avoid a collision between a small force of his own and a large one of the enemy's, his ideal being to secure in every impact an assured preponderance of the force of his own side. Accordingly he estimates the resources of the opposing Power, the probable energy which it will throw into the struggle, and the probable size of its armies. He considers every possible move that the enemy can make. Then he calculates the forces, the armies and their size, which will be required to overpower the enemy.

This calculation is all important. What the statesman has to find out is not merely the relative strength of his own army and that of the adversary, though that comparison has its importance, but also the proportion between those parts of them that are likely to come into collision with one another. I may have twenty thousand men divided into four groups of five thousand, each upon a different island. If I have no ships, and the enemy has ten thousand men and a fleet to carry them, he may land on each island in turn and defeat my twenty thousand in four battles. The comparison

to be made is between the force I shall be able to use, and that which he will be able to use at the time and place of the first, second, and third battles, and so on. Unless I can see how I am going to win the series of battles one after the other, I should be foolish to go to war at all, and the best way of securing a good chance of winning a battle is to come on to the ground in superior force. It is a calculation not of numbers only, but of numbers available at a certain time and place.

In the beginning of 1866 the quarrel was brewing between Prussia and Austria. The King of Prussia was very anxious to keep out of war if he could, but as a wise statesman he was still more anxious to avoid defeat. The two States had armies of much the same size, and each of them had other enemies to attend to besides the principal one. The advisers of the King of Prussia, knowing that the Prussian army could be ready first, wanted the King to order the mobilization and hasten the rupture, so as to have the advantage of attacking with the whole Prussian army the moment it was ready so much of the Austrian army as might then be in the field. On the 3d of April, Moltke, at the suggestion of the King's other advisers, laid before him the following calculation:

"If we start with the actual situation of to-day, and assume that both sides begin to mobilize at the same time, the forces available, beginning from the first day, will be as follows:

	Austrians.	Prussians.
On the eighth day	50,000	——
On the fourteenth day (add 24,000 Saxons)	74,000	33,000
On the eighteenth day (43,000 men from Galicia, Moravia and Austria)	117,000	143,000
On the twenty-fifth day (42,000 men from Austria and Hungary)	159,000	285,000

	Austrians.	Prussians.
On the twenty-eighth day (20,000 men from Austria and Hungary).....	179,000	285,000
On the forty-second day (60,000 men from Austria and Hungary).....	239,000	285,000

Accordingly, the chances for Prussia lie between the eighteenth and forty-second days. Every day during which Austria arms, while we do not, must be deducted from this incomparably important period of operations."

The advantages of a prompt mobilization thus clearly laid before the King did not overcome his hesitation. A partial mobilization was not ordered until the 3d of May, the thirtieth day according to the memorandum just quoted, and the order for the mobilization of the whole army was deferred until the 15th of May, the forty-second day. Accordingly, as Moltke had foreseen, the Austrians were able to bring to the decisive battle of Königgrätz a force about equal to that with which the Prussians opposed them. So great was the superiority of the leading, the training and the equipment of the Prussian army, that it won a crushing victory; but had the King been able to make up his mind a month earlier, the strategist, who with equal forces could thus defeat the Austrians, would probably have delivered a still more effective blow. The papers are preserved, and have been published, in which Moltke almost from day to day worked out the modifications in his plan of campaign required by the constantly increasing force of the Austrian army, with which he would at the beginning be confronted. It cannot be said, in view of the actual result, that the King of Prussia did not decide in time; yet it seems probable that if he had sooner seen that the conflict of policies between Prussia and Austria had reached the point at which war was inevitable, the judgment of posterity about the rights and wrongs of Prussia's case would have been substantially the same, while the

unity of Germany might have been attained and the German Empire founded four years earlier than it was.

Be this as it may, the lesson that those in charge of a nation's welfare must decide, and decide in time, had, after 1866, been learnt in Prussia. When the Luxemburg question was raised the decision was that war was unnecessary, and therefore a compromise was easily reached; but when, in 1870, the intention of the French Government to humiliate Prussia was made manifest, the decision to fight was immediate.

The examples which have been reviewed may serve to illustrate some of the marks of right action by a Government in connection with war. The necessity for a sound policy involves the requirement that a Government shall appreciate correctly the drift of the purpose of any other Governments with which it has relations; shall truly gauge the national purpose of which it is the representative, and shall make a correct forecast of any probable conflict of purposes. When a collision is foreseen, there is scope for decision in regard to the moments when preparation and when action should begin, and the processes both of preparation for and of the management of the war test the efficiency of the Government's control over the national resources, and the excellence of the organization by which those resources are turned to account for the fighting.

How, then, does the British Government stand the tests imposed by war? How, in view of recent events, are we to estimate its intelligence or power of seeing the world as it is, its will or capacity of setting in motion, at the right time, the executive limbs of the nation, and its control over the national body—its power to transmit into a given channel the stored-up energy of the population?

The perceptive faculty of the Government has not come out well from the very simple task imposed upon it during last year: that of watching an adversary of known ill-will,

the Government of the Transvaal. According to the repeated admissions of more than one minister, the Cabinet entirely failed to perceive that the Transvaal was about to resist the British Empire, although the British Government had plainly expressed a purpose, which the Government of the Transvaal had as plainly refused to accept. This weakness of the perceptive faculty was accompanied by a weakness of will, which hesitated to set in motion the army, the active member of the organism, while an insufficient control of the directing organ over the general energies of the body politic is revealed by the comparison between the boundless resources of the Empire upon which ministers in their speeches expatiate, and the inadequacy, up to the present moment, of the military resources in the hands of the British generals who are wrestling against the forces of the Boer Republics.

These failures of the national organ of direction are attributable to its composition. Cabinets have been for many years selected according to the legislative needs of the country rather than according to the requirements of a strenuous foreign policy. They have contained no trained judge of war either in its naval or military branch, or in its relation to the national policy. They have contained too many members to be capable of prompt decision. For the efficient management of business a small committee is always better than a large one, and, unfortunately, of late years Cabinets have gradually increased until they have become so unwieldy that recourse has to be had to sub-committees, to the detriment of the doctrine of collective responsibility.

These reflections on the condition of the nation, and of its Government, are not intended in any way as what is called hostile criticism of the present Government, which is certainly no worse, and in many respects much better, than any previous Government for many years past. Nor are they

intended as attacks upon any political party. The question is whether they represent a true diagnosis of the case.

Assuming the diagnosis to be correct, what is the remedy, and how is it to be effected? Certainly not by party changes or by party recrimination. The beginning must be a recognition of the truth. Suppose that one-half of the principal business men in the country, one-half of the politicians and one-half of the men active in the professions, were convinced that the nation's difficulties are in part due to some such functional weakness of government as has here been described, they might combine to insist upon such changes as could reasonably be expected to produce the wished-for improvement. In order to show what might be done a hypothetical scheme may be explained. Suppose there were a fairly general desire to have a Government formed on the principle of competence for the performance of specific functions. How could the attempt be set about? The first step would probably be to choose some public man commanding confidence by his character and general intelligence. He might be a Conservative, a Liberal Unionist, or a Liberal Imperialist. His party connections matter little or nothing, provided he were not in principle opposed to national action. He would be commissioned to form a Government for the sole purpose of maintaining the nation's position in the world, without any regard whatever to party traditions, and without any legislative programme, and to seek to form a Ministry by selecting for the head of each department the most competent man to be found in the subject with which that department has to deal—for the Foreign Office the best diplomatist, for the Admiralty and the War Office the best strategists, naval and military, irrespective of rank; for the Chancellorship of the Exchequer the best financier. He would make his Cabinet as small as possible, keeping outside of it the heads of all departments not concerned with the special purpose of his mission. He and

his colleagues would be expected to work, to keep clear of "society," to take no more recreation than is necessary for health, and to spend no more time in talking to Parliament than would be absolutely necessary to justify their executive measures. The temporary suspension of legislation would render possible this reduction of parliamentary time.

The procedure here imagined is in no way unconstitutional. If the will existed to make the attempt there would be no need to wait until the discovery of that phœnix, the great man or the man of genius. There are at least three or four among the present party leaders, any one of whom would probably be capable of presiding over the kind of Government suggested, provided it were impressed upon him that he had not to think about votes and constituencies, but simply to attend to the nation's business until dismissed. The competent men required for the several departments exist, though perhaps some of them would have to be sought outside of the narrow parliamentary circle. The qualification for the management of a branch of business, whether of the nation or of some smaller proprietor, is not genius but a familiarity with that branch of business.

It will, no doubt, be said that such a dream is chimerical. The first objection raised will be that the present party leaders would oppose it. That is by no means certain. The party leaders are not behind the rest of their countrymen in patriotism, and will make any sacrifices, personal or party, so soon as they are convinced that the nation's cause would thereby be assisted. We cannot yet estimate accurately the full gravity of the crisis. A victory in Natal, for which we all hope, and of which at this moment—January 22—there seems to be some prospect, may completely change the aspect of affairs. But there are symptoms of possible danger in other quarters which it would be foolish to overlook, perhaps none of them so grave as the very strong language used by Count Bülow in the Reichstag on January 19, in which

he indicates that the German Government is not far from the point at which it would consider that the action of the British Government furnished it with a *casus belli.* In view of the possibilities suggested, but by no means exhausted, by the attitude of the Germans, it can hardly be wrong to assert that Great Britain to-day has need of a Government that will lead the nation in accordance with its own judgment, rather than wait for the slowly formed judgment of the constituencies, and that such a Government cannot be created except by the successful endeavour to put knowledge into power.

Surprise in War[1]

NOTHING is more effective in war than to take your enemy by surprise. Except by surprise, says Clausewitz, the greatest of all writers upon war, it is logically impossible to bring a superior force to the decisive point.

The element of surprise is to be traced through all the operations of war from the smallest to the greatest. It plays its part in each of the three branches into which the conduct of war is subdivided: in tactics, in strategy, and in policy. At the present moment there could, perhaps, be no more useful way of reviewing the war, and of finding out exactly where the British nation stands, and how it came there than by tracing through each of these branches the influence of the element of surprise upon the course of recent events.

Troops are said to be surprised when the enemy comes suddenly upon them when they are not expecting him, and are not ready to receive him—that is the primary meaning of the term. If the troops are on the look-out and ready for a fight they are not said to be surprised, even though, in fact, the enemy's appearance is sudden and unexpected. The remedy against surprise consists in precaution. It is the affair of the commander, because no one but the commander can make the arrangements by which the various possible actions of the enemy are anticipated. The precautions themselves are very simple, and are for the most part perfectly understood, yet half the disasters that occur in war

[1] *Cornhill Magazine,* March, 1900.

are due to these simple arrangements being forgotten. One half of the business of tactics and one half of every text-book on the subject consists of precautions against surprise. The object of outposts is to prevent an army from being attacked while it rests, of an advance guard to gain time for an army on the march to put itself in order of battle, of reconnaissance to find out what the enemy is doing. The British army in recent campaigns has hardly distinguished itself for clockwork regularity in the performance of these precautionary duties. In the campaigns of the early eighties on the Red Sea littoral there were surprises due to the neglect of the outpost service, and the South African campaign abounds with instances in which reconnaissance, though it may have been attempted, has failed to give the commanders the information which it was indispensable that they should have had. These elements of failure are so palpable that it would almost be waste of time to dwell upon them; they are writ large in the reports of special correspondents, and even in the official despatches.

There is a much more serious kind of tactical surprise which results from the want of forethought, not on the part of the officers leading the troops in the field, but on the part of those whose duty it was to superintend the training of officers and troops. It consists in the officers and men not having been properly taught the use of the weapons with which they and their enemies are armed. When the first European ships visited the islands of the South Seas there were occasionally, as was natural, misunderstandings between the natives and the newcomers, and more than once when the newcomers in their ignorance violated what appeared to the natives to be sacred laws, the brave warriors attempted by force to defend the sanctity of their laws or the majesty of their gods. But when the newcomers flashed thunder and lightning from the sticks which they carried, the warriors, who had nothing but bows and arrows, spears

and hatchets, were dismayed and terror-stricken. What would have been their position if, after being presented with firearms and taught to shoot, they had also been taught that the right way to win a battle was to shoot as little as possible and to run at the enemy with their spears? The tactical instruction given of late years to the British army is not without resemblance to the kind of teaching which is here imagined. The British infantry went out to South Africa armed with two weapons of offence, the bullet and the bayonet. It had been taught to rely neither upon the one nor the other, but upon both. It had to face an enemy who relied entirely upon the bullet, and the result was that which was expected by those who had considered the problem. In a few cases where the British could advance up a hillside, which almost invariably gives a certain amount of shelter to those who ascend it, the Boers were so astounded by the magnificent courage displayed that they ran away. But after the first two or three battles, as they had time for reflection, and as with their first successes their spirits rose, the Boers discovered that the right way to meet a charge was to lie still and shoot; and the later charges of the British have been disastrous failures accompanied with terrible loss.

If the soldiers of an army have been taught to expect a charge and to expect to succeed in and by that operation, what must be the effect upon them of a series of attempts ending unfortunately? They cannot but see that something has been wrong with their training, and cannot but lose confidence either in their leaders or in those who have been responsible for their instruction. They will say to themselves either that their drill-book was wrong or that their general does not know his business; and as the general is a person whom they have seen, while the drill-book is a piece of anonymous literature, they are much more likely to lay the blame upon the man to whom they naturally look, because he is the authority in whose hands they are. This discovery,

that a method of fighting which has been taught to the troops does not produce the effects which were promised from it, is a most dangerous form of surprise, and may very soon demoralise a whole army.

What is the truth about the bullet and the bayonet, and about the instruction given in peace to the British army on this subject? The bayonet has been for thirty-five years an exploded superstition. Even in the days of "Brown Bess," the actual use of the bayonet was a rare exception. Wellington, who perhaps knew something about fighting, relied mainly upon the fire of his two-deep line, which usually made an end of the attempts of his opponents to charge. Napoleon also, by no means an incompetent judge, said: "Shooting is the thing, everything else matters little." But there have been men in the British army ready to forget the practice of Wellington and the opinion of Napoleon because Souwaroff, a brilliant but certainly eccentric personality, is reported to have said: "The bullet is a fool, but the bayonet is wise." The bullet of Souwaroff's time, though Napoleon and Wellington relied mainly upon it, was no doubt erratic in its ways, but under the influence of Whitworth it acquired wonderful steadiness and persistence; while Dreyse and his successors have enabled the modern soldier to discharge sixty bullets, guaranteed to go exactly where they are aimed anywhere within a mile, during the time required by Souwaroff's contemporaries to send forth one solitary bullet which had no more than a half chance of hitting a barn door at the other side of a spacious farmyard.

In 1864 the bullet was only at the beginning of its modern education. A Prussian captain, who had not been brought up in the school of Souwaroff, was with his company in the village of Lundby, when he heard that a company of Danes was marching to attack him. He made his men lie down behind a bank, and waited for the Danes, who at 700 yards from the village formed a small column and set

out to attack. The Prussian captain waited until the Danes were 200 yards off, and then let his men begin to fire. A quarter of an hour later the surviving Danes were retreating, leaving 101 dead and wounded, and twelve prisoners. Three Prussians were wounded. That little skirmish made no great sensation in the newspapers at the time, but it was a decisive battle. It settled the question between the bayonet and the bullet. The moral was drawn by competent judges somewhat as follows: riflemen posted upon ground suitable for their weapon, the bullet, having in front either flat ground or ground gently sloping away from them, cannot be approached in front by men on foot intending to use cold steel. Men who want to turn them out must either shoot them down or go round them. The bayonet has no chance against the bullet, and is useful only when the bullet cannot be used against it, either because the bayonet man has come to striking distance before the bullet has had a chance, or because there are no bullets left. The first consequence of all this was to make it necessary in attacking a position to let some of your troops walk round it towards the flank or rear, while the rest occupied the attention of the defenders in their front. The reply of the defence was to prolong its line to the flank or otherwise take precautions against being outflanked or turned, and the counter-move of the attack was to put its riflemen in a circle all round the defence, and thus give the defender the choice between pure frontal attack and surrender. The theory was explained by Moltke in 1865, the practical demonstration by the same hand followed in 1870 at Sedan. The intervening five years had brought with them another development. If the assailant relied on the bullet and could use it better than the defender, frontal attack might still succeed. Its chances would be improved if the defender could have his nerves unsteadied by previous shelling while the attacking troops were protected from any such disturbing influence. Accord-

ingly the Prussian artillery was taught that its one duty in life was to explode its shells where they were wanted, that is, among the enemy's gunners, until they should be satisfied, and then among the enemy's infantry. It became an accepted maxim that an attack by riflemen could not succeed unless two conditions were fulfilled: First, that the defender's artillery should be silenced by that of the assailant, and, secondly, that the showers of bullets fired by the attacking infantry should be more destructive to the defending infantry than the bullets of the defenders to the infantry of the attack. In later years officers whose preoccupation was war came to see more and more the necessity for an alliance, not merely between the bullet and its assistant, the shrapnel shell, but between the rifleman and the ground. The rifleman was taught to lie down so that the ground should protect him, to move so that it should conceal him, and to dig heaps and holes for his protection against the enemy's bullets. It must be at least a dozen years ago that the spade was adopted as an offensive weapon to enable the advancing rifleman to hold his own against counter-attack.

These were some of the conditions of modern war, long recognised in armies in which the officer's life is devoted to the preparation of himself and his troops for war. The recent campaign seems to show that they were well understood in the Boer army, but came as a surprise to the British forces. The British soldier has indeed, during the last twenty years, been taught to shoot, and the army ought to have learnt from its own experience in the Soudan that the bravest and most athletic troops cannot possibly, however fleet and sound-winded, carry the knife or the spear within reach of a line of riflemen. But this lesson can hardly be said to have been digested. Last summer I spent a day watching a sham fight on Salisbury Plain, carried out by British troops under British generals. On both sides the men were armed with magazine rifles, but without bullets.

I watched two lines of troops standing up in clusters at least as dense as the old two-deep line, facing each other at three hundred yards' distance, and making a terrific noise as they fired blank cartridge, each line apparently aiming at the other line. The generals and the umpires seemed quite satisfied. To me that part of the spectacle seemed to be a sham, for it was quite clear that all concerned had completely forgotten the existence of the one thing that reigns supreme on the modern battle-field, the bullet. But to have forgotten, in your exercises preparatory to war, the factor which in war is essential, is to guarantee for yourself a painful surprise when the troops pass from the sham fight to the battle-field.

Strategy is too often thought of as a very easy business. To British officers, at any rate to the great majority, the subject is known only from Hamley's *Operations of War,* or from Jomini's once famous *Précis,* and there is a considerable public which is familiar with the elementary principles which these treatises explain. But the great difficulty in strategy is the correct application of principles, a matter as hard as the principles themselves are easy, and neither of the writers just named has so presented his subject as to guard against misconception on fundamental points. They both of them analyse with great subtlety the relations between lines of operations and the lines representing the fronts of armies, and thus give undue predominance in the theory of war to what has been called the geometrical element. The utility in its place of the geometrical element has never been denied, but it is insignificant in comparison with the moral factors which have to be dealt with.

When Sir Redvers Buller reached Cape Town he had a difficult situation to meet. Sir George White's force was invested by the Boers who were about to overrun Southern Natal. There was a ferment in the Cape Colony, and no one knew how soon there might be an extensive rising

among the Cape Dutch. The small British forces in Mafeking and Kimberley were besieged. The business of strategy was out of this tangle to discover the point at which a sufficient effort would make it possible to solve all the different problems. This point was in Northern Natal, because the principal Boer army was there. Strategy said: Defeat that army and everything else will be easy. Time is in war of the utmost importance, and to defeat the Boer army it was therefore desirable to choose the shortest way to get at it, which was the railway line from Durban to Colenso. Strategy prescribes the concentration of effort upon the main point, when that has been discovered. But instead of the British force, 50,000 strong, being taken to Colenso for a decisive attack upon the Boer army, it was split up into two halves, one for Colenso, one for the Cape Colony, with the result that one-half was defeated at Colenso and the other half at Magersfontein and Stormberg. These defeats only made the importance of action in Natal more evident. The two divisions were reinforced by a third, which has in turn met with defeat. Yet all the time the adherents of the geometrical school have thought that the mistake lay in not advancing through the Orange Free State by a roundabout route which offered no certainty in a reasonable time either of relieving Ladysmith, or of bringing the principal Boer army to a decisive battle.[1]

When Sir George White first reached Natal he found his forces wrongly divided, and proposed to concentrate them. But because he was told that concentration would create a temporary panic, he consented to meet the enemy with his force divided. The weakness of this decision is veiled by the phrases which contrast military with political expediency, but sound strategy knows of no such distinction, at

[1] This paragraph, written early in February, refers to the strategical situation with which, in December and January, Sir Redvers Buller had to deal, not to the very different strategical situation which confronted Lord Roberts on his arrival at the Cape.

least in such a case. To have concentrated the forces and evacuated Dundee might have led to the increase of the Boer forces by a large contingent of Dutch colonists from Natal, which would no doubt have been a misfortune: but to leave the forces divided was to court defeat, and defeat was still more likely to lead the Natal Dutch into the Boer camp, and certain to expose the whole colony to Boer invasion. That being the case, there was to a clear eye no choice. The one course was right and the other wrong. But the clear eye, which in matters of this kind sees through phrases into the heart of the situation, can never be obtained except by a man who by repeated efforts has thought out to their very essence, and to their ultimate elements, all the problems of war, so that the principles of strategy have become incorporate with the fibre of his mind, and he is incapable of violating them.

No army can secure in its average general the presence of the indispensable minimum dose of strategy, unless it has the means of passing him for a number of years through a strategical school under the supervision of a master of the subject. There is in the British army no office for testing its generals as strategists, no guarantee whatever that an officer, before rising to the rank which may at any time place in his hands strategical decisions of national importance, shall have given any proofs of his competence to make such decisions. Thus it has come about that the army sent to South Africa was inadequately supplied, not merely with field guns, mounted troops, and transport, but with the strategical direction, without which an army is as helpless as a nation without a government.

The most fatal form of surprise is the political, which occurs when one nation attacks another which is neither expecting nor ready for war. The British Government, in its innocence of the art of policy, unwittingly and unsuspectingly made the most elaborate and perfect arrangements to

bring upon itself this kind of surprise. The question of the independence of the Transvaal, which was in fact involved in the questions of the franchise and of suzerainty, was raised and pressed by the British Government under the impression that it could be settled by good-tempered theoretical discussion. The Boers, being resolved to defend their institutions and being well armed for the purpose, no sooner satisfied themselves that the issue was seriously raised than they mobilised their army. It was not until the Boer army was massed on the Natal border that the British Government suspected itself to be engaged in serious business. Even when the war had begun, and fifty thousand British troops were at sea, no member of the Cabinet appears to have quite grasped the elementary truth that the conduct of a war is the business of a government, which cannot clear its responsibility by delegating its powers to an inferior authority.

Speaking in the House of Commons on Tuesday, January 31, Mr. Balfour declared that the British Commander-in-Chief in South Africa, and in general the British officers in the field, had not been hampered by any orders or instructions whatever from the Cabinet. His idea seemed to be that the Government had fully discharged its duty when it had selected the general to command, and given him a free hand to do right or wrong, to muddle things or to straighten them according to his lights. But if a commander-in-chief throws away his army by dispersing it into fractions, and in this way loses his campaign, the duty of a competent government is not to stand by idle, but so to instruct its commander-in-chief as to cause him to distribute his troops correctly. The only excuse for the neglect of a government to do this would be its incapacity for knowing whether the general was acting wisely or foolishly. The question of the distance between the seat of government and the theatre of war is for this purpose irrelevant, so long as telegraphic

communication exists between the two places. For a competent government would be well able to distinguish between decisions which depend upon local conditions, and in which, therefore, interference from a distance is injurious, and those which, depending only upon the application of true principles, can be rightly settled by any strategist acquainted with the problem. Mr. Balfour's statement, made by him as a complete defence, was in fact a declaration of the strategical bankruptcy of the Cabinet.

Those who are to blame for the disasters of the four first months of this war are, primarily, the politicians of both parties, who have been eager to undertake, and have in turn carried on the government, without any of them understanding war, which is the first business of a government. If Lord Lansdowne is at fault, his culpability in no way exceeds that of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, who preceded him at the War Office. The nation itself is to blame for having entrusted its affairs to men who were notoriously ignorant of the art of national self-defence. The army is not to blame, for an army cannot administer itself, and the best men in the army have for many years been warning the politicians of both parties against the consequences of their neglect. The nature of the disease in the army and of its remedy has been perfectly known for many years to those who wanted to know it. In proof of this it is only necessary to turn over the files of old newspapers. At any rate I cannot now give any better diagnosis than I have attempted in years gone by, and I venture to borrow for application today passages written before the present war was thought of. The following paragraph is taken from a newspaper article published in May, 1885:

"The shortcomings of the army have been discussed so often and so many contradictory views have been expressed on the subject, that it might seem hopeless to renew the inquiry. But there is one opinion that has of late found in-

creasing acceptance, and which may therefore bear repeating. The army, according to this view, suffers from lack of knowledge. This does not mean that individual officers are incompetent, or negligent, or culpably ignorant. But it does mean that the service as a whole in its habits and traditions has not yet reached a full appreciation of the value of the systematic, liberal, disinterested study of the business of war. There are officers in the British army to whom the study of war is an absorbing interest, but they are the exception, and, if we may trust the evidence of high authorities, the rare exception. Accordingly there is, or at least until recently there has been, no such thing in England as a body of recognised and competent opinion upon military matters. There is no system of knowledge in the army. Opinion is amateur, not professional, in its character. Accordingly, upon every question of organisation that has come up we have had a series of sporadic expressions which may be described as so many individual crotchets. But there has been no such unanimity as would be found on questions of principle among the students of one of the natural sciences."

As regards the remedy, here is an extract from a newspaper article published in October, 1887:

"Amid the mass of information collected by the recent commissions and committees on the army, its finances and its departments, one principal fact recurs again and again. The army is a body without a brain. There is no institution to do the work which in every other army is performed by a 'great general staff.' That work is the most important that an army requires. The business of a general staff is to study the art of commanding armies and of carrying on war; to train generals for the high and responsible posts; to arrange the organisation by which these generals shall control their troops; and to lay down the principles which must be followed by the officers entrusted with the training of the army

for fighting. It is evident that an army without a general staff is like a workshop without a manager, and that it cannot work properly. This is the condition of the British army, and this, the gravest of all defects, has been pressed upon the notice of the Minister and of the country by all the most competent officers at headquarters. Lord Wolseley and General Brackenbury, to go no further, have implored Mr. Stanhope to begin by creating a general staff. Mr. Stanhope, we cannot tell why, refuses.

"The army is without a general staff, and the work of the staff is not done. The consequence is that the whole system is unhealthy. From top to bottom, the right working of the machine is hindered by the absence of any connection between knowledge and control. A general staff is required, not to amass pedantic learning and fill an unused library with technical lore. What is wanted is to bring existing knowledge to bear on the settlement of all questions that have to be decided, and to ensure that whenever a decision has to be made—whether it concerns the halting of a corporal's guard, the building of a fortress, or the choice of the point of attack in a great war—the authority to make the decision shall rest with a man who by his previous life has been better prepared than any other man to make that particular decision wisely. So much for what should be the system. But instead of this we have the Intelligence Branch. General Brackenbury, a first-rate general, and six officers, all of them clever, and all hard-working, meet at an office in Queen Anne's Gate—a safe distance, be it noted, from the War Office. There they have a sort of museum of military knowledge, which the War Office may consult if it likes. Between the seven of them they try and get to know everything, but, being only seven and not seventy, they overwork themselves without succeeding. Seven officers, working all the time they could give to work without detriment to a healthy balance of mind, could not do more

than merely keep watch over the armies of the Continental Powers. But for the English army it is necessary to watch the whole world, and for this purpose seven officers are evidently too few. Some dozen military sciences, every day growing more complicated, have to be followed. A dozen drill-books have to be kept up to date. The plans of mobilisation and concentration for twenty possible campaigns ought to be kept in accord with the current state of the army and navy. Most of these things, the Intelligence Department, we believe, tries to do. Seven men cannot do seventy men's work, and the marvel is how much the seven accomplish. But when the department has done its work the authorities can take it or leave it. General Brackenbury and his officers are a sort of dictionary, which the War Office may or may not consult. The condition of things may be described very accurately by saying that there is a responsibility department in Pall Mall with a rope round its neck held by the financial secretary, and that the intelligence is kept at a branch office in another place. It is as though a man kept a small brain for occasional consultation in his waistcoat pocket, and ran his head by clockwork.

"An organisation like this appears to us to be hopelessly bad. The cure, as we believe, is to multiply the Intelligence Branch by ten, and let it absorb the War Office. We do not believe it possible in any other way to put the army right. A very few examples may be given to show how the army at present suffers from the separation between intelligence and authority. In the first place, the principal branches of the military art are not studied. There is no school of English strategy. No original book on the subject has appeared in the country for over twenty years. There is scarcely a school of tactics. School-books indeed are written on this subject, but original essays could be counted on the fingers of one hand. Even Lord Wolseley can permit himself the most slipshod language on the subject, because there is no

school of trained tacticians who would keep him in bounds. The lay reader may imagine that the absence of a school of strategy and tactics—we use the word ' school' to mean not a place of education, but a system of thought—is a matter of no importance. We venture to hold that it is the cardinal point."

These passages, written many years ago, explain how it is that the British army in the present war has suffered in various forms from the unforeseen which ought to have been foreseen.

The War in South Africa and the American Civil War[1]

AN army marching through an enemy's country very often finds it necessary to cross a river which is too deep to be forded at a place where there is no bridge. In that case it becomes necessary to build a bridge across the river. The first, and in one sense the most important, duty of the engineer is to estimate accurately the width of the stream; for if it should turn out that he has prepared an insufficient number of pontoons or of trestles the work will be interrupted at a critical moment and may have to be done all over again.

When a Government is about to enter into a war, its most important duty—the function the correct performance of which is apt to govern the whole course of the subsequent events—consists in rightly estimating the character and the magnitude of the conflict. This is not a mere matter of detail, which can be entrusted to a military intelligence department. A military department if properly organized will, no doubt, be able to furnish trustworthy figures showing the numbers, the armament, the training, and the distribution of the enemy's forces—matters with regard to which it is always desirable to be well informed. But the character of a war is not primarily a military question; it

[1] *Contemporary Review,* June, 1900.

depends upon the quality of the two States engaged in the dispute and upon the nature of the quarrel. There have been many wars in which neither party was very deeply interested, and in which one side or the other was ready to make terms after moderate exertions and an almost homœopathic dose of defeat. In the eighteenth century, after the collapse of the aggressive policy of Louis XIV., most of the European wars had this modest character. Each Government maintained a small army of professional soldiers, which absorbed a large part of a never extravagant revenue, and it would have been thought the height of rashness to use this carefully prepared military instrument with such violence as to risk breaking it. Frederick the Great, indeed, having to fight several enemies at once, found himself engaged in a struggle for existence, so that he had to use up an army which was larger in proportion than that of any of his neighbours; he was able to come out successful only because none of his neighbours was willing to run similar risks, and to stake political existence upon the issue of the quarrel. The French, after their Revolution, thought, perhaps rightly, that their national existence was threatened by the monarchies around them; and, when they were attacked by the old-fashioned professional armies of their neighbours, replied by calling their whole nation to arms. After a few years of practice had made them soldiers, and their impatience of defeat had led them to cashier generals until a competent leader was found, they were able to destroy one after another all the Continental armies of the old style. The peril to their nation had brought them to look upon war under its elementary aspect of a struggle for national existence, in which each side must crush or be crushed, but the desperate energy developed by them ultimately compelled the other nations to arm themselves on the same scale. Accordingly, the wars of the Empire appeared, in comparison to the wars of the eighteenth century, like a struggle between Titans.


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West Point
Vicksburg
Big Black Br.
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
NEW YORK
PENNSYLVANIA
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Harper's Ferry
WASHINGTON
Shenandoah R.
Bull's Run
Chancellorsville
Acquia Cr.
Potomac R.
Chesapeake Bay
Wilderness
Rapidan R.
Spottsylvania
Ohio R.
WEST
VIRGINIA
V I R G I N I A
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Richmond
York R.
Lynchburg
Petersburg
Mountains
Allegheny
Weldon
NORTH CAROLINA
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A T L A N T I C O C E A N
O R I D A

After the peace of 1815 the European nations wanted peace, and the conditions of war were forgotten. Colonial expeditions, like those of the French in Algeria and like most of the British expeditions in India, were enterprises in which a great Power incurred no very great risk; and even undertakings like Louis Napoleon's campaign in 1859 in Italy, and the Anglo-French pedition to the Crimea, bore the mark of wars undertaken on the principle of limited liability. The Franco-German war revived the elementary truth that war may upon occasion be a struggle for existence.

During the years of peace one professional soldier, Clausewitz, the favourite pupil of Prussia's great military teacher, Scharnhorst, gave his time almost wholly to working out the natural history of war. He came to the conclusion that the true measure of the violence of a war, of the energy which a nation will devote to it, is to be found in the degree to which a population is stirred by the cause of the quarrel; that where the deep feelings of a whole nation are excited by a dispute with another nation, the nation so stirred will throw its whole energies, its whole resources, the lives and the goods of its citizens, into the conflict, and will employ the best intelligence in the direction of the operations, so that plans commensurate with the greatness of the issue at stake will be devised and put into execution.

There can be no doubt that the diagnosis of Clausewitz was sound. He died in 1831, but the history of the wars which have taken place since then shows that he had plumbed the depths of his subject, and that, for a truly national cause, a population will make exertions and sacrifices which, in behalf of an accidental or a trivial purpose, no Government could extract from it. Every community will fight to the death for its own conception of national life. I am inclined to think that an addition may be made to the doctrine

of the Prussian analyst of war. The half-hearted, indecisive wars in which neither side is thoroughly beaten, and which usually end with a peace that settles nothing, are, as a rule, due to the bunglings and the misunderstandings of incompetent statesmen. But the great wars which are fought out, which end in the settlement of the disputes out of which they arise, and which mark the progress of the world, take their origin from conditions of slow growth, bringing about incompatibilities which cannot be reconciled by compromise or by concession, and which develop, in spite of the efforts of statesmen and Governments, until a violent explosion is inevitable. Two societies grow up side by side in close and constant contact with one another, based upon principles the one incompatible with the other, cherishing antagonistic ideals of religion, of private, social, and public life, and even of right and wrong. Every effort is made to smooth over the differences, to bring harmony out of dissonance; but the incompatibilities grow, and the friction increases, until each side finds the development of its own life hindered and embarrassed by that of the antagonistic life with which it is associated, and sooner or later the two communities are brought into conflict, from which the only issue is the destruction of the one or the other. During this struggle the sympathies of mankind are divided, and are often preponderatingly on the side of what is the doomed cause. But, after it is all over, in the next generation or the next generation but one, the historian explains to an assenting world that the victorious cause was, on the whole, that of which the success was bound to contribute to the general progress of mankind.

The view of the nature of war which I have attempted to suggest can hardly be better illustrated than by a comparison between the American Civil War and the struggle which is now in progress in South Africa. Each of these conflicts had its origin in conditions of long and gradual growth, ren-

dering an ultimate explosion inevitable. Each of them deeply affected the whole existence of the communities which found themselves in antagonism. In each case, therefore, the energy and the duration of the fighting far exceeded the expectations of most of those who might have seemed to be in a position to judge.

The origin of the American conflict must be traced back to the epoch of the foundation of the United States. At the time of the Declaration of Independence and of the original Confederation the thirteen States were divided into two groups, which, in spite of a similarity of political conditions, yet inherited distinct social and economical conditions, and were, above all, distinguished by the fact that in the Southern group slavery was an established institution, while in the Northern group it had no legal existence. The distinction between North and South which was thus given at the beginning seemed at first but a little rift which could be patched up by compromises. The first of these was, perhaps, the arrangement made in 1787 under the Confederation that the territories in the north-west, which were in the future to become States, should not have slavery as an institution. A second was the condition adopted in the new Constitution that slaves should be counted at three-fifths of their numbers in the apportionment of representatives. This provision gave to the social and economical distinction a political importance destined to grow to gigantic proportions when, a few years later, industrial changes in Europe gave an unforeseen stimulus to the growth of the cotton trade, for which slave labour was found eminently suitable. The export of cotton was so profitable that in two generations the economical existence of the South was identified with slavery, while at the same time that of the North depended upon the industry of free workmen. The two systems were necessarily antagonistic and a complete rupture might well have come about much sooner than it did but for

circumstances which while they intensified the magnitude of the struggle tended to postpone its outburst.

The Southern leaders inherited a sort of political primacy in the Federal Government, and when the nation began its course of westward expansion it soon became clear that the preservation of their influence depended upon such an extension of slavery into the newly created States as would secure for its adherents at least an equality of representation in both Houses. This implied a number of slave States equal to the number of free States, and a growth of the slave population sufficient to carry a large representation. The possession of territories, some of which were secured for freedom by the Ordinance of 1787, led to the acquisition of new territories in the south-west suitable for the creation of new slave States. Thus the rivalry for many years took the form of a competition between the slave-holding class of the South and the people of the free industrial North, in the propagation of their own institutions in the region between the Alleghanies and the Pacific. This competition, of which the chief events were the Mexican War, the acquisition of Texas and of California, the conflicts as to the status of the negro, first in California and afterwards in Kansas, became embittered, so that on both sides extreme parties arose: in the North the Abolitionists, who aimed at introducing free institutions among the coloured population in the South; and in the South the partisans of the extension of slavery to every State in the Union. The Dred-Scott decision, the fugitive slave law and Brown's famous Raid—perhaps, too, the story of *Uncle Tom's Cabin*—roused the feelings of the North, with the consequence that feeling on the opposite side became equally general and acute. Matters were brought to a head in 1860, by the election of President Lincoln, who had said: "This nation cannot remain half slave and half free; it must become all one or all the other."

But, though slavery was the real issue, the nature of the

quarrel was veiled and obscured by a quite different question of a constitutional nature. The makers of the Constitution had been by no means agreed as to the relation between the Federal Government and the several States, and the Constitution itself was something of a compromise on this point, so that there were always two parties, the one holding that the Federal Government was supreme and the Union indissoluble, the other that each State was independent, and could cease at will to be a member of the Federation. It was upon this issue that the war broke out, and it was because this aspect of the dispute was prominently put forward, that so many European observers, especially in England, believing that the South was upholding the cause of independence, and that slavery was not really in question, gave their sympathies to the side of secession.

The Northern democracy was, as democracies usually are, ignorant of war, and its politicians, brought up under the maxim "no foreign policy," were entirely unable to gauge the magnitude of the effort that would be required. The Southern leaders were in these respects better equipped —they formed something like an oligarchy, and were the natural leaders of a large population of dependents accustomed to arms. The class to which they belonged furnished most of the officers of the United States army, very many of whom believed that their duty was to their State rather than to the Federal Government. Accordingly, the South was comparatively well prepared for war, its troops were the first ready, and they were in the beginning better led, better organized, and better armed. They had, moreover, the advantage of standing on the defensive in their own country, which was of enormous extent and peculiarly difficult of access.

The North began without organization, without tried leaders, without any of the requisites of warfare, but they had a cause, and the will to fight for it. Accordingly, the

military history of the war shows on the side of the North the gradual formation of an enormous army, the natural selection of great leaders by the survival of the fittest in the process of supersession, and that energy and determination of which President Lincoln was the impersonation, and which in such a case is the best guarantee of ultimate success.

If Lincoln was the type of the nation, Grant in a similar way represented the army. His Memoirs show that, though as a young man he had been trained at West Point, and fought in the Mexican War, he had not seriously grappled with the soldier's work until at the beginning of the Civil War he obeyed his country's call. He began in his first command and in his first march to learn by direct experience the business of a general. Being a man of large and simple character he learned each lesson as it came and before the end of the war had inscribed his name upon the list of great commanders. The Northern army, like its best known commander, began its career with little knowledge and experience, and struggled, at first ineffectively, with new conditions; but the military student of to-day, reading the war as a whole, recognises in its large outlines and in all its principal operations the embodiment of that good sense or practical shrewdness which, when set out systematically and developed into a theory, receives the scientific name of strategy. The truth was early grasped by such leaders as Sherman and Grant, that the struggle was one of those which could only be terminated by the military annihilation of the adversary, and that, therefore, the destruction of the enemy's armies must be the prime objective. The Southern leaders were also well aware that they were fighting for existence. Long before the close of the war they must have known that their cause was hopeless, but it was too late for them to admit it, and they fought to the bitter end. When Lee's troops laid down their arms at Appomattox Court-

house the war was over in a sense which can rarely be said at the close of any war. Slavery, the root of all the trouble, had disappeared during the conflict, and the right of a State to secede from the Union now vanished into limbo. The great questions were settled; slavery and secession were dead, and could never again trouble the American nation. No doubt new questions were left, the legacies of those that were buried, but they were new issues carrying on the nation to new stages of a sound and natural growth.

The South African conflict closely resembles in many of its features that which has just been reviewed. The disagreements between the Dutch and British settlers in South Africa may be said to date back from the time before there were any British settlers at all, for the Cape Boers under the Dutch Government were perpetual malcontents and persistent insurgents. When the settlement passed into the hands of the British, at a time when France, at war with Great Britain, was in possession of Holland, the Cape of Good Hope was of purely strategical importance. The colony was, perhaps, as well governed as colonies in those days, before the telegraph, usually could be; but the Boers were no better contented with the British than they had been with their Dutch governors. What thoroughly incensed them was the advent of ideas which have since transformed the British and American world, especially the idea of freedom for all men alike, irrespective of race and colour. The abolition of slavery wounded the deepest feelings of the Cape Dutch, and at the same time touched their pockets, for, by some administrative bungle, they were badly treated in the matter of compensation. Next came the British missionaries, who outraged the feelings of the Boers by insisting on treating the Kaffir as a human being, and by setting up an arbitrary distinction between black men and cattle. When to these indignities was added the audacious demand of the Government that the taxes should be paid, many of

the Boers found life under British rule intolerable, so, like the Mormons, they trekked out into the wilderness, seeking new homes where the tax-collector could never come, and where every man could "wallop his own nigger." They were still British subjects, and remained under British jurisdiction, at least in theory and in law, but it was in those days practically impossible for any jurisdiction to be enforced north of the Orange River. During the first half of this century a small number of Englishmen settled on the fringes of South Africa, and lived apparently in amity with their Dutch neighbours. Owing to peculiar local conditions these colonies on the South African coast involuntarily caused the British Government enormous anxiety, trouble and expense, for while Dutch and English had been touching the southern edge of the continent, there was a great native migration going on within. Many tribes of Kaffir warriors moved down from the centre of the continent towards its southern end, and, as the tide flowed slowly but steadily onwards, they came into contact with the European settlers. Against the hordes of these splendid warriors the settlers, though as a rule they fought well, were helpless without assistance, and the British Government was compelled to send expedition after expedition to defend the new settlements against these intruders. As the natives pushed on, and were driven back, the British territory advanced, and it is only the simple truth to say that the British arms, and the British arms alone, have rendered possible the existence of white communities in the country between the Zambesi and the Cape.

In the fifties the British-speaking world was full of ideas of peace, of self-government, of "no foreign policy," and of letting colonies shift for themselves, a course which very young colonies are never anxious to adopt. The Boers who trekked north of the Orange River and of the Vaal were very inaccessible, and to manage their affairs seemed to the

British Government of those days to be a great deal more trouble than it was worth. Accordingly, the British Government decided to wash its hands of these communities. The Boers between the Orange River and the Vaal, who, after friction and fighting, had become well pleased with British administration, were told that they must become independent, and were formed into the Orange Free State. The Boers north of the Vaal were granted a convention giving them the management of their own affairs subject to certain conditions. The Free State was fairly prosperous and lived on the best of terms with the British Government for nearly half a century. The Transvaal Boers failed to create a working administration, partly because of their inherent dislike to the payment of taxes, without which even a Boer Government becomes insolvent. They were, moreover, indignant with Great Britain, because Great Britain had insisted on establishing its authority in Natal, where they had been the pioneers of settlement. Matters came to a crisis in the period of Beaconsfield's ministry, when the Transvaal Government, into which had been consolidated a number of bankrupt and quarrelling parishes, came to an administrative breakdown and a financial collapse. The British Resident, apparently with the concurrence of all concerned, annexed the Transvaal, which was just then threatened by an invasion of the great Kaffir tribes, especially the Zulus. After the annexation the British Government took the Zulus in hand and broke their fighting power. Then, when the danger was over, the Transvaal Boers, who had been irritated by administrative blunders and delays, came to the conclusion that they preferred to be independent. This was refused by Mr. Gladstone, who had meantime taken office, and the malcontents revolted. There were only a handful of British troops in the country and in the neighbourhood, and it was easy for the Boers to get the better of them. A small army was sent out from Great Britain and

prepared to invade the country, but before it came into collision with the Boer forces Mr. Gladstone changed his mind and agreed to give the Transvaal the home rule for which the malcontents asked. Mr. Gladstone persuaded himself and half the world that he had made a magnanimous concession; the Boers thought that they had won their independence with their own right arms.

During the middle portion of the century Great Britain had organized the government of her South African colonies on a liberal basis of free institutions. In the Cape Colony, where the majority of the white population was of Dutch extraction, the Dutch language had been given legal equality with the English. Parliamentary Government, based on a wide franchise, to which not only the Dutch but a number of coloured natives were admitted, was gradually introduced, and the same system was in due time adopted for Natal. It was supposed that the Boer States would develop their institutions on a similar basis, but the Convention which Mr. Gladstone granted in 1881 had in the circumstances an effect in South Africa which had not been contemplated at home. The concession of independence to the Transvaal after the British had been defeated in one or two skirmishes and before their army had been engaged, was there universally regarded as a surrender. The British settlers felt that they had received a slap in the face, while the Dutch had had a pat on the back. Immediately the consciousness of national distinctions was revived; the Transvaal Boers having been so easily granted the right of managing their own affairs, began to ask for more, and Mr. Gladstone, much more concerned with the popular vote in England than with the realities of South African life, consented to revise the Convention by omitting the explicit assertion of the Queen's suzerainty and certain other obnoxious stipulations, though he retained the right of the British Government to control the treaty-making power of

the Transvaal and to interfere in regard to the treatment of natives. This was in 1884; soon afterwards came the discoveries of gold and the rush of miners, on the first sign of which the Transvaal Volksraad modified the laws regulating the franchise in such a way as practically to exclude the new settlers from all political rights.

There were now face to face throughout South Africa two irreconcilable sets of ideals. On the one hand was the conception, embodied in the Constitutions of the British colonies, of South African States in which all dwellers of European origin should have equal political rights, while the natives should have a status of assured personal liberty, though, no doubt, of social and political inferiority. On the other hand was the conception of a Dutch State in which political rights should be confined to persons of Dutch descent, or who could be assimilated by a Dutch community, and in which the Dutch language alone should have legal recognition. The latter conception was realized in the Transvaal. In the course of a few years the white residents in the Transvaal of other than Dutch origin became more numerous than the Dutch burghers; but the franchise law kept them in the status of aliens or Uitlanders, and as they were forbidden to carry arms, while every Boer burgher carried and practised with a rifle, they were unable to exercise any influence upon the Government of the State.

Socially and industrially the country from Cape Town to Salisbury is one and undivided. Its conditions of life and work are the same; the population is everywhere similar, the great majority being Kaffirs, and the white population being partly Dutch and partly British. That being the case, the political and social condition of the Transvaal could not but deeply affect the neighbouring colonies. In the Cape Colony the Parliament was elected by the whole white population, and at the last election contained a Dutch majority. The Transvaal was entirely in the hands of a Dutch minor-

ity, and the British residents counted for little more than so many Kaffirs, yet the whole of the industry of the country was carried on by the Uitlanders, by whom also the bulk of the taxes were paid. It could not but be that the British, whether within or without the Transvaal, deeply resented this state of things, and that the Dutch population outside the Transvaal should cherish the idea of such a transformation as would give them the same predominance as was enjoyed by their kinsmen in the South African Republic. The feelings of both sides were strong, and some form of violent explosion was probably inevitable. The British Government, always anxious to avoid strong action and put off disagreeable discussion, appeared to be indifferent. The adherents of the British side in South Africa despaired of obtaining a solution by the action of the Home Government, and that despair found its expression in the abortive rising in Johannesburg, and its accompaniment, the Jameson Raid. The Raid was an act of mad folly, at once a blunder and a crime. It had a double effect; for while it stimulated the antagonism in South Africa, and naturally increased the animosity of the Transvaal Boers towards the British Government, it caused the public in Great Britain, for the first time, to occupy itself seriously with the South African problem. But the British Government, which was as much taken by surprise as the public at large, found itself greatly embarrassed in its subsequent action by the fact that a crime had been committed on behalf of the cause from which Great Britain could not dissociate herself.

After the Raid the Transvaal Government, in its correspondence with the British Government, asserted that the Transvaal was an independent and sovereign State, an assertion which, of course, is inconsistent with the stipulation of the Convention of 1884, which gives the Queen a right to veto any treaty made by the Transvaal. A correspon-

dence regarding the status of the Uitlanders and the Transvaal franchise law was inevitable.

If Great Britain should recognise the sovereignty of the Transvaal, and should abandon the Uitlanders, she must prepare to lose her South African colonies, and, perhaps, other colonies besides, for every British resident in South Africa now felt that the cause of the Uitlanders was that of himself and his kith and kin, and that of the British authority; no one could doubt that the success of the Transvaal in the assertion of its sovereignty and the maintenance of its franchise law, would make the British despair of their ideal, and lead them to join the Dutch in revolt against Great Britain, and in the creation of an Afrikander South African State or group of States. This, in view of its possible results upon the relations between Great Britain and the rest of her Empire, it seemed the duty of British statesmen to prevent. Some thought from the beginning that it could be prevented only by a war, and by the annexation of the Transvaal. The British Ministry thought otherwise, and felt so confident that the whole matter could be settled by friendly discussion, that they made little or no preparation for a fight.

The Transvaal Boers saw that their independence, as they conceived it, was at stake; for if they enfranchised the Uitlanders, they themselves would cease to be the governing class, and if they should resist the enfranchisement and bring on a war, the probability was that Great Britain, in case of success, would annex the country. But they were determined to fight for their right to govern themselves and their Uitlanders in their own way. The Jameson Raid had enabled them to make propaganda among the Dutch of the Free State and the Colony, and they counted upon a racial war in which they would have either the sympathy or the active assistance of the bulk of the Dutch population, of

whom the great majority are farmers accustomed to a life resembling that of a campaign and to the use of arms.

The situation at the beginning of last year had thus many resemblances to that of the United States in 1860. There were two rival systems—that of the Boers, which meant the exclusion from political rights of all but themselves; and that of the British, which means equal political rights for Boer, for British, and for every other settler. These two systems could not continue to divide South Africa between them; it was inevitable that the whole region should be pervaded by the one or the other. Great Britain is fighting in the cause of personal freedom, as was the North in the Civil War, and the Boers are fighting for independence in the same sense in which in the Civil War the Southern States may be said to have upheld that cause.

If the view of war with which I set out be sound it was to be expected that a quarrel of such gradual growth, turning upon ideals which to both sides are so deeply rooted in all their past traditions, would be fought out with the utmost energy. The Boers, like the Confederate States, were ready first, and, fighting in country familiar to them, of great extent and with poor communications, have made a stubborn resistance. But, like the Confederates, they have under-estimated the determination of the adversary with whom they have to deal. They have failed to grasp that the British cause is as vital to Great Britain as their own cause to themselves, and that, therefore, the energy and the resources of the British Empire will be placed without stint at the disposal of its generals until the war has been finished.

At the commencement of the war the British statesmen who had charge of it were no better qualified for the conduct of military operations on a great scale than was Mr. Lincoln's Cabinet when he took office, and it may be doubted whether the British Ministry contains any man so capable of learning as he goes along as was the American statesman.

But the whole British nation, which term includes the population of the great colonies, is practically resolved and united; at least, as much so as were the Northern States in 1861. The few who dissent from the national policy at the present moment count for no more, and would probably count for less, than the Copperheads of the early sixties.

The reader may smile at the comparison which has here, perhaps too elaborately, been drawn out; because it is, of course, absurd to compare the Boer Republics, which have between them only the population of a moderate-sized town, with the Confederate States. The Boers can hardly continue for more than a few months to carry on the contest by the employment of armies in the field or by the defence of positions. How far they may be able to postpone their submission by turning their burghers into guerillas, is an interesting problem for military observers, but one upon which it would be rash to pronounce a dogmatic opinion.

There is, however, one analogy between the two conflicts which I am unwilling to pass over in silence. The true nature of the American Civil War was, as I have said, veiled from many outside observers by the nominal issues over which it broke out, and to this cause I attribute the wrong direction which at that time was given to the sympathies of too many of my countrymen. It was, perhaps, a misfortune that at that time it should have been easy to confuse the issues, so that some should have thought that the South was fighting for freedom, of which the North was the true champion. But it is no less a misfortune that at the present time the fact that the Transvaal is fighting for its independence should cause the too widespread impression that Great Britain, which in this case is the champion of free institutions, is belying her traditions and acting the part of the oppressor. Time is, perhaps, on the side of those who are fighting for right, and time will vindicate the present action of the British nation if, as I hope, the war should be

fought out to a finish, so that the oligarchical system may be buried. The British purpose undoubtedly is to maintain the equal political status of both the white races; and when that purpose has been accomplished, the Boers themselves will recognise that, though they fought bravely, they were fighting for a lost cause.

INDEX

Afghan war, second, 209
Afghanistan, British Government's policy after second Afghan war, 209
— importance of, in British defence of India, 204
— Russian policy with regard to, 225
Afghans of the Khyber range, 189
Afrikander Bond in Cape Colony, 352
Albany, congress at, 10
Albrecht, the Archduke, 112-118
Ali Masjid, fort in the Khyber Pass, 192
American civil war, 1-58
— compared with South African war, 419-436
— origin of, 423
— political situation immediately before, 28, 392
Ammunition debate in the House of Commons, 1895, 278
Anglophobia, cause of, 226
Arbitration as a substitute for war, 329
— probable effect of, on the points at issue in the American civil war, 57
Ardagh, Sir John, author of scheme for the defence of London, 308
Army administration, 275
Art of going to war, 367-390
Asia, Russian policy in, 225
Aslam Khan, Afghan Prince in the British service, 191
Aspern, the Archduke Charles, defeats Napoleon at, 100
Attack and defence, 155
Auerstädt, battle of, 92
Austria and Constantinople, 237
— war with France and Sardinia, 1859, 371
— war with Italy, 1866, 112
— war with Prussia, 1866, 397
Balance of power, 339
Balfour, A. J., declaration in the course of the South African war, 413
Basle, treaty of, 89
Battles:
Antietam, 47
Auerstädt, 92
Belmont, 1861, 41
Big Black Bridge, 45
Breitenfeld, 65
Bull's Run, 30
Chattanooga, 46, 48
Chickamauga, 46
Champaubert, 153
Champion's Hill, 45
Chancellorsville, 47
Colenso, 411
Custozza, 116
Fort Donelson, 41
Gettysburg, 47
Gravelotte, 167
Jena, 92
Koniggrätz, 398
Lützen, 67
Maggersfontein, 411
Memphis, 41
Montmirail, 153
Murfreesboro, 46
Nashville, 49
Nile, 127
Perryville, 42
Port Gibson, 45
Shiloh, 41
Spottsylvania Court House, 47
Trafalgar, 135
Wilderness, 47
Bavaria, Gustavus Adolphus and, 67
Bayonet in modern warfare, 406
Beaurepaire, suicide of, 78
Berry, Sir Edward, note to Nelson, 132
Berthaut, *Marches et Combats*, 155
— *Principes de Stratégie*, 154

Bilimek-Waissolm, military writings of, 155
Biron, in war of 1792, 73
Bismarck, on German policy with regard to Russia, 223
— on Germany's capabilities in a war with Russia, 220
Bismarck's views on a German war with England, 323
Blume on strategy, 154
Blockade, effect of, in the American civil war, 35
Bloemfontein conference, 375
— failure of, 380
Blücher in war of 1806, 92
Boer ultimatum to Great Britain, 381
Bragg, Confederate general in the American civil war, 42
Breckenridge, Democratic candidate in the United States Presidential election, 1860, 27
Breitenfeld, battle of, 65
Britain's possible naval enemies, 319
British cabinets, weak foreign policy of, 287
— fleet, the peace distribution of the, 304
— Government blunders in South African war, 396
— weakness before the South African war, 400
— interest in Southern Russia and the Danubian countries, 233
— policy in Europe, 250
— policy in South Africa, 348
— policy and the command of the sea, 327-343
Brown, John, his anti-slavery raid, 26
Browne, Sir Sam, in the Afghan war, 1878, 196
Brunswick, Duke of, in war of 1792, 74
— in war of 1806, 91
Buchanan, Democratic candidate in United States Presidential election, 1856, 24
Buell, Federal general in American civil war, 41
Buller, Sir Redvers, alters his original design in the South African war, 382
Bullet in modern warfare, 407
Bull's Run, battle of, 30
Bülow, in war of 1806, 92
Burnside, Federal general in American civil war, 46

Cabinet, duties of a, 293
— responsibilities of a, 282
Calhoun, leader of the Southern party in the United States, advises secession, 22
California, effect of discovery of gold in, 22
—Spanish possession in 18th century, 9
Campbell-Bannerman, Mr., now Sir Henry, Secretary of State for war, 276
Cantonments in India, 186
Cavalry, Frederick the Great on, 145
— Gallifet on, 146
— Hohenlohe on, 145
— Kaehler on, 144
— Lewal on, 145
— Maurice on, 143
— Schmidt on, 144
— Verdy on, 144
Charles, the Archduke, 100-105
Charles's, the Archduke, protest against Austrian alliance with Russia in 1804, 370
— treatise on strategy, 151
Champaubert, battle of, 153
Character of modern war, the, 176-182
Chattanooga, investment of, 46
Chief of staff, 263
Chitral, 200-205
Churchill, Lord Randolph, proposals in the Hartington commission, 265
Civilian minister, the, 274-284
Clausewitz, classification of wars, 180
— diagnosis of war, 421
— on strategy, 151
— sketch of Scharnhorst, 87
Coalition between England, Austria, and Russia, 1805, 90
Colenso, British defeat at, 411
Command of an army, a conversation, 259-273
— of the sea and British policy, 327-343
Commander-in-chief, 263
— position of a, 182
Congo conference, 1884-85, 323
Connaught, Duke of, House of Commons debate, 277

Constantine the Great, founder of Constantinople, 229
Constantinople, 228-240
— defence of, 230
— future ownership of, 233
— importance to Russia, 201
— trade of, 231
Constitution of the United States, 14
Cotton agriculture in the southern United States, 16
Custozza, battle of, 116
Crete, Britain and, 241
— Greek action in, 245
— the fighting in, 241
— the Powers and, 245

Dakka, town near the Khyber Pass, 195
Davis, Jefferson, President, 28
Declaration of American Independence, 11
Defence and attack, opinions concerning, 157
— common sense methods of preparing for, 290
— modern weapons and, 159
— naval, 291
— of London, plans criticised, 311
— of London, the, 301-314
Denmark, war with Germany, 106
Diocletian and his eastern frontier, 228
Douglas, Democratic candidate in Presidential election, 1860, 27
Dred Scott, claim of liberty, 25
Dumouriez, in war of 1792, 78
— retreat, 80
Dunkirk and Basle, region of war of 1792, 73

Eastern question, Moltke and the, 224
— Russian and Austrian policies, 224
Eckmühl, defeat at, of the Archduke Charles, 100
Eckernförde, capture of Danish war vessel at, 111
Edwardes, author of *A Year on the Punjab Frontier*, 208
Egypt, French dissatisfaction with British occupation of, 286
Elsdale, Colonel, his views discussed, 156
English colonies in North America in 18th century, 8
English policy, ambiguity of, 302

Failures and successes in modern wars, causes of, 295
Far East, the, 225
Farragut, Federal Admiral in American civil war, 42
Ferry, M. Jules, understanding with Bismarck, 323
Florida, Spanish possession in 18th century, 9
Foote, Federal general in American civil war, 41
France, alliance with Russia, 221
— at war with Prussia and Austria, 71
— possessions of, in North America in 18th century, 9
Franklin, 10
Frederic the Great's ideas of war compared with Nelson's, 131
— wars of, 4
Frederick William I., King of Prussia, 88
— II., ditto, 88
— III., ditto, 89
— and Napoleon, 90
— ingratitude towards Scharnhorst, 99
Fremont, Republican candidate in United States Presidential election, 1856, 24
French general staff, 272
— Revolution, Scharnhorst on the earlier wars of the, 6

Gallifet on cavalry, 146
Gandamak, treaty of, 209
Georgia, granary of Confederates in American civil war, 49
German diplomatic interference in South Africa, 287
— invasion of England, probability of, 287
Germany and a Franco-Russian attack, 252
— and Denmark, war between, 106
Gneisenau, in war of 1806, 92
Goethe as a war correspondent, 70-85
Gold, discovery in California, 21
Goltz, baron von der; his book, *The Conduct of War*, reviewed, 176-182

Government, early, of the United States, 13
— and war, 391-403
— represents and acts for the nation, 4-5
Grant, appointed commander-in-chief of Federal army in American civil war, 46
— great commander, 426
Gravelotte, battle of, 166
Great Britain and a Franco-Russian combination in Asia and Africa, 286
— and the command of the sea, 248
Grey, Sir Edward, opinion of Boer policy, 365
Gustavus Adolphus, King of Sweden, 59-70

Hamilton, Nelson and Lady, 134
Hamley, Sir Edward, author of *National Defence,* 307
— on strategy, 153
— on operations of war, 410
Hamley's, Sir Edward, views on defence of London, 307
Hannibal, Roman resistance to, 169
Hanover, theatre of war in 1803, 89
Hari Singh, official residence of political officer in the Khyber Pass, 190
Hartington's commission discussed, 259-273
— proposals of the, 282
Helpless Europe, 241-256
Herbert, W. V.; *The Defence of Plevna* reviewed, 119-125
Hicks-Beach's, Sir Michael, opinions on the needs of the British Army, 291
Hohenlohe, Prince, in war of 1806, 91
Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, Prince, on cavalry, 145
— on strategy, 154
Hooker, Federal general in American civil war, 46
Hudson's Bay, British possession, 9

Independence, declaration of American, 11
India, how to prevent Russia invading, 200
India, Russian policy, 225
Italian war of 1805, the Archduke Charles in, 100
Italy, Austrian war of 1866, 112

Jameson Raid, effect of the, 432
Jamrood, in the Khyber Pass, 190
Jena, battle of, 92
Johnston, Albert Sidney, Confederate general in American civil war, 41
— Joseph, ditto, 48
Jomini on strategy, 150
— *Précis,* 410
Jourdan, defeat of, by the Archduke Charles, 100

Kabul, suggested continuation of the railway to, 199
Kaehler on cavalry, 144
Kansas-Nebraska bill, 23
Khyber Pass, the, 185-199
— range of mountains, 188
— Rifles, 189
Koniggrätz, battle of, 398

Lafayette in war of 1792, 73
Lala China, the "red mill," in the Khyber Pass, 191
La Marmora, General, in Austro-Italian war, 1866, 115
Landi Khana, at the foot of the Khyber Pass, 195
Landi Kotal, fort in the Khyber Pass, 194
Lansdowne's, Lord, opinions on the needs of the British Army, 292
Law of empire, 340
— of insularity, 338
— of service, 341
Lee, Confederate general in American civil war, 46
Lehmann, Max; *Life of Scharnhorst* reviewed, 86-99
Lewal, *Etudes de Guerre,* 154
— on cavalry, 145
Lincoln, Abraham, elected President of the United States, 27
— foresees contest of North and South, 26
— slavery proclamation, 54
— type of the American nation, 426
Lockhart, Sir William, 208

London, the defence of, 301-314
Longwy, investment of, in war of 1792, 76
Luckner, in war of 1792, 73
Lützen, battle of, 67
Lytton, Lord, views on Indian frontier policy, 209

Magdeburg, Gustavus and the fall of, 65
Maggersfontein, British defeat at, 411
Mahan, Captain, *Life of Nelson* reviewed, 126-137
— on the war of American Independence, 10
Maritime strategy, 334
Marlborough, wars of, 4
Maurice, Sir Frederick, article on *War* in *Encyclopædia Britannica* reviewed, 141-155
McClellan, Federal general in American civil war, 39
— superseded, 40
Mehemet Ali, Turkish general, 122
Military aspect of the South African crisis, 347-359
— literature, 141-155
Milner, Sir Alfred, 347-375
Minto, Lord, Nelson's letter to, 137
Modern war, the character of, 176-182
Moltke and Eastern policy, 224
— and improved firearms, 163
— Danish campaign, 1848-9, 107
— memoir in 1857 on a possible war with France, 371
— memoir in 1860 on a possible war with Austria, 371
— on an invasion of Germany by Russia, 217
— on German policy with regard to Russia, 253
— on mobilization in the Austro-Prussian war of 1866, 397
— on the defence of Prussia against Austria, 307
— tactical problems, 170-175
— Verdy's account of, 174
— views on European action towards Turkey, 255
Montmirail, battle of, 153
Moreau, defeat of, by the Archduke Charles, 100
Müffling, chief of Prussian staff, 170
Munich, Gustavus' march on, 66
Murfreesboro, battle of, 46
Naples, the Queen of, Nelson's letters to, 133
Napoleon and Frederick William III., 90
— earlier campaigns of, 7
— on shooting, 407
— probable plans for the direction of the Federal operations in the American civil war, 53
— successes in first years of the Empire, 370
— wars of, 4
Napoleonic strategy, 149
Nashville, battle of, 49
Natal, campaign in, 381
Nation and the navy, an enquiry concerning the, 315-326
— meaning of, 328
National defence, trifling with, 285-300
Natural history of States, 4
— of war, 3
Naval preparation, standard of, 325
Navy, an enquiry, 315-326
Nelson, 126-137
Neutral powers, suggested league of, 330
New Jersey, an English colony in the 18th century, 10
— York, an English colony in the 18th century, 10
Nile, battle of the, 127
North America, English colonies in, 8
North-West frontier policy, 200

Orange Free State army, 353
Organisation, Gustavus and, 61
Osman Pasha and the defence of Plevna, 119-125

Pathans, Khyber, 189
Peace, ideal of the Victorian age, 367
— and the sentimental school, 57
Persia, Russian influence in, 225
Peshawar described, 186
Philadelphia, congress of the Confederation at, 11
Pisgah, Mount, hill in the Khyber range, 195
Plevna, the defence of, 119-125
Poland, Russian forces in, 220
Polish war, Gustavus Adolphus in the, 60

Pope, Federal general in the American civil war, 40
Press, effect on government relations, 5
Problems, Moltke's tactical, 170-175
Prussia and Austria, war with France in 1792, 72
— result of England's desertion of, in the Seven Years' War, 10
— revolution of 1848, 371
Prussian army, reorganisation by Scharnhorst, 95
— retreat in war of 1792, 82
Punjab Government and the Khyber Pass, 198

Railways, effect on government relations, 5
Responsibility in War, the Archduke Albrecht on, 118
Rifle in modern warfare, 160
Roman resistance to Hannibal, 169
Rosecrans, Federal general in American civil war, 45
Russia, Afghanistan policy, 225
— alliance with France, 221
— and the Danish campaign, 1848-9, 110
— Bismarck and a war with, 220
— Bismarck's policy, 223
— British policy with regard to, 214
— designs on China and Japan, 286
— Eastern policy opposed to that of the great Powers, 244
— Eastern question, 225
— importance of Constantinople to, 201
— Indian policy, 225
— invasion of India, 200
— railways in, 219
— strength of, 216-227
— war with Turkey, 1877, 119-125
Russian army, organisation of the, 218
— navy, 221

Salisbury, Marquis of, Cretan policy, 255
Scharnhorst, 86-99
— reorganisation of the Prussian army, 95
— traces the causes of French successes in the revolution, 6
Schmidt on cavalry, 144
Schönbrunn, treaty of, 90
Sea warfare, 316
Secretary of State for war, 274
— the professional politician as, 276
Seeley, Sir John, and the Archduke Charles, 101
Serbia, King Milan of, invasion of Bulgaria in 1885, 372
Seven Years' War, causes of, 9
Sherman, Federal general in American civil war, 44
Skobeleff, Russian general in attack on Plevna, 125
Slavery becomes a burning question of American politics, 27
— difference between free and slave States, 18
Slavery differences of opinion in the Philadelphia congress, 13
— Dred Scott incident, 25
— John Brown's famous anti-slavery raid, 26
— Louisiana compromise, 21
— President Lincoln's proclamation, 54
— prohibition of importation, 16
— statistics of, 18
— status of, 16
— *Uncle Tom's Cabin,* 23
Soldier's profession, the, 385
South Africa, German diplomatic interference in, 287
South African question, 374
— growth of the, 427
— Republic, army of the, 351
— war, 347 to end
— and American civil war compared, 419-436
— beginning of, 381
— British unpreparedness in, 377
Souwaroff on the bullet and bayonet in war, 407
Spain, possessions in North America in 18th century, 9
Stanhope, Mr., speech on the defence of London, 1889, 310
States, natural history of, 4
Stephen, Sir James, Royal Commission on the army, 282
Stosch, General von, and the movement of large forces, 223
Stralsund, Wallenstein's attack upon, 60
Strategy, Berthaut on, 154
— Blume on, 154

Strategy, Clausewitz on, 151
— Gustavus and, 62
— Hamley on, 153
— Hohenlohe on, 154
— Jomini on, 150
— Maritime, 334
— Maurice on, 143
— Napoleonic, 150
— Willisen on, 152
Suleiman, Turkish general, 123
Surprise in war, 404-418
Sweden, Gustavus Adolphus, King of, 59-70
Symons, Sir Penn, position in Natal during early stages of South African war, 364

Tactical problems, Moltke's, 170-175
Tactics, Gustavus and, 61
— Maurice on, 143
— Prussian methods of, 172
Tartara, peak of the Khyber range, 190
Telegraph, effect on Government relations, 5
Texas acquired by the United States, 21
Thomas, Federal general in American civil war, 49
Trafalgar, battle of, 135
Transvaal, Uitlanders' petition, 347
Treaty of Basle, 89
— Gandamak, 209
— Schönbrunn, 90
Triple alliance, origin of, 251
— Russia and the, 222
Turkey, antagonism between British and Russian policy, 286
— of to-day, 228
— reconstitution of, 237

Uitlanders, Transvaal, petition to the Queen, 347
— enfranchisement, 375
Uncle Tom's Cabin, 23

Valmy, cannonade of, 81
Venezuelan dispute, 1895, 286
Verdun, capitulation of, 78
Verdy on cavalry, 144
— account of Moltke, 174
Vicksburg in American civil war, 43
Victor Emmanuel, King of Italy, Austro-Italian war, 112
Victorian age, peace the ideal of the, 367

Waldersee, Count, assistant to Moltke, 171
Waldstätten, his work *Strategical Principles in their Application to the Campaign of* 1866 *in Italy* reviewed, 176-182
Wallenstein, attack upon Stralsund, 60
Walton, Mr. Joseph, member of party going through Khyber Pass, 191
War and Government, 391-403
— art of going to, 367-390
— character of modern, 176-182
— natural history of, 3
— readiness for, to be based on forethought, 299
— Seven Years', 9
— substitutes for, 328
Warburton, political officer, Khyber Pass, 190
— with author through Khyber Pass, 190
Warfare, evolution, not revolution, in modern, 156
Weapons, modern, and defence, 159
Wellington, reliance on shooting, 407
White, Sir George, in the South African war, 365
William I., Emperor of Germany, wars of, 4
Willisen on strategy, 152
"Wolseley's Ring," 270
Wrangel, Prussian commander in Danish campaign, 1848-9, 109

York, von Wartenburg, in war of 1806, 92
Young, Arthur, postscript to *Travels in France*, 71

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